White Phosphorus

That guy has a very appropriate name. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GRAU

A Russian thinktank put out an analysis of the war a few years ago. Called "Tanks of August" it's all over the web. Here's an English version. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=119867

Are we seriously going to have this discussion again?

Heavy SMG squads were garbage in CM:BB because all weapons in the squad were fed from a single ammunition pool. So you would engage the enemy at long range with the MG, which would magically deplete the SMG ammo as well. And by the time you got into SMG range, your squad would have an ammo rating < 5. There was a big thread about that, and people actually defended that crap.

So on what basis did everybody suddenly decide that Zis-3 was good? Is there a penetration test from a certain year that shows that 76.2mm AP ammunition stopped being useless? I'm going to re-post the May 1943 Soviet Tiger penetration study. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/69944650/38_11377_12.pdf Summary: The 76.2 mm F-34 (T34 KV) failed to penetrate anything even at 200m range. When firing at the side only the 82mm armor was targeted. 76.2 AA is also bad. Scored only one penetration at 500m on the turret from the side when the round hit the weld between the roof and the side of the turret. 45mm 1937 (T70). firing sub-caliber ammo penetrates 82mm side out to 350, and 62mm side out to 500. This thing is more effective than the F-34. The round is tiny though. Makes only a 20mm hole. 57mm Zis-2. Breaks welds at 500m shooting the front but cannot penetrate. Penetrates the side and turret out to 1000m, makes a giant 110mm hole, and breaks off a chunk of armor 110x140mm. 85mm AA is beast. Penetrates lower front 100mm at 60 degrees at 1000m. The study also lists various artillery pieces, grenades, mines AT rifles, and LL equipment.

I'm thinking the easiest way to model the Soviets is to just give them a higher mark up for having experienced troops. Conscripts get no mark up, green get a reasonable mark-up. Anything above green gets a huge markup. That way the force will be composed of mostly conscript/green replacements and a small number of regular/vets. Whereas the German force is all Vet. Simply forcing the Soviet side to always be conscript implicitly models all the personnel issues.

http://dl.dropbox.com/u/69944650/38_11377_12.pdf Original report. The gist of it is that the 76.2 mm F-34 (T34 KV) failed to penetrate anything even at 200m range. When firing at the side only the 82mm armor was targeted. 76.2 AA is also bad. Scored only one penetration at 500m on the turret from the side when the round hit the weld between the roof and the side of the turret. 45mm 1937 (T70). firing sub-caliber ammo penetrates 82mm side out to 350, and 62mm side out to 500. This thing is more effective than the F-34. The round is tiny though. Makes only a 20mm hole. 57mm Zis-2. Breaks welds at 500m shooting the front but cannot penetrate. Penetrates the side and turret out to 1000m, makes a giant 110mm hole, and breaks off a chunk of armor 110x140mm. 85mm AA is beast. Penetrates lower front 100mm at 60 degrees at 1000m. The study also lists various artillery pieces, grenades, mines AT rifles, and LL equipment.

How would this apply to Afghanistan though? The above quote is really only relevant for the European theater, where the goal is deep rapid advance by mobile formations. Soviet general staff study series published during WWII about select operations give a very interesting insight into the centralization in the Soviet army. When reviewing performance of mobile formations, the reaction of Soviet high command can only be described as shock at the ignorance of Soviet commanders. Ignorance of of both the role of their forces, and the mission that they are to carry out. Basically when given freedom, soviet armored and mechanized formations bogged down at every single strong point they came across, and wasted days trying to storm it, with insufficient infantry support. Instead of bypassing and sticking with the operational plan of actually advancing deep into enemy territory. The solution to that problem was to give them less and less initiative, to force them to get a move on. Now when it comes to Afghanistan, if "Bear went over the Mountain" is any indication, Soviet doctrine was completely inapplicable to anything over there, and instead was replaced with a freeform exploration of tactics. If there is no deep battle, there can really be no plan to stick to.

