Infantry experience ratings and reactions to fire [LONG]

[John D Salt]

There has been much discussion about the way infantry react to fire in CM:BB as compared with CM:BO. I don't propose to re-hash the arguments about whether infantry in CM:BB is “too brittle” or whether this is “realistic”. I don't think “realism” is often a sensible topic where simulation models are concerned even when one has lots of trustworthy historical data, and in the question of people's reactions under fire is an area where we have very little numerical data of any kind.

Instead, what I'd like to suggest is that the way the experience system works in CM:BO and CM:BB (and for that matter in almost any historical or fantasy game with any kind of experience levels at all) is, in at least one important respect, backwards.

CM (and almost every other game I know) assumes that the more battle experience troops have, the more resistant they are to being suppressed or neutralised by incoming fire. The assumption seems to be that there is some kind of “hardening” process involved, and that prolonged exposure to combat accustoms men to it and makes them more psychologically resistant. Indeed, some of history's less competent military commanders have evidently believed that inexperienced troops needed to be “blooded”, or, like young gun-dogs, “shot over”.

For all that it is a wargamerly convention, this does not seem to me to match the known facts. Lord Moran (quoted in Richard Holmes' “Firing Line”, Jonathan Cape, London, 1985, published in the USA as “Acts of War”) says: “A man's courage is his capital, and he is always spending”. It is pretty well accepted that troops will suffer combat exhaustion after a period of 60 days or so in combat. “Firing Line”/”Acts of War” shows a nice graph due to Swank & Marchand, 1946, and similar material is to be found in various books I am too lazy to chivvy out of the bookcases right now (I'm thinking of John Ellis' “The Sharp End of War”, Peter Watson's “War on the Mind” and Hugh McManners' “The Scars of War”, but there are probably many others). Swank & Marchand's graph shows a rising curve of effectiveness for the first ten days as the soldier becomes “battle wise”, then a period of maximum efficiency lasting until 30 days, after which it reduces steadily through a “hyper-reactive” stage until it reaches a “vegetative” stage of complete exhaustion where the man is completely ineffective at about 60 days (the actual number of days varies by author; Swank & Marchand seem to have been dealing with especially intense combat).

There is no doubt that soldiers need to become accustomed to the sights and sounds of the battlefield before they can be fully effective -- that is the idea behind “battle inoculation”. The thing I imagine that soldiers acquire from experience is not greater courage, but an ability to assess more accurately the hazards present on the battlefield (and my reading of Holmes supports this). I would therefore expect that “green” troops may often be more willing to expose themselves to danger than veterans, even if the veterans are not worn-down by combat fatigue, because the “green” men may not realise how dangerous are the things they are doing.

The most striking historical example of this, from a British perspective, is doubtless the first day on the Somme. Most of the men who walked through the machine-gun fire on that day were Kitchener volunteers, who had never been in combat before and had little idea of what to expect on a modern battlefield. However, there are plenty of other examples of “green” troops showing great determination and being prepared to accept high levels of casualties without giving up. The “Kindermord bei Langemarck” (the “Massacre of the Innocents”) provides a WW1 example from the other side. 6th Para, the US 101st, the 12th SS “Hitler Jugend” and 47 Royal Marine Commando were all in action for the first time in Normandy, although admittedly these were formations with special selection criteria. The performance of the US 95th Infantry Divison at Metz, however (see Anthony Kemp's “Metz: The Unknown Battle) provides an example of a normal division performing very well on its first outing. One might also recall that the British divisions that did less well in Normandy tended to be those made up largely of the “old Desert hands”. As the old saying has it, “There are old soldiers, and there are bold soldiers, but there are no old, bold soldiers”.

Another old saying, used to “encourage” student pilots when they start learning to fly, is that you start with a full bag of luck and an empty bag of experience, and your aim is to fill the bag of experience before you empty the bag of luck. I think that a comparable view of infantry morale might be that you start with a full bag of courage and an empty bag of experience, and you progressively fill one as you empty the other.

