Infantry experience ratings and reactions to fire [LONG]

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by Pak_43:

[QB]Good point Tarq... nigh on impossible...just a series of anecdotal evidence really

I hope it isn't _that_ difficult, I've been suprised before with some of the studies that have been done and are known of here. I am curious as the the frequency of reckless but brave behavior from "green" troops, though. I've not idea how representational of common events the anecdotes I've heard or read are.

OTOH, Combat accounts/unit histories I've read are more understandable when the "phases" mentioned in the first post are applied - I'd love to see them added to the game. Commanders may have seldom used the terminology of the JS's post, but they often seemed acutely aware of the phenomena. (And no, I'm not going define "acutely aware" as it applies here, or supply any references. )

(Well trained and Fit but "Sticky" troops would be especially interesting to play with, IMO.)

I think the most basic point in JS's first post - that a troop's quality and "experience" aren't tied together as closely as some - CM, for example - often imply. "Training" might be a better word than "Experience" to describe the Con/Grn/Reg/Vet/Crk/Elt spectrum in CM, but it doesn't really cover everything either. "Quality" is probably too vauge... not the word used doesn't matters all that much. Maybe not in QBs, but using the editor I think every one of the "phases" mentioned other than "Sticky" can be seen in CM. Use "Experience" for training, apply "Fanaticism" if Green or Fought Out, and use Fitness for fatigue and possibly for Fought Out. That's pretty good.

Of course "pretty good" doesn't seem good enough for BFC... or the grognard players, at least. Here's hoping "Battle Experience" (Combat Fatigue?) makes it into the next game.

(The spread of panic mentioned in the first post is something I'd like to see in CM too. Expressed perhaps as the ability for troops, esp. poorly trained troops, to become "Sticky" during a battle? Or does Global Morale already cover this?)

[JonS]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

Ueberhampster Finnish forest troopers in Ukraine? (tick)

I thought the Finns could only show up in 'North'?</font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

We have platoon leaders and we have squads. We should have platoon leaders, squad leaders and soldiers.

Okay, I see what you want now. Interesting proposition.

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Abbott:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> What if I want 17 yr old fanatic soldiers led by old combat hardened veteran squad leaders? I cant have that now can I?

Conscript troops, with high fanaticism and Crack Platoon leaders with bonuses would simulate that situation quite well. It is there right now. Not down to squad level but the available setup would produce the same results, game wise.

Squad leaders unless handled internally by the engine would certainly add to the micro management of the game. If handled internally would we see different results then we do now? If different, how much different and why? What would be gained over the present system by dropping down another tier? Would there be enough gained to make it reasonable or worthwhile? The present system is very flexible as is.</font>

[Stacheldraht]

Stacheldraht, where exactly do you think the infantry does currently not conform to historical reality, within the boundaries of what can be done?

I didn't say it doesn't conform to historical reality. I wasn't in WWII, nor am I a qualified expert on this particular subject of combat psychology/infantry behavior in WWII. I've heard some of the same points about combat stress described in this thread in various documentaries and books, though, which leads me to wonder about how it's modeled in CM.

I'm asking a) how accurate is the modeling? and what specific scientific research has BTS relied on to recreate the historical realities of troop behavior in WWII insofar as they are documented and understood?

The material in the first post of this thread (and some of the source material alluded to throughought this thread) leads me to wonder how accurate the modelling in the game is and how it might be improved upon.

[Tarquelne]

Edited out because Lt. H's last post made his position clear.

[ November 05, 2002, 05:04 PM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]

[Cpt.Kloss]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JonS:

Thanks John. I alluded to this, rather ineffectually, in one of the other 'brittle infantry' threads. Nice to know I wasn't completely off my rocker Also nice to see some useful references.

Perhaps one could think of the current system (conscript, green, regular, vet, crack, elite) as reflecting mainly the level of training received, with a spot of experience thrown in?

