Multiplayer proposal - Battalion Command

[Michael Dorosh]

I suspect Sergei is about to take over the battle scope thread, so I thought I'd repost these comments here for consideration. We were discussing realistic burdens for battalion commanders, and how CMX1 is really a company commander's level simulation, no matter how many units one throws onto the map.

CMX2 will be similarly scaled.

My suggestion is that battalion command can be simulated - even in the CMX1 engine, though not currently as coded.

I would suggest a quasi-multiplayer mode. And I don't mean TCP necessarily, you can do it simply as different players in a hotseat format - even by having the same player take over all the "players" on one side.

Wouldn't be much different from what we have now. Assume a battalion game with three US companies, vs. German AI.

Each orders phase, a player gets to see only his own units, all limited to one Company of men. He has LOS to friendly units that are either in plain vision, or whom the company commander has been advised of the positions of. He gives orders, and gets the opportunity to pass a text message to the other company commanders (players). He chooses the method - wire, wireless, runner.

He ends his orders phase. The next player - another company commander of the same battalion - opens up his turn. Same thing. He sees his own units, and friendly units that he has been made aware of. Enemy units that his men can see or that other companies have identified. The text message that player one sent? Maybe it doesn't arrive this turn; if it was wireless, and the radio works, it does. If it was a runner, it may take ten turns. He may be killed before it arrives. Player two gives his orders.

Play passes to player three. Maybe player three is in reserve; he knows the general location of the other two companies, but doesn't see anything on the map because they are out of direct LOS. If he is ordered to move up, or pass through, then he will see them when direct LOS contact is made.

Etc.

I think that would be a more realistic burden; one player could take over all the roles simultaneously; I think then he'd be close to being a true battalion commander (though of course a battalion commander wouldn't be ordering squads and platoon around). But it would be much closer than CM's current model.

You could also have different objectives for each company - A Company to secure the Start Line, B Company to pass through and take a village, C Company to pass through and secure the final objective on a hill top. A Company to dig in on the flank of the advance after securing the Start Line. The victory level of the battalion would depend on how well each company did its job.

[hellfish]

I think it's a good idea, and if multi-multi-play makes it in it should be very doable. TacOps already allows this and it's also a we-go, so maybe some basic principles and design strategies could be carried over.

[J Ruddy]

Michael, that is a well thought out proposition.

One question - would the Strat AI be programmed to react in a similar way? In your example, would the German forces be broken into company level segments and the AI simulate communications chains between them?

In your system, would you be able to have an AI contoled force on your team. For example 2 human controled companies and one AI controled company. If so, what level of command & control would you have of AI Company? Still using messages (using pre-canned commands) would you simply request actions of the AI "Advance 200 meters", "Advance to point Romeo", "Hold your ground" etc...?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by J Ruddy:

Michael, that is a well thought out proposition.

One question - would the Strat AI be programmed to react in a similar way? In your example, would the German forces be broken into company level segments and the AI simulate communications chains between them?

In your system, would you be able to have an AI contoled force on your team. For example 2 human controled companies and one AI controled company. If so, what level of command & control would you have of AI Company? Still using messages (using pre-canned commands) would you simply request actions of the AI "Advance 200 meters", "Advance to point Romeo", "Hold your ground" etc...?

I think AI controlled friendlies is a great idea - if the Tac AI improves a bit.

As far as the Strat AI - I would hope so. I don't know, what would you suggest? I guess that's up to the guys who actually code this, mabye the Stat AI "needs" to cheat a bit in order to be any good.

[Barrold]

To add to this notion, I have to say that when I have played the Bull Run game from MadMinute Games, one of the really cool bits was the coordination with the AI-controlled large units.

In the role of a divisional commander, it was a real kick to see units over which I had absolutely no control, line up and advance into battle as I supported. Yelling at the commander whose cautious delays were getting my men slaughtered certainly simulates some of the frustration real leaders felt.

Anything that would further these types of experiences within the CM environments could not be help to enhance certain types of scenarios. Maybe if options to have different levels of command able to be selected this would keep flexibility for those who don't like playing this way. I dunno.

BDH

[MPK]

Co-operative multiplayer as described

sounds like a great idea...

As well, the ability to have a three-sided

battle might open up some interesting

possibilities...

A true multiplayer setup might allow you

to assign formations to humans or AI's.

[General Bolt]

MPK

I don't understand your last statement: :confused: :confused: :confused: :confused:

A true multiplayer setup might allow you

to assign formations to humans or AI's. :confused: :confused:

AI should be doing its own unit formations..

And the other humans would se up their own unit formations.

[David Chapuis]

Dorosh, what actual battlefield decisions does a battalion commander make? Other than giving orders/objectives to the Company commanders, what does he do? Resupply?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by David Chapuis:

Dorosh, what actual battlefield decisions does a battalion commander make? Other than giving orders/objectives to the Company commanders, what does he do? Resupply?

Personally make? My understanding is that he is like the captain of a ship; he has responsibility for everything that goes on in the battalion, from the private in the rifle section who gets VD on leave, to the success/failure of the last battalion attack.

He has a lot of help, though. The Regimental Sergeant Major (these are all CW examples, is different from army to army but only in matters of detail) handles discipline of the troops, organizes battalion headquarters security, establishes prisoner collection points, helps oversee ammunition dispersment to the companies.

The Adjutant handles administrative matters, along with I presume the deputy commanding officer.

I see reference to Battle Adjutant in some histories (in armoured regiments I think he is the Battle Captain?), which I presume to mean is a tactical advisor to the CO, or someone who co-ordinates administration in "F" (Fighting) Echelon, as opposed to the Adjutant who does admin in "A" and/or "B" Echelon (headquarters company - kitchen staff, transport staff, medical staff, sanitary detail, water detail, etc.).

The Intelligence Officer (I.O.) and his Int section, along with the battalion scouts and snipers, were the eyes and ears of the battalion CO. The IO liased with the Brigade IO, as well as overseeing the gathering of local intelligence; so the battalion received int from above and below.

The Transport Officer looks after the battalion's vehicles, the Quartermaster oversees supply for the battalion, assisted by the Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant (RQMS) and his storesmen. They establish fuel, ammo, ration, water points. Each rifle company has a Company Quartermaster Sergeant, who along with the Company Sergeant Major ensure the supplies get organized into company ammo, POL, points and then forward to the fighting troops.

It's a lot more complex than many might think, or seems that way in print. CM gives no hint of any of this organization, mainly because the guys who fight the battles - the company commanders - don't have to worry about most of it. They leave it to their subordinates, or delegate it. They might designate where a CP goes, where they want their casualty collection point, etc., but it is the CSM who goes out and does it.

The battalion commander, I presume, keeps all the little details in mind but focuses on fighting the battle; usually from his CP, keeping in touch with his companies by wire (optimal), wireless (when the radios work; they often didn't due to German jamming, or atmospherics, etc.) or runner. He probably advised the FOOs (artillery observers) where he wanted them to go to do the most good; he kept Brigade Headquarters informed of his unit's progress, and co-ordinated - through Liason Officers, his own staff, etc. - with supporting units such as an armoured squadron or regiment, an APC unit if assigned, the divisional support battalion (MG and 4.2 in mortars), any artillery assets above divisional level, possibly air LOs (not sure if they would liase with individual battalions, one of the CW Mafia can correct me).

In battle he decided when to commit the battalion's reserves, and how to employ Support Company - the anti-tank platoon, mortar platoon, scout and sniper platoon, pioneer platoon, and carrier platoon.

My understanding is that he ran the tactical side of the battle by directing his companies, and kept the brigade commander "in the picture" so that the brigade commander could direct his battalions in pursuit of the divisional objectives.

I'm certainly open to correction/clarification on this.

Once battle was joined, I think a lot of the battalion CO's real work may have been past him - he collated the intelligence before hand, figured out which companies were capable of performing which tasks, set objectives for the companies in order to achieve the battalion objective given to him by the brigadier, and then I suppose remained on hand to change the plans as the battle developed and co-ordinate with supporting units and above all keeping his boss informed as to their progress.