I also suspect that the shared experience of combat builds social cohesion in small groups, and so I would imagine that troops who had been exposed to more combat would not only take cover quicker than green troops, but, having got used to the idea that combat is always completely shambolic, would re-organise and try again more quickly after each time they are driven to cover, and be less prone to spreading panic. This opinion is harder to substantiate from references, but I seem to recall that Eric Bowlby's “The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby” gives something of the flavour of this.

Instead of the Conscript/Green/Regular/Veteran/Crack/Elite levels of CM, then, I would imagine experience levels matched roughly to the phases of the Swank & Marchand graph:

Green (0-5 days of combat): Poor at estimating risk from enemy weapons, and so liable to reckless courage through sheer inexperience. Liable to spreading panic, and, once panicked, find it very hard to recover.

Fresh: (6-10 days of combat): Still bold and keen to prove themselves, but now with a better idea of the true dangers posed by different weapons and a more circumspect approach.

Experienced (11 to 40 days of combat): Make sound estimations of how dangerous things are, and so take cover promptly when the situation warrants, while ignoring wild or ineffectual fire. Recover fairly quickly from suppression or neutralisation.

Sticky (40 to 50 days of combat): Increasingly unwilling to take risks, over-estimating the danger of fire and taking longer to get going again having once gone to ground.

Fought out (50 to 60 days of combat): Inert, emotionally withdrawn from reality, taking no part in action even to ensure own survival, having lost all hope of survival. The only question is whether they will be evacuated as a psychological or a physical casualty.

I would imagine that the actions described as “fanatic” in CM would be those performed by soldiers in this last category who had somehow been goaded into action and, having lost all hope, demonstrate the “courage of despair”. Holmes recalls from Robert Graves' memoirs that units in this state “waste men wicked”; I would see this as being the psychological state of Japanese soldiers participating in Banzai charges or having to be killed in their spider-holes instead of surrendering, or of the soldiers in Russian or German punishment battalions.

There is plenty more to say on this subject, but I think I'll shut up and let other people say what they think about it before blethering again.

All the best,

John.

[Conscript Bagger]

I remember Doubler describing combat fatigue with a similar timeline. He added that combat-exhaustion cases could be "rehabilitated" with only a couple of days off the extreme front line - did your sources say anything in support of or in contradiction to this?

[JonS]

Thanks John. I alluded to this, rather ineffectually, in one of the other 'brittle infantry' threads. Nice to know I wasn't completely off my rocker Also nice to see some useful references.

Perhaps one could think of the current system (conscript, green, regular, vet, crack, elite) as reflecting mainly the level of training received, with a spot of experience thrown in?

If that is accepted, then perhaps one would need to have two seperate 'qualities' for units: training and experience. So, one could have regular training, but be sticky (7th Armd in Normandy), or elite training and be green or fresh (101st and 82nd AB respectively, again in Normandy).

Regards

JonS

[ November 04, 2002, 04:59 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Offwhite:

I remember Doubler describing combat fatigue with a similar timeline. He added that combat-exhaustion cases could be "rehabilitated" with only a couple of days off the extreme front line - did your sources say anything in support of or in contradiction to this?

Holmes mentions Graves mentioning (apologies for these references-within-references, but I don't have my own copy of "Goodbye to All That") that once an officer had reached a certain point the best thing to do was send him on a course in order to give him a few days' rest.

However, from what I've read of Moran's work elsewhere, I believe that once a man has reached the breaking point, he will never fully recover. It is therefore important to rotate men out of combat before they go over the edge.

This points up the importance of the contrasting troop rotation policies of the different nations. I believe that the British and Germans tried to rotate individuals. The Amercians and Russians, I believe, kept soldiers with their unit until they were made casualties or the war ended. What other nations did I have no idea -- troop rotation policies are not glamorous, and Osprey don't print pretty picture-books about them.

