The trap awaiting all tactical, Eastern Front wargames.

[Moon]

The delay for the first waypoint is bigger than for subsequent waypoints if you plot them all in one go. So if you plot six waypoints, one each turn you will - in the end - suffer more delay (i.e. your unit will take, say, 20 seconds to start moving in each turn). When you plot all six waypoints in one go, you might get a total of 45 seconds delay in turn one, but there will be no pause for all the following waypoints (unless you need to change your orders at some point).

BTW, I totally made those numbers up. Don't even think about starting discussion if 20 sec vs. 45 sec is too long or too short.

[Stacheldraht]

From what I recall (so don't take this as gospel) the answer is yes, just like in CMBO now. You will lose use of the ball MG and suffer a SHOCK delay, but now you will additionally suffer a morale hit, which of course could very well result in the tank buggering off.

Fwiw, Matthew Hughes and Chris Mann in The T-34 Russian Battle Tank state that "during some of the Red Army's acute manpower crises the hull gunner/radio operator position was occasionally left unfilled" p.40 If that were modeled in the game, I guess such a tank would be essentially useless if the TC bought it.

Were Soviet tank crews regularly cross-trained to handle all the different necessary functions? I.e., would the hull gunner and make-believe radio operator generally know how to use the main gun adequately?

[ January 31, 2002, 11:38 AM: Message edited by: Stacheldraht ]

[MikeyD]

Your mention of the manpower shortage for tanks reminds me of a couple anecdotes in that regard. First and most significant was the occassional use of female tank crewmembers (often 'recruited' from nearby tank factories) to to fill-out empty positions. Could BTS add a random female soldier pict to the crew info display to signify this practice?

I also read an odd report about a dead female crewmwmber being pulled from a GERMAN tank on the western front in 45, which is a BIG shock considering the extreme chauvanism of the Nazi doctrine

[Spook]

Originally posted by Stephen Smith:

BTS_

I don't quite understand the waypoint system, so I'll ask: as I understand it, better commanded units will be able to create a more complex waypoint path, or create it and suffer fewer delays in execution, than worse-commanded units. The longer or more elaborate the waypoint path, the greater the delays.

But is it possible to avoid those delays by simply not plotting long, elaborate paths, and instead plot short, simple paths? In other words, if I as a Russian player can plot a complicated waypoint path stretching over 6 turns, and suffer lots of command penalties, could I avoid the penalties by plotting a new single waypoint path each turn? And if so, how is that a penalty? I as the Russian would simply plot the same complicated path, but plot it in six smaller turn-sized chunks, and avoid any command disadvantage. Or is there something else (perhaps a substantial '1st waypoint delay' that makes this unprofitable?)?

steve

It would be situation-dependent, of course, but for the moment, let's assume, as per your example, that moving a unit to some desired final location requires about six turns, and that interim locations (e.g., those that provide cover along the way) further make it that you define five unique "waypoints" before the final endpoint.

If plotting it all as a single movement path, then yes, it would take slower for the unit to get moving in the first turn. But once that the unit is moving, it pays no further delay penalties; it continues moving, from turn to turn, until reaching its final destination (unless shot at or shaken up in some way).

If, instead, you plotted only to reach an "interim" point for one turn, then yes, your unit would get moving sooner. But for the next turn, you have to plot a new movement to the next interim point. And thus, you have to pay the "start-up delay" penalty all over again, the length of this delay based on unit experience. And you'll pay this time penalty five times before reaching the destination that is about six turns' distance away.

Odds are that the sum of the "start-up delays" will add up to make the second unit slower overall in reaching the final destination. But again, it'll probably be situation-dependent, based on unit experience, distance, command benefit, etc.

In the case of a conscript unit, I would choose the latter method, given that a lot can happen within six turns, and only plotting to reach "interim points" allows me some more flexibility to get the conscripts to respond to a new situation. But I recognize that doing this will make the conscripts slower overall if I want them to move to some faraway point.

