New Syrian TO&E thread

[Moronic Max]

Steve, why do you hate freedom?

Er, Syria. Whatever.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Syrian core force is well led, well trained, well equipped, has good combat experience, is oriented in modern warfare against heavy western style combined arms force and is extremely motivated to defend against American invasion.

there is no way Americans can make a sufficiently sized and determined invasion and it is questionable wether they have been able to learn from recent events and adapt for modern warfare.

[panzermartin]

I wonder if the Syrians will get any in game bonus for fighting in their own land in antithesis with the US professionals. Like determination and will to fight, intel from local population perhaps, better knowledge and understanding of the environment etc. Can these be featured in some way in CMSF?

[Battlefront.com]

Undead reiendeer cavalry,

Syrian core force is well led, well trained, well equipped, has good combat experience, is oriented in modern warfare against heavy western style combined arms force and is extremely motivated to defend against American invasion.

No Syrian unit has any combat experience against a modern force. There are probably some aging officers that remember the wars of the 1960s and 1970s, but that's completely dusty info and limited to a handful of guys that probably are sitting in comfy office jobs. They also have no other form of combat experience either, unless you count sitting around in Lebanon and then marching out of it.

As for the core force being well led, that is apparently somewhat true. The Syrians have three divisional sized forces that would fit this description; Guards Mech (really an Armored Division), Airborne, and Special Forces (which is only loosely a division). These units have officers that are promoted on merrit and are generally kept at a higher state of training than the rest of the standing army (roughly another 10 divisions IIRC). The Reserves, which make up about half of the wartime force, are not much of a consideration.

So... with the exception of about 15% of the total force (rough estimate), your description does not accurately describe the Syrian Army. And in terms of experience, 0% of the total force fits your description.

As for motivation, there are two types. One is to have guys bother to show up to meet the attacker. I would say that by and large the Syrians have this sort of motivation. Then there is the sort of motivation that is required to remain in fighting positions once the battle actually comes to them. I'd say 50% of the Syrian force can't be counted on, minimum. Probably closer to 60-70%. I think that many of them would stay and fight, but if the last war they were in is any indication... staying and fighting amounts to staying and dying. They hunker down and wait to be overrun. No initiative.

there is no way Americans can make a sufficiently sized and determined invasion

Yup, and I've said as much. The US military is pretty much out of the ground war business for the next few years. It *could* if it had to, but it has no capacity for stabilization ops without a massive influx of warm bodies into the military (i.e. a draft). See earlier comments by me about this.

and it is questionable wether they have been able to learn from recent events and adapt for modern warfare.

As someone who has been following the progress of US tactics and equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan every single day and in great detail... I have to say you're completely off base here. The US military is night and day different today than it was going into Iraq in 2003. The problems are all at the strategic level where politicians are in command. Until very recently the same idiots have been in charge. Idiots who don't listen and don't change their thinking to adapt to reality. Fortunately, #1 idiot is out and there is slow change in the winds for the strategic level of military planning. It would also be nice if the Joint Chiefs grew a set, but so far I'm not impressed.

My point is that tactically speaking, the US forces are more than ready for a fight with a conventional force and are well suited for a fight with unconventional forces. Still, the battlefield is a constant learning experience, so the US forces will never be completely on top of things. The unconventional forces always have the advantage in some ways.

Steve

[Dook]

Steve,

The first thought that jumped into my mind as you were describing the fantasy battle that might give a Syrian armored force a chance against an outnumbered US armored force was the Battle of 73 Easting from Desert Storm.

Although the details vary slightly, it was remarkably close to the scenario you describe. Bad weather meant the US forces had no advance warning that they were moving into Iraqi positions. The 18th Brigade of the Tawakalna Division of the Iraqi Republican Guard (one of the best Iraqi units) conducted a prepared positional defense against a frontal attack by a numerically inferior force. The Iraqis did not surrender readily and conducted numerous counterattacks during the battle.