The British also had a policy of selecting a proportion of a unit's personnal to be LOB (Left Out of Battle) for specific actions, based on WW1 experience. The idea behind this was always to have a cadre of men to re-build a regiment destroyed in action, but presumably it gave people intermittent rest as well.

All the best,

John.

[Pak_43]

I can thoroughly recommend "The Sharp End of War" by John Ellis for an in-depth analysis of this topic which includes research by the US military after the war...

I'll post just two sections from this fascinating book but frankly I could post loads more...

"The answers to another American questionairre emphasised the prevalance of fear. This time a sample of infantryman were asked how far such feelings of fear actually impaired their ability in combat: 65 per cent of them, from a division in NW Europe, in August 1944 admitted that on at least one occasion they had been unable to perform adequately because of extreme fear, whilst 42 per cent admitted it had happened more than once."

He then posts some results of a survey of 2095 men from a Pacific division where 21% admitted to losing control of their bowels in combat... now bearing in mind the stigma of a man admitting this somewhat unmanly act the fact that 1-in-5 responded in this way, I leave you to speculate on the real percentage....

Also...

Captain Peter Cochrane serving in the Tunisian campaign has this to say:

"Nearly every attack involves some sort of re-grouping or change of line, even down to the lowly level of a platoon. With seasoned troops this can be done without loss of momentum, even if at the moment no-one is actually moving forward, but when the soldiers or their junior leaders are inexperienced and bewildered the pause to regroup can be fatal to success. This is not just due to the fact if one goes to ground under fire it requires a real effort of will to stand up again; it is also because in all the noise and danger of action one is inclined to think the worst. Any pause, therefore, can be taken by raw troops as a sign that the attack has already failed, where the old sweats will sit tight until the next command reaches them."

Hope this helps...

[JonS]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

The British also had a policy of selecting a proportion of a unit's personnal to be LOB (Left Out of Battle) for specific actions, based on WW1 experience...

With the four-company battalion, this proportion would sometimes be an entire company. In general ISTR that it was about 7%, drawn from all ranks.

...The idea behind this was always to have a cadre of men to re-build a regiment destroyed in action, but presumably it gave people intermittent rest as well.

Perhaps just as important as an actual rest (ie being LOBed) was the prospect of a potential rest (ie "well, I wasn't LOBed this time, maybe next time.") Hope can be a powerful emotion.

Regards

JonS

[Pak_43]

Sorry I meant to add this bit to the discussion...

The solution/amendment John proposes is exactly what the WRG WWI miniature rules use... units are rated for morale and experience, thus allowing a finer differentiation of units...allowing a differentiation between (for example) the veteran but distinctly "sticky" 7th Armoured in NW Europe and the raw but fanatical SS Hitler Jugend.. in the rules a unit is pinned when a proportion of the platoon is suppressed, the proportion differs upon experience... green units are harder to pin then experienced ones for example, but much easier to actually get to retreat when the morale threshold is reached....

my £0.02 pennies worth....

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JonS:

Thanks John. I alluded to this, rather ineffectually, in one of the other 'brittle infantry' threads. Nice to know I wasn't completely off my rocker Also nice to see some useful references.

Perhaps one could think of the current system (conscript, green, regular, vet, crack, elite) as reflecting mainly the level of training received, with a spot of experience thrown in?

Very sensible: I'd just like to add the words "and selection". AIUI the difference between paratroops and glider men in both the US and the UK, and between Army Commandos and Royal Marine Commandos, was that although all received comparable training, Paras and Army commandos were hand-picked, whereas glider men and Royal Marine Commandos were drafted en bloc. To some extent one might regard Territorial or National Guard units as more highly selected than draftees, because of the element of self-selection implicit in volunteering.

Originally posted by JonS:

If that is accepted, then perhaps one would need to have two seperate 'qualities' for units: training and experience. So, one could have regular training, but be sticky (7th Armd in Normandy), or elite training and be green or fresh (101st and 82nd AB respectively, again in Normandy).

