Infantry experience ratings and reactions to fire [LONG]

[Tero]

Originally posted by Spook:

Well, I'm compelled to monkey-wrench your monkey wrench, tero, and say that "105 days of front line action" is not sufficiently compelling.

What are your sources on this ?

In fact, as will be related further below, one could even speculate that the Finns were actually wimps.

How so? Please bear with me later on below. But first, I must return to one of John's original quotes:

Lay on, McSpook !!!

Originally posted by John D Salt:

For all that it is a wargamerly convention, this does not seem to me to match the known facts. Lord Moran (quoted in Richard Holmes' “Firing Line”, Jonathan Cape, London, 1985, published in the USA as “Acts of War”) says: “A man's courage is his capital, and he is always spending”. It is pretty well accepted that troops will suffer combat exhaustion after a period of 60 days or so in combat. “Firing Line”/”Acts of War” shows a nice graph due to Swank & Marchand, 1946, and similar material is to be found in various books I am too lazy to chivvy out of the bookcases right now (I'm thinking of John Ellis' “The Sharp End of War”, Peter Watson's “War on the Mind” and Hugh McManners' “The Scars of War”, but there are probably many others). Swank & Marchand's graph shows a rising curve of effectiveness for the first ten days as the soldier becomes “battle wise”, then a period of maximum efficiency lasting until 30 days, after which it reduces steadily through a “hyper-reactive” stage until it reaches a “vegetative” stage of complete exhaustion where the man is completely ineffective at about 60 days (the actual number of days varies by author; Swank & Marchand seem to have been dealing with especially intense combat).

It is a bit unclear if the 60 days of combat is continuous or scattered over a period of up to a year. The Finnish troops were engaged in continous front line conditions for over 105 days (the troops had been mobilized and positioned well before the war actually broke out) all of which must be considred to have been intense combat. When talking about averages.

You see, there is the key, which has been little broached in prior discussion: what do we all mean by "60 days of combat" or even of "intense combat"? I don't even think as that "front line action" can be equated to this term, because, as tero noted in his above post, being in the lines doesn't necessarily mean being directly in battle all the time.

It does however imply there is little or no slackening in the mental and physical stress excerted on the troops.

The "60 days" figure seems rather small, when compared against the length of WWII overall. To combat veterans, however, it would of course seem an eternity if they were keeping track.

Agreed.

In my own opinion (subject to correction), intense combat would represent any combat situation in which a soldier came under fire that impressed upon him that he had a chance of becoming a casualty from that engagement. He walks away from the battle unhurt, but it's added on along with the memories of other earlier battles and making him ponder more on his odds of coming through by war's end or being taken off the line.

That would mean even a chance encounter with a sniper while on patrol on a relatively slow day counts as intense combat. And it does not take into account if the soldier knows he is up for a rotation to the rear or not.

As I said earlier the fear of dying during the last minute of the engagement (or what can considered to be a needless sacrifice) was a very real factor when assessing troop performance. During Winter War the Finnish troops were more resolute in this respect when compared to the performance of the Finnish troops during Continuation War.

Consider, by added example, the typical tour of US and British bomber aircrews flying over western Europe. The USAAF tour was 25 missions (increased to 35 by 1944), and 30 for the RAF. In the timeframe of 1942-43, loss percentages per mission were projected in Allied planning to "average" at about 5% or so. This might even had been conveyed to the bomber crews at one time or another. So, assuming the early USAAF case of 25 missions (with no more than one mission a day), a bomber crewman might not cringe at a 95% survival chance for any one mission. But thinking on 95% taken over 25 missions --- that means a survival chance for the whole tour of just under 28%.

Jon's original proposed set does not distinquish between actual combat action and front line conditions. I think the analogy is fitting. The mental stress excerted on the bomber crews equals that of the ground troops. On average one lousy mission every two weeks. No biggie, right. I think there is nobody who could say the crews were not veterans after a few runs (if they survived them) and by the time they hit the 20 mark they could be rattled. But the timeframe would be either well below 60 days (actual combat) or over 365 days (front line conditions).

Now getting back to the soldier on the line, assume that for each battle he was in, casualties in killed & wounded were also only 5%. (EXTREMELY unlikely for combat units!!) Further assuming no more than one engagement in a day, then after 60 days (engagements), his survival chance goes down to less than 5% overall.

So, it's probably little surprise about combat exhaustion setting in after about 60 engagements of "intense combat." Not that the combat soldiers were all busy calculating odds between engagements, but most could intuitively sense that after 60 days of close battle, the odds were so heavily stacked against them. And this is just of the surviving soldiers who made it through those many days of close fighting, without further considering the effect of seeing everyone else who started out with them already being killed or maimed.

On a related note: I find it fascinating how the different replacement systems affected the troops and their performance in different armies. The German system made the units coherent internally by having them remain in the (relatively) same level of combat experience. The old units were patched up with similarly old units and the new units were pathed up with experienced NCO's and officers. The Americans filled the units piecemeal thus saturating them with different level of experience across the board. The Finnish system was much like the American system. The difference was the "new guy" syndrome in the American units seems to have been far worse than it was in the Finnish units. AFAICSI the reason for this was the fact during Winter War the new replacements (fresh off the boot camp or volunteers) were usually from the same region the parent unit was formed in and usually the old hands knew the newcomers from civvy street. During Continuation War the replacement system got more varied because during Winter War one time losses during combat concentrated too much to certain regions at a time. Losing 40 men from a single municipality in one hour during one failed counter attack was what happened and that affected the demographics of that region too much to be ignored when the system was overhauled.

By Continuation War most of the replacements could have Winter War under their belt and from past experience they knew the really new guys needed coatching more than scorn. Everybody knew the new guy, being inexperienced, was liable to get hurt far more easily than an old hand. But they also knew the limits of the pool of available replacements so every man counted. The new guy did have to prove his worth in combat before he became one of the lads. The old hands gave them tips and somebody was usually assigned to pair up with the replacement until he got battlewise.

But the central intangible is how those "60 days" play out. Here again, how of the days of front line action add to the "intense combat" toll? And how are they distributed? I vaguely recall one postwar study of British WWII soldiers being able to "stay on the line" about 300 or 400 days average, but don't recall the source. That's quite a larger figure than the "60 days," but here again, the issue is of how many of those days (again averaged) featured intense combat.

I've seen the similar figure on American divisions. And a figure of 90 days of continuous combat before total breakdown for American troops in the Hürtgen forest IIRC. The Finnish divisions remained on the line from 1941 until 1944.

Be that as it may all these figures must pale in comparison with the similar German figures.