Here's a quote from a memoir of a radioman with an infantry company headquarters - lots of good stuff, from the effectiveness of Typhoons (just had a long thread about that in another of the CM forums), to communications between the companies and battalion.

Baker Company - - my company - - took the lead. Captain Clarke, second in command of the company, was in command. Major Robinson, I assume, was L.O.B. for the operation. It was late in the evening as we moved single file at five-yard intervals southward down the road to the eastern approach to the causeway. I was carrying the 18-set. I had the earphones on but no messages were being passed. We never passed messages going into action unless it was absolutely necessary, and then the message would be as brief as possible so as not to let the enemy discover the frequency we were transmitting on. I normally had one earphone on my ear to listen for messages and the other off my ear so I could hear what was going on all around me. As we moved out onto the causeway all was quiet and calm. The road was paved. To the right of the roadway was the railroad track. To the left of the roadway it seems the Germans had dug slit trenches at regular intervals. They were evidently intended to be used for their own defence if necessary. It was October 31. I remarked to my partner: "Tonight is Hallowe'en. I wonder if there are going to be any fireworks?" The answer came soon enough. A very few minutes later, at 11:00 p.m., our field artillery started to put down a barrage on known targets such as gun emplacements on the Walcheren shore to support our attack, but the moment our guns opened up the German artillery opened fire on the causeway.

It was devastating fire with high velocity shells coming straight down the roadway, sometimes ricocheting off the pavement. We had to go to ground. Captain Clarke and I scrambled into one of those German slit trenches so he could try to assess the situation and communicate with Battalion. To assess the situation was easier said than done. The rifle platoons were spread out along the roadway up ahead. So Captain Clarke told me to stay put till he got back; took his runner Maxwell with him and went forward as fast as possible to check on his platoon officers to see how far their platoons had got and what problems they had run into.

Meanwhile the commanding officer of the battalion, Acting Lieutenant Colonel Ellis, came on the air asking for a situation report. Captain Clarke having gone up ahead, I had to find the company sergeant major to answer the C.O. I found him but he didn't have anything illuminating to say except what was obvious, that we were coming under very heavy artillery fire. I got back to my slit trench where I remained as ordered.

This must have been close to halfway across the causeway. The slit trench seemed to be solid. Jerry had been considerate enough to line the sides with bricks. This must have been done at their leisure, long before the present hostilities. Little did the Germans know that it would be a life-saving shelter for Canadians. Besides the high velocity shells, the enemy was firing with heavy artillery. These were probably coastal guns in permanent emplacements on the island.

Suddenly Captain Clarke and Maxwell appeared from the direction of Walcheren. They dove into the slit trench. Maxwell was completely out of breath and made the observation that Captain Clarke was a hard man to keep up with. Captain Clarke was obviously very tense and understandably so. He was agonizing about the situation his company was in and about what to do next. However, he got himself together, took the microphone and spoke directly to the colonel, giving him a full report on the deployment of his platoons and what we were up against.

At some point the Germans discovered our wireless frequency and proceeded to jam it. All I could hear then was a loud EEE-YOW-EEE-YOW-EEE-YOW. When that happened the control set at Battalion (HQ) would start sending out a netting signal on our first alternative frequency, which is what happened. Then I had to tune in my receiver to Battalion, net my transmitter to my receiver and call up Battalion to see if they could hear me: "Hello Mike Two, report my signals, over." If they could hear me loud and clear I would get the message: "Mike Two, strength five, out." Messages had to be brief. The 'Mike' was part of our battalion call number for the day; 'two' meant Baker Company; 'strength five' meant loud and clear and 'out' meant end of conversation, no reply expected.

We had to change frequencies several times on the Causeway. It was usually like that. On a quiet night with nothing going on the 18-set was good for clear communication for about twelve to fifteen miles, but as soon as you went in on an attack there would be a lot of static from vehicles and explosions and probably Jerry would jam your frequency. It became difficult to maintain communication over one or two miles, let alone twelve miles. I believe that there on the Causeway, as on other occasions, the problem of maintaining communications helped me to keep my sanity. I was so busy with this task that to some extent it took my mind off what was going on around me.

The night passed and morning came. Baker Company headquarters remained where it was. The shelling continued. The heavy shells were the worst. The explosion would send a shock through you that would reach the very depth of your nervous system and put in doubt your ability to take it. But once in a while one would land in the soft mud flats beside the Causeway, sink in the mud and fail to explode. You could feel the ground shake as it dug in. With this continuous bombardment I was about at the limit of what my nerves could take.

There was a bit of relief though. We did have some air support in this operation. On several occasions 'Typhoons' flew over and fired rockets at the heavy gun emplacements on Walcheren. The Jerries must have taken cover because the shelling would cease for several minutes and we would be able to get out of our trenches and cheer and shout defiance at the enemy. But the guns were not silenced. As soon as the 'Typhoons' had completed their attack the Germans resumed the bombardment.

A heavy shell hit awfully close. When I looked up I saw nothing but black. I thought for a moment that I had had it; but it was only a shower of mud and dirt that came down and there was a wheelbarrow sticking out over the end of the trench. Where that wheelbarrow came from I will never know. I hadn't seen it before. At this point I swore that if I ever got out of this hellish place I wouldn't mind eating dirt for the rest of my life.

Captain Clarke spent a lot of time up ahead with the platoons, but from time-to-time would need to pass messages over the wireless. We would call down artillery fire on enemy positions on Walcheren. I would say, for example, "Hello Able Two, message for Shelldrake, Mike Roger 242703, Mike target, fire, over." 'Mike Roger' was a code word for map reference and 'Shelldrake' was the code word for artillery. Within a few seconds we could hear the gun reports from the eith twenty-five pounders of one battery of field artillery and I would receive the message: "Hello Able Two, shot, send corrections, over." Then we would hear the shells whistling overhead and the detonations on the enemy target. It was very reassuring. If I called for a 'Yoke' target all twenty four guns of the 5th Field Regiment would fire. It was my understanding that we could also call for a 'Queen' target, in which case all the artillery in Second Division would open up. By my calculation at the time that would be eighty guns, that is, three field regiments plus one regiment of medium artillery. All this was available because for a short time we were the lead company of the lead battalion of the lead brigade of Second Division.

Once, where I was, a young rifleman dropped into my trench; I didn't know where he came from. We talked a bit. He looked distraught and bewildered. All of a sudden he turned pale, peeled off his equipment and said: "I'm getting out of here!" He climbed out and headed eastward off the causeway. The poor guy had lost his nerve. He had cracked.

...At one point a shell hit very close to me and the explosion did something to the wireless set. It went dead and I couldn't find the problem. Captain Clarke was not there. What was there to do? I couldn't just do nothing. I headed back off the causeway to Battalion HQ to pick up another 18-set. In my absence, so I was told, Baker Company moved ahead and since they had no signaler, they borrowed the signaler from Dog Company which was moving up behind them so I went in with Dog Company. As we advanced along the causeway the main problem was the shelling. I noticed several Canadian dead lying face down in the dirt, wearing the insignia of the Canadian Black Watch. They must have been casualties of the Black Watch assault of the previous afternoon.

D Company headquarters advanced as far as a huge crater about two-thirds of the way along the causeway. It pretty well cut the causeway in two. The Germans must have blown the hole to prevent vehicles from crossing. Dog Company headquarters took up a position in the crater. Baker Company HQ must have been up very close to the island. Where Able Company and Charlie Company were I had no idea at the time. Sometimes, as I have said, it was difficult to know the complete picture, especially at night. It was hard enough to do your job and keep track of the few people around you. Later that night Baker Company and Dog Company were relieved by other units and moved back off the causeway. That was the night of the first of November.

...When B Company gathered the next morning we counted about sixty out of about one hundred who went in on the attack. That meant that B Company alone suffered about forty casualties...