A very astute comment, and just what I was going to suggest.

It should, I think, be the training level rather than the experience level that determines how extensive a repertoire of orders troops know how to obey. It might even be worth attempting to separate out skill-at-arms training and motivational training or selection; I imagine the early war SS, for example, and Russian infantry for much of the war, as fiercely well-motivated but tactically inept.

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Pak_43:

Sorry I meant to add this bit to the discussion...

The solution/amendment John proposes is exactly what the WRG WWI miniature rules use... units are rated for morale and experience, thus allowing a finer differentiation of units...allowing a differentiation between (for example) the veteran but distinctly "sticky" 7th Armoured in NW Europe and the raw but fanatical SS Hitler Jugend.. in the rules a unit is pinned when a proportion of the platoon is suppressed, the proportion differs upon experience... green units are harder to pin then experienced ones for example, but much easier to actually get to retreat when the morale threshold is reached....

my £0.02 pennies worth....

Actually the WRG 1925-1950 rules don't quite do that, but it's possible to analyse them in the way you've described -- as I did, so we're obviously thinking along similar lines.

The WRG use the categories INEPT, GREEN, STUBBORN, DASHING, SKILLED, THRUSTING, FANATIC and IRREGULAR.

Within the classes STUBBORN, DASHING, SKILLED and THRUSTING, you could reasonably say that the DASHING and THRUSTING troops are aggressive, and the SKILLED and THRUSTING troops are well-trained.

The WRG also use the idea of different tactical repertoires to reflect levels of training; STUBBORN and DASHING troops cannot use Skirmish mode, and GREEN and INEPT troops cannot use either Stalk or Skirmish.

All the best,

John.

[Enoch]

I think there is something to this argument. I have run across similar references to diminishing combat capabilities the longer a unit is in combat but i always wondered if a unit was taken off the line if it regained some of its capability.

I haven't had enough time to dig into CMBB, but does the fitness rating for units take this into consideration at all? Or is that simply mean that weakend units will tire more rapidly?

[JonS]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

... I'd just like to add the words "and selection".

Agreed, but would it make much difference in game terms?

...It should, I think, be the training level rather than the experience level that determines how extensive a repertoire of orders troops know how to obey...

Concur.

[Gpig]

Outstanding thread, gentlemen.

Do go on!

My only contribution would be that Fanatical troops would occur more randomly across experience levels than just past "fought out."

Very interesting . . .

Gpig

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JonS:

Agreed, but would it make much difference in game terms?

Only to explain the slight difference in rating between people who had done the exact same course at Achnacarry, really.

All the best,

John.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

[

It should, I think, be the training level rather than the experience level that determines how extensive a repertoire of orders troops know how to obey. It might even be worth attempting to separate out skill-at-arms training and motivational training or selection; I imagine the early war SS, for example, and Russian infantry for much of the war, as fiercely well-motivated but tactically inept.

All the best,

John.[/QB]

I agree entirely and have put forward such argument before on how combat experience does not make better solders and can actually result in the opposite. (along with Andreas in one of the innumerable “we want a campaign with troops gaining experience threads.) Poorly performing units remain so no matter how many times they've been in combat ie 6 DWR, German 276 ID.

But I do believe that "fiercely well-motivated but tactically inept." can already be recreated within CM by applying Green troops with fanatism. Where it falls down is creating well trained yet unblooded troops such as the Paras and 12SS. Then of course there is the difference in the amount of live fire exercises carried out by the 17yr old SS soldiers under 4 year war Veterans, Paras and Commandos versus the traditional “square bashing” that line Infantry had to put up with.

The problem I see in game, is if such distinctions make much difference. As BTS seems to regard experience as a combination of combat and training experience. If anything this modelling really makes a difference if BTS actually creates a campaign system following a coy/battalion through the war.

