Infantry experience ratings and reactions to fire [LONG]

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[snips]

True enough, but it could also mean those too young, stupid and/or inexperienced to know better. Look at the Hitler Youth division in Normandy - individual riflemen at the battle of Buron in early July 44 had to be blasted out of their slit trenches by direct 75mm gunfire, so fiercely did they resist. Perhaps there was a glimmer of "no hope" amongst those whose families had been killed in the bombing, etc., but for many, they were simply very well indoctrinated in the culture of sacrifice that the SS seemed to have bred.

These I would have fitted into the model I describe by assuming them to be Fresh -- and so willing to take more risks than more experienced troops -- and of a very high training/selection level. I would also see their training as including not only their military training, but also their indoctrination in the Hitler Youth from an early age.

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

No doubt what you say was true, but I would not categorize it as the only possible source of fanaticism (if that is what you are trying to do, apologies if not).

It depends on what you define as "fanaticism". If it means a complete disregard for one's own continued survival, then clearly one way such feelings are produced may be through the psychological breakdown occasioned by combat fatigue (I think Farley Mowat touches on this in "And No Birds Sang" when he describes how people become casualties performing acts of suicidal bravery because they no longer care whether they live or die).

However, I believe that you are right that this is not the only cause of disregard for one's own personal survival, which may be due to good old-fashioned heroism. The distinction I would make is that this kind of hero continues to care whether he lives or dies; but he has decided that there are some things worth more than his own life. This distinction may make no practical difference to the outcome on the battlefield.

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Abbott:

Let us not forget the fact that experience in combat is key.

Yes, but the key to what?

I am happy to accept that more battlefield experience maps to a more accurate perception of danger and a greater tolerance for disorganisation, but not that it produces a greater willingness to go forward under fire.

Originally posted by Abbott:

Knowing what your weapon and fellows are capable of and not capable of is the important factor. This may apply to smaller units more then the broad studies quoted above.

The work on combat fatigue refers to individuals, and you can't really get smaller units than that.

Originally posted by Abbott:

The influx of untested troops mixed with combat veterans also brings about different possibilities.

A good point; I believe the ability to mix battle-tested NCOs with fresh soldiers and combine the advantages of both is often considered to be one of the reasons the Wehrmacht retained a high degree of combat effectiveness in the face of very substantial atrition.

All the best,

John.

[Abbott]

I disagree John. Combat experience is key to effectiveness. Which transforms into many different applications including movement, be it forwards or another direction. Green troops being more willing to move forward under fire, maybe once.

Veterans have a much better idea of what it takes to survive in an advance. There is NO substitute for knowing what your fellows are likely to do or not to do, especially when your life is on the line. This also translates to veterans knowing what their weapons and equipment can do and not do. To a much finer degree then green troops. The only sticking point I see would be green troops being more ignorant thus more willing to advance in a difficult situation. I believe your argument is “Ignorance is bliss?”

However I am in no way convinced that green troops are more effective in an advance then veterans troops. Been there and done that. I have seen it for myself. While I admire authors and studies, especially good ones, I do not find there opinions override what I have seen with my own eyes. I also do not believe that man has changed that much since the studies were conducted. If anything they were tougher then we are now. However slackers and men ill equipped mentally or emotionally to cope are quickly weeded out in a combat situation. Many times with nothing being said derogatory neither to them nor about them by their peers.

[Abbott]

John, I would also like to add that I am in no way saying "I know more" then the fine studies being referred to. I am sure the men who prepared them were much more educated then I in research abilities and experience. Having much more information to draw from then I. I am saying in a small group, where each fellow has worked, fought and lived together, known performance in men and equipment is a given.

[ November 04, 2002, 08:45 PM: Message edited by: Abbott ]

[Andrew H.]