Taken from A BACKWARDS GLANCE: The Personal Story of an Infantry Signaller with the Calgary Highlanders in World War II by Frank P. Holm (Sault Ste Marie, ON, 1989)

[ September 03, 2005, 08:11 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Michael Dorosh]

He was agonizing about the situation his company was in and about what to do next. However, he got himself together, took the microphone and spoke directly to the colonel, giving him a full report on the deployment of his platoons and what we were up against.

This is why I object to the notion that employing two or more companies on a CMX1 map is the same as 'commanding a battalion.' Captain Clarke

<font size=1>(This is his picture incidentally, and note that it was a rule that if your name was Clarke in the British or Canadian army, your nickname was automatically "Knobby", just as all men named Rhodes were automatically nicknamed "Dusty")</font>

knew where his platoons were, after finding them, but had left his radioman behind so couldn't report instantly to BHQ about their progress. Even then, the situation was confused and quite like Captain Clarke had no "perfect" advice for his boss on what to do with the follow up companies. So unlike BigDuke6, who could send his reserve company in any time he wanted simply by deciding it (referring to his posts in the Game Scale thread), we see here that LCol Ellis was dependent on reports from a company commander who wasn't even by his radio, having gone forward to reconnoiter.

Here's Lieutenant Colonel Ellis, also.

Granted, the terrain in this case was not usual - a 40 metre wide causeway rising up out of the tidal flats. Not really the place you can send more than one company at a time forward in any event.

[ September 03, 2005, 09:04 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Interesting snippets from the battalion war diary from the end of the Normandy fighting; not really relevant to what he did in a tactical battle, but notice the detachment from the troops the first night, and then the concern when he goes out to actually march with the troops. One would presume the CO didn't stay out with the men that often. One can see why Steve is keeping Battalion HQ out of CMX2.

Calgary Highlanders War Diary

Date: Aug 25, 1944

Summary of Events:

FRANCE, BOURNAINVILLE, Map Reference 7284. ST. CYR DE SALERNE, Map Reference 8489.

At 1630 hrs., Lt. Col. MacLauchlan was called to Bde. to an "O" Gp. and when it finished, we had exactly 30 minutes to get the Bttn. on the move and in position with the balance of 5 Canadian Infantry Brigade to cross the river RISLE and on to the SEINE. This time ,however, lagged on and on, because very shortly after 1730 hrs. we were told to sit tight and move at 1830 hrs. and then again, this time was changed so that we were still in the area around the Troop Carrying Vehicles at 2330 hrs.

At 2330 hrs., the Hun dropped many flares from planes, and it struck queer to see one complete area ringed by bright lights. At this same time, the C.O. was called up by the Brig. to check line "Wynn" 9394 to attend a conference. Report line "Wynn" was the position across the river RISLE of the forward recce. groups of the 8th Recce. This route is our main axis through to the SEINE river. As the C.O. and I.O. were pulling well away from the Bttn. area on the way to "Wynn" it was a horrible sight to see the Bttn. being very heavily bombed by the Hun. Lt. Col. MacLauchlan had to push ahead anyway, and when communications from the carrier to the Bttn. failed, it was a very definite feeling of anxiety that overcame the C.O. and I.O., and yet nothing could be done at this time.

Calgary Highlanders War Diary

Date: Aug 26, 1944

Summary of Events:

FRANCE, BOURGTHEROULDE, Map Reference 0200, sheet 8F/2.

At 0100 hrs., Lt. Col. MacLauchlan and the I.O. arrived at the HQ. 5 CIB on line Wynn, 9394, and here, many hours of waiting took place, once again. The R.H.C. were to pass through in TCV's to the SEINE river by 0300 hrs. but this movement did not take place until 0500 hrs. and we were brought up in TCV's immediately in R.H.C. rear. Following us were the R. de Mais. We followed the axis of advance on foot, having dismounted at check line Wynn on the excellent intuition of the C.O. Just because the R.H.C. had passed through to their objective without trouble from the enemy was no indication that all would be smooth with us. For one thing, we were advancing by daylight, while the R.H.C. had passed through in darkness.

Lt. Col. MacLauchlan caused more worry for the I.O. during the day when he insisted in marching with the forward companies and when contacted appeared to be really enjoying himself. By 1930 hrs. the Bttn. was again bogged down when the forward companies became pinned down by hy MG fire some 1000 metres short of their objective, including all of Bttn. HQ. dismounted and the tanks harboured in the centre of the position. when the companies were in their own company localites, the tpt was filtered into the orchard in small packets. All of this took place in complete quiet, both from our own side and more particularly, from the enemy side.

And even more relevantly, the battalion war diary for the period of the quote given above by Holm the company signaller. Some stuff about the Weasel which might interest Steve if he reads this.

Calgary Highlanders War Diary

Date: Oct 31, 1944

Summary of Events:

HOLLAND, sheet (composite) 14 N.W., N.E., S.W., S.E. Bttn. HQ., 311296.

Nothing unusual occurred during the early hours of the morning. However, 'I' section worked until the small hours of the morning, preparing maps and air photos. Local liaison was maintained. The Bttn. was on a third stand-to, and with reveille at 0800 hrs. the majority enjoyed a good night's rest.

A Bde. Huddle Red was called for 1000 hrs. A/C.O. Maj. Ellis, 5th Fd. RCA Maj. Harrison, and the I.O. attended. Brig. McGill announced that the (Royal)Regt. of Canada was established at the Eastern end of the causeway to get a bridgehead on WALCHEREN Island. The main plot was, therefore, to establish by first light a Bridgehead area...

It was decided, however, that the Calgary Highlanders would initiate the Bridgehead as phase 1....

In phase 2, the R. de Mais. would be ferried across to the bridgehead and would assault North from the line of the railway (sheet 14, N.W.). The 3rd phase involved an exploitation by the Calgary Highlanders to the edge of ARNEMUIDEN. The Inter-Bttn. boundary was to be the railway. Naturally, the plan was subject to change or amendment. The allotment of storm boats to the Div. was 35, and they were all available for the Calgary Highlanders. We were informed also that the Bde. had all the Weasels on hand. Arty. wireless was to be packed the same way as in Exercise Kate. The function of the Weasels was:

a) As an essential wireless line after the assault.

For build up of ammunition.

The plan was to have men carry some extra ammunition over and then dump it when they landed. As far as the 3" mortar and 4.2" mortars, they were to remain in South Beveland. A mortar representative to travel with each Bttn.

Fire support, briefly, was to consist of barrage or time concentration, made up of a series of stonks. For this purpose, 4 Fd. Regts. could be available. Unit commanders ie battalion commanders were to advise Bde. at 1315 hrs. what fire support was required. No A/T guns and no carriers to be taken over. MMG were to be used to neutralize the enemy on the right and the left flanks. A troop of tanks was to be on hand to support the daylight exploitation to ARNEMUIDEN.

Storm boat troop commanders and flotilla commanders were to contact us at 1700 hrs. to rehearse carrying dryshod. Maj. Carsen, R.C.E., was to contact us re. lights and markers. Maj. Ellis suggested that the initial landing to be staged as originally planned and that it included the use of LVT's. The Brig. explained that there were none on hand. The plan then was that if the Black Watch were successful, then the Calgary Highlanders would "swoosh" through to ARNEMUIDEN and R. de Mais. would have no set task, until later. The Brig. said he expected the "form" would be definite about 1400 hrs. And therefore, there would be an "O" Gp. at 1500 hrs.

Before leaving Bde., A/C.O. Maj. R. L. Ellis had phoned to the Adjt. to have the company commanders assembled. They were waiting when we arrived and were given the proposed plan.

At 1300 hrs., A/C.O. Maj. Ross Ellis was on his way again to Bde. to talk over the Fire plan for the night's operations.