Still, the Iraqis were nearly wiped out. Eagle Troop of 2nd ACR (9 M-1 Abrams and 12 M-3 Bradleys)knocked out 37 T-72s and 32 other AFVs in 40 minutes. Three US cavalry troops destroyed and overran an entire RG brigade (113 vehicles destroyed, total) with the loss of only 1 Bradley. [Note that Wikipedia's numbers are slightly different, but not enough to make a difference].

The years since 1991, even the ones since 2003) have been a heck of a lot kinder to US armored forces than they have to the Syrians or any other armored force in the Middle East. I would expect any similar confrontations in the near future , in the very unlikely event they occur, to produce a similar result.

Of course, that's the whole point, isn't it? Similar confrontations are unlikely to occur precisely because they will end the same way. Any even marginally competent adversary of the US will seek to avoid such clashes and engage using other methods.

[Elmar Bijlsma]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

No Syrian unit has any combat experience against a modern force.

One might argue that neither has the USA. Accidentally shooting up Brits and Canadians doesn't count.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

No Syrian unit has any combat experience against a modern force. There are probably some aging officers that remember the wars of the 1960s and 1970s, but that's completely dusty info and limited to a handful of guys that probably are sitting in comfy office jobs. They also have no other form of combat experience either, unless you count sitting around in Lebanon and then marching out of it.

if you look at the big picture, few nations have as much experience in fighting modern combined arms war against competent enemy as the Syrians. i'm also quite sure they have a good feel thru operatives about how Israeli and American forces wage war this very day. they certainly have more experience about modern warfare than say Russians or Germans, yet i doubt anyone would say that a major weakness of Russians or Germans is their lack of experience in modern warfare.

So... with the exception of about 15% of the total force (rough estimate), your description does not accurately describe the Syrian Army.

yes but that 15% is the number that matters. if they are defeated Syria loses the war, but if they are not defeated Syria is victorious.

i very much doubt Syria plans to use the rest 85% the old Soviet way. most likely half of them aren't used at all and the rest are used only in urban centers as local defensive forces. it's the 15% that are going to destroy American supply columns at the desert highways and stop combat formations at key locations.

As for motivation, there are two types. One is to have guys bother to show up to meet the attacker. I would say that by and large the Syrians have this sort of motivation. Then there is the sort of motivation that is required to remain in fighting positions once the battle actually comes to them. I'd say 50% of the Syrian force can't be counted on, minimum. Probably closer to 60-70%. I think that many of them would stay and fight, but if the last war they were in is any indication... staying and fighting amounts to staying and dying. They hunker down and wait to be overrun. No initiative.

it's all fine and OK for the 60-70% to hunker down and wait to be overrun. that they will do, but after they have seen what became of Iraq they will fight and die.

My point is that tactically speaking, the US forces are more than ready for a fight with a conventional force and are well suited for a fight with unconventional forces.

i question the tactical readiness of US forces to fight a military armed with modern weapons and using asymmetrical tactics and strategies. i fear the fighting would lead to lot of confusion if not paralyzis, because the combined arms package would be broken.

[Battlefront.com]

Dook,

Although the details vary slightly, it was remarkably close to the scenario you describe. Bad weather meant the US forces had no advance warning that they were moving into Iraqi positions. The 18th Brigade of the Tawakalna Division of the Iraqi Republican Guard (one of the best Iraqi units) conducted a prepared positional defense against a frontal attack by a numerically inferior force. The Iraqis did not surrender readily and conducted numerous counterattacks during the battle.

True. And there were large formations of Iraqis that moved around in OIF as well as large formations that basically gave up without hardly a shot being fired (especially around in the Basra area).

Still, the Iraqis were nearly wiped out.

Yup, and that was 16 years ago when the technology gap between the two sides was significantly smaller than it is today.

Of course, that's the whole point, isn't it? Similar confrontations are unlikely to occur precisely because they will end the same way. Any even marginally competent adversary of the US will seek to avoid such clashes and engage using other methods.