Very sensible: I'd just like to add the words "and selection". AIUI the difference between paratroops and glider men in both the US and the UK, and between Army Commandos and Royal Marine Commandos, was that although all received comparable training, Paras and Army commandos were hand-picked, whereas glider men and Royal Marine Commandos were drafted en bloc. To some extent one might regard Territorial or National Guard units as more highly selected than draftees, because of the element of self-selection implicit in volunteering.

Originally posted by JonS:

If that is accepted, then perhaps one would need to have two seperate 'qualities' for units: training and experience. So, one could have regular training, but be sticky (7th Armd in Normandy), or elite training and be green or fresh (101st and 82nd AB respectively, again in Normandy).

A very astute comment, and just what I was going to suggest.

It should, I think, be the training level rather than the experience level that determines how extensive a repertoire of orders troops know how to obey. It might even be worth attempting to separate out skill-at-arms training and motivational training or selection; I imagine the early war SS, for example, and Russian infantry for much of the war, as fiercely well-motivated but tactically inept.

All the best,

John.</font>

[Abbott]

But that is the entire idea....

(Snipped to be brief)

I am having a difficult time understanding how much different you believe this would make game play. The system is so flexible at the present time everything discussed can already be simulated.

A platoon made up of a veteran squad, a regular squad a green squad would simulate the different ideas you have posted nicely. Without adding squad leaders to an already complex and flexible system. The simulation seems to already accomplish all these things.

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Abbott:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> But that is the entire idea....

(Snipped to be brief)

I am having a difficult time understanding how much different you believe this would make game play. The system is so flexible at the present time everything discussed can already be simulated.

A platoon made up of a veteran squad, a regular squad a green squad would simulate the different ideas you have posted nicely. Without adding squad leaders to an already complex and flexible system. The simulation seems to already accomplish all these things.</font>

[JonS]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

Another thing that would be good with adding another layer (the squad leader) is that it will be possible to add "bad" leaders. Right now we dont have any leaders with negative influence.

Not at the squad level, but you could create a platoon that had three elite squads and a conscript Pn HQ (to take an extreme example). That would simulate some of the effects of having a bad leader, I should think.

A note on fanaticism: While a useful tool to add another 'dimension' to the units overall 'quality', doesn't it affect all units on the map equally(ie all your units have the same chance of going fanatic)? There will be situations were that isn't appropriate.

Regards

JonS

[Abbott]

Ok, over to the question on how this would affect game play. I can think of a thousand uses for these new squad leaders. We are opening up another "dimension" of fire effects, morale effects, you name it. The best part of it is that the game engine handles it internally. We never have to worry about it, we only see the results. But the game engine is able to simulate more effectively the complexity of a battlefield situation.

I am in agreement with anything that makes CMBO/CMBB better. I am still failing to see how adding this would effect the simulation much differently then is already possible though.

[Abbott]

A note on fanaticism: While a useful tool to add another 'dimension' to the units overall 'quality', doesn't it affect all units on the map equally(ie all your units have the same chance of going fanatic)? There will be situations were that isn't appropriate.

Regards

JonS

Ahh, now that is a good point and helps me to understand LT's position a bit clearer.

[Khane]

I do not read too much statistics but I am sure that they certainly represent more correctly some average soldier of different units at different levels of experience than my personal experience. According this personal experience , the experience of my friends from my unit and other soldiers' experience from other units that I knew ,it seems that a well trained soldier of a high level unit with combat experience may in certain circumstances break and panic when under the same conditions soldiers with less or no combat experience won't panic. There is no rules. An Airborne soldier may become "sticky" not after 40 to 50 days of combat as described in the Swank & Marchand graph but just one second after the first bullet ever fired on him passed over his head.