I was watching world at war about Stalingrad, and I noticed a very weird bit of footage. Watch the scene that starts at 1:16. Some kind of large tubular device is shot, at a conglomeration of rubble, and what appears to be a burnt out T-34. This results in a fiery smokey explosion. When the soldiers advance the device is carried by a single soldier. At first I thought it was just a time period error on the part of editors, and they were shooting a schrek, which is interesting in itself, but under closer examination it just doesn't look right. The explosion has no power, and the device looks like it has multiple pieces. The gunshield makes it look like a schreck, though. Here's one for sale, http://www.relics-citadel.ru/index.php?id=6839929460 there is a picture of soldiers with it that look similar to the one in the video.

This paper gives a good overview of how doctrines evolved starting with WWI up to end of Cold War. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/house.pdf Lets not exaggerate now. Mounted archers vs barbed wire, bunkers, breech loading artillery and machine guns wouldn't work too well. You mean you haven't read David Glantz's opuses on the matter? http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz4/glantz4.asp In the paper edition of the strategic one he even claims: "More recently, Western study of 'August Storm' provided inspiration, concrete guidance and a virtual model for its namesake Operation 'Desert Storm', the US-led coalition that crushed the Iraqi Army in 1991, US Military planners in the Gulf War initially intended to name the offensive phase of the war against Iraq 'Desert Sword' to match the defensive phase 'Desert Shield'. However, planning cells sent to the Gulf from Fort Leavenworth's School of Advance Military Studies, which had studied the Soviet Manchurian offensive in detail, developed an offensive operational plan that replicated the Soviet offensive and named it "desert Storm'." Mounted archers indeed. [ May 15, 2004, 07:35 PM: Message edited by: White Phosphorus ]

It wouldn't have won, but it would be definitely better off than it was defending. They'd get to keep their industries intact which could result in a different weapons mix than they originally had. T-34Ms, T-50s, Tu-2s very nasty. And I don't think that their equipment losses could get any worse than they were in the defensive battles, when there was no transport or gas and whatever wasn't destroyed fell into the enemy hands. Stuff would at least be breaking down on friendly territory.

I think the design team seriously went overboard with the whole "one penetration kills are unrealistic" thing that Close Combat series suffered from. There a single ATR penetration (well any penetration) resulted in a catastrophic explosion. In CMBB however, in one scenario I had a Soviet MG only T-26 pounded with a German ATR at 200 meters for turns on end, without doing any damage. By the time I took out that riffle the front hull must've looked like a wiremesh. The crew should've started aiming and vision slits at that point anyways.

I read that the first batch of T-34/85s was paid for by the Russian orthodox church.

I read a Russian article about Kursk a while ago, and there a Soviet tanker recalled that during the briefing their unit commander specifically instructed the unit to engage Tigers only from the side below 500m and ONLY using sub-caliber ammunition. Of course the reporter could've been wrong, the tanker could've remembered it wrong his officer could've been wrong. So interpret it how will.

I know it is not kosher to refer to other wargames, but in Steel Panthers T-34s had a,b,c,d versions which had alternating armor thickness 5-7mm. And somebody on the forums was so impressed with the detailed modeling that he posted an article about Soviet T-34 production that argued that few factories actually produced T-34s with the specified armor thickness, but made some plates 5-7-10mm thicker then specks. Which might explain the discrepancy in the various AARs. This was so long ago I don't think I'll be able to dig it up.

I simply cancel the movement and wait.