Yup, which is exactly what we've been saying since day one. It is also what CM:SF is set up to simulate. Any thoughts of coming up with a setting where large formations of Syrian forces can go toe to toe with US forces and do significant damage (not to mention avoiding being wiped out) are pure fantasy. I said it in the other thread going about these things... the US military is very, very good at destroying whatever it can see. The more visible and high profile the enemy, the easier it is for the US to wipe it out. Somewhat counter intuitive to some people, but that's what the facts show.

Elmar Bijlsma

One might argue that neither has the USA

Anybody that thinks the US has no combat experience has been sleeping since 2002. Two countries invaded, two countries that were defeated. The counter insurgency ops that follow are absolutely combat ops, just not the sort the US would like to be engaged in. The Syrian Army's most recent combat op of note was suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood and murdering several tens of thousands of people. And even that was nearly 20 years ago.

URC.

if you look at the big picture, few nations have as much experience in fighting modern combined arms war against competent enemy as the Syrians.

True. However, the US is one of the few.

i'm also quite sure they have a good feel thru operatives about how Israeli and American forces wage war this very day. they certainly have more experience about modern warfare than say Russians or Germans, yet i doubt anyone would say that a major weakness of Russians or Germans is their lack of experience in modern warfare.

What the Germans lack in experience they have in training. The US forces going into Iraq were almost all without battlefield experience too (some did serve in the First Gulf War), yet they performed extremely well. In Gulf War One totally inexperienced US troops completely routed Iraqi forces that had just participated in the invasion of Kuwait, which at the very least was a large scale maneuver.

The problem is that the Syrians, by and large, lack training and experience. What training they do have is considered to be horribly outdated. The Russians found this out when they threw conscripts into Grozny. Poorly trained according to bad doctrine, no experience and bad leadership. It was a disaster. Since the the Russians have plowed a lot of their oil and gas money into training and modernization. Syria has no such resources to draw from and therefore is stuck with its largely 1970s based military and doctrine.

The exceptions to this are the ones that will cause a lot of problems for an invading force. It is why Syria has been expanded its Special Forces over the years.

yes but that 15% is the number that matters. if they are defeated Syria loses the war, but if they are not defeated Syria is victorious.

True, but it is hard to see how roughly 3 divisions in size could defeat a western style force of roughly the same size. Damage, delay, etc.... very possible. It's what we're "counting on" for the challenge in CM:SF. But I don't think it is enough to fundamentally change the outcome. There are larger considerations that would neutralize the possibility of Syria retaining sovereignty.

i very much doubt Syria plans to use the rest 85% the old Soviet way. most likely half of them aren't used at all and the rest are used only in urban centers as local defensive forces.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Elmar Bijlsma:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

No Syrian unit has any combat experience against a modern force.

One might argue that neither has the USA. </font>

[John Kettler]

Steve,

I think the comparison you're making here is rather unfair. Your "fairly small, light force" was, according to the linked article at least, 450 elite Army Rangers, supplemented (per my own reading) by some creme de la creme Delta Force types, such as the two snipers who inserted to protect the downed helo crew survivors.

http://www.slate.com/?id=2060941

Rangers and other SpecOps types are trained to operate independently, in formations as small as two man teams, to operate largely unsupported deep behind the lines, and to fight ferociously when required, so the fact that "they did not break, they did not become paralyzed" doesn't surprise me in the slightest. Nor, if you know your Ranger history, should it surprise you. See, for example, what the Rangers did to the Hermann Goering Division while surrounded in Cisterna against a highly trained, fully equipped main force unit consisting of thousands of men with armor and artillery support.