I have seen an Airborne officer (platoon commander) of my company , with real combat experience who suddenly broke up during the October war of 1973 in the Egyptian front when five soldiers under his command were transformed into a distorted piece of bones and flesh and metal by an Egyptian arty shell. The guy just sat , trembling , babbling ,crying without being able to move for long minutes , keeping his head as close as possible to the ground while soldiers with no previous combat experience and some with very basic training , like drivers of ammunitions trucks were going on functioning , almost dying of fear and with wet pans , but more or less functioning.

According what I have seen , when bullets are flying above your head , shells falling and you know it's for real , there is in general no difference between the reaction of well trained Airborne troops with or without combat experience and regular infantry troops with or without real combat experience : all instinctively fall and stick to the ground at the same speed. The experience of a soldier is important with matters like handling weapons , understanding orders , executing orders on the best side , identifying threats , better spotting , identifying from which direction they are being fired from , understanding complex situations and many other technical stuff but all that has nothing or very little to do with panicking or not in real combat. It depends also on what you call "combat experience". According my experience ( and that of course is only my experience ) the more your experience has been traumatic and the more horrors you have seen the less you are willing to combat and the more you are frightened. To look at distorted pieces of dead body is less dangerous than a bullet flying one centimeter from your right hear but far more traumatic.

Among the soldiers that I knew , without exception , all those who had some experience of real combat were far more afraid of the possibility of engaging combat than those who had no experience of the real thing. The more the experience was long and horrific the more they were afraid to fight and far more unwilling to take risks

Any average 17 years teenager fed up to the nose and hears with cheap romantic war literature, "heroic" but unrealistic war movies ( even if Saving Private Ryan would be in 3D it would be very far from depicting the real thing ) and PC wargames (even the so called "realistic" ) , has only a very "romantic" ( and terribly false ) idea about what war and real combat situations are and he is without any doubt far more fanatic , motivated and impatient to get some real action than an Elite unit veteran with real combat experience. Generally the romantic and heroic vision of the war vanishes with the apparition of the first real bullet fired at you for real by a real enemy. Then your "curiosity" and anticipation are satisfied and a fanatic + motivated soldier may panic at his first real experience while the scared and not so motivated soldier next to him may react with less panic.

Now , back to wargames and CM...

As I understand the "Conscript/Green/Regular/Veteran/Crack/Elite" classification in CMBO/CMBB , it models a mixture of level of training , fitness /physical conditioning and combat experience. According the CMBB manual :

Conscript = "Third line" troops who received little or no training....Certain combat arms like Airborne troops and Gebirgsjager which always required a certain amount of training and physical fitness...cannot be conscripts

Green = second line troop. Received basic training but have little if any combat experience.

Veteran = first line troop who received first class training (airborne , SS troops ) and/or haven proven themselves in combat and regular infantry units with long combat histories and so on with Crack and Elite

All that is fine and sounds a legitimate choice even if it does not cover all the possibilities of real life , but I am a bit confused with this classification : in a QB you may pick Green Gebirgsjager or Green Fallschirmjager units and then among the platoons you find one conscript squad ! How can Fallschirmjager troops ( first line top trained units) be "conscripts" in CM if according the CMBB manual a "conscript" is "third line troops ( which a Fallschirmjager is not ) or a Green ( troops who received basic training ) ? Of course that's perfectly possible in real life since any Fallschirmjager at some stage of his career is a conscript. How does CM for example modeled Airborne / Gebirgsjager troops with no combat experience if according the manual, troops without real combat experience can be only Conscript ( little or no training ) or Green ( received basic training ). Is a "conscript/Green Gebirgsjager squad" a possibility not included in the manual but modeled in CMBB ?

Any improvement is welcome but I am quite satisfied with way CM modeled certain among many human reaction.

Khane

[ November 05, 2002, 06:22 PM: Message edited by: Khane ]

[Schoerner]

The opinions not agreeing with a much more complex system reminded me, that implementing more details doesn't really have to mean, that realism AND gameplay/fun is increased.