<font color="brown">Busy guy, eh? Lots of energy expended before battle was joined - conferences and briefings and details to plan for hours in advance of the actual operation. This is 1 in the afternoon, and the attack didn't go forward until around midnight.</font>

Leaving Bde. at 1500 hrs., our "swash buckling" swoosher A/C.O. returned to Tactical HQ. to hold a meeting of company commanders. Representatives of the Corps Troops, Fd. company were on hand to put Baker company through its paces in handling the Assault Boats. Instructions were given to Ptes. Thompson and Fox as they were to drive the Weasels. As the definite plan for crossing had not yet been formulated, discussion centred more on the subject of the attack once we had landed on WALCHEREN Island. Scout officer Lt. Sellar had gone up ahead to study the situation from close angles and to observe and report on the Black Watch progress. He found that they were held up due to heavy enemy resistance from mortar, MMG and heavy guns.

During Maj. Ellis's visit to Bde., the company commanders went up to recce. the area 2130. The Bttn. "O" Gp. was cut short as Maj. Ellis again had to return to Bde. to attend further briefing on the subject of the crossing.

After supper, company commanders returned to Tactical HQ. to get the final picture. At 1830 hrs., Maj. Ellis broke the news that there would be no "boating", but that we would cross the causeway on foot at 2400 hrs. The order of approach was to be Baker, Dog, Able and Charlie, and eventually, Tactical HQ. Baker company was to cross the start point at 2400 hrs., i.e. set foot on the Eastern extremity of the causeway. Baker company was to move off from its company area at 2245 hrs. and the other companies were to gauge their time from the leading companies. The initial plan was that Baker company would traverse the causeway and fan out North, South and West to include the area from 202300 to 203306. Dog company was to pass through Baker and go South to area 197294. Once these two had signalled their success, then Able company securing second objective at 190315. Mobile Fire Controllers were to operate with Charlie, Dog and Able. A section of pioneers was allotted to Baker, Dog and Able. Bde. arranged to procure for us the mortar platoon of the Camerons. Together with the Black Watch and our own, a comprehensive fire plan was outlined. The bulk of the support before and during the crossing was to be provided by arty., bofors, med. arty. and 4.2 mortars and to start at H-20. The code word "Robin" was to be used to notify afty. that three companies had crossed and that Charlie company was on its way over. Maj. Ellis stated that he would hold another Huddle before pushing North. The sequel to our operation was that R. de Mais. would follow us and enlarge the bridgehead Southward. In the meantime, the 157 British Div. would come up from the South. Advance Tactical HQ. was to be established at the same locale as that occupied by R.H.C., namely Farm at 224294.

Capt. Clarke caused certain consternation when he announced at 2145 hrs. that his company was on the move. One other company took up the signal and started to "green". After a few humourous exchanges on the blower, Maj. Ellis finally succeeded in halting the column. The explanation was that the men were suffering from sore feet and it was decided that it would be a help to have them move early and slowly so as to be on the start line on time with a minimum of effort. Promptly seizing advantage of the situation, Maj. Ellis had Capt. Clarke and his platoon commanders in to Tactical HQ. for a last minute briefing. The Black Watch, having had an unpleasant time all afternoon and night, was thinning out to allow us in. Promptly at 2340 hrs., as per schedule, the fire programme unfolded and it was quite spectacular. By this time, Tactical HQ. was in position and a going concern. At 2350 hrs., Baker company once again starled its listeners by announcing "Baker company reports Merry Christmas".

At 2400 hrs., Baker company started out along the causeway, while everyone waited, almost with bated breath for their first report.

Maj. D. K. Robertson came up the Bttn. and sat in on Maj. Ellis's "O" Gp. Our efficient and hard working Adjt., Capt. Dore brought up some liquid cheer in the form of 2 bottles of Cognac per officer.

Capt. Newman, our very good arty. fellow worker put in an appearance once again, eager to go to work.

Calgary Highlanders War Diary

Date:Nov 1, 1944

Summary of Events:

HOLLAND, sheet 14, N.W., N.E., S.W., S.E. Advance Tactical HQ., 217298, Rear Tactical HQ., 223293.

Baker company's progress along the causeway 2030 was halted about midway when the forward elements were subjected to heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Earlier in the night, R.H.C. had reported being within 25x of WALCHEREN Island, but in the interim, the enemy had evidently worked in some additional close support weapons and was lacing Baker's axis of advance. Realizing the futility of the situation, Capt. Clarke requested permission to withdraw and Maj. Ellis obtained Bde.'s sanction. Capt. Clarke and Maj. Ellis went to Bde. to explain the situation and to lay on a new fire plan. It was decided that Dog company would attempt a crossing at 0530 hrs. followed by Able, Baker and Charlie companies.

"H" hour had been set for 0530 hrs. then changed to 0545 hrs. and finally to 0606 hrs. In the face of heavy shelling, Dog company kicked off and determinedly and doggedly inched its way. At 0652 hrs., the leading elements spotted an extensive road block at the end of the causeway. At this time, there was only a small amount of MG fire but heavy shelling continued. Enemy snipers were quite active, too. Despite the cross fire, Dog company passed the road block. To silence enemy guns, arty. engaged the territory just ahead of Dog company. Brig. McGill paid a visit to Maj. Ellis and watched the proceedings. Satisfied that the Calgary Highlanders were, as usual, doing their utmost, he did not dally long. At 0830 hrs., Dog company reported no change in enemy opposition and Jerry niping taking a toll of the company. Arty. was, once again, the solution and by 0933 hrs., Dog company reported on its objective, that the operation was successful and that a platoon was working along the dyke South of the causeway. Moreover, the first prisoners, approximately 15 in number, were on the way in. Maj. MacKenzie announced that another company could be sent through them, although care should be taken because of the high velocity gun firing down the road. Able company was then put in motion, followed by Baker company. Charlie company, on the heels of Baker company. Able company cleared Dog company and going North to its objective, encountered light opposition. Baker comapny, going South, made good progress, too. Charlie company got nicely started on its way at 1300 hrs., when it bumped the tail of Able company as Capt. Lasher and his platoon commanders had gone on a recce. Dog company was meeting heavy shelling and could get no further West while Baker company was sitting tight astride its objective. At 1545 hrs., A/C.O. Maj. Ross Ellis and Bde. Maj. George Hees crossed the causeway to contact all companies. They returned at 1610 hrs.

<font color="brown">

Short visit - 25 minutes including walking time. His place was at his CP; note that even with all the company officers wounded, the battalion CO is staying in the rear, and letting a brigade staff officer go forward to take over, as well as an artillery rep.</font>

It was learned that Capt. Lasher had been wounded, and as Able company had no other officers, the Brigade Major obtained approval from the Brig. to fill the breach and take over Able company. Showing his heart was in the Infantry, arty F.O.O., Capt. Newman volunteered to go as 2 i/c of Able company. Accompanied by these two staunch comrades, Maj. Ellis set out once again for the causeway at 1625 hrs. Maj. Ellis did not return until 1730 hrs. Proceeding to Bde. to learn what decision had been made, Maj. Ellis returned to advise us that we were to hold the causeway until Div. decided what to do. Dog company, in the meantime, had been pushed back along the causeway to within 300 yds. of the Island. Baker company had also withdrawn. Able and Charlie companies took up a defensive position near cratered area, 208303, and prepared to resist any enemy counter-attacks. Dog and Baker companies, having earned a rest,were sent back into Bttn. reserve in area 2329.

Fighting along the causeway had been terrific for the last 40 hrs. and words are inadequate to express all the difficulties that had to be surmounted to make an advance along the 2000 yd. narrow causeway. The memory of it will live long in the minds of the Calgary Highlanders.

Sidelights during the day were made up of the sight of a R.C.E. bulldozer operator unconcernedly trying to fill in the huge crater on the causeway - a sapper inquiring if it would be in order for a party of 9 men to go out and remove the roadblock. When advised that it was extremely dangerous and foolhardy, the laconical reply was, "Well, the Calgary Highlanders are out there to protect us".

Calgary Highlanders War Diary

Date: Nov 2, 1944

Summary of Events

HOLLAND, sheet 14, N.W., N.E., S.W., S.E. Advance Tactical HQ., 213293, Rear Tactical HQ., 223293.