This is what I was teasing about on the "105 days of front line action" for the Finns, tero. That seems low as compared to UK or Commonwealth soldiers.

The entire war lasted for only 105 days.

During Continuation War the Finnish divisions remained on the line from 1941 until 1944 during Winter War. That means the Finnish soldiers stayed on the line for roughly 1400 days. With a couple of weeks for R&R leave at home a year that still leaves well over 1300 days on the line.

Of course, the whole issue is what exactly is being compared here in terms of "front line action."

True. It is also a matter of actual intensity of actions during a given timeframe, available resources, losses sustained and tactics and doctrine used. For all intents and purposes that 105 days of Winter War can be said to have been intense combat for the front line troops. On averages.

There was no possibility for being rotated to the rear for proper R&R. The only way you got off the line was if you got wounded. The front line units were rotated to the rear for R&R but they had to remain ready for action, they were subject to harrassing bombardment and they had to perform counter attacks because the Finnish doctrine dictated the positions must be in control of friendly troops by the time the engagement was over. That meant any breakthrough had to be handled with forces on the spot. When losses mounted that meant the reserves got depleated at the same rate as the actual front line units. By the end the Finnish army was essentially a force comprised of men who fell asleep standing up (because they had not slept properly for weeks) but who still performed very unlike the "60-day wonders" as described in Jon's example.

Things like sense of purpose (motivation), trust in the guys next to you and your immediate superiors and even trust in the arms and assets at your disposal are not factors that can be overlooked when assessing the performance of the troops over prolonged periods of time. During Contination War the Finnish troops remained cohesive even when sustaining cripling casualties. The (small) number of Finnish POW's the Red Army was able to take during the entire war (1939-44) is one indication of the morale of the Finnish troops.

Also, one major reason for the initial collapse of the defending units morale during the 1944 Soviet assault was the lack of effective infantry AT assets. They could handle (emotionally) the heavy artillery barrages, the aerial bombardment and the infantry but when they could not deal with the new armour they lost faith. Once the new AT assets became available the troops gained back their fighting spirit rather quickly.

In sum, it's immensely variable from unit to unit as to how many soldiers in that unit have seen 40-60 days of intense combat, and thus are becoming "old lags" on a significant scale, even within just one squad. Chances are nonetheless VERY low that a WWII squad is going to have a majority of its soldiers, as having come through enough days of combat as survivors, as to make "combat exhaustion" something to easily scale for.

IMO the determining factor should be the time frame, ie if the combat was continuous or not. The fact that can handle the fear of death (you acknowledge you are basically dead in the combat zone) is a universal key which all combat veterans who survived never fail to mention when they tell about how they managed to survive while others died.

[ November 07, 2002, 03:50 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

I'm sure we all agree that the best thing would be if the game modelled every soldier individually, from the lowest grunt up to the batallion commander.

Well no, in fact we don't all agree with that. At least I don't. That strikes me as turning the game into something like Medal of Honor, say, which is a different proposition from CM.

As far as my own tastes go, I would much rather play games scaled on the operational level where the units are normally battalions. But I do not expect —and let me emphasize this—I do not expect CM to be changed to reflect my personal tastes. I'm satisfied for CM to be what it is and to do what it does. I am in favor of improvements to make it do those things better, but I do not advocate altering the fundamental nature of the game.

And it sounds an awful lot to me that that is what you are trying to do.

Michael

[ November 07, 2002, 04:32 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

I'm sure we all agree that the best thing would be if the game modelled every soldier individually, from the lowest grunt up to the batallion commander.

Well no, in fact we don't all agree with that. At least I don't. That strikes me as turning the game into something like Medal of Honor, say, which is a different proposition from CM.

As far as my own tastes go, I would much rather play games scaled on the operational level where the units are normally battalions. But I do not expect —and let me emphasize this—I do not expect CM to be changed to reflect my personal tastes. I'm satisfied for CM to be what it is and to do what it does. I am in favor of improvements to make it do those things better, but I do not advocate altering the fundamental nature of the game.

And it sounds an awful lot to me that that is what you are trying to do.

Michael</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

I'm sure we all agree that the best thing would be if the game modelled every soldier individually, from the lowest grunt up to the batallion commander.

Well no, in fact we don't all agree with that. At least I don't. That strikes me as turning the game into something like Medal of Honor, say, which is a different proposition from CM.

As far as my own tastes go, I would much rather play games scaled on the operational level where the units are normally battalions. But I do not expect —and let me emphasize this—I do not expect CM to be changed to reflect my personal tastes. I'm satisfied for CM to be what it is and to do what it does. I am in favor of improvements to make it do those things better, but I do not advocate altering the fundamental nature of the game.

And it sounds an awful lot to me that that is what you are trying to do.

Michael</font>

[Spook]

Just to note, tero, that my "Finns being wimps" lead-off note in my previous post was tongue-in-cheek. There are no sources, of course, because I wasn't serious about it.

Anyway, you've provided some interesting feedback. And I will expand to comment on the US replacement system that it was probably one of the worst elements of the US Army in WWII Europe. The USA "repple-depples" (replacement depots) could at least had made a minimal effort to put the incoming replacements through various combat training before shipping them off to units at indeterminate times. But as the depots weren't directly instructed to do so (a shortfall on the US higher commanders' end), they didn't.

Anyway, your final note, about if the streak of intense combat was continuous enough, is certainly worthy for CM scenario designers to weigh when trying to simulate a historical action for an "exhausted" unit. Furthermore, it's a completely valid question if the "60 days" makes enough consideration for "background factors" that may drive soldiers on, especially on the East Front where hardship was an extremely common currency.

[Schoerner]

Originally posted by Spook:

In my own opinion (subject to correction), intense combat would represent any combat situation in which a soldier came under fire that impressed upon him that he had a chance of becoming a casualty from that engagement. He walks away from the battle unhurt, but it's added on along with the memories of other earlier battles and making him ponder more on his odds of coming through by war's end or being taken off the line.

I don't know how you come to this estimation.

I know a quite well amount of german veterans (besides the books i read) and they ALL say/said the same:

the longer the front-experience, the less you are thinking what can happen to yourself and the more you are taking care of the comrades. It's becoming a fully-automated job and the center of the thoughts is comradeship.

You are becoming a real part of your unit and are losing the egoism of an indiviual.

During the pauses you wish to be at home, but when the next order comes, all you have in mind is to be a good comrade.

Also many of the recovered wounded (as i know from my grandpa, too) preferred to come back to their original unit (no matter if in Russia on the Hauptkampflinie).

Why?