[ November 04, 2002, 06:08 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Andreas]

Don,

I think 6DWR is maybe not a good example - excuse me for not getting out the reference, but weren't they shot up again and again and then again in just two days, losing almost all their officers? I think the 'not a team player' Lt.Col. who wrote the report that got them disbanded mentioned they had ceased being a unit, and instead became a collection of individuals. Looking at John's figures, 6DWR never had a chance to waking up. The batallion never knew what hit it.

Great thread, BTW.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

I would imagine that the actions described as “fanatic” in CM would be those performed by soldiers in this last category who had somehow been goaded into action and, having lost all hope, demonstrate the “courage of despair”. Holmes recalls from Robert Graves' memoirs that units in this state “waste men wicked”; I would see this as being the psychological state of Japanese soldiers participating in Banzai charges or having to be killed in their spider-holes instead of surrendering, or of the soldiers in Russian or German punishment battalions..

True enough, but it could also mean those too young, stupid and/or inexperienced to know better. Look at the Hitler Youth division in Normandy - individual riflemen at the battle of Buron in early July 44 had to be blasted out of their slit trenches by direct 75mm gunfire, so fiercely did they resist. Perhaps there was a glimmer of "no hope" amongst those whose families had been killed in the bombing, etc., but for many, they were simply very well indoctrinated in the culture of sacrifice that the SS seemed to have bred.

I think you could apply it to many of the Russians in Stalingrad as well, who fought tenaciously out of not desperation, but simple inexperience or lack of self-preservational instinct due to faith in their superiors, etc.?

No doubt what you say was true, but I would not categorize it as the only possible source of fanaticism (if that is what you are trying to do, apologies if not).

[Mark Gallear]

US Army studies seem to suggest the opposite – troops who go into battle for the first time take more risks are more willing to move under fire than more experienced troops. As time goes on and casualties are taken the less willing they are to move forward under fire. However, the more training and esprit de core they have the better they will fight and then longer before total battle fatigue sets in and they just cower and rarely fire their weapons.

The US airborne troops did far better than other units who had like them had no battle experience but had extremely good training, the units had better selection and they knew that they were volunteering for a dangerous but important task. British Airborne and commando units by D-Day were largely picked from battle experience units and had extra training – it is hard to say that they did better during D-Day and Market Garden than their American counterparts. (Although it is hard to believe that any troops at any time fought harder the British Paras at Arnhem).

The US Army studies do not really explain SS units that kept fighting all the way through the war at a high level of effectiveness. Although individual case studies show signs of such battle stress occurring in these units. British interrogations of SS commanders where amazed at the fanastism and loyalty shown to Hitler that translated into fighting ability, which few allied units matched in the name of democracy. Perhaps this is just a British perception rather than a reality.

I think Battlefronts line that a unit's effectiveness is decided before a battle begins is largely correct. It can only really go down hill not up. I think this is true even if you push the operation system as I did in my Polar Bears op which simulated over a months fighting.

German troops before the invasion of Russia had tasted nothing but victory and that by itself increased their confidence.

Russian Guards units were formed from units that had been successful – they were giving slightly better equipment and possible some extra training.

[Zarquon]

It would be nice to have a 'fanaticism indicator' for troops (only with FOW off, of course). The way it is now you cannot really say if a unit is fanatic or just plain lucky when rolling for morale effects.

Another question is the definition of 'being more resistant to fire'. I think in CM troop experience implies higher morale (i.e. stress resistance) as well as the ability to make better use of all available cover. This should be reflected by making veteran troops harder to hit, especially while using Assault/Advance, than green troops.

Or is it that exposure is already related to experience in the game and nobody told me?

Afterthought : imagine the cries of disappointment in the forum when BTS broke with wargame convention and made veteran troops hit the ground earlier than greens.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Don,

I think 6DWR is maybe not a good example - excuse me for not getting out the reference, but weren't they shot up again and again and then again in just two days, losing almost all their officers? I think the 'not a team player' Lt.Col. who wrote the report that got them disbanded mentioned they had ceased being a unit, and instead became a collection of individuals. Looking at John's figures, 6DWR never had a chance to waking up. The batallion never knew what hit it.