With Able and Charlie companies holding the dyke from 208303 East to the mainland, the Calgary Highlanders waited and waited. Dog and Baker companies had been relieved and had gone into Bttn. reserve in area 2329. Jerry kept up a continual mortaring, shelling and machine gunning, making movement impossible. Word came through that the R. de Mais. would attempt a crossing. Our stretcher bearers did a grand job evacuating casualties. The long, nerve wracking hours wore on and finally at approximately 0430 hrs. arty. broke loose and the R. de Mais. arrived to take over at about 0500 hrs. Bde. Maj. Geo Gees, who has earned himself a niche in the Calgary Highlanders hall of fame, led a group across the causeway, past the never-to-be-forgotten road crater, and was shot in the arm for his pains. Quickly appreciating the situation, the R. de Mais. promptly decided to remain at the Eastern extremity of the causeway. When the Glasgow Highlanders arrived on the scene, the R. de Mais. were withdrawn. the alacrity with which the R. de Mais. acted upon the order was quite noticeable and showed they had, in a very short time, gained a healthy respect for Jerry's murderous coverage of the strip of dyke.

At approximately 0645 hrs., A/C.O. Maj. Ellis closed his forward Tactical HQ. and returned to Bttn. HQ. at M.R.252287, where a fairly substantial breakfast was served. Wash up and clean up was the next item for the weary planning group.

Called to a Bde. Huddle at 1000 hrs., A/C.O. Maj. Ellis returned at about 1100 hrs. In the interim, the company commanders of Baker and Dog companies had come so that it required sending for only Able and Charlie commanders. Maj. Ellis announced that the entire 2nd Div. was being withdrawn for a period of about 48 hrs. to 7 days. The time was to be devoted to fitting and cleaning up. In addition, Div. had laid on extensive Auxilliary Services, Mobile Bath and recreational facilities. The locale of the rest area was to be between ANTWERP and BRUSSELS and all troops were to be housed with only a minimum guard on. Time for the move as outlined in the Route card - see appendix. Order of march within the Bttn.: 'C', 'B', Bttn. HQ., 'D' and 'A', Support company and A Echelon. Great jubilation spread over the troops when they heard the glad tidings and all looked forward to the start time. Advance recce. party of unit guides, under Capt. Stott, set out at 1330 hrs. and Bttn. HQ. joined the column at 1415 hrs.

So one can see all the running around the CO did before a battle, and the constant liason he did during a running battle, not just with his own company, but with brigade headquarters, artillery reps, and other supporting units. This action was unique in that there were no flanking units to maintain contact with - as there was no flank! The width of the front was 40 metres, with mudflats and impassable terrain on either side. Normally there would be neighbouring battalions to contact also, or even other brigades/divisions if the neighbouring battalion was from a seperate formation.

Note also the example above - Captain Clarke started his company off early because the men had sore feet - without the Battalion CO even knowing about it! You would never do that in CMX1. And the CO then had to get on the radio and try and get them to stop.

Sorry for the length of this, but it gives you an idea of how much co-ordination really went into a battalion attack - and bear in mind this battalion attack was really a single company going forward (there was no room for anything else).

[ September 03, 2005, 09:10 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[hoolaman]

There's some very interesting stuff there Michael, and a good idea for a batallion level sim. The only slight problem is that playing solo doesn't allow you to know some things and not others like each group would, and we all know, most games of CM are played solo vs the AI. There has to be a way to actually put what each unit knows and more specifically what each unit has been order to do into the game in game terms.

To take this idea a bit further, another idea is to give each formation, such as a company or platoon an individual dynamic objective flag that could be moved to simulate higher level orders. This objective flag would count strongly for points at the end of the game, and maybe even throughout the game, but be independent of the victory location markers we currently have. It is a variation of the command-zones idea which binds certain units to where they have been ordered to be, but hopefully a bit more elegant.

There would have to be some kind of simulation of the kind of C&C radio chatter and runners and any other form of communication mentioned in the real world examples above.

For example, at the start of a game you have 2 companies. At setup you can freely place the objective flags for each company, and maybe one also for each platoon of each company. The player is then encouraged to go for the flags, which constitute the intial "battle plan" which they formulated with their batallion hat on.

So the action starts and each platoon/company heads off for its objectives, so the player is then wearing their company hat. Simulations of C&C between HQs result in the ability for company flags to be moved by batallion when comms are established. This way every unit is encouraged by the game system to achieve its last know orders, whether they reflect the new situation or not.

The problem with having one player play one unit, then the next, is that they are still an all-seeing god. This effect would be fixed with "Co-play", but there must be a solution for solo play as well for those day when you don't have any friends (who play CM).

You could add to this by making certain unit purchases by HQ level. So a good batallion CO might get a few more regimental support weapons, and perhaps FOs must send some fire requests through batallion for approval.

[Bigduke6]

I think an individual "company level" objective flag is an outstanding idea - although I am not clear how you could rig that up with the VP system.

Here I think is an important question: How does the work of a battalion commander differ from the work of a company commander?

Just for the record guys, I'm not lobbying for a little battalion commander unit that acts like just another platoon or company commander. As far as that goes, I haven't seen any one say "The battalion commander unit must stay!"

But then, battalion commanders definately have a battlefield effect. A battalion commander that sits in his CP during the battle is probably doing a bad job. Most militaries consider it important for the battalion commander to be at the same place as a company commander at a critical point in a battle, so he can lend his rank and ability to bringing strong resources to the tactical problem. Then, when the local crisis is either fixed or heading in the direction of being fixed, the battalion commander heads off to another crisis, or failing that back to his CP, where his staff brings him up to speed.

This "command effect" of course does not stop at the battalion level. In general as unit quality improves, the more often higher levels of the command chain are found intervening directly in the company level tactical fight.

Exhibit "A": 504th Airborne's Major Julian Cook did the river assault across the Waal to capture Nijmegan Bridge under the direct supervision of Gavin and Ridgeway. According to most histories (for instance Devlin) the presence of those general officers was critical in making the operation a success. With all that hard-ass brass looking on, the paratroopers had no choice but to attack the Germans; Gavin and Ridgeway weren't accepting the "There's too much fire to advance" arguement.

It would be a shame if that sort of tactical effect - the presence of the field grade officer - got left out of a WW2 tactical combat computer simulation engine, in my opinion.

[c3k]

Michael Dorosh,

I understand, but disagree with, your view on the scale of CMx1 and the announced CMx2 level.

I'm not trying to hijack this thread.

It seems to me, from what you've posted, that you think a true battalion level GAME (not SIMULATION) should be limited to giving control to the PLAYER (not COMMANDER-IN-TRAINING) of 3 to 4 units. (Perhaps just the 3 line companies, one support company and some attached higher level assets.)

If CMx1 (and possible CMx2) is a COMPANY level GAME, shouldn't player control be limited to ordering 3 to 4 platoons? Players in CMx1 (and according to the posts by BF.C, in CMx2) are able to reach down and control half-squads and support weapons, even individual sharpshooters. If I understand your repeatedly voiced opinion on the matter, shouldn't the CMx1/2 game be limited to platoon level?

As it is, _I_ enjoy these GAMES (yes, I am trying to emphasize something here) at many levels of command: using level 1 views to follow a squad and give orders; sharp firefights with an understrength platoon; ordering, in detail, a reinforced armored battalion attack on a strongpoint.

Would I like to see your ideas for multiplayer coded into the GAME? YES. Do I want my gameplay to be limited by it? NO.

Thank you,

Ken

(Edited for clarification)

[ September 05, 2005, 07:29 AM: Message edited by: c3k ]

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

But then, battalion commanders definately have a battlefield effect. A battalion commander that sits in his CP during the battle is probably doing a bad job. Most militaries consider it important for the battalion commander to be at the same place as a company commander at a critical point in a battle, so he can lend his rank and ability to bringing strong resources to the tactical problem. Then, when the local crisis is either fixed or heading in the direction of being fixed, the battalion commander heads off to another crisis, or failing that back to his CP, where his staff brings him up to speed.

does it really belong to the scope of CMx2? i'd imagine that each CM battle (lasting some tens of minutes) is the kind of critical point in a battle (lasting hours) which you speak of above.

battalion commander's position would make a great difference in a bit larger battles though, because his position would be directly related to command /information lag. e.g. when and where to commit reserves etc.

i really like what Dorosh is suggesting.