Because it was the first situation in life, where they saw REAL friendship becoming alive: comradeship between soldiers during war.

We can't imagine what it means for the human psyche, if a comrade claims freely to be the best runner, knowing that this will be his last order, but we get an estimation, what comradeship and the strong feelings it can create was about.

What i'm really starting to miss in this discussion, are certain aspects of reality.

This also confirms exactly and fits perfectly what Tero said, that the finnish were much longer with great success in combat than some allied studies suggest.

Additionally i want to mention, that such short times of combat were not the reality for the germans (on the eastern-front, this sounds like a joke).

As we see in german and finnish-army, this theory has already been proven wrong by history, and i think BTS needs a (much) more flexible system.

For getting the brainstorming-process running, nevertheless this thoughts were great but if so many conclusions are built on studies, not guilty for big parts of fighting-troops in WWII, they need to be reflected in a more critical manner.

[ November 07, 2002, 08:42 AM: Message edited by: Schoerner ]

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

You said, and I quote, "...the best thing would be if the game modelled every soldier individually, from the lowest grunt up to the batallion commander."

Now 'modeling' means that each person on the battlefield would be represented by a 3D model and would have computer-tracked individual characteristics. Even assuming a computer powerful enough to do all that, it would necessarily be a different game from CM which is only concerned with the behavior of groups of men, not individuals. Am I starting to get through yet?

Ahh, now I understand. I'm sorry, I should have expressed myself more clearly. What I mean was modelled in the game engine, not modelled as a 3D model.

My "vision" is to have the exact same units as today (ie squads and teams) but inside the game engine, the game keeps track of every individual soldier in the squad. Although I realize that will probably be too much resource demanding, and therefore I propose the three layers: soldiers, nco's and officers (platoon leaders). But, as I said, the soldiers and ncos will still be represented by the same graphical model as today (ie a squad).

I thank you for your recommendation. I am however obliged to omit to follow it up as—so far as I am aware—none of those games will run on a Mac. There is at the moment a complete lack of operational games for the Mac, at least good operational games. It is a market that game designers have chosen to ignore.

Michael

Oh that must be really frustrating. I'm sorry, I did not know you were on a mac.

[ November 07, 2002, 08:38 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Spook:

And I will expand to comment on the US replacement system that it was probably one of the worst elements of the US Army in WWII Europe. The USA "repple-depples" (replacement depots) could at least had made a minimal effort to put the incoming replacements through various combat training before shipping them off to units at indeterminate times.

While inadequate training was a problem for replacements, a bigger one was that they weren't given time to be absorbed into the "family" that was a squad or a platoon. This was important, not only psychologically, but procedurally.

It was psychologically important to the preplacement, because he was apt to feel isolated, and that is the worst thing to feel on a battlefield. It was bad for his squadmates as well, because they had no idea whether they could depend on him in a shootout or not—mostly not.

It was bad procedurally because every formation, including every squad, had its own way of doing things that grew out of the corporate experience of that unit and the personalities that comprised it. Until a new man had had time to find his place in the unit and absorb their way of doing things, he was apt to be just dead weight. Often in the most disagreeably literal sense.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

My "vision" is to have the exact same units as today (ie squads and teams) but inside the game engine, the game keeps track of every individual soldier in the squad. Although I realize that will probably be too much resource demanding, and therefore I propose the three layers: soldiers, nco's and officers (platoon leaders). But, as I said, the soldiers and ncos will still be represented by the same graphical model as today (ie a squad).

I think I understand. I think you are probably right that it would require too much computational resources, but that is not for me to say. It is a suggestion to be made and see how the "gods" of BFC receive it.

Michael

[Spook]

Originally posted by Schoerner:

I don't know how you come to this estimation.

I know a quite well amount of german veterans (besides the books i read) and they ALL say/said the same:

the longer the front-experience, the less you are thinking what can happen to yourself and the more you are taking care of the comrades. It's becoming a fully-automated job and the center of the thoughts is comradeship.

You are becoming a real part of your unit and are losing the egoism of an indiviual.

During the pauses you wish to be at home, but when the next order comes, all you have in mind is to be a good comrade.

What you are all saying here, Schoerner, is potentially 180 degrees in full opposition to to what all that John D Salt laid out earlier.

Certainly, it can be argued as that a soldier who gains experience with a unit is going to desire to "mesh in" with the unit instead of "acting the individual." But that doesn't necessarily counteract as that base human emotion and mental states may still have an increasing toll taken from them after surviving extended combat experiences.

The late Stephen Ambrose, in his "Citizen Soldiers," related at least a couple of occasions of veteran soldiers in 1945 basically just "snapping." In the first case, one veteran is asked by his sergeant to scout ahead and see if a machinegun nest is still deployed in some hidden terrain. The soldier froze, and finally said, "F--- you, sarge, I ain't doing it." So the sargeant went instead, found that there were no German soldiers deployed anymore where they were earlier. In the second case, a veteran soldier who had been with the 1st Infantry Division since D-Day suddenly curled up one day in 1945 and couldn't stop sobbing. And he wasn't under fire or other "duress," he just couldn't go on from that very point in time for some reason or another.

Comradeship is certainly a factor, but it isn't a blank check, and any attempts to assess nationality to inherent "resistance to combat exhaustion" is going to gain the same ground with BF as it has before --- zero.

What's more, one has to maintain a critical eye even to first-person veteran's stories when trying to draw the experience of one, two, or even a few other veterans as "consistent" experience for all soldiers of a nation's armed force. Such stories are invaluable, of course, but should be kept in perspective.

Comradeship is a factor, and yes, the reasons for war can play some role too. By example of the Finns, it's little surprise to their tenacity in wanting to defend their country from Soviet invasion in 1939-40. But would the Finns had shown the very same level of tenacity if deployed to fight out in the North African desert or in the jungles of Burma, without knowing why they were being sent to such places priorhand? One can only speculate, but never presume with certainty.

It is similarly a tricky thing to assess "comradeship." As you argue, "It's becoming a fully-automated job and the center of the thoughts is comradeship." But isn't comradeship enhanced by fighting alongside familiar faces in a unit? What if the unit takes severe losses in a short period of time, on a repeat basis, such that within a platoon, there's no more than one or two familiar faces not only amongst the original unit members, but even amongst the first round of replacements? Could an "old hand" veteran who's still around truly maintain the same level of "comradeship" as before? That can't be assumed as absolute.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Bastables:

I think that's the basis of our dis-agreement, I don't think they could have climbed the curve espesially when seen in the light of consitanly poor performance German ID and USA ID who never climbed the curve as well as "burnt out" Commonwealth formations such as 7th Armd.