In another thread, I posted this:

I ran across this incident in the Green Book that describes the river crossing at Arnaville:

"When one soldier, a veteran of all the division's combat, had his carbine shot from his hand and his closest friend killed by a shell which fell near his foxhole, he jumped up screaming and ran towards enemy lines. He was caught by a fellow soldier but had to be knocked unconscious before he could be quieted. Evacuated, he could not remember what he had done."

What I didn't mention in the quote (because it didn't seem relevant to the discussion at hand) is that this guy's unit was described as having been in the line for a while and had a lot of troops suffering from "battle fatigue." In other words, these were troops who were "fought out," to use John's nomenclature. I thinkt that fought out guys could be modelled pretty realistically by having them start the game "rattled." (I don't know if you can set this up in the scenario editor or not).

I think the point about vets hitting the ground sooner is a good one, too. If you used green troops in CMBO, it would often turn out that they lived longer than vet troops because they were more skittish and, consequently, wouldn't end up in as many ambushes. If you sent vet troops forward and they ran into a couple of hidden enemy squads, the vet troops would often be killed to the last man as they continued to try and carry out their orders in the face of all that firepower. Green troops, by contrast, would take a one - or maybe two - casualties and then run away. In a couple of turns, though they would be fine. IMO, that aspect of green vs. vet was reversed - it should have been the green troops who walked obliviously to their deaths, while the vet troops hit the ground early and survived.

I haven't noticed this in CMBB - it may be present in some form, but it's much less pronounced than in CMBO.

Obviously, there's more too it than just switching how the units behave - but the net result should be about the same, I think.

[tabpub]

An interesting disscussion indeed. One thing that comes to mind that may be able to reflect the behavior that some are seeking in the troops is the "fitness" rating. A unit could be of high quality troops, but "weakened" or "unfit", thereby giving some of the "sticky" qualities that have been seen in some veteran units.

I am currently in a QB where the computer provided me with a Crack battalion of GJ in Finland. They are unfit however, so very fragile exhaustion wise and not easy to rally when broke. Since I am on the defensive, this is not a HUGE problem, but if I had been tasked with an attack with these men, it would have been very difficult in the least. One MG team went from fresh to exhausted just from sneaking 30m forward. It has recovered to tired now, after over 15 turns have passed.

Just a thought on the subject.

[White Phosphorus]

Wouldn't it be fair to say that Veteran troops would identify their threats better. They don't drop when they shouldn't and do when the should. They also would drop to the ground better than the Greens, they'd be better at spotting little variations in terrain which would offer some protection.

I think that Green troops drop to the ground as often as the Vets, except that the vets are still alive when they do so.

In a way this can already be recreated with a Human Wave. When properly executed, it is all fun and games, and gets temporarily great results, until you notice the little trail of corpses that it left behind.

[Schoerner]

Originally posted by Pak_43:

Sorry I meant to add this bit to the discussion...

The solution/amendment John proposes is exactly what the WRG WWI miniature rules use... units are rated for morale and experience, thus allowing a finer differentiation of units...allowing a differentiation between (for example) the veteran but distinctly "sticky" 7th Armoured in NW Europe and the raw but fanatical SS Hitler Jugend.. in the rules a unit is pinned when a proportion of the platoon is suppressed, the proportion differs upon experience... green units are harder to pin then experienced ones for example, but much easier to actually get to retreat when the morale threshold is reached....

my £0.02 pennies worth....

EXCELLENT thread.

The differentiating between morale and experience opens complete new possibilites for BTS and the engine rewrite.

Hope Steve takes a look into this thread.

Imagining an elite infantry platoon with quite low morale... - they are not that good for attacks, but they have very low casualties and hell some of the Waffen-SS units with almost undestroyable morale and high experience?

I think such a new system would lead to overwhelming variety and what that means for even better historical accuracy everyone can imagine.

Great ideas and definately worth for BTS to take a closer look.

[L4Pilot]

Agreed, very interesting thread.

Synthesizing the comments above, troop effectiveness seems to be a 3 dimensional matrix: Training, Experience and Morale (aka Motivation) They can each vary somewhat independently (though there are obviously interactions between the three.)