Which, I believe, is the design intent; improved short-term "flexibility" for poor-quality troops comes at a cost in long-term "maneuverability."

[Urban Shocker]

I'm a little confused about the command delays. Are they going to be instituted because the early Soviet army was green or because of Soviet battalion commander and below personality traits (i.e. tactical training)?

The debate has been pretty civilized so far. Let's remember teasing apart interlocking elements can be difficult. So deciding whether a Soviet company behaved a certain way because it was something inherent to it (and thus modeled in CMBB) or something having to do with higher levels of command (and thus not modeled in CMBB, IMHO) is going to be difficult with some gray areas.

I have faith that BTS will take the best evidence at hand and interpret it correctly. We should all realize that CMBB might not be made precisely what we would make but it is going to be damn good game.

P.S. Just the fact we are having discussions like this should be evidence that this is going to be a worthwhile game.

[Juardis]

Sounds like the sniper will be much more valuable in this game . what with their ability to kill a soviet TC and all.

[dalem]

Originally posted by Juardis:

Sounds like the sniper will be much more valuable in this game . what with their ability to kill a soviet TC and all.

Maybe we'll stop making fun of that giant hatch opening forward now.

-dale

[Battlefront.com]

I think Spook did an excellent job summing this up.

I also want to correct something I said earlier. Distance isn't factored into the waypoint delays. This was part of the original design and, I forgot, we yanked it out because we thought it was a redundant penalty. If you plot a single, long distance move you are already penalized for the initial delay plus the fact that the path is highly unintelligent.

I would list some specific examples right out of the game for you guys, but there is a "bug" in the latest build which prevents purchasing Conscript Soviet forces. Obviously that would make it kinda tough to give you something concrete at this moment Charles will fix it for the next build though.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Urban Shocker:

I'm a little confused about the command delays. Are they going to be instituted because the early Soviet army was green or because of Soviet battalion commander and below personality traits (i.e. tactical training)?

Both + ridged restrictions on freedom of action imposed by the internal system of terror which prevailed for much of the first year of the war. Every frontline commander literally put his life on the line when making a decision, especially if it could be seen in any way defeatist. Because of that planning was painfully uncreative and to the letter of their training, and only done after receiving clear instructions from someone else.

In English we call this "CYA" or "CYOA" (Cover Your Ass or Cover Your Own Ass). It is a system which stifles creativity and initiative, and is alive and well in the corporate world far too frequently. In the early war period this problem was SO bad that even Stalin realized they would likely lose the war unless he loosened up a bit. So the Commisar system was largely dismantled in 1942 and the emphasis on evaluating of performance being on total track record and end results, not what happend in a particular battle.

To recap...

The Soviets had three very real, very negative things working against them during the first period of the war:

1. Lack of trained NCOs, junior officers, and mid level commanders.

2. Doctrine which was too ridged and did not offer the kind of tactical flexibility which was the core of Axis doctrine in general.

3. Fear of making any decision, tactical through strategic, without getting countersigned approval by someone else in "good standing" in case of failure.

The amazing thing about the Soviet system, and the Red Army in particular, is how quickly it learned from its mistakes and how thoroughly it could do a 180 to make improvements. The initial war went really bad, the middle period much better as internal reform took root, and the latter stunning in cases as the reforms were practiced with routine success. Sure, there were still major failings even all the way up to the end of the war (Battle for Berlin being the worst), but overall the rate and degree of improvement of the Soviet fighting forces is nothing short of astonishing.

Steve

[Lee]

A very good point has been raised about tank commanders getting killed when they

also happen to be the gunner for the tank.

Steve mentioned shock being an issue. But in the case of Russian tanks with

two-man turrets, I would think the situation would be much worse. First off, if

the commander gets killed, you not only have lost your leader but your only gunner,

as well. This is a really bad double hit on the tank crew. And thus I would think

that the tank would tend to stay in a shock status much longer for a two-man turreted

tank that loses it's commander than one with a separate gunner.