You can see this magnified in small Air force formations i.e. JG 26 III Gruppe consistently under performed and was said to hold a "defeatist attitude." Droping bombs before the target and running for home etc.

Sorry to be so late in the thread, but this is an interesting thought. The Soviets must've believed in the relative innate abilities of units, because they tended to send replacements according to their combat record and abilities. Thus, the best performing rifle divisions received the most replacements and the worst rifle divisions, the fewest.

[Schoerner]

Spook, let's assume YOUR estimation is right and mine is wrong.

How can your's explain, that most of the wounded german soldiers preferred freely to come back to their squad in the first frontline?

How can it be explained, that german, finnish (and also hungarian) troops didn't suffer that way, from the long time being on the first front.

The field-post letters, the performance during the battles and the narrations of vets are showing another picture and are fitting very well together.

Only 2 examples: the holding of the Murmansk-front or Stalingrad also cannot be explained, with your theory.

When the 6. Armee reached Stalingrad, following the argumentation, it must have been already burnt out. Even the cold and the hunger couldn't break the will to fight and also desertions were extremely rare.

Also the episode you tell, where a soldier refuses the order.

Yes, it seems this was quite usual in the US-army, that subordinates spoke this way to their officers.

But does it mean, this was common in all other armies, too?

I only have knowledge about german vets, but they UNISONO told me, that in 90% of the situations a strong LOOK of the officer was enough.

In very rare and extreme situations, the officer had to become louder, for solving the problem.

Incedibly that the NCO or even an officer does the order himself, after a subordinate refused it. Being a model and then not having enough reputation that the subordinate follows the order?

Impossible - and i believe not only in the german army.

Such a behaviour would show to all subordinates, that he's surely no leader and not worth to follow his orders. He would have lost his complete reputation and even his military honour.

As i understand it today, this wasn't only a matter of the military education, it was more a matter of models. The Unteroffizierkorps (the whole NCO-corps) was in most cases a model with their behaviour.

But not good in giving orders only, they SHOWED how things need to done.

Also the argument, that heavy losses reduce the will to fight seems to me, is made from an individual under normal circumstances.

The target of military education is, to forget about it and to become a functioning part of the bigger system.

All armys are trying to do that.

Some better, some worse, 'cause the military education is only one part:

the ideals of a society, a nation, are the fundamentals, on which military education is built on.

It's not a secret, that european soldiers had not that big psychological problems like US-soldiers.

The reason lies in society (and PLEASE, forget the "studies" - there was no time in Russia for such things and all the german soldiers who came back after years of war (and maybe additionally some years in a Gulag), became complete normal members of society and i guess the same is guilty for the other european soldiers).

The US-citizen was/is not a soldier. Since Thomas Jefferson the US-civilian is not a soldier and soldiers are not part of the ideals of this society.

But for the european societies, soldiers were models for the society. Especially for the germans, who always had to be prepared due to the geographical situation. Or the Brits with their empire over centuries. And also the smaller nations, that had to live over centuries with the threatening of being occupied.

The finns, irishmans, scotsmen, hungarians,...

Before WWII in the USA the indiviualism was already part of society, while i.e. the Brits still stood in the tradition of the, the whole world ruling empire.

The French already were caught in individualism (150 years french-revolution), with the ideal of individual freedom, while the germans, the finns, the russians or the hungarians still had a look at their society, where individualism was seen as something devastating to the community.

The experiences of vets who fought against French AND Brits in France. Or Russians AND US or Brits AND US fit perfectly from this point of view.

It is capable to explain the enourmous performances of humans of many of the involved sides and it also explains, why nowadays all the western armies have such big problems with the psyche of the soldiers after combat.

Therefore i hope BTS will keep their universal model and make it even more complex and universal, to give the scenario-designers the possibility to specialice and simulate the behaviour/condition THEY want, instead of forcing the units to fit into small corsets.

IMO the time-dependent morale/efficiency is such a corset, not capable of modelling the units historically accurate during many great and important battles.

[ November 07, 2002, 01:08 PM: Message edited by: Schoerner ]

[Spook]

Originally posted by Schoerner:

Spook, let's assume YOUR estimation is right and mine is wrong.

We don't have to define it to that level of extreme. Merely to note that while some of the things you've mentioned could be valid, others are perhaps less than compelling when we're talking about a host of "soft factors" to the psychological behavior of soldiers in combat.

How can your's explain, that most of the wounded german soldiers preferred freely to come back to their squad in the first frontline?

It doesn't have to be explained, because I didn't have contention with the notion of a soldier wanting to return to a unit that he is familiar with.

However, your statement infers that a German soldier, throughout WWII, had the latitude to "opt out" from being returned to combat duty; that he could be reassigned to noncombat duty, or even sent home, if he asked for it? Is that correct?

How can it be explained, that german, finnish (and also hungarian) troops didn't suffer that way, from the long time being on the first front.

The field-post letters, the performance during the battles and the narrations of vets are showing another picture and are fitting very well together.

Only 2 examples: the holding of the Murmansk-front or Stalingrad also cannot be explained, with your theory.

When the 6. Armee reached Stalingrad, following the argumentation, it must have been already burnt out. Even the cold and the hunger couldn't break the will to fight and also desertions were extremely rare.

Yes, you've reeled out some examples of where some soldiers on the East Front, in a given set of circumstances, can continue to fight on beyond the theoretical "burnout" of John Salt's referenced studies. Now --- can you say with unimpeachable authority that this all applies in stock to all units serving on all theaters in WWII? Even the Germans? No.

Also the episode you tell, where a soldier refuses the order.

Yes, it seems this was quite usual in the US-army, that subordinates spoke this way to their officers.

But does it mean, this was common in all other armies, too?

I didn't assert for it to be "common" in the US armies, and I don't believe you have the authority to do so either. I noted that it HAPPENED. And I consider it a complete 100% POSSIBILITY that it happened in other armies too, even the Germans.

"Possibility" and "commonality" are not the same.

I only have knowledge about german vets, but they UNISONO told me, that in 90% of the situations a strong LOOK of the officer was enough.

In very rare and extreme situations, the officer had to become louder, for solving the problem.

Incedibly that the NCO or even an officer does the order himself, after a subordinate refused it. Being a model and then not having enough reputation that the subordinate follows the order?

Impossible - and i believe not only in the german army.

Such a behaviour would show to all subordinates, that he's surely no leader and not worth to follow his orders. He would have lost his complete reputation and even his military honour.