Morale level doesn't vary due just to recent failure or success. There's also a long term, theater wide, element to it. (I.e. how's the war going?) Would it matter how much training and experience you had if you were trapped in the Stalingrad Pocket after relief efforts had failed?

More grist for the thought mill.

[Michael Emrys]

Very good discussion. I don't think I have a lot to add to the points made, but to summarize I think a case can be made that there are at least three major factors that effect soldiers' battlefield performance and need to be accounted for in the game:

1) Morale. Willingness to perform acts necessary to achieve the assigned objective. As John has presented, this tends usually to peak out early in a soldier's personal history and to decline from that point onward. The point has been made that resting out of the line can bring morale up from depleted levels, but I have anecdotal evidence that this is not always the case. Some soldiers who have escaped from the fighting dread returning.

2) Skill. Mainly determined by training, but experience can definitely improve on that. I suspect that soldiers acquire skills faster if they are in the same unit with other soldiers who already possess those skills or have a particular knack for acquiring them and passing them on.

3) Fitness. Determined by basic health, diet, physical conditioning, protection from the elements, adequate rest, etc.

Each of these factors can impinge on the others and the relationships may be non-linear. Morale can be effected by the performance of one's skills—and perhaps more importantly one's confidence in them, those of one's platoon mates, one's officers, the way the war is going, one's health, availability of creature comforts, etc., etc. The speed and thoroughness with which one acquires battlefield skills can be strongly effected by morale and fitness among other such factors as raw intelligence and prior education. One's fitness can slump if one either does not know how to take care of oneself or is not motivated to.

This highly simplified exposition is intended to be indicative rather than exhaustive.

The point is, I think, that while CM in its present state of development rigidly links two of those factors—skills and morale—into one Experience rating, we can see now that they (and possibly others we have yet to identify) need to be tracked separately and their interactions accounted for in the program.

Michael

[ November 05, 2002, 03:16 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Hortlund]

Wonderful thread. Allow me to make some observations.

Much of the success of the 12th SS lay in the unique combination of green, fanatic 17 year old soldiers, and experienced cool headed "old" (20-30 year old) NCO's and officers. If I remember correctly (dont have my books close here at work) the vast majority of NCO's and officers in 12th SS were drawn from Liebstandarte and Das Reich, two of the best performing German divisions.

With that combination, the Germans got the best from two worlds. Fanatic teenagers who would follow any order given by an experienced veteran. If a change is proposed to the infantry quality system, we must not forget the importance of the NCO inherent in each squad.

There are two reasons as to why the Germans performed so well on a tactical level. One is the emphasis placed on initiative, in the small unit leaders, the other is the MG. Not to drift too far off subject, let me just say this. If you do a bullet per bullet or rpm per rpm comparison between a 44 US rifle squad and a 44 German rifle squad, the US squad has better firepower. The problem is that in the US squad this firepower is "spread out" among the soldiers, while in the German squad it is focused on the MG42. Why is this a problem? This brings us to the US study made during the Vietnam war (I am really sorry but I do not remember the exact source, this is something I read a long time ago. Maybe one of you could direct me to the exact source) which stated that out of 10 men in a squad in combat, 1-2 would aim and fire their weapons at the enemy, 3-5 would fire in the general direction of the enemy, and the rest would generally keep their heads down. Back to our comparison between German and US rifle squads. In the German squad the squad leader always stayed with the MG. That means that the MG would always fall into the first category of fire.

Back to the more immediate subject. Training/skill, morale and experience should all be modeled, that is an excellent suggestion.

But in my opinion, there should also be a "second layer" added, training, experience and morale of the squad leader (not the platoon leader…I'm talking about the "invisible" squad leader).

The squad leader is the key to the performance of a squad in combat. This is something that should be included.