Now, if some vanilla U.S. infantry unit

had fought with the same success in Mogadishu while equipped the same way as the Rangers, I'd be much more impressed. The historical battle, though, pitted superbly trained and equipped U.S. elites with limited helicopter gunship support against heavily armed, technical supported Somali irregulars, albeit tough, angry (see article for some of the whys) and high on qat, supplemented by an armed, outraged city populace.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ February 08, 2007, 03:40 AM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[Sgt Joch]

"Black Hawk Down" is actually a very good example of what the U.S. forces can accomplish.

You have well trained, well equipped light infantry force, which:

1.accomplishes their primary mission of capturing high value prisoners;

2.are capable of switching mid mission to secure new objectives (i.e. the crash sites);

3.advance and operate in a hostile urban environment where they are outnumbered 10-20 to 1, with no armor or artillery support (although light armor shows up late in the battle), and only helicopters as air support, yet achieve kill ratios of 50 to 1; and

4. are able to leave the area with full unit cohesion and having lost NO prisoner.

If a german Kampfgruppe commander had done the same thing on the eastern front in WW2, he would have been flown to Berlin to receive the Iron Cross personally from Adolf Hitler.

(edited after aka_tom_w pointed out I could improve the story )

[ February 08, 2007, 08:52 AM: Message edited by: Sgt.Joch ]

[aka_tom_w]

"4. are able to leave the area with full unit cohesion and having lost only one prisoner."

Will Durant? the downed Black Hawk Pilot? ( somehow that hardly counts as a lost prisoner in the context of ground unit cohesion as he was a pilot, AND they got him back in prisoner swap right? )

Did they not have to give ALL their high value prisoners back to get Durant free? (Just a question.)

-tom w

Originally posted by Sgt.Joch:

"Black Hawk Down" is actually a very good example of what the U.S. forces can accomplish.

You have well trained, well equipped light infantry force, which:

1.accomplishes their primary mission of capturing high value prisoners;

2.are capable of switching mid mission to secure new objectives (i.e. the crash sites);

3.advance and operate in a hostile urban environment where they are outnumbered 10-20 to 1, with no armor or artillery support (although light armor shows up late in the battle), and only helicopters as air support, yet achieve kill ratios of 50 to 1; and

4. are able to leave the area with full unit cohesion and having lost only one prisoner.

If a german Kampfgruppe commander had done the same thing on the eastern front in WW2, he would have been flown to Berlin to receive the Iron Cross personally from Adolf Hitler.

[Battlefront.com]

John,

Your "fairly small, light force" was, according to the linked article at least, 450 elite Army Rangers, supplemented (per my own reading) by some creme de la creme Delta Force types, such as the two snipers who inserted to protect the downed helo crew survivors.

First, for the actual battle itself it was nothing more than a reinforced platoon at the outset IIRC, and perhaps not more than double that at any one time. Not an entire battalion. Second, that was part of the problem at the tactical level. There was no force in place to handle a major conflict with the Somali warlords, yet that is exactly what they got themselves into. Even with several thousand in place they were horribly outnumbered at the strategic level. Third, the Rangers were arrogant and over confident BECAUSE they thought themselves so superior. That worked against them, not for them.

So I will say again... at the tactical level the US has had few examples of being beaten since its matchup against the forces of the Third Reich. Whatever examples there are on record, they are overshadowed by the vast bulk of tactical vicotries. Even the debacle of Black Hawk Down was a tactical success by any military definition of the term. It had political elements that made it a failure, for sure, but that is outside of CM's scope.

Anyway... the point I made, and Andreas rightly reinforced, is quite simple. Which side would you place your bets on:

Force one - well led, highly trained, very well equiped, highly supported by combined arms, and has extensive recent and applicable experience

Force two - very poorly led, poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly supported by combined arms, and lacks practical hands on battlefield experience in any meaningful sense of the term

If you don't hesitate to select one over the other, then I would say that pretty much means there is no room for argument. If you would select force 2... that would be an interesting, but not very rational in my mind

Steve

[Sgt Joch]

Originally posted by aka_tom_w:

Did they not have to give ALL their high value prisoners back to get Durant free? (Just a question.)