You may assert this from the specific anectodal stories related to you. The trap here is that you are attempting to further extrapolate that the stories of a select group of veterans apply in absolute throughout the German army. IIRC, several million Germans served in the German armed forces in WWII. Can we speak of this entire body of soldiery in terms of absolutes?

As i understand it today, this wasn't only a matter of the military education, it was more a matter of models. The Unteroffizierkorps (the whole NCO-corps) was in most cases a model with their behaviour.

But not good in giving orders only, they SHOWED how things need to done.

And I didn't contend that aspect, nor asserted that other nations' armies didn't apply this too at some degree or another. But the "model" of contention isn't of NCO experience & conduct. It's of the behavior of any individual soldier under any given set of circumstances, which is quite far-reaching in latitude; and not all of which will be addressed by "NCO control."

Also the argument, that heavy losses reduce the will to fight seems to me, is made from an individual under normal circumstances.

The target of military education is, to forget about it and to become a functioning part of the bigger system.

All armys are trying to do that.

Sure --- in theory. But how things evolve in the field can be a rather different matter, again not all of which can accounted for in military education or training.

Some better, some worse, 'cause the military education is only one part:

the ideals of a society, a nation, are the fundamentals, on which military education is built on.

Probably true to a point, at least in the definition of "doctrines"......

It's not a secret, that european soldiers had not that big psychological problems like US-soldiers.

Now you're out on a limb, and cutting it off behind you.

"European" soldiers didn't have "big" psychological problems? BULLOCKS, with a capital B. You have zero-percent authority to make such a stock assertion.

What's more, the study referenced by John Salt didn't assert that just US soldiers were being studied. It gave me every impression as that "soldiers in general" were being studied, without some arbitrary focus on nationality. However, John, or whoever else has read the specific study (I haven't), could elaborate otherwise.

The reason lies in society (and PLEASE, forget the "studies" - there was no time in Russia for such things

If soldiers' behavior on the East Front wasn't studied or analyzed, then what basis or authority do any of us have to assert one thing or the other? "Studies" aren't necessarily the final authority either. But they are a point of reference to seek trends from.

and all the german soldiers who came back after years of war (and maybe additionally some years in a Gulag), became complete normal members of society and i guess the same is guilty for the other european soldiers).

The US-citizen was/is not a soldier. Since Thomas Jefferson the US-civilian is not a soldier and soldiers are not part of the ideals of this society.

Again, you're out on a limb, with no authority to assert that "US soldiers are not part of the ideals of US society." Besides, all of this is not directly linked to the psychological behavior of soldiers seeing extended combat.

But for the european societies, soldiers were models for the society. Especially for the germans, who always had to be prepared due to the geographical situation. Or the Brits with their empire over centuries. And also the smaller nations, that had to live over centuries with the threatening of being occupied.

The finns, irishmans, scotsmen, hungarians,...

Something like the above has been issued by "uber-Deutsch" disciples on this forum for years, never gaining ground throughout. One might next argue that it's reprehensible that German soldiers in CMBO and CMBB are subject to ANY kind of "morale" rules. After all, shouldn't their "comradeship," Unteroffizierkorps, and "societal expectations" make it impossible for Germans to even break or rout in the CM system?

I may seem a bit harsh in my response to you, Schoerner, and I don't mean to leave the impression that what all you're asserting is "wrong." Some of what you argue can have a basis of validity, excepting those points which I've retorted to more firmly. But on this issue of "combat exhaustion," you are overreaching at times, and attempting to apply a series of extraneous factors to same.

It's like when the late Stephen Ambrose asserted, in "Citizen Soldiers," that soldiers coming out from a USA-like democracy were going to inherently make better soldiers than the European "automatons." He attempted to argue the point persuasively, but I also accord his viewpoint as invalid in sum.

[ November 07, 2002, 04:35 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

[Andreas]

On the dangers of generalisation.

Translated by me, quote is a note by GOC 12. Panzerdivision talking about the period March 1943, when the division came into heavy combat in the Orel sector. Previously the division had incurred heavy losses in the Belyi and Luchessa sectors in the Rhzev salient.

During the fighting of the last few days, I had to let myself be convinced that we can only speak about a dashing spirit (Angriffsgeist) where an officer or older NCO can directly influence the troops. In other sections sometimes total failure has occurred because of the lack of officers and NCOs. This has led so far that the troops in some posts had to be forced to the attack or kept in their posts by use of arms (nur mit Waffengewalt).

Must have been some comradeship going on there.

Also in the text and evaluation of enemy and own performance:

4. The fighting value (Kampfwert) of our troops should no longer be overestimated, although the heroics of some small Kampfgruppen in defensive islands have to be recognised

About the preparation for Zitadelle:

After a short rest, especially mental recovery (seelischer Erholung), intensive training [...] commenced.

The status report in early July 1943 reads:

Despite the short time available, because of intensive training, sufficient quarters and care, the spirit and esprit (Haltung) of the division has been increased to a degree that limited attacking operations can again be undertaken.

When using individual tales about comradeship and how nice it was in the trenches when your best buddy was next to you, and how you would have done anything for him, especially with the Wehrmacht in Russia one has to be aware of survivor bias. The chap who can tell the story can do so because he survived. Which means that it is a fallacy when one assumes that his story can be generalised.

[Schoerner]

Originally posted by Spook:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Schoerner:

[qb]Spook, let's assume YOUR estimation is right and mine is wrong.

We don't to define it to that level of extreme. Merely to note that while some of the things you've mentioned could be valid, others are perhaps less than compelling when we're talking about a host of "soft factors" to the psychological behavior of soldiers in combat.</font>

[Pak_43]

Tarq...

"I hope it isn't _that_ difficult, I've been suprised before with some of the studies that have been done and are known of here. I am curious as the the frequency of reckless but brave behavior from "green" troops, though. I've not idea how representational of common events the anecdotes I've heard or read are."

I would have hoped so too...and I have no idea either, my main motive in the studies I've quoted is to try and establish the (IMO) reasonable point of view that newcomers to the theatre were initially less afraid in combat than infantry who had experienced a lot of combat, which is at least a basis for my supposition that Green troops should be pinned down by fire less than veteran...(just had a thought though... standard anti-ambush tactics recommend assaulting the ambush position as soon as possible don't they? Presumably vets would be more likely to know this than green troops? Oh feck now I can't make my mind up!!)

Ellis's bibliography runs to around 400 references from general works to eye-witness accounts but has no specifics on this matter.. the only reference to it I can find is the following: (apologies for long quote..)

"Though always reticent where such matters are concerned, many sources dealing with the end of the European campaign allude to what was generally called "stickiness" on the part of certain battalions or divisions <quote snip> A combination of war weariness and a certain sense of superiority, it was charged, led many of these units to proceed with a caution beyond the dictates. Firm evidence for this is lacking (my emphasis)...