Great thread, BTW.

Not sure I agree, the Officer in question indicated that the 6 DWR should be pulled back for reconsitution and re traning becasue the entire regt had become "shell shocked." Monty was the one who came down hard on the unit and the Officer, describing him as "not a proper chap."

Also 6 DWR although on the edge of the spectrum is not alone in losing cohesiveness the longer they are held in combat.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by John D Salt:

I would imagine that the actions described as “fanatic” in CM would be those performed by soldiers in this last category who had somehow been goaded into action and, having lost all hope, demonstrate the “courage of despair”. Holmes recalls from Robert Graves' memoirs that units in this state “waste men wicked”; I would see this as being the psychological state of Japanese soldiers participating in Banzai charges or having to be killed in their spider-holes instead of surrendering, or of the soldiers in Russian or German punishment battalions..

True enough, but it could also mean those too young, stupid and/or inexperienced to know better. Look at the Hitler Youth division in Normandy - individual riflemen at the battle of Buron in early July 44 had to be blasted out of their slit trenches by direct 75mm gunfire, so fiercely did they resist. Perhaps there was a glimmer of "no hope" amongst those whose families had been killed in the bombing, etc., but for many, they were simply very well indoctrinated in the culture of sacrifice that the SS seemed to have bred.

I think you could apply it to many of the Russians in Stalingrad as well, who fought tenaciously out of not desperation, but simple inexperience or lack of self-preservational instinct due to faith in their superiors, etc.?

No doubt what you say was true, but I would not categorize it as the only possible source of fanaticism (if that is what you are trying to do, apologies if not).</font>

[Abbott]

Let us not forget the fact that experience in combat is key. Knowing what your weapon and fellows are capable of and not capable of is the important factor. This may apply to smaller units more then the broad studies quoted above.

Men first perform as to their individual abilities and training, which can be heightened or degraded by the abilities of those around them and their equipment. The influx of untested troops mixed with combat veterans also brings about different possibilities.

I believe most references describe studies on a larger scale then the few squads we fight in Combat Mission.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Bastables:

Also 6 DWR although on the edge of the spectrum is not alone in losing cohesiveness the longer they are held in combat.

What I meant was that they only saw three days days of combat in total, not enough to get them up the curve (especially if you condiers they lost close to 50% casualties in those three days).

[Guest Mike]

Green troops throughout history have often been keener, but ultimately less effective, than veterans.

Examples abound - French "sans Culottes" in the Revolutionary wars (ultimately absorbed by regulars), Royalist Cavaliers in the ECW (ultimately beaten by Roundheads), some raw Hoplites in the heyday of the Greeks (eg Syracusan hoplites vs Athenians in Sicily a couple of times), Early Roman legions at times, and of course new recruits to the firing line in WW1, including the whole American army in 1917!

Not always, and not everywhere, but often enough to not be a surprise.

[tar]

The thing I imagine that soldiers acquire from experience is not greater courage, but an ability to assess more accurately the hazards present on the battlefield (and my reading of Holmes supports this). I would therefore expect that “green” troops may often be more willing to expose themselves to danger than veterans, even if the veterans are not worn-down by combat fatigue, because the “green” men may not realise how dangerous are the things they are doing.

If you are looking for additional supporting "evidence", I recall reading about something along these lines in Ambrose's Band of Brothers. It described an incident in which one (or more -- it's been a while) men climbed up a tree to get a better view of the battlefield. This was in Normandy after the initial drop. The veterans relating the story said that it was something they would never do again. They had learned too much about how dangerous that was.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bastables:

Also 6 DWR although on the edge of the spectrum is not alone in losing cohesiveness the longer they are held in combat.

What I meant was that they only saw three days days of combat in total, not enough to get them up the curve (especially if you condiers they lost close to 50% casualties in those three days).</font>