As the discussion shows CMBB is already capable to simulate MANY different conditions and maybe we are sometimes losing the focus, why CM is THAT much attractive. The developing of the thread reminded me of the first moments, why i started to love CM: not the showing of a huge amount of variables was the key for fascination, but the realistic behaviour of the units under certain connditions.

Following this thought, maybe only a few changes/improvements will bring the game even more forwards, than completely redesigned unit-conditions.

I'm interested in your opinions, which SMALL changes could be made, for greatly increasing unit's realism AND gameplay/fun.

I have to admit, that atm i have no idea, how this great system could be made even better. And this is a good sign, i guess.

[Simon Fox]

I beleive that BTS have indicated in previous discussions on the subject that they will look seriously at a more complex mechanism for modelling morale/experience than the current one when the engine is rewritten. It is likely that limitations in the current engine preclude anything other than minor tweaking of the system as it exists.

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=12;t=000556;p=2

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=12;t=001593

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=13;t=012130;p=7

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Has anyone here actually tried to play with unfit veterans? If not, give it a go. They come pretty close to the burnt-out chaps being talked about, IMO.

That was the first thought that came to my mind too, Andreas, when I began to read this thread. But then I had a second thought. AIUI, fitness effects not only morale issues, but physical stamina as well. It might be the case in many instances that that would be okay, such as depicting troops who have been in the line for many consecutive days and are well and truly worn out. But what about the case of, say, the 7th. Armoured again? Veteran troops, in good physical shape, but pretty well fought out. How do we model them within the existing system? They are healthy, they are just sick of the war and feel that they have done their share already.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

(The spread of panic mentioned in the first post is something I'd like to see in CM too. Expressed perhaps as the ability for troops, esp. poorly trained troops, to become "Sticky" during a battle? Or does Global Morale already cover this?)

This is modeled (after a fashion) by routing troops bumping unbroken troops from their foxholes. Two birds with one stone, eh?

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

I dont want to see hundreds of small squad leaders...

Then how would you know what their ratings were, or how well they were functioning in the game? For that matter, how do you know that they aren't already in the game and accounted for, since by your description they would be invisible to the player?

I agree with your assertion that non-coms are the backbone of any army, that seems self-evident. But I think when you start talking about modeling their individual effects, you are talking about a different game than CM. It might be a very interesting game and a project well worth taking on. But it is on a different scale than CM.

I think for CM, the effect of non-coms is factored in among all the other things that go to make up a squad's overall experience rating. CM is just one level too coarse to separate out buck sergeants and corporals for modeling.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Khane:

According what I have seen , when bullets are flying above your head , shells falling and you know it's for real , there is in general no difference between the reaction of well trained Airborne troops with or without combat experience and regular infantry troops with or without real combat experience : all instinctively fall and stick to the ground at the same speed. The experience of a soldier is important with matters like handling weapons , understanding orders , executing orders on the best side , identifying threats , better spotting , identifying from which direction they are being fired from , understanding complex situations and many other technical stuff but all that has nothing or very little to do with panicking or not in real combat.

A shrewd observation and a very good post.

Michael

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

I dont want to see hundreds of small squad leaders...

Then how would you know what their ratings were, or how well they were functioning in the game? For that matter, how do you know that they aren't already in the game and accounted for, since by your description they would be invisible to the player?

I agree with your assertion that non-coms are the backbone of any army, that seems self-evident. But I think when you start talking about modeling their individual effects, you are talking about a different game than CM. It might be a very interesting game and a project well worth taking on. But it is on a different scale than CM.

I think for CM, the effect of non-coms is factored in among all the other things that go to make up a squad's overall experience rating. CM is just one level too coarse to separate out buck sergeants and corporals for modeling.

Michael</font>

[Schoerner]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=13;t=012130;p=7

So we maybe will get morale levels and experience and training levels shown seperately with the engine rewrite.

Never thought BTS already did make that much research. This explains why CM is what it is.