Schoerner...

you are, in my opinion, on very dodgy ground with at least some of your claims...

selected anecdotal evidence is just that, selected... it proves nothing...(as I pointed out in my last post, I would not expect BFC to alter the software based on anecdotal evidence, a large volume of anecdotal evidence combined with combat studies and surveys might start the ball rolling.. but that's all... and I'll give you a for instance about selected anecdotes... Henry Metelmann :- Through Hell for Hitler page 96 specfically cites an example where his own Hauptmann is killed by his comrades in order to stop having to follow his lunatic orders...

Why can't we just accept that the PBI is just that PBI... not German PBI or American PBI or Russian PBI, or even Finnish PBI ,

Christ, the PBI of any nation in WWII had far more in common with each other than anybody they might know back home.. almost always hungry, usually either too cold or too hot, either bored rigid or scared stiff... the list of commonalities goes on and on...

[Spook]

I made some minor edits to my earlier post, Schoerner, at the same time while you posted, although I wasn't modifying the content. Anyway, Andreas's follow-up post helps magnify the points I was making earlier.

Originally posted by Schoerner:

I don't know in which world this Stephen Ambrose lives or lived, and maybe he talks about future, but a look at the past, shows not that good performance without overwhelming air, land and sea superiority.

And you're going out on a limb again with this statement.

Certainly, some US units fared poorly in combat, particularly in their initial engagements. But that is far more readily traced to shortfalls in prior training, lack of initial overall combat experience, and to erroneous doctrines, than to "societal impact" on the ability of a nation's soldiers to be effective in combat.

And there were a vast host of occasions in WWII, both in the Pacific and in Europe, were US military personnel could perform well enough, even with "elan," without having overwhelming land, air, and sea superiority.

It would be idle to pretend that US forces in WWII always performed well, because that isn't true. It is similarly a fallacy to presume that US forces were effective through overwhelming resources alone. I would recommend Michael Doubler's "Closing With the Enemy" as a good basic reference describing the ways on how US soldiers improved their combat performance in the NW European campaigns.

Anyway, to your main counterpoint: where I would concur with your expressed concerns is of letting any one study become the "authority" to account for the performance of any and all soldiers & units in WWII. But then, I don't think that John's originally cited study intended that. Instead, such a study instead becomes the basis or "foundation" of looking for trends in combat behavior.

And we can always allow for exceptions, as again, the circumstances affecting a soldier's behavior in combat can vary greatly.

[ November 07, 2002, 05:04 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

[Wisbech_lad]

Schoener, couple of quick points.

German soldiers were fairly quick to surrender in large numbers where they were guaranteed good treatment (e.g Tunisia)

German field discipline depended much more on coercion than the Western allies - and had more in common with the Soviets (eg the whole concept of punishment battalions). I have read that Model was considered a "bloodhound" for the number of battlefield executions in his units.

So the PBI on the Eastern front had Hobb's choice. Surrender to the Soviets, and die. Run away, and face stern discipline. Or stay and fight and take your chances.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Spook:

Just to note, tero, that my "Finns being wimps" lead-off note in my previous post was tongue-in-cheek. There are no sources, of course, because I wasn't serious about it.

I know.

Furthermore, it's a completely valid question if the "60 days" makes enough consideration for "background factors" that may drive soldiers on, especially on the East Front where hardship was an extremely common currency.

True.

[patolino]

Originally posted by JonS:

Those Finns, I tell ya - they're getting more and more like cockroaches everyday: turning up everywhere and bloody hard to kill!

Regards

JonS

A picture book is translated to English it seems; a thick study called Panttipataljoona by Mauno Jokipii is AFAIK available only in Finnish.

To keep this slightly on-topic, Jokipii's book contains numerous anecdotes critisising the ineptness of SS Wiking's tactical leadership in '41. If I have time I can dig some up & translate them.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Spook:

Comradeship is certainly a factor, but it isn't a blank check, and any attempts to assess nationality to inherent "resistance to combat exhaustion" is going to gain the same ground with BF as it has before --- zero.

I do not think nationality inherently predisposes anybody to be superior to everybody else.

However, if we look at for example trenchfoot and frostbite occurrances in various armies there is a marked tendency. The Germans suffered from them in the East during the first winter. The Americans suffered (IIRC) over 90 000 casualties to trenchfoot alone as late during the winter of 1944-45 eventhough they must have been avare of the dangers by simply observing the other combatants and their experiences.

I have not seen any firm figures on the cases of trenchfoot and frostbite in the Finnish army but I think can be counted with a 3 or low 4 digit number from 1939-45. Given the superior supply system of the Americans I am forced to conclude there is something in the fact the Finns being Finns could avoid trenchfoot and frostbite better than the Americans. This is because the Finnish society as a whole was much more rural back then than it is now and practically everybody knew the importance of keeping your body warm and your feet dry at all times. The Finnish army had half squad tents and mini-stows to keep them warm. No matter what the situation was the availability of proper accomodation was one of the first things the Finnish troops built up when they settled down for any longer period of time. Well, actually the first thing to be built when entrenching was almost always a sauna.

I think this kind of nationality based aptitude does exist. But even a Finnish foot fells wictim to trenchfoot if not properly prevented or treated.

But would the Finns had shown the very same level of tenacity if deployed to fight out in the North African desert or in the jungles of Burma, without knowing why they were being sent to such places priorhand? One can only speculate, but never presume with certainty.

Well, I can say for certain that when the Finnish troops went over the 1939 border there was a marked drop in the zeal of the troops. There were even occurances where troops refused to go over the old border. Then again in 1944 (after the influx of proper infantry AT weapons) the zeal returned when the fate of the entire country was at stake again.

But isn't comradeship enhanced by fighting alongside familiar faces in a unit? What if the unit takes severe losses in a short period of time, on a repeat basis, such that within a platoon, there's no more than one or two familiar faces not only amongst the original unit members, but even amongst the first round of replacements? Could an "old hand" veteran who's still around truly maintain the same level of "comradeship" as before? That can't be assumed as absolute.

I would not dismiss that off hand. It is not absolute but given the differences in the initial formation of the units and replacement procedures in different armies I'd say there might be something to this.