I just started reading about bagration, and in the 1st Baltic Front 5th army sector the recon elements captured the first trenches, so the barrage was directed deeper into the enemy rear. In the 1st Baltic Front's sector. "The time allocated for the artillery preparation in the 6th Guards Army was shortened, and the quantity of artillery to be used in the preparation was reduced by up to 50 percent. The artillery offensive in the 43d Army's 1st Rifle Corps began as an accompaniment to the attack period, while in the 60th Rifle Corps it began during the suppression period." 2nd Belorussian Front's sector. "Most of the first-echelon regiments had crossed and occupied the first German trench by the end of the artillery preparation; some had even reached the second and even third trenches. Individual battalions of the rifle divisions (290th, 222d) had penetrated so far forward during the artillery preparation that they reached the fourth enemy trench and had to return to the third trench for fear of being struck by their own artillery fire. The swift infantry advance required that artillery correct its schedule for the artillery offensive. These changes were not, however, always implemented in a timely fashion, and there were instances when our artillery and mortars fired upon regions already occupied by our sub-units. Also during the Manchurian operation the barrage was cancelled completely due to a heavy thunderstorm. [ October 21, 2003, 01:52 AM: Message edited by: White Phosphorus ]

I think the type of game is important. In a turn based tactical wargame it is best to take things slow and thorough, getting exited gets people killed. People who enjoy that type of game are more levelheaded, and if they are not they quickly learn to be. Aircombat on the other hand, is twitch gaming at it's worst (your whole body twitches not just left hand). Thinking is ill advised, everything happens too fast to be pondered on, you have to go by your instinct. People who enjoy that kind of game are the reason why there were ridiculous kill overclaims in all airforces of WWII.

The U.S. army was impressed enough to name operation Desert Storm in honor of Soviet operation August Storm, because it was so heavily studied. The Majority of lend lease arrived after the Germans were stopped. The Red army had more german trucks in 45 then western trucks in 41-42.

Paniced units can still fire.