[Michael Dorosh]

Responding to each in turn:

<font size=4>Hoolaman </font>

There's some very interesting stuff there Michael, and a good idea for a batallion level sim. The only slight problem is that playing solo doesn't allow you to know some things and not others like each group would, and we all know, most games of CM are played solo vs the AI. There has to be a way to actually put what each unit knows and more specifically what each unit has been order to do into the game in game terms.

This is true - but - given enough complexity, and with 1:1 modelling finally here, along with some fuzzy logic - it's possible that what one company sees in the next treeline won't match what the next company sees; or that the player won't recall well when going from one to the next. It will always be a "problem" however.

To take this idea a bit further, another idea is to give each formation, such as a company or platoon an individual dynamic objective flag that could be moved to simulate higher level orders. This objective flag would count strongly for points at the end of the game, and maybe even throughout the game, but be independent of the victory location markers we currently have. It is a variation of the command-zones idea which binds certain units to where they have been ordered to be, but hopefully a bit more elegant.

So if I take a flag with a platoon from one company, I get the points, but if I do it with a platoon from another company, I don't? Interesting - has ups and downs. In action, plans always changed once contact was made. This might serve only to punish those who think well on their feet.

There would have to be some kind of simulation of the kind of C&C radio chatter and runners and any other form of communication mentioned in the real world examples above.

Yes, or simple text messages; even hotkeys like you have in Op Flashpoint with "canned" messages -

a) MY OBJECTIVE IS TAKEN

ENEMY INFANTRY AT (click on map to enter co-ordinates)

c) LOCATION CLEAR OF ENEMY

d) TANK WARNING!

etc.

For example, at the start of a game you have 2 companies. At setup you can freely place the objective flags for each company, and maybe one also for each platoon of each company. The player is then encouraged to go for the flags, which constitute the intial "battle plan" which they formulated with their batallion hat on.

So the action starts and each platoon/company heads off for its objectives, so the player is then wearing their company hat. Simulations of C&C between HQs result in the ability for company flags to be moved by batallion when comms are established. This way every unit is encouraged by the game system to achieve its last know orders, whether they reflect the new situation or not.

The problem with having one player play one unit, then the next, is that they are still an all-seeing god. This effect would be fixed with "Co-play", but there must be a solution for solo play as well for those day when you don't have any friends (who play CM).

Interesting. Would you penalize players for taking an objective with the "wrong" unit?

I think a realistic game would remove the flags altogether - I'd love to see a move towards SL type victory conditions - for example, removing all good order enemy units with an LOS to a road or other feature.

You could add to this by making certain unit purchases by HQ level. So a good batallion CO might get a few more regimental support weapons, and perhaps FOs must send some fire requests through batallion for approval.

That would be a realistic restriction.

<font size=4>Bigduke6 </font>

I think an individual "company level" objective flag is an outstanding idea - although I am not clear how you could rig that up with the VP system.

Here I think is an important question: How does the work of a battalion commander differ from the work of a company commander?

Just for the record guys, I'm not lobbying for a little battalion commander unit that acts like just another platoon or company commander. As far as that goes, I haven't seen any one say "The battalion commander unit must stay!"

But then, battalion commanders definately have a battlefield effect.

I think this was a lot more rare than you would believe.

A battalion commander that sits in his CP during the battle is probably doing a bad job.

Disagree.

Most militaries consider it important for the battalion commander to be at the same place as a company commander at a critical point in a battle, so he can lend his rank and ability to bringing strong resources to the tactical problem.

Can you quote an official manual or doctrine where this is stated?

Then, when the local crisis is either fixed or heading in the direction of being fixed, the battalion commander heads off to another crisis, or failing that back to his CP, where his staff brings him up to speed.

This "command effect" of course does not stop at the battalion level. In general as unit quality improves, the more often higher levels of the command chain are found intervening directly in the company level tactical fight.

Exhibit "A": 504th Airborne's Major Julian Cook did the river assault across the Waal to capture Nijmegan Bridge under the direct supervision of Gavin and Ridgeway.

Take a look at Exhibit "B": 506th Airborne's Major Richard Winters. In the movie version of BAND OF BROTHERS - what does Dale Dye as Colonel Sink yell at him during the attack on Foy? "Get back here! You do NOT go out there, you're the battalion commander!" I think taking a look at that miniseries highlights the importance of the company commanders - and the near absence of the battalion commander during tactical operations.

Do they even show who the 2nd Battalion commander was during the first few episodes? I think it was Strayer, but not once do you see him in the action.

More relevantly, look again at the real life examples I gave. Walcheren Causeway was our biggest test in WW II and still looked on fondly; we parade every October and hold a church service to commemorate it above all the other battles we fought from Jul 1944 to April 1945. And yet, the battalion commander himself only set foot in the bridgehead for, apparently, a sum total of 20 minutes or so during the course of a two day fight. Ellis was no coward, either; he was noted for eschewing a helmet and visiting the front line soldiers often. Was he malingering? Or was he simply more effective where he was?

I could post countless more examples of battles where the battalion commander stayed where he was supposed to be.

The ones where he was up front seem to end badly. The Black Watch of Canada was wiped out on Verrierres Ridge on 25 July 1944; their new commander was a company commander that morning; the CO was killed at an Orders Group (attending O Groups seem to be the main activity of Canadian battalion commanders) and Major Phil Griffin personally led the battalion up the slope; 325 men crossed the start line and only 15 answered the roll the next day. It was the worst single day of combat for a Canadian battalion outside of Dieppe.

It is an extreme case, like your Waal river crossing. Sometimes, the battalion CO had to put up himself, no doubt. But Griffin really exercised no more control than had he stayed to the rear (SS tanks and machineguns were dug in on the top of the Ridge), and one wonders if he had been in the job a little longer if he would have felt the need to go out personally - ie, was he simply "used to" being a company commander?

According to most histories (for instance Devlin) the presence of those general officers was critical in making the operation a success. With all that hard-ass brass looking on, the paratroopers had no choice but to attack the Germans; Gavin and Ridgeway weren't accepting the "There's too much fire to advance" arguement.

With a bunch of generals in attendance, I would have a hard time sitting on the riverbank watching, but I suggest to you this was a rare occurence.

It would be a shame if that sort of tactical effect - the presence of the field grade officer - got left out of a WW2 tactical combat computer simulation engine, in my opinion.

Did the riflemen fight any more effectively once they reached the far side of the Waal, just because some generals they may or may not have known about were watching? I tend to doubt it, frankly.

A good company or battalion CO, however, could and did have very real effects on morale; I still recall the Designer's Notes for the original Squad Leader which quoted a good example from "Enemy at the Gates"; this was used as one of the justifications for the whole concept of Morale in SL. One might also argue that the death of a headquarters unit, or more accurately, a single personality, should have repercussions for entire units, though some might think it gamey for them to take effect immediately. I am probably in that latter group; morale effects sometimes take longer than the 30 minutes of a CM game to manifest themselves.

<font size=4>c3k </font>

Michael Dorosh,

I understand, but disagree with, your view on the scale of CMx1 and the announced CMx2 level.

I'm not trying to hijack this thread.

On the contrary, your comments seem direct and to the point.

It seems to me, from what you've posted, that you think a true battalion level GAME (not SIMULATION) should be limited to giving control to the PLAYER (not COMMANDER-IN-TRAINING) of 3 to 4 units. (Perhaps just the 3 line companies, one support company and some attached higher level assets.)

Yes, but I'm not necessarily saying I would want to play it. Seriously.