Also, since the only properly trained gunner is now dead (or drooling in the corner,

being not very helpful at the moment ), this leaves only crewmen who likely

barely know how to operate the main gun to shoot it. This should then result

in a massive accuracy penalty on all main gun shots taken after the tank commander

goes down, for all but extreme close range shots. Long range shots of any kind

would be especially inaccurate.

[ January 31, 2002, 03:18 PM: Message edited by: Lee ]

[Lee]

Any opinions on my last post? Curious what others think about the subject.

[LongLeftFlank]

Interesting. Now that I think about it, I don't recall ever seeing a photo/newsreel of a Soviet AFV in action without being buttoned up (although others will doubtless have seen more than I). I suspect that this was standard doctrine, but also a practical matter of battlefield survival, regardless of impact on C&C.

(And by the way, I kinda liked some of Carrell's stuff when I read it back in high school, even though it'd make you think that the only reason the Germans ever lost was that Hitler was personally nailing his generals' feet to the scorched earth. But then again, Manstein made more or less the same kind of claims in his biog.)

"We caught them... and we shot them... using Rule .303!" Breaker Morant

[Battlefront.com]

Lee,

Crew members are supposed to be cross trained to the extent of their other crew members. Now, you might think that is a stretch early in the war BUT keep in mind that most tanks will be Green or Conscript, so it isn't like an Elite gunner getting nailed and his totally untrained MG/radio man taking over at Elite status. And until we can track individual abilities, there is no way around this issue any more than what we have now.

LongLeftFlank,

The thing about Hitler making bad decisions and gumming up the works is partially true. For a good general, like Manstein, this was totally correct. For someone like Palus, this is totally incorrect. Basically, you can only blame the guy above you to the degree he prevented you from doing a better job. If you weren't capable of doing a better job, or (worse) agreed with the idiot, then you have no excuse. After the war the German top brass almost to a man said "it was all Hitler's fault" and "I never knew what horrible things were going on". Truth in both, but not for all who said these things.

Steve

[Stacheldraht]

Though I haven't gotten to read it yet, Alan Clark's Barbarossa : The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45 is supposed to argue that Hitler was a better strategist than he was given credit for in that context.

It's not all surprising that the German generals, soldiers, and populace would frequently try to pass the buck after the war. How many generals want to admit to professional failings when they can blame a political leader? How many soldiers want to admit to war crimes or atrocities when they can blame the SS? How many civilians or police want to admit to their role in the Holocaust when they can point at Hitler, or Himmler, or their neighbor Hans down the Straße? But that's a whole gigantic topic in its own right. Look at how much controversy that Hitler's Willing Executioners alone has caused.

***

Crew members are supposed to be cross trained to the extent of their other crew members.

Anyone know of some good books or documents that detail Soviet armor training and doctrine during the period? Thanks.

[Mattias]

Originally posted by Stacheldraht:

Look at how much controversy that Hitler's Willing Executioners alone has caused.

OT but as you mention it..

Just make sure you read "Ordinary Men : Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland" by Christopher R. Browning too.

It might serve to broaden the perspectives a bit and show why some of the controversy that Willing Executioners created flared up.

M.

[MikeyD]

Someone above mentioned they never saw newsreel of a T34 in action that wasn't buttoned up. I'm reminded of a snippet I saw in the ancient "World at War" series that showed a T34-76 zooming across the snow at top speed. What struck me was at every dip and bump you could see the big top hatch flopping open and banging shut! Maybe BTS should model the sounds of a T34 at speed as "Vrooom -- CLANG! CLANG! CLANG!..."

[Lee]

Steve:

Even if in theory all crewmen know how to do the others' jobs, I think it's

safe to say that in most tanks the gunner is the gunner for a reason. Namely

that he is the best gunner of the bunch and they want the most well-trained accurate

shooter on the main gun so they don't all die in some fiery explosion when the

other tank's gunner gets off an accurate shot first.