-tom w

I dont know the answer to that question, but it would not affect the result of the battle, only the wisdom of undertaking the mission in the first place. I edited my original post to take into account your useful comment.

However the battle does point out the achilles heel of U.S. forces, namely the unwillingness to take casualties. The battle was considered a defeat in the U.S. because 19 americans died, even though in strictly military terms it was a victory since U.S. forces killed an estimated 1,000 somali militiamen. That is why guerilla warfare is the preferred route against U.S. forces. No Arab army can defeat the U.S. in conventional warfare, but Arab guerillas/insurgents know that if they cause enough casualties, U.S. troops will eventually leave.

[Battlefront.com]

One qualification about casualties and US willingness to suffer them. If the mission is perceived as worth it, if there is a perception that it can be acheived, and that the benefits of acheiving it are considered sustainable then the US population is willing to sacrifice blood and treasure without wavering one bit on achieving that end. The problems come in with the mission is unclear, the benefits doubtful, and the chance of success long term very low.

US forces went into Somalia as part of a completely screwed up mission and people were not prepared for it. It was only a matter of time before something went horribly wrong. When it did, people asked their political leaders for clarification, reassurance, and justification for remaining there. The political leaders knew they couldn't do any of those things and so had no choice but to withdraw. In short, losing blood and treasure for Somalia was not seen as being in the national interests so that was that. Same for failed efforts like Haiti (all of 'em), Panama, etc. Contrast that with Korea, Vietnam, and the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The big difference between Iraq now and Vietnam before is that the people know they were mislead and lied to by the military and the politicians for years. Therefore, they are rightly more skeptical and demanding. Yet the fact remains, despite all of this and the daily killing of US personnel, only a small number of people in the US want an immediate withdrawal EVEN THOUGH the overwhelming majority are not happy with the way things are going. Why? Because as bumbling as the war has been, the American people do understand it is in their national interests to finish what was started and to have some sort of satisfactory conclusion. The same would be expected of a conflict with Syria.

Steve

[Sgt Joch]

I would differ with your analysis of the facts. Certainly in the major wars, such as the American Civil War or World War II, the American public and politicians were willing to accept high casualties since losing the war was not an option.

However, since 1945, there has no been any war/mission where the American public or politicians were willing to accept high casualties. In both Korea and Vietnam, support for the war eroded as casualty figures rose.

In Vietnam, the U.S. suffered about 60,000 combat deaths. Quite before they reached that point, public opinion had turned against the war. In the same war, the Vietcong & North Vietnamese combatants suffered about 1,000,000 combat deaths to secure victory. Would the U.S. have been willing to suffer 100-200,000 combat deaths to achieve victory in Vietnam? I dont think so.

In Iraq, there have been about 3,000 U.S. combat deaths since 2003 and support for the war is very low. U.S. politicians and the public can't even agree on whether Bush should send another 21,500 troops for about six months.

I think you would have a hard time convincing the American public/politicians that any post 1945 limited war, whether its keeping Korea or Vietnam non-communist, liberating Kuwait or bringing democracy to Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria was vital enough to U.S. interests to justify high casualty figures...

...and if you apply that to CMSF, casualties should be a much greater concern to the U.S. player than to the Syrian player.

[ February 08, 2007, 03:09 PM: Message edited by: Sgt.Joch ]

[Moronic Max]

However, since 1945, there has no been any war/mission where the American public or politicians were willing to accept high casualties. In both Korea and Vietnam, support for the war eroded as casualty figures rose.

And yet ground involvement in Vietnam lasted until 1973. Combat troops--I'm sorry, advisors--had been present since, what, '61?

There was a significant anti-war movement for the better part of a decade before American involvement ended.

For that matter, there was a significan anti-war movement inside the military (enlisted, not officers) for half a decade before the war ended.

These, um, 'issues' did not end the war. Not in anything like a timely matter.