[Tero]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

Instead of the conscript/Green/Regular/Veteran/Crack/Elite levels of CM, then, I would imagine experience levels matched roughly to the phases of the Swank & Marchand graph:

Green (0-5 days of combat):

Fresh: (6-10 days of combat):

Experienced (11 to 40 days of combat):

Sticky (40 to 50 days of combat):

Fought out (50 to 60 days of combat):

The überFinns throw in a monkey wrench. Again.

The Finnish army endured 105 days of continuous front line action under extreme weather conditions during Winter War.

There were basically three types of fronts.

- Static with 2 stints of combat with a reatively quiet period in between. Practically no rotation to the rear for R&R. Rotation from front line to reserve and back only. Being in reserves meant fixing the entrencments at night and counter attacks by day.

- Static with continuous, increasing pressure by the enemy. Practically no rotation to the rear for R&R. Rotation from front line to reserve and back only. Being in reserves meant fixing the entrencments at night and counter attacks by day.

- volatile (mobile actions against an encirceled enemy) with continuous action. Barely adequate rotation to the rear for R&R. Some units in blocking positions were under similar conditions as in the two other examples.

Your proposed list leaves out at least one factor:

- Fear of death (or the acknowledgement of the possibility of your own demise).

"Fear of dying at the last minute of the engagement" - syndrome is a factor related to the experience meter you gave though.

One factor perculiar to the Finns during WWII was not the fear of death itself but the possibility of your body not being salvaged to be buried in your home cemetary.

I would imagine that the actions described as “fanatic” in CM would be those performed by soldiers in this last category who had somehow been goaded into action and, having lost all hope, demonstrate the “courage of despair”.

That explains only a part of the "fanatic" behaviour. IMO there is behaviour that is "fanatic" and what can be called to be "berserker". Fanatic troops act as a group while berserkers are individuals. Can't really see a whole decimated platoon turn "fanatic" but I can see individuals of that unit turn berserk.

[ November 06, 2002, 09:12 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[JRRRT]

In many of the units cited, the leadership may have been the key to unit strength. 12 SS for instance, was officered and, more importantly, NCO'd by Ostfront vets. The undoing of certain British units in Normandy may have been due more to lack of replacements than poor performance...It is less disruptive to bnlend a couple of shot-up units than create new ones.

Soviet performance is an enigma, and was, even to the Germans...How much due to NKVD? Good comment re: deterioration of performance over time. One of the books puts it well...Early on it's "not me"...I'm too strong, wrapped tightly, keen, etc. A few combat days later: "Well, I might get it, but..." assuming a "Blighty" wound. Finally..."I'm fricking doomed, and that's it." There have been unreported failures to obey and desertions (bombers deliberately flying off to Switzerland - rapid surrender of many troops during "Bulge")among both green and veteran troops. Good comments.

[Spook]

Well, I'm compelled to monkey-wrench your monkey wrench, tero, and say that "105 days of front line action" is not sufficiently compelling. In fact, as will be related further below, one could even speculate that the Finns were actually wimps.

How so? Please bear with me later on below. But first, I must return to one of John's original quotes:

Originally posted by John D Salt:

For all that it is a wargamerly convention, this does not seem to me to match the known facts. Lord Moran (quoted in Richard Holmes' “Firing Line”, Jonathan Cape, London, 1985, published in the USA as “Acts of War”) says: “A man's courage is his capital, and he is always spending”. It is pretty well accepted that troops will suffer combat exhaustion after a period of 60 days or so in combat. “Firing Line”/”Acts of War” shows a nice graph due to Swank & Marchand, 1946, and similar material is to be found in various books I am too lazy to chivvy out of the bookcases right now (I'm thinking of John Ellis' “The Sharp End of War”, Peter Watson's “War on the Mind” and Hugh McManners' “The Scars of War”, but there are probably many others). Swank & Marchand's graph shows a rising curve of effectiveness for the first ten days as the soldier becomes “battle wise”, then a period of maximum efficiency lasting until 30 days, after which it reduces steadily through a “hyper-reactive” stage until it reaches a “vegetative” stage of complete exhaustion where the man is completely ineffective at about 60 days (the actual number of days varies by author; Swank & Marchand seem to have been dealing with especially intense combat).