Now, I understand that individual crewmen can't be tracked in CM or CM2. But in

the case of two-man turrets and the commander getting shot, we know for a fact

in this case that the gunner has been taken out, also. And since we know this

with a certainty, it can perhaps be accounted for in some way. I was thinking maybe

having CM2 do a check for two-man turreted tanks to see if they've lost their

commander (hit while looking out hatch), and if so, then just apply a negative

modifier for main gun accuracy, especially at long range. As you say, this isn't

much of a factor when all your crews are green or conscript to begin with, but

it becomes more important later when regular and vet crews start to show up.

What do you think about the longer shock period for two-man turreted tanks who

lose their commander/gunner, as opposed to tanks that have separate gunners?

[Battlefront.com]

Regarding the buck passing...

WWII was exceptionally complex and highly difficult to draw broad generalizations from. Sometimes the peson saying "it wasn't my fault, I did everything I could but..." is telling the truth. In fact, I think most could say things like "I didn't know" or "it wasn't me" or the like. But when we are talking about the scale and sope of the whole, even if 1% (which is clearly too low) "knew" or "didn't object" or whatever... we are still talking about 100s of thousands, perhaps even millions (when you take into consideration the WHOLE population) who can not claim to have done their best or did not contribute to the negatives of the Third Reich (which is in and of itself a broad list of things).

I've never had the stomach to read Hagen's "Willing Executioners" because I first heard about it when he did an hour long talk show on Public Radio. I was shocked at how shoddy his work and opinions were. Cripes, even I had no trouble poking HUGE gaping holes into his core reasonings, not to mention the Harvard (I think?) History Professor who was having a field day with it. My distinct opinion of Hagen is that he doesn't know what the heck he is doing and entered into his "research" with his mind already made up about what he wanted to find (i.e. that the German people were somehow predisposed to do what they did). This is beneath contempt for a researcher/historian to do, so it came as no surprise to me to find out he was neither in the professional sense.

On the other hand, "Ordinary Men" and "Into That Darkness" explore the realities and complexities of how it is that Humans (men AND women) can, and far too often do, rationalize and even enjoy causing pain and suffering upon others. The motivations are many and deeply troubling due to their pervasiveness in even the most "ordinary" people. Anybody who wishes to study the real lessons of WWII that does NOT understand this should find another line of work.

Sorry for the rant, but I loath people who miss the point and therefore muddy the waters with their blindness, bias, incompetence, and/or political/social/cultrial/racial agendas. If any of you have read the garbage churned out by the Historical Revisionist groups you would know the extremes this can be taken to.

OK, end of rant

Lee, you make a good point. Not sure if anything can be done at this point, but I will pose a couple of suggestions to Charles.

Steve

[Stacheldraht]

Goldhagen's book has been the subject of scathing criticisms from a number of scholars. There have been a bunch of books in both German and English that have taken it task, or at least seriously questioned its conclusions. It sounds like the book has been more a succes de scandale than anything.

There are, nevertheless, lots of books and articles (again in both English and German) by major scholars that do raise related questions about the guilt or sins of ommission of the German populace and/or the Wehrmacht (as opposed to the SS). And after all, the Wehrmacht was by and large fighting unprovoked campaigns of aggression and eradication--and hardly just against opposing militaries. Nowadays, it's PC to find excuses and ameliorating explanations for everything, but some things shouldn't be excused.

[Mattias]

As long as one is not blinded or become complacent by ones high justification for not forgiving.

These things must be brought to light and that is all that matters. Help the victims and teach the lesson to the growing generations, without black and white, simplification or stereotypes.

And there is an awful lot of that going around...