The Finnish army brought its fallen home whenever possible. If at all possille the Finnish troops were even willing to risk further casualties to recover a fallen comrades body so it dould be transferred home for burial. On the other hand the entire Finnish doctrine was to geared so the use of costly frontal assaults would be the last resort. In a reservist unit where the CO is his messangers neighbour (and has been for the last 30 years) and where he knows everybody else on a first name basis from civvy street this kind of behaviour is understandable. What is more in a system like this mounting losses tend to make the men more resolute and this is one of the reasons why the Finnish army was so tenacious during Winter War.

I know the WWI buddy regiments were detrimental to morale in the eyes of the Western military leaders but I think they were detrimental only because of the way they were used (up), not because of the inherent fallacies of seeing your mates get killed by a single, long burts of MG fire.

ADDENDUM: The age of the combatants as a factor. I think a 19 year old can be more of a zelot than a 35 year old father of 4. But given his experience in life that 35 year old will propably be more resilient to mental stress than the 19 year old.

[ November 08, 2002, 03:46 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[Spook]

Originally posted by tero:

However, if we look at for example trenchfoot and frostbite occurrances in various armies there is a marked tendency. The Germans suffered from them in the East during the first winter. The Americans suffered (IIRC) over 90 000 casualties to trenchfoot alone as late during the winter of 1944-45 eventhough they must have been avare of the dangers by simply observing the other combatants and their experiences.

I have not seen any firm figures on the cases of trenchfoot and frostbite in the Finnish army but I think can be counted with a 3 or low 4 digit number from 1939-45. Given the superior supply system of the Americans I am forced to conclude there is something in the fact the Finns being Finns could avoid trenchfoot and frostbite better than the Americans. This is because the Finnish society as a whole was much more rural back then than it is now and practically everybody knew the importance of keeping your body warm and your feet dry at all times. The Finnish army had half squad tents and mini-stows to keep them warm. No matter what the situation was the availability of proper accomodation was one of the first things the Finnish troops built up when they settled down for any longer period of time. Well, actually the first thing to be built when entrenching was almost always a sauna.

I think this kind of nationality based aptitude does exist. But even a Finnish foot fells wictim to trenchfoot if not properly prevented or treated.

The US Army shortfall in dealing with trenchfoot in late 1944 is undeniable, tero. However, it must be taken in perspective.

First off, the US Army experience of extended wartime campaigning in combined cold and wet weather was very limited. The only prior experience was for soldiers who served in Italy in the 1943-44 winter, and these were in the extreme minority (the US 3rd, 36th, & 45th Divisions) of divisions deployed on the NW European front.

It might seem straightforward in hindsight that the US Army planners should have paid attention to the East Front experience, or more to the Italian front. But in hindsight, "should" and "did" don't seem to match here. Further consider that even in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy, German Tiger I tanks (and Panthers in Italy) had been encountered in battle by US forces. In theory, such prior engagements should have accelerated US armor development and "doctrines" to counter, but again, the lessons were learned the hard way.

As to the presumed abundance of supply, here again, one must remember that the sudden expansion of theater operations from Normandy to the West Wall, and with limited availability of high-capacity ports in France and Belgium until after October, challenged the delivery of supplies more than what otherwise might be assumed. And in the early fall of 1944, within 12th Army Group, it was the "judgement call" of Gen. Bradley that winter clothing & shoes take lower priority in delivery than the standards of "bullets, beans, and gas." Because at that pre-winter timeframe, hope still remained with Bradley and other higher Allied commanders that the German army on the West Front was only a few weeks from total collapse.

As to the Finnish example, why should one be surprised about the development of methods to combat trenchfoot being more extensive and in place by wartime? The winters are typically longer in Finland, with heavier snows and colder temperatures. Even in the preceding prewar years, how could this had been missed by the Finnish high command?

In effect, for a nation like Finland, cold-weather wartime preparations were far more "institutional" than for a nation like the USA. Certainly, parts of the USA (the 48 states) get cold too in winter, but in northern army stations, I rather doubt that troops were put through exercises that kept them out in the field in severe cold for any more than a few days. That doesn't equate to what was going to be experienced with soldiers put on the line for weeks on end in the West Front in 1944-45.

So in sum, tero, while the Finns could outperform most others in checking the ill effects of cold weather to its soldiers, this was in response to geographic and climatic conditions that would almost always ensure severely cold winters within Finland. Were the USA in sum total subjected to the same kinds of prewar climates on a consistent basis, without regional "gradation" of the winter weather, the prewar US response would have probably been comparable.

[TSword]

More options yes (maybe), but no corset !

It is very dangerous to generalize such soft factors as morale, experience, endurance, spirit to fight, obidience, esprit de corps, fear and what else..., because foremost the prepositions and reasons are set by behaviour and interaction of humans in time and space together with the natural variance and boundaries of the human being (while being the simplest part still is a huge undertaking to understand..).

Greets

Daniel

[Tero]

Originally posted by Spook:

The US Army shortfall in dealing with trenchfoot in late 1944 is undeniable, tero. However, it must be taken in perspective.

Not making the US Army look bad is not the proper perspective. We should be looking at this issue dispasionately.

The Finnish politicians directly caused needless casualties when they opted for a shoestring budget all through the 30's. This meant that when the feces hit the ventilation there was a basic shortage of every kind of arms and type of munition except for the basic infantry small arms. Had there been enough artillery and AT assets and munitions the Winter War tale could be even more lobsided than it is today.

Sound tactics and doctrine developed to match the prevailing conditions by the Finnish military prevented the lack of proper amounts of supplies, weapons systems and munitions from becoming the downfall of the Finnish army. One of the pilars of the Finnish army was the high regard for the wellfare of each and every individual soldier. This sprung from the fact that with only 3,5 million inhabitants the Army could not afford ANY casualties due to sloppy management of the basic needs of the individual soldiers. A soldier down due to frostbite or trenchfoot was everybid as serious, actually even more so, than a soldier down due to enemy action. Even when they could not supply him with the latest weaponry they made sure he could at least get a hot meal and take care of his personal gear when not in combat. From their point of view it did not matter if the soldier had only 10 rounds instead of 100 in his pockets if he was in the condition to actually fire those 10 shots and not down due to trenchfoot and unable to fire the 100 shots.

Incidentaly, as late as the mid-80's it was formally forbidden to wear socks when on a march. You were supposed to use the "rag" (similar to the one which was used during the war) because when used properly it could absorb more sweat without irritating the foot and it was easier to maintain during breaks than a sock.

The US Army on the other hand had an abundance of resources, including human resources, but it seems the US Army as an institution did not believe the wellfare of the individual soldier was in the interest of the common good of the institution. Under extreme conditions that is.

First off, the US Army experience of extended wartime campaigning in combined cold and wet weather was very limited. The only prior experience was for soldiers who served in Italy in the 1943-44 winter, and these were in the extreme minority (the US 3rd, 36th, & 45th Divisions) of divisions deployed on the NW European front.