You see, there is the key, which has been little broached in prior discussion: what do we all mean by "60 days of combat" or even of "intense combat"? I don't even think as that "front line action" can be equated to this term, because, as tero noted in his above post, being in the lines doesn't necessarily mean being directly in battle all the time.

The "60 days" figure seems rather small, when compared against the length of WWII overall. To combat veterans, however, it would of course seem an eternity if they were keeping track.

In my own opinion (subject to correction), intense combat would represent any combat situation in which a soldier came under fire that impressed upon him that he had a chance of becoming a casualty from that engagement. He walks away from the battle unhurt, but it's added on along with the memories of other earlier battles and making him ponder more on his odds of coming through by war's end or being taken off the line.

Consider, by added example, the typical tour of US and British bomber aircrews flying over western Europe. The USAAF tour was 25 missions (increased to 35 by 1944), and 30 for the RAF. In the timeframe of 1942-43, loss percentages per mission were projected in Allied planning to "average" at about 5% or so. This might even had been conveyed to the bomber crews at one time or another. So, assuming the early USAAF case of 25 missions (with no more than one mission a day), a bomber crewman might not cringe at a 95% survival chance for any one mission. But thinking on 95% taken over 25 missions --- that means a survival chance for the whole tour of just under 28%.

Now getting back to the soldier on the line, assume that for each battle he was in, casualties in killed & wounded were also only 5%. (EXTREMELY unlikely for combat units!!) Further assuming no more than one engagement in a day, then after 60 days (engagements), his survival chance goes down to less than 5% overall.

So, it's probably little surprise about combat exhaustion setting in after about 60 engagements of "intense combat." Not that the combat soldiers were all busy calculating odds between engagements, but most could intuitively sense that after 60 days of close battle, the odds were so heavily stacked against them. And this is just of the surviving soldiers who made it through those many days of close fighting, without further considering the effect of seeing everyone else who started out with them already being killed or maimed.

But the central intangible is how those "60 days" play out. Here again, how of the days of front line action add to the "intense combat" toll? And how are they distributed? I vaguely recall one postwar study of British WWII soldiers being able to "stay on the line" about 300 or 400 days average, but don't recall the source. That's quite a larger figure than the "60 days," but here again, the issue is of how many of those days (again averaged) featured intense combat.

This is what I was teasing about on the "105 days of front line action" for the Finns, tero. That seems low as compared to UK or Commonwealth soldiers. Of course, the whole issue is what exactly is being compared here in terms of "front line action."

In sum, it's immensely variable from unit to unit as to how many soldiers in that unit have seen 40-60 days of intense combat, and thus are becoming "old lags" on a significant scale, even within just one squad. Chances are nonetheless VERY low that a WWII squad is going to have a majority of its soldiers, as having come through enough days of combat as survivors, as to make "combat exhaustion" something to easily scale for.

[Spook]

I will add, however, that I did apply the "old lag" factor in a personal edit of the "Juggernaut" scenario for the game Airborne Assault. And truth be told, I do like how certain factors like training, experience, leadership, and morale are all seperable to be modified individually in that game for each unit.

In the "Juggernaut" scenario, this features a full-strength British 30th Corps facing off against German II SS Panzer Corps. Included in the UK formations are the 43rd, 50th, and 52nd Infantry divisions, and the Guards Armoured.

By my editing, I modified so that the 50th Division had relatively greater overall experience and leadership efficiency than for the other units. However, allowing that enough "old hands" are in the combat units that could trace back from fighting since in North Africa and onwards, I also made the 50th's units to have marginally lower morale than for the other units.

But again, this presupposes that enough veterans are around in the 50th Division, as survivors, to make it more "sticky" unit.