I just Read "The Holocaust on Trial" by D. D. Guttenplan. He writes about, what essentially became, the trial against David Irving, the well known writer (and now exposed revisionist and academic cheat). Though this might not be the best book ever written it does a good job of presenting some of the forces at work in the, shall we say, building of history. It also serves well as a bibliography of text relevant to the subject. The trial in itself is fascinating as well.

And.. that is all I have to say on this subject..

M

[ February 01, 2002, 08:33 PM: Message edited by: Mattias ]

[Battlefront.com]

Doh! GOLDHAGEN!! That is what I meant to write

Yes, I think it is important for there to be a closer examination of what role non-SS units had in the various crimes which took place during the Third Reich. There has definitely been too much blame shouldered by too few. This is not helped by the demonizing of the SS and "Nazi" as blanket terms by people who don't understand 1/100th of the complexity of the issue.

I can say that I have talked with many Germans and many American Jews that are equally as clueless about what happened, yet because of their cultural ties and family involvement, feel that they inherently know more than others. Instead, both were brought up being fed a concentrated dose of history which was not well explained to them, nor was it particullarly accurate. Unfortunately, this is true of history teaching in general. I honestly think that history should be more important in primary schools than math or sciences. But of course, I am biased because I am not as good at those things as I am history

Ah... I could go on and on about this stuff, but I won't My basic philosophy is to shine the light in someone's eyes only if it becomes necessary to do so. Otherwise, I'd go crazy trying to correct all the misinformation and misperceptions that are out there.

Steve

[ February 01, 2002, 05:01 PM: Message edited by: Big Time Software ]

[Keith]

The fact of the matter is Hitler did not create the rabid anti-Semitism present in Germany, Poland, and the Baltic States. Hitler merely tapped into and channeled what people were already feeling and wanting. The German people, and especially the German military officers, joyfully rode the fast horse that was Hitler until they realized, too late, that they couldn't get off and that Hitler would take the nation to its doom.

BTW the first Holocaust occured way before Hitler ever walked onto the stage. The Crusaders slaughtered millions of Jews on their way to "liberate" Palestine.

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

I honestly think that history should be more important in primary schools than math or sciences.

Certainly agree with that, but I'd argue a more solid emphasis on developing critical thinking skills; many public school history classes just teach a laundry list of "what happened" rather than "why." The kind of critical thinking that can be generated by an effective and relevant history class is a fundamentally useful tool in all disciplines.

Steering a bit back to the topic, I find the command issue resolved fairly well with regard to the Soviets in the early war. A Soviet player fighting in 1941 will have the chance to attempt to plan long, detailed moves that anticipate his opponent's actions, but once combat seriously begins, he'll be forced to keep his actions simple so as to not give up all ability to respond.

What was the answer on the 'early war' morale issue? I should hope veterans have been made extremely rare, rather than omitted entirely.

Scott

[Stacheldraht]

Though this might not be the best book ever written it does a good job of presenting some of the forces at work in the, shall we say, building of history.

That's a major key right there. It's usually not until graduate-level critical theory, philosophy, and historiography classes that you really delve into the concept of history as contested narratives. History as a field of scholarly (often not so scholarly with WWII) endeavor is incredibly far from just recounting the facts, though the naive belief that that's the case abounds. History writing involves selection, filtering, creation, and all those involve biases, whether cultural or individual.

Unfortunately, assuming people even get taught some history these days (and liberal arts education in the US is frighteningly bad), history education usually just does amount to the laundry list or calendar approach.

Critical thinking and research skills definitely are paramount: with those, any reasonably intelligent person can seek out and evaluate source material on their own.

[gatpr]

Let me say that I teach Geography/History to 7th graders. (So shouldn't I get a free advance copy?) The real point is that far from being the most important subject it and science are the least emphasized subjects. I am supposed to give an overview of the geography of the planet and inculcate some historical awareness in 90 days. I have an hour and fifteen minutes per block. I love history and my work but I have few illusions about how effective I can be under the current constraints.