The first layer of training/skill morale and experience should affect how well the unit performs in combat. Things like well aimed fire, personal courage, ability to withstand incoming fire. While the second layer should primarily affect maneuver, delay, spotting etc. BUT it should also modify the first layer… kinda like how a platoon leader influences squads inside his combat range now. The difference would be that the squad leader will affect his men both in positive and negative ways depending on his "values".

[TSword]

Bastables,

Poorly performing units remain so no matter how many times they've been in combat ie 6 DWR, German 276 ID.

Wrong, they might remain poor but not necessarily.

Totenkopf performed poor in Feb./March 1943 in their first weeks back in russia because they were unacustomed and inexperienced, but performed superb in the Kursk campaign. Already in the Kharkov-campaign after about 2 weeks performance increased noticeable. Same goes for 320. ID poor in the beginning but good after some time.

Take it this way, you may be superbly trained extremely motivated (overmotivated maybe), selfconfident. But when you face endless mud, extreme cold, deep snow drifts, enemy infested rear area and the like for the first time all training in the world and motivation will not prevent you from failing. It is the ability to learn,react and adapt which makes the difference, and here good professionel Leadership bears the main responsibility with example and positive motivation.

Btw. i'm happy with the current morale and experience system. Expansion into more parameters would be masked anyway by the comparatively poor AI (measured vs. real world). It would only lead to even more grotesque distortions in AI behaviour, IMHO.

Greets

Daniel

[aka_tom_w]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

Wonderful thread. Allow me to make some observations.

Much of the success of the 12th SS lay in the unique combination of green, fanatic 17 year old soldiers, and experienced cool headed "old" (20-30 year old) NCO's and officers. If I remember correctly (dont have my books close here at work) the vast majority of NCO's and officers in 12th SS were drawn from Liebstandarte and Das Reich, two of the best performing German divisions.

With that combination, the Germans got the best from two worlds. Fanatic teenagers who would follow any order given by an experienced veteran. If a change is proposed to the infantry quality system, we must not forget the importance of the NCO inherent in each squad.

There are two reasons as to why the Germans performed so well on a tactical level. One is the emphasis placed on initiative, in the small unit leaders, the other is the MG. Not to drift too far off subject, let me just say this. If you do a bullet per bullet or rpm per rpm comparison between a 44 US rifle squad and a 44 German rifle squad, the US squad has better firepower. The problem is that in the US squad this firepower is "spread out" among the soldiers, while in the German squad it is focused on the MG42. Why is this a problem? This brings us to the US study made during the Vietnam war (I am really sorry but I do not remember the exact source, this is something I read a long time ago. Maybe one of you could direct me to the exact source) which stated that out of 10 men in a squad in combat, 1-2 would aim and fire their weapons at the enemy, 3-5 would fire in the general direction of the enemy, and the rest would generally keep their heads down. Back to our comparison between German and US rifle squads. In the German squad the squad leader always stayed with the MG. That means that the MG would always fall into the first category of fire.

Back to the more immediate subject. Training/skill, morale and experience should all be modeled, that is an excellent suggestion.

But in my opinion, there should also be a "second layer" added, training, experience and morale of the squad leader (not the platoon leader…I'm talking about the "invisible" squad leader).

The squad leader is the key to the performance of a squad in combat. This is something that should be included.

The first layer of training/skill morale and experience should affect how well the unit performs in combat. Things like well aimed fire, personal courage, ability to withstand incoming fire. While the second layer should primarily affect maneuver, delay, spotting etc. BUT it should also modify the first layer… kinda like how a platoon leader influences squads inside his combat range now. The difference would be that the squad leader will affect his men both in positive and negative ways depending on his "values".

IN CMBO and CMBB there is usually 3 squads per Platoon. Platoons usually have platoon leaders with special modifiers Morale Stealth Combat Leadership commad radius (whatever).

The suggestion above is therefore a request to differntiate ONE man in the squad (of between 7-12 I assume) as the Squad Leader and give that man special modifiers (Command Stealth combat and so on).

This is an interesting suggestion but it would appear to change the scale of the game yet again.