[John Kettler]

Steve,

I agree that the actual initial raid force was small and heavily outnumbered. I also agree that the havoc the Americans ultimately inflicted on the Somalis was immense. No argument there either. As for force choice, I'd go with the first choice given. My point, though, was that it is dangerous to equate elite unit performance with that of vanilla line units under the same combat situation.

Sgt. Joch,

While I agree that well trained, experienced, light elite forces can indeed accomplish wonders, my issue is equating such top combat specialists' performance with what their less martially gifted, equipped and trained line unit bretheren could accomplish, with all other things being equal. This is not to say the U.S. doesn't have great troops compared to practically everyone, but that to expect Ranger performance from line infantry is not terribly bright, IMO, let alone than in the hell that was Mogadishu.

Turning now to your figures on U.S. combat fatalities, I hope you're aware that the administration and the Pentagon have raised "creative accounting" on such deaths from the sublime to the ridiculous. As I recall, if you die once wheels up while in country on a flight out, you don't count, nor if you die while en route to or at Landstuhl, nor at any point thereafter. Thus, the real number for KIA's is much higher, by a least a factor of two. There have also been some disturbing reports indicating that the U.S. has several mass graves for its men in the boonies of Iraq.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sgt Joch]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

While I agree that well trained, experienced, light elite forces can indeed accomplish wonders, my issue is equating such top combat specialists' performance with what their less martially gifted, equipped and trained line unit bretheren could accomplish, with all other things being equal. This is not to say the U.S. doesn't have great troops compared to practically everyone, but that to expect Ranger performance from line infantry is not terribly bright, IMO, let alone than in the hell that was Mogadishu.

The 150 or so Rangers/Delta Force prevailed against an estimated 5-10,000 somali militiamen, odds of roughly 1:50. The U.S. line infantry invading Syria would not be as good and the Syrian defenders would be better, granted, but the U.S. would invade Syria probably with overall odds of 1:4 or 1:3 with odds approching 1:1 where battle is joined. The U.S. would be backed by air and artillery support. In those circumstances, we can expect the U.S. to cut through Syrian defences with ease, depending of course on the number of casualties they are willing to suffer.

[flamingknives]

So, what's the point in playing?

If the game is really as unbalenced in the US' favour as seems to be suggested, why bother? I can go and steal candy from babies, while their parents aren't looking, if I want a similar challenge.

When they made the CMX1 series, BFC steered well clear of 'national stereotypes', and with good reason. Can it be that this wisdom is being turned on its head?

Being as the primary failing of the Syrian armed forces, AIUI, - its tactical leadership - has been removed and replaced by the player, can we expect a more even battle, or will the Syrians be nerfed by poor reaction times and enforced low unit quality? The whole reason the US armed forces are so successful is that they are well trained in combined arms. Shouldn't it be possible for an incautious US player to get themselves hammered by whatever an astute Syrian player can get together, including artillery?

[Sgt Joch]

Originally posted by Moronic Max:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />However, since 1945, there has no been any war/mission where the American public or politicians were willing to accept high casualties. In both Korea and Vietnam, support for the war eroded as casualty figures rose.

And yet ground involvement in Vietnam lasted until 1973. Combat troops--I'm sorry, advisors--had been present since, what, '61?

There was a significant anti-war movement for the better part of a decade before American involvement ended.

For that matter, there was a significan anti-war movement inside the military (enlisted, not officers) for half a decade before the war ended.

These, um, 'issues' did not end the war. Not in anything like a timely matter. </font>

[MikeyD]

There's this old canard that keeps going round & round about how 'hippie protesters' lost us the Vietnam war. An NPR radio report last night was talking about one of the last big helicopter assaults in Vietnam - airlifting ARVN into Cambodia I believe they said - the U.S. had 100 helos shot down inside a week with another 400 so shot-up to be unservicable. That doesn't sound like the war going badly due to failing public support. That just sounds like the war going badly.