If CMx1 (and possible CMx2) is a COMPANY level GAME, shouldn't player control be limited to ordering 3 to 4 platoons?

Yes, if in fact it was a true company level game. However, being made for fun rather than accuracy (ie being a game and not a simulation), you have to step in and micromanage. I love it; I think it's the best computer tactical game in history, better than Close Combat or Steel Panthers.

Players in CMx1 (and according to the posts by BF.C, in CMx2) are able to reach down and control half-squads and support weapons, even individual sharpshooters. If I understand your repeatedly voiced opinion on the matter, shouldn't the CMx1/2 game be limited to platoon level?

I think the burden on the player can still be described as company level, for the reasons I stated before - available intelligence and the speed with which it arrives corresponds to what a company commander knows. A company commander wouldn't personally place individual teams and squads, so the player is actually stepping in as a platoon commander too, but I don't think that is inconsistent with calling it a "company level" game - it sure is much more fun that the alternative.

As it is, _I_ enjoy these GAMES (yes, I am trying to emphasize something here) at many levels of command: using level 1 views to follow a squad and give orders; sharp firefights with an understrength platoon; ordering, in detail, a reinforced armored battalion attack on a strongpoint.

I agree, and me too.

Would I like to see your ideas for multiplayer coded into the GAME? YES. Do I want my gameplay to be limited by it? NO.

Thank you,

Ken

Well stated.

<font size=4>undead reindeer cavalry </font>

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bigduke6:

But then, battalion commanders definately have a battlefield effect. A battalion commander that sits in his CP during the battle is probably doing a bad job. Most militaries consider it important for the battalion commander to be at the same place as a company commander at a critical point in a battle, so he can lend his rank and ability to bringing strong resources to the tactical problem. Then, when the local crisis is either fixed or heading in the direction of being fixed, the battalion commander heads off to another crisis, or failing that back to his CP, where his staff brings him up to speed.

does it really belong to the scope of CMx2? i'd imagine that each CM battle (lasting some tens of minutes) is the kind of critical point in a battle (lasting hours) which you speak of above.

battalion commander's position would make a great difference in a bit larger battles though, because his position would be directly related to command /information lag. e.g. when and where to commit reserves etc.

i really like what Dorosh is suggesting.

</font>

[hoolaman]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

So if I take a flag with a platoon from one company, I get the points, but if I do it with a platoon from another company, I don't? Interesting - has ups and downs. In action, plans always changed once contact was made. This might serve only to punish those who think well on their feet.

[snip]

Interesting. Would you penalize players for taking an objective with the "wrong" unit?

I think a realistic game would remove the flags altogether - I'd love to see a move towards SL type victory conditions - for example, removing all good order enemy units with an LOS to a road or other feature.

The way I see it it would be more of a carrot to encourage realistic play than a stick to punish unrealistic play.

The only problem with making a C&C system that accounts for higher level orders is the situation when a unit decides to do something on it's own initiative or disobeys orders. A player prevented or punished from making his units do something realistic like this when neccesary will not be too happy and rightly so.

That is why a "following orders" type flag would be separate from a more traditional "take this position" victory marker. Maybe at the end you get a separate rating on how well you followed orders and played under realistic C&C conditions. Tournaments and the like may choose to include this rating to weed out gamey play, and you would alway know that your opponent gets to see it at the end. In-game the penalty could be something more subtle like higher misidentification rates and slightly lower morale.

eg

Total Victory

Objectives achieved - 86%

C&C Rating - 47%

Probably veteran units with a higher "initiative rating" would be more able to depart from higher orders and get less of a penalty.

This has advantages from a scenario design perspective as well. If a designer placed the C&C flags to show who was ordered to do what, it might be interesting trying to achieve an objective with a flawed plan.

Would all of this be worth it in single player? I think so, but I don't know if Steve et al. would agree. I'm sure BFC is looking at "co-play" in the future to solve the bulk of the problem in much the same way as you have suggested in your first post.

The problem with co-play is also: how do you enforce orders and encourage realistic play. There is still opportunity for abuse of the system, and combining it with a rating for realistic play would be quite telling.

[ September 05, 2005, 10:22 PM: Message edited by: Hoolaman ]

[Ardem]

quote:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Most militaries consider it important for the battalion commander to be at the same place as a company commander at a critical point in a battle, so he can lend his rank and ability to bringing strong resources to the tactical problem.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

MD - Can you quote an official manual or doctrine where this is stated?

I know I can't give you a quote at the moment but from von Manstein memiors he said this when he was in the 38 Korp, at the beginning of an attack it is important to be at the front, to show your men your face and show them your not stuck in a desk several miles from the front like World War 1 Officers.

He then went on to say he encouraged his officers to do likewise.

Now how far to a front a General goes I doubt he was in the front line trenches, but I expect his divisional commanders closer and his battalion commanders even closer.

-----------------------------------

I go on to add this there is two times in France 1940 that he did get his hands dirty, remind you this is a german general not a Major of a battalion, so I would expect more of them.

First point he called in some artillery on a spot in front of a held up battalion, he said to the bn commander that he is positive that there is no allied formation ahead and he should move out, the hestiant bn commander did not react, so he got into the kubelwagon with his 2 drivers and adjuant and took off towards the village ahead, came back after swinging into the village and back and said ' See, now in future you do you own recons' and then left.

The second time a battalion was trying to take a bridge but there was some french armour across the other side, he grabbed a platoon of men and stripped down to his waist and al of them dove in across the river then to take the bridge from and exposed flank, unforunately the fight was over just as they arrived.

------------------

So if there is instance atleast in the german army of a general doing this, I expect his bn commander to follow his lead and make it a norm atleast with the 38 Korp

Either way I think your multiplayer concept would be a great addition to the game, but I do believe Bn Commanders do get there hands dirty as a norm, should they be modeled, actually I liked them to be modelled as they were in CMx1, no overriding command structure, perhaps a boost to morale if they are around.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Ardem:

When the Hermann Göring Division counter-attacked the American bridgehead in the Gulf of Gela, the commander of the 7th Army, General Patton, personally (or at least with the help of a naval officer with him) called down battleship gunfire on them. Rommel is reported to have crossed the Meuse in 1940 as commander of the 7th Panzer Division. (At the very least, he made an appearance as a 10-3 leader in Crescendo of Doom).

None of which convinces me that a battalion commander should be anyplace but in his command post. Would be interested in some actual examples; I suspect you'll mostly find them in desperate situations - the Canadian examples I can think of are Dieppe, where Cec Merritt earned a VC for personally leading attacks or Doug Catto (CO of the Royal Regiment of Canada) who scaled the cliffs on Blue Beach and became one of a handful of men to get off the killing ground there unwounded. But these were exceptional circumstances.

Personally, after seeing all the admin the battalion CO has to do, I think there is something to be said for the men under his command not begrudging him the comforts of an army cot and tent when in the field, for a well rested CO makes better decisions.

From MILITARY TRAINING IN THE BRITISH ARMY 1940-1944:

Not that this is a smoking gun of any kind; what it does do is suggest that during the training phase in England, CW battalion commanders spent much of their time in admin and were not part of the tactical training of their companies. If this pattern continued beyond 1943 (the time period discussed in this particular passage) it isn't hard to imagine them leaving the tactical employment of those companies to the company commanders in the field in action.

The author does go on to discuss some battalion commanders who took a great interest in unit tactics, but does not describe the role they personally played in the field.

Also, given that many battalion commanders for much of the training phase were World War One veterans, one has a hard time imagining them advancing and firing from the hip at the head of their companies. By the time the battalions went into action they were mostly all replaced by younger men thanks to Montgomery's influence (the youngest battalion commander at Dieppe, Dollard Menard of the Fusiliers Mont Royal, was 21 IIRC, while the youngest CO of the Camerons of Canada was 23 when he was killed in the Rhineland fighting.)

There may be a difference between the two age groups as far as "leading from the front"; but perhaps not.

[ September 06, 2005, 08:46 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Boris Balaban]

Michael Dorosh,

One way may be able to command orders to your battalion are that your units could have some indicator that they belong to you. Like a color halo around your units.