A specific Squad leader then would likely be the among the last to get hit and would presumably ALWAYS be in command radius of his squad (unless it spilt up I guess?)

It is an interesting concept this one person Singel Squad Leader Ability modifier.

GREAT thread

very interesting to read

I Hope Steve and Charles find it equally interesting

-tom w

[Tarquelne]

Can we (ie - you ) attach any numbers to the willingness of "green" troops to advance where more experienced troops would not? Probability, distance, increased tolerance for losses?

[Pak_43]

Good point Tarq... nigh on impossible...just a series of anecdotal evidence really...whether that's enough to back up the argument that green troops should advance into the teeth of a defence more actively than regulars or vets is v. hard to quantify...

I can only dig out a few references that might be relevant:

An observer wrote of an exhausted batt. of the 3rd div:

"The old sweats had gone to ground when they heard a Spandau, and the young re-inforcement, in action for the first time, thought that when his elders and betters did so he should too. Such is the state to which too much hard fighting and mental exhaustion can reduce a fine formation"

John Ellis also goes into a fair bit of detail of mens anticipation of their first taste of combat, and cites 3 individuals who declare that "the dominating emotion in my mind was an immense curiosity" and "curiosity was stronger than patriotism or politics and one went to the shooting with the speculative interest of a man examining a new microbe under a microscope"

one solder also notes that he was "unable to concieve of himself being killed, or even hit, and that fear was not uppermost in his mind"

A US Army survey asked it's Mediteranean soldiers whether "In general would you say that battle became more frightening or less frightening the more you saw of it?"

The response of the survey was:

74% more frightening

7% don't know

7% less frightening

12% Frightening all the time...

Food for thought? probably... a watertight case for engine amendment? almost certainly not...

[Stacheldraht]

Good point Tarq... nigh on impossible...just a series of anecdotal evidence really...

I've long found it interesting that the CM games are apparently extensively researched in terms of the OOB, armor penetration values, etc., but what sort of research did BTS do into the sorts of vital issues being discussed in this thread? Have they ever listed any sources or data? Have they discussed how they went about interpreting it? That could be quite illuminating.

If CM is supposed to be the pinnacle of realism in the field of WWII tactical combat simulation, then you have to wonder how much BTS is relying on expert evidence and interpretations in the realm of combat psychology. Before I see a tank's side turret armor angle correct, I'd rather see the infantry of the game acting in accordance with historical reality--insofar as one can ever implement programmed rules about human behavior and derive a realistic simulation.

[ November 05, 2002, 04:07 PM: Message edited by: Stacheldraht ]

[Andreas]

Stacheldraht, where exactly do you think the infantry does currently not conform to historical reality, within the boundaries of what can be done?

Let's see - want 14-year old HJ with no military training but imbued by the spirit of the Goetterdaemmerung? Take conscript fanatical infantry with lots of AT weapons and low ammo. (tick)

Battle-hardened vets after 5 days of combat in the ruins of Velikye-Lukyi? Veterans, unfit, low ammo @ 60% unit strength. (tick)

Relatively untrained, fresh, poorly led Luftwaffefelddivisionssoldaten ( )? Buy the unit, give it crap officers with no bonusses, make it green, fit. (tick)

Ueberhampster Finnish forest troopers in Ukraine? (tick)

Numerous examples abound. Instead of just insinuating that CMBB does model the armour fine, but the infantry not particularly well, why don't you outline what the problem is?

Has anyone here actually tried to play with unfit veterans? If not, give it a go. They come pretty close to the burnt-out chaps being talked about, IMO.

[xerxes]

I think there is great danger in relying on anecdotes of what green/new soldiers accomplished. Some of the bravest (foolish?) actions involved untested troops. The more important question is was this the norm or the exception?

A very similar thread to this one occured in CMBO. My personal opinion is that fanaticism is an appropriate and effective tool to use to create brave/green troops and can quite accurately simulate the examples brought up in this thread.