Yet, from what I have read, the decision to ship munitions instead of proper gear for the troops was a deliberate one made quite high up in the chain of command. That would indicate they were prepared to sustain further casualties to the elements. 90 000 equals what, 9 divisons at 10 000 men a pop. With casualties like that some 60% of the entire Finnish army OOB would have been out of comission.

It might seem straightforward in hindsight that the US Army planners should have paid attention to the East Front experience, or more to the Italian front. But in hindsight, "should" and "did" don't seem to match here. Further consider that even in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy, German Tiger I tanks (and Panthers in Italy) had been encountered in battle by US forces. In theory, such prior engagements should have accelerated US armor development and "doctrines" to counter, but again, the lessons were learned the hard way.

Tech-spec developments as such are not inside the scope of this debate.

As to the presumed abundance of supply, here again, one must remember that the sudden expansion of theater operations from Normandy to the West Wall, and with limited availability of high-capacity ports in France and Belgium until after October, challenged the delivery of supplies more than what otherwise might be assumed. And in the early fall of 1944, within 12th Army Group, it was the "judgement call" of Gen. Bradley that winter clothing & shoes take lower priority in delivery than the standards of "bullets, beans, and gas." Because at that pre-winter timeframe, hope still remained with Bradley and other higher Allied commanders that the German army on the West Front was only a few weeks from total collapse.

This brings up the basic gear as a part of the OOB of the respective infantry platoons. What did they carry with them to shelter them from the elements ?

IIRC the Germans carried ponchos that could be attached into (leaky, flimsy) two man (larger ?) tents. There was no way to heat that edifice except with the body heat. The Finnish army platoon carried a tent (or a plywood equivalent) which housed a half platoon. It came with a stove for heating (good also for cooking).

What kind of arrangement did the US Army use ?

Being motorized I would expect the US Army was not burdened with issues pertaining hauling the men and their stuff around. The Finnish infantry was horse powered so they had to carry most necessities with them when in the field.

As to the Finnish example, why should one be surprised about the development of methods to combat trenchfoot being more extensive and in place by wartime? The winters are typically longer in Finland, with heavier snows and colder temperatures. Even in the preceding prewar years, how could this had been missed by the Finnish high command?

Indeed.

But when looking at the tech-spec development of the respective armies the Finnish army was (supposedly) at the lower end of the food chain. Keeping the men (pool of which was VERY limited) fit for duty under all conditions was of prime importance when they could not get the latest high-tech gizmos.

Lets look at it this way: the FP of an American squad was impressive on paper. Each man carried a semi-auto rifle. The Finnish squad had bolt action rifles, LMG's and SMG's (the ratio between semi/full auto and bolt action weapons would go semi/full auto heavy in front line units quickly during combat when captured arms were taken up to give more firepower). Throw in prolonged trenchfoot conditions (in the Finnish front even summer time because of the boggy/marshy conditions in several sectors) and an equal number of combat casualties, say 3 men. Both squads start out with 10 men. Subtracting the 3 combat casualties we are left with 7 men in each squad. Now take out the casualties due to the elements (frostbite and trenchfoot). Say, Finns nil, Americans 2. That leaves the Finns with 7 men in the squad and the Americans with 5 men in the squad. The Americans still have 1 SMG, 1 LMG and 3 M1 semi-autos but the Finns have taken a few extra LMG's and semiauto's during the engagement so they now have 2 SMG's, 3 LMG's and 1 semiauto and 1 bolt action rifle.

Now, lets reinforce the squads to full strength. Finns 3, Americans 5 men. After a few days lull in the fighting but similar weather conditions the Finns are still at full strenght but the Amis have lost yet another 2 men (the old hands) to frostbite and trenchfoot. The ammo resupply is on the blink. The Amis have what they carry (say, 150 rounds each). The Finns have what they carry but they get resupply when they rummage through the enemy fallen and they retreive a Maxim in the process. The squads are thrown into combat again.The Finns have 7 veterans and 3 regular troops (all fit) and sport 1 HMG, 2 SMG's, 3 LMG's, 1 semiauto and 2 (actually 4) bolt action rifles while the Amis have 3 veterans and 5 regulars, (all of whom suffer different degree of exposure) and sport 1 SMG, 1 LMG and 6 M1 semi-autos. Which of the squads do you think can keep up the FP and act effectively in the upcoming engagement ?

In effect, for a nation like Finland, cold-weather wartime preparations were far more "institutional" than for a nation like the USA. Certainly, parts of the USA (the 48 states) get cold too in winter, but in northern army stations, I rather doubt that troops were put through exercises that kept them out in the field in severe cold for any more than a few days. That doesn't equate to what was going to be experienced with soldiers put on the line for weeks on end in the West Front in 1944-45.

True. But that does not mean it can not be foreseen and dealt with accordingly beforehand. Unless of course you calculate you can afford a certain number of inevitable casualties to the elements. Which would cripple a smaller army.

So in sum, tero, while the Finns could outperform most others in checking the ill effects of cold weather to its soldiers, this was in response to geographic and climatic conditions that would almost always ensure severely cold winters within Finland. Were the USA in sum total subjected to the same kinds of prewar climates on a consistent basis, without regional "gradation" of the winter weather, the prewar US response would have probably been comparable.

Agreed. But when engaged in combat for years such needless casualties to elements seems to show a certain degree of disrespect the professionals had towards the "citizen soldiers".

[ November 11, 2002, 03:46 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[Martin Rapier]

Originally posted by Pak_43:

"I would have hoped so too...and I have no idea either, my main motive in the studies I've quoted is to try and establish the (IMO) reasonable point of view that newcomers to the theatre were initially less afraid in combat than infantry who had experienced a lot of combat, which is at least a basis for my supposition that Green troops should be pinned down by fire less than veteran...(just had a thought though... standard anti-ambush tactics recommend assaulting the ambush position as soon as possible don't they? Presumably vets would be more likely to know this than green troops? Oh feck now I can't make my mind up!!)"

===============================

Perhaps they key point here is that in game design terms it is perhaps more appropriate to separate a squads tactical ability from their morale - 'able' squads would make better use of cover, fire more effectively, use the advance command(!) etc & their reaction to fire would be determined by their morale level. In the case of the veterans being ambushed then perhaps their tactical ability would be sufficient to outweigh their desire to take cover (how else did they get to be veterans;)

This is approach taken in some minis rules, most notably the Command Decision series, and it seems to produce reasonable results.

Cheers

Martin