[Battlefront.com]

Mikey is correct. It wasn't the casualties that had us out of Vietnam, it was the lack of faith that the war was winable and, even if it was, if the price was worth it. Casualties, obviously, figured into this quite a lot. But the overriding reason why support for Vietnam fell apart is because the US was not winning and the war aims were too abstract from a national interest standpoint. Let a bunch of jungle be lorded over by Commies... who cares?! What impact does it have on our lives as Americans?! Those were very good questions to ask and the military and politicans couldn't answer them successfully.

So far the battles and wars against militant Islam are supported by the vast bulk of the US population. The support for the war in Iraq is failing because of incompetent leadership and (once again) lies being told instead of the truth. Yet only a small number are calling for an immediate withdrawal even though the vast majority don't have much hope in Iraq becoming stable. Casualties are not the driving factor, obviously.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

flamingknives,

If the game is really as unbalenced in the US' favour as seems to be suggested, why bother?

I've participated in about a dozen discussions that answer this question in great detail. IIRC they are linked to at the top of this Forum. Suffice to say the game isn't unbalanced at all. I expect most players, as the US, will be defeated quite easily.

So what is all this talk about the Syrian inferiority? Well, because man to man, piece of equipment to piece of equipment, it is pretty much an established fact. To deny that is to deny reality. The Syrian Army would, by and large, be obliterated quite quickly in any conventional confrontation with a Western power (or even Israel, perhaps. Though their performance last summer was surprisingly bad). But that is at the strategic level. At the tactical level, all bets are off. Especially when one throws asymetric capabilities into the mix.

When they made the CMX1 series, BFC steered well clear of 'national stereotypes', and with good reason. Can it be that this wisdom is being turned on its head?

There is a difference between national stereotypes and national capabilities. Find some factual reason to challenge anything I've said and you may be able to prove stereotyping. If you can't, then it's not. Simple as that.

Nothing is in a vacuum. The US has a history of certain capabilities, strengths and weaknesses, and so too do the Syrians. All CM:SF is doing is simulating these differences, nothing more and nothing less. We did that in CMx1 too, otherwise you would have seen totally different results in CMBB, that's for sure!

Being as the primary failing of the Syrian armed forces, AIUI, - its tactical leadership -

Not so. Their equipment is basically 1970s technology sprinkled with 1990s technology. The US is fighting with 1990s and 2000s technology, with much of it being the latter. You can be the best led, best trained, best motivated soldier in the world, but if the other guy can shoot up your tanks before you can even see theirs... what good is all that value invested into the soldier?

has been removed and replaced by the player, can we expect a more even battle, or will the Syrians be nerfed by poor reaction times and enforced low unit quality?

It is true that a Human player can lead and coordinate the Syrian forces in a way far superior to real life, just as the US Human player can. The difference is that the Syrians will likely benefit more from this since the US forces are inherently closer to this ideal than the Syrians. And yes, the out of box scenarios will have the Syrians portrayed as they likely would be in the conflict. However, if you want to make your own scenarios with Elite Syrian Reserves... knock yourself out. But keep in mind you can't make their equipment any better. Best you can do is give them unrealistically frequent access to their top of the line stuff.

The whole reason the US armed forces are so successful is that they are well trained in combined arms. Shouldn't it be possible for an incautious US player to get themselves hammered by whatever an astute Syrian player can get together, including artillery?

Sure. For any one tactical battle the Syrians could do a whole lot of damage. However, in the big picture they will lose in a direct confrontation in real life because they would have to succeed tactically as a rule and not as an exception. That is the difference between a tactically focused wargame and a strategic one. It's a foregone conclusion that the Syrians would be militarily defeated. After that... well... let's say I wouldn't be putting too much money on the occupation force keeping things nice and calm. A people can lose a war and still ultimately win against the occupation.

Steve

[flamingknives]

Steve,

I'm glad that you're reiterating what was said in previous discussions. I thought for a moment that reality had become unhinged and that strategic considerations were making a serious incursion into a tactical wargame.