Experienced troops that have been battered and are at the point of collapse shouldn't be considered "veteran". Better to make these Green even though they've been through many battles.

All that aside, can you imagine the complaints if vets/cracks went to ground MORE easily then they do now? I can hear the howls.

[xerxes]

You forgot the Human Wave Andreas.

Proletariat Division pulled from the factory line, barely equipped that assaults and overruns a fortified position (with 80% casualties).

Soviet conscript, Fit, max fanaticism, 1/2 low ammo, 1/2 10-20 ammo loadout, commissar with +2 morale, +2 range.

The power of CMBB to model infantry is simply stunning. I've never seen a game that remotely approaches it.

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Stacheldraht, where exactly do you think the infantry does currently not conform to historical reality, within the boundaries of what can be done?

Let's see - want 14-year old HJ with no military training but imbued by the spirit of the Goetterdaemmerung? Take conscript fanatical infantry with lots of AT weapons and low ammo. (tick)

Battle-hardened vets after 5 days of combat in the ruins of Velikye-Lukyi? Veterans, unfit, low ammo @ 60% unit strength. (tick)

Relatively untrained, fresh, poorly led Luftwaffefelddivisionssoldaten ( )? Buy the unit, give it crap officers with no bonusses, make it green, fit. (tick)

Ueberhampster Finnish forest troopers in Ukraine? (tick)

Numerous examples abound. Instead of just insinuating that CMBB does model the armour fine, but the infantry not particularly well, why don't you outline what the problem is?

Has anyone here actually tried to play with unfit veterans? If not, give it a go. They come pretty close to the burnt-out chaps being talked about, IMO.

What if I want 17 yr old fanatic soldiers led by old combat hardened veteran squad leaders? I cant have that now can I?

I was assuming that we are "brainstorming" about features that we would like to see in CM3, not something that should be included in the next patch. Maybe I was wrong?

[JonS]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Ueberhampster Finnish forest troopers in Ukraine? (tick)

Really? I thought the Finns could only show up in 'North'?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

What if I want 17 yr old fanatic soldiers led by old combat hardened veteran squad leaders? I cant have that now can I?

I call them 'regulars'. Since CM does not currently model anything but the squad and not the individual soldier, what purpose does your 'want' serve in the current model? How do your guys work differently from what we currently have as a maneuver unit, without going to the modelling of the infividual soldier?

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

I was assuming that we are "brainstorming" about features that we would like to see in CM3, not something that should be included in the next patch. Maybe I was wrong?

No, but Stacheldraht's post quite clearly implied that the infantry model does not allow him a wide flexibility. I would argue that it does, and when acknowledging the constraints of soft-factor modelling, and the paucity of research on the topic (compared to armour strength) it is actually as good as it is going to get at the moment.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

Ueberhampster Finnish forest troopers in Ukraine? (tick)

Really? I thought the Finns could only show up in 'North'?</font>

[Abbott]

What if I want 17 yr old fanatic soldiers led by old combat hardened veteran squad leaders? I cant have that now can I?

Conscript troops, with high fanaticism and Crack Platoon leaders with bonuses would simulate that situation quite well. It is there right now. Not down to squad level but the available setup would produce the same results, game wise.

Squad leaders unless handled internally by the engine would certainly add to the micro management of the game. If handled internally would we see different results then we do now? If different, how much different and why? What would be gained over the present system by dropping down another tier? Would there be enough gained to make it reasonable or worthwhile? The present system is very flexible as is.

[ November 05, 2002, 04:53 PM: Message edited by: Abbott ]

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

What if I want 17 yr old fanatic soldiers led by old combat hardened veteran squad leaders? I cant have that now can I?

I call them 'regulars'. Since CM does not currently model anything but the squad and not the individual soldier, what purpose does your 'want' serve in the current model? How do your guys work differently from what we currently have as a maneuver unit, without going to the modelling of the infividual soldier?</font>