All this nationalistic analysis is just so much rubbish. </font>

s333cr333tz Is this the order you are reffering to? An Order in Regards to Organization of POW Evacuation form the Frontline # 001 January 2 1943 Current practices of transiting and supplying of POW at the front and in during the transit stage to rear area camps has a number of significant shortcomings: 1. POW are held for a long time in units of the Red Army. From the moment of capture to the moment of their arrival to transit points, POWs have to walk 200-300 kilometers, while receiving almost no food, and because of that they arrive in the state of extreme exhaustion and sickness. 2. Considerable number of POW, not having own winter clothing, despite my orders, is not supplied form the captured stock. 3. POW, walking form the place of capture to the transit points, often guarded by small groups of soldiers or not guarded at all, which forces them to settle among the local population. 4. Concentration points for the POWs, as well as receiving points of NKVD, that in accordance with orders issued by the Staff of the Rear Area of the Red Army and Main Directorate of food supplies of the Red Army, must be supplied by Fronts with foodstuffs, clothing, transport, -receive them in utterly insignificant numbers, that cannot provide for minimal necessities. Because of that POWs cannot be supplied in accordance with assigned norms. 5. VOSO of the Fronts, supplies transport for the POWs transit to the rear area camps, in accordance with “too little too late” principle; moreover railcars supplied are not fit for transportation of the people : without beds, stoves, toilets, fuel and other necessities. 6. Contrary to the Rules of POW handling, which were signed into action by SNK of USSR and order of Main Directorate of Military Medicine, wounded and sick POWs are not accepted to the frontline hospitals but rather made to travel with general POWs columns to the receiving points and NKVD camps. Because of that considerable number of POWs is getting exhausted and dies before they sent to the rear. In order to decisively put an end to these malpractices in POW handling and to preserve them as a workforce I am ordering: To the Front Commanders: 1. provide for immediate transit of POWs by the Army units to the concentration points. Speed this up –use all the means of transport available that are moving form the Front. 2.Make unit commanders responsible for supplying of POWs in transit, till their acceptance by NKVD receiving points, in accordance with norms envisaged by the Directive of SNK of USSR # 18747874s. Attach to the POW columns field kitchens from the captured equipment and transport, that is needed for foodstuffs. 3. In accordance with Rules of POW handling, confirmed by the SNK of USSR directive # 17987800s from July 1st 1941, provide in timely manner all kinds of medical services to the wounded and sick POWs. Transit of sick , wounded, exhausted, frostbitten POWs with general columns with consequent delivery to the NKVD receiving points is categorically forbidden. This contingent is to be hospitalized with consequent evacuation to the rear area special hospitals; supply them in accordance to norms that are envisioned for sick POWs. 4. To provide enough troops for convoying of POWs from places of capture to the places of concentration. 5. In order to escape long walking stretches- make loading points for POWs as close as possible to the places of their concentration. 6. Unit commanders, when arraigning POWs transit, are to make a report of all POWs, amounts of foodstuffs supplied, transport and other means. The report is to be shown at receiving points. All personal documents of POWs are to be passed to NKVD personnel at NKVD receiving points 7. Daly marches are to be limited to 25-30km. After every 25-30 km -a stop is to be made to feed the POWs hot food, tea and to allow them to warm up and rest. 8. All personal belongings of the POWs shall remain in their possession. In cases when POWs lack winter clothing, footwear, and dishes, these items must be provided form captured stock or from dead enemy personnel. 9. To Fronts and Military Districts Commanders : a) in accordance with order issued by the Main Directorate of Rear Areas of the Red Army # 24/103892 from 11.30.42 and order issued by Main Directorate of Food supplies of the Red Army #3911/sh (here was used Russian latter that is not available in Latin Alphabet -oleg) from 12.10.42, immediately verify food supply situation of NKVD receiving points and transit points; create necessary stocks so that uninterrupted feeding of POWs can be sustained. Completely supply receiving points and NKVD transit camps with transport and other hardware. In case of arriving of the POWs in large numbers- additional means of transportation are to be dispatched immediately. 10.To the Chief of VOSO of the Red Army a) supply necessary numbers of rail cars for immediate departure of POWs to the camps; rail cars are to be refitted with beds, stoves, toilets; provide uninterrupted supply of fuel is to be provided; use all the echelons that are available after delivering their cargo to the front. provide for the fast transit of echelons – at the rate equal to that of military cargo c) organize in VOSO directorate dispatcher control over POWs echelons. d) norms for POWs per rail car: for 2 axel cars – 44 to 50 men. 4 axel cars – 80-90 men. No more than 1500 POWs per echelon. e) provide for uninterrupted hot food supply to the POWs and resupply of on- board stocks on every possible occasion. f) provide for uninterrupted supply of drinking water – 30 liters fro every 2-axel rail car, 50 liters for every 4 axel. 11. to the Chief of main Medical Directorate of the Red Army: a) provide for hospitalization of all wounded, sick, frostbitten, and extremely exhausted POWs in medical establishments of the Red Army at the frontline and in the rear. organize their immediate evacuation to the rear special hospitals c) for medical service of POW in transit provide needed medical personnel with sufficient medical supplies on hand, also utilized for this purposes captured German medical personnel. d) at evacuation points organize inspections in order to determined health conditions of POWs in transit and provide medical help if needed. Whose POWs who cannot continue with the transit because of their health are immediately to be taken off the trains and hospitalized in the nearest hospitals, with consequent transit to the rear area special hospitals as soon as their health permits. e) conduct sanitizization of POWs with disinfection of their personal belongings along the route. f) conduct antiepidemic works among POWs (till their acceptance by NKVD camps) 12. Forbid transit of POWs in the railcars that are not suited for transit of personnel, without necessary supplies, and of the POWs that are not dressed in accordance with season demands. Deputy to the Peoples Commissar of Defense colonel-general of Rear Area Service A. Hrulev .

When you starve to death there is a certain point where your body stops accepting solid food. The captured German soldiers needed specialized care, which the USSR simply could not afford; hell they could barely afford normal food for the prisoners, which killed them pretty quickly anyways. Stalingrad was also the first major Soviet victory resulting in huge numbers of enemy prisoners, they didn't really know what they were doing.

But they didn't have B29s, B24s, and B17s raining 1000 lb bombs on their heads. Transport hubs would likely have been prime targets. </font>

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp#t3