If you step through your units, you only go through your units. If you mouse click on friendly units you can see some things about them, like strength and orders (they may not be up to date).

How would the AI give you control of friendly units? Would you be able all the time but buy unit indicator you would not give/change orders until needed.

What does Battle Front say if some way to control units?

[Michael Dorosh]

Bump for Bluebottle

[BloodyBucket]

Dorosh, you've got some interesting ideas here, and I would like to add my vote for the battalion commander being most effective when he is not up front micromanaging his platoons.

It is a pyramid scheme, really. The fireteam leader worries about his three or so men, the squad leader about his few fireteams, the platoon leader about his few squads, on up to the battalion commander worrying about his companies.

The problem with simulating Battalion level decisions in a computer game is really about simulating complex human interactions and leadership, not so much in defining roles. A lot of what a commander does happens before the battle, and the higher the level goes the more this holds true. By leadership at the Battalion level, I mean setting the pace and standards for training, ensuring the chain of command is followed, weeding out the incompetent, ensuring supplies and replacements flow smoothly, and not the classic "follow me!" leadership with rifle in hand. Not very dramatic, but vital, and when it is lacking or not competent the privates and corporals sense it.

Going back to your "Band of Brothers" example, Winters is shown struggling with the issue of a less than stellar company commander during the attack on Foy. Do we really want to go to that level in CM, where officers would be rated for political connections and personality, making it harder to get rid of a nice guy who tries hard or the division commander's nephew? Note that a lot of the "Band of Brothers" story focuses on lower ranks once Winters is promoted, because the life and duties of a staff weenie are not as exciting (for mini series uses, at least) as the life and duties of those closer to the sharp end.

In my mind, what the Battalion commander brings to the table in a company level sim is rank and leadership. Having three Captains asking for artillery support is not the same as having a Lt. Colonel ask for it. The fact that he has the rank lets him deal with the staff weenies higher up the food chain (that's me nowadays) and not get blown off. He also simply protects the higher staff weenies from being deluged with requests from multiple captains who all have the most important problem on the planet, via the pyramid scheme.

The leadership portion MIGHT involve micromanaging a company if the situation calls for it, but that really means that he has screwed up by not having a competent company commander in place.

Perhaps adjusting company objectives in light of new situations, information and directives from higher HQ is within the scope of CM, but to really make it work in Multiplayer I think you would have to let other humans or the AI control the companies, and much of the time the situation would remain static enough where there really wouldn't be too much to do as the battalion boss.

[Bigduke6]

Just got around to catching up on this thread. I'll start by saying Dorosh has a tres cool idea, and more details on that at the bottom.

Besides the Waal Bridge I would cite, off hand, Gudarian's and Slim's memoirs. Hasting's book on the Korean War and Ridgeway's effect on U.N. tactics would be another good example. Manstein was mentioned above. I can't cite a historical work off the top of my head, but I will give 10 to 1 in any currency you want Patton wanted his battalion commanders up front and leading the troops.

Oh yeah, I remember, Rommel's The Infantry Attacks. (Die Infantrie Greift An) That book is pretty much a paen end to end to leading from the front. About half the book Rommel was a battalion commander, if I recall correctly.

So if Rommel said battalion commanders should be up front, that's good enough for me!

There may actually be field manuals out there suggesting battalion commanders stay in their HQs and out of the fighting. Rommel would have disagreed with that POV, however.

These general officers - all famous for battlefied success - seemed to believe a battalion commander's proper position is at the critical point in the battle, rather than on his doofus, all the time, at the HQ. Certainly this does not mean battalion commanders should be squad leaders.

What this does mean is that battalion commanders need to be able to tell the difference between the time when they should be in their HQs, and the time they need to be at a company or even a platoon HQ leaning on the junior officer and taking away excuses for failure from the troops. It also means a battalion commander spending most of his time in his hq, and not with his troops, is a battalion commander likely to be unsuccessful if his battalion is faced with any kind of serious fight.

Certainly if you have brilliantly-trained troops, super NCOs, and three company commanders like Rommel in his youth, and a crappy opponent, you can sit in your battalion HQ and everything will be fine. But war doesn't always give a battalion commander all those advantages.

I strongly disagree with Bloody Bucket's claim that a battalion commander ipso facto has screwed up if the battalion commander is intervening in the company level fight. This is war we're talking about, not organizing development teams in an advertizing agency. In a war:

1. Company commanders die, are incapacitated, or turn out to be useless, very frequently at the point where the stress on the company is highest. Indeed, the better the company commander, in general, the more likely he is to be hit. See Company Commander by MacDonald. If the company CO stops a round the battalion commander needs to help.

2. Battalion commanders by their rank and seniority can achieve things in the company level fight even the very best company commander cannot. Besides BB's very accurate description of using rank to force higher echelon staff to provide needed support, there is the even more important factor that the battalion commander almost inevitably has more and wider combat experience than any one in the company.

Then there is the not insignificant point that the idea of a battalion commander with a dedicated staff and proper HQ is far from a universal concept. That belongs to the West.

Most Eastern armies - the Russian and Chinese for instance - have traditionally concentrated staff at the regiment or even division level.

In the Red Army, battalion commanders were expected to fight. Heck, there is the case of 3rd Guard Tank Army where the commander Pavel Rybalko commanded solely from a T-34 (crewed by his relatives BTW). This probably helped account for the less than smooth staff work of 3rd Guards Tank Army at times, but two things are for sure: (1) no one ever accused old Rybalko of not being a fighter, (2) 3rd Guards Tank Army's combat record was nothing to sneeze at, even though I doubt any of that formation's battalion commander spent much time in their HQs, once the shooting started.

As to Dorosh's suggestion, it is outstanding. Make it so there are three companies, and the player acting as battalion commander is allowed to fine-tune and micro-manage one company if he is there, but at the price of letting the A/I handle the other two. Or the player can issue commands from his HQ, which will get executed across the board, but with delays and limited intell.

[nijis]

A variation on the idea -- allow players to control as units that are as large as they want, but penalize them for commanding anything more than a reinforced company or so. Say, you can control a battalion if you want, but you'll be faced with whopping command delays, or maybe you can only issue commands once every 2-3 minutes instead of once every minute.

As I understand it, a battalion-level operation simply isn't going to move as fast as a company-level operation. What you're modeling here is a choice between a small, flexible force or a large, inflexible force. Want to grab that objective fast and move on? Use a company. Want to overwhelm the opposition, even if it means that you lose lots of time trying to coordinate the left flank with the right flank? Use a battalion.

Something like this could also be used with multiplayer to simulate armies with centralized command structures and/or incompetent junior officers, fighting armies whose junior officers are trained to take the initiative. The examples I'm most familiar with are the Arab-Israeli wars. For example, a battalion versus battalion in the Sinai in 1967 could have an Israeli force commanded by three company-level players communicating imperfectly but issuing orders every minute, versus one Egyptian battalion commander issuing orders every three minutes. The Egyptian player would have a hard time reacting to getting flanked, columns would stall for long periods as soon as the lead tank was knocked out, strongpoints would fail to come to each others' defense -- all stuff that happened repeatedly with Arab forces in 1967 and 1973. This could be a nice way to model decentralized versus centralized armies, although it might be pretty frustrating for the centralized side.

[ September 12, 2005, 03:13 AM: Message edited by: nijis ]

[mrpwase]

TBH, I'd rather play a game rather than a simulation, yet these ideas seem to be tilting towards the latter. Sure, they'll make it realistic, and maybe what I usually play with CM1 is unrealistic (i.e. playing with large numbers of troops and no further command delays as a result), but I would find it a lot more fun playing without these restrictions, IMO. Hopefully if something like this is introduced it will be an option. I might try the other option for a while to see if the command restrictions make the game more interesting, but I would prefer if it remained an option. That way, people who want a simulation out of CMx2 can have one, and likewise people who want a game out of CMx2 can have one.