The trap awaiting all tactical, Eastern Front wargames.

[Stacheldraht]

Earlier in the thread I mentioned how one source noted that at times manpower shortages meant that the T-34 sometimes was used without the MG/radio operator and asked whether the crews were trained to take over other positions if need be (this in the context of the TC in a two-man-turreted tank getting wounded in CMBB). Here are some interesting excerpts from David M. Glantz's Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Kansas UP, 1998):

"Compounding these deficiencies, since the [mechanized] corps were formed on the basis of existing cavalry corps and divisions, many of its new officers and men had no familiarity with the basics of armored warfare. Hastily organized remedial courses failed to solve this problem. Moreover, since the new model KV and T-34 tanks were secret, training in their use was limited, and by 22 June only 20 percent of corps personnel had any experience operating them." p. 118

"Numerous archival documents indicate that, on the eve of war, many of the older Soviet model tanks had been allowed to fall into disrepair and the new Soviet tanks often were not even bore-sighted and, hence, could not fire. Furthermore, many tank crews had not received the requisite driver and crew training [emphasis mine]. All of this, together with the surpise nature of the German offensive, negated any Soviet numerical or qualitative advantages." p. 119

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Stacheldraht:

Earlier in the thread I mentioned how one source noted that at times manpower shortages meant that the T-34 sometimes was used without the MG/radio operator and asked whether the crews were trained to take over other positions if need be (this in the context of the TC in a two-man-turreted tank getting wounded in CMBB). Here are some interesting excerpts from David M. Glantz's Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Kansas UP, 1998):

Glantz goes into quite a bit of detail over like twenty pages in Stumbling Colossus to explain that the tank and mechanized units participating in the frontier battles were horribly unprepared. In some battles crews drove into combat in a vehicle they'd only received hours before and had no training on whatsoever.

I'd argue, however, that this doesn't really make a strong case against "cross training." Sure they weren't cross trained-- the actual crew members weren't trained in their own roles in the first place. If the gunner gets killed and has never so much as looked out the sights of a T-34 in his life prior to that day, I have a hard time believing that the radio operator would (or could) do worse. If a crew is already 'conscript' in CM terms, they're pretty much as bad as they can get.

Scott

[Grisha]

It should be remembered that in 1941 the smart Soviet commander usually waited in ambush for the advancing Germans, and since so many Soviet commanders were following strict orders to attack, any commanders who did set up a proper ambush were often rewarded with many German losses.

Rokossovky did so on 28 June 1941 along the Lutsk-Rovno Highway, repulsing 13th Panzer Division's advance after inflicting heavy losses. Katukov did the same on 11 October with his 4th Tank Brigade, ambushing elements of the 4th Panzer Division as it entered Mtsensk. 4th Panzer was forced to retreat and by the end of the battle 4th Panzer's tanks were largely destroyed. By T-34s. Katukov's brigade withdrew largely intact.

It all depends on how they were used. T-34s may have had many deficiencies, but Russians are quite good at 'getting around any kinks in the system.' In any case, T-34s were not blind pillboxes, just not as 'fluid' in pure mechanized warfare as the German tanks.

I'm posting this not so much in protest as to remind one of what the T-34 was capable of in the right hands, and under the right conditions. Certainly, give the T-34(and Soviets) their early war(or entire war depending on your bias) C3i and equipment penalties, but also make sure you understand how the Soviets got around these limitations and took advantage of what they could. Good Soviet commanders generally did, even in summer 1941. Make sure they can be replicated in CMBB. Please

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Rokossovky did so on 28 June 1941 along the Lutsk-Rovno Highway, repulsing 13th Panzer Division's advance after inflicting heavy losses.

Hmm, the German history on my shelf(Die Magdeburger Division - zur Geschichte der 13. Infanterie und Panzerdivision) confirms the heavy losses, and the temporary confusion (the divisional HQ train almost got caught in the attack), but states that these were amongst supply units (which is critical on the operational level if you try to conduct Blitzkrieg, but irrelevant on the CMBB level). I also don't think that 'repulsed' is the right word. The 13th PD's KTB states clearly that it was a tough fight, won only because the combat leaders kept their nerve, but that they advanced in the end.

Glantz in chapter 5 of 'The initial period of war' says of the 27th:

13th Panzer Division plunged southward down the highway from Lutsk and struck the Soviet forward detachments in the flank, rolling over them one after another.

The overrunning of the supply units does not register with him. Of the 28th he says

13th Panzer reached the Rovno area, but found itself without any basic infantry support, since the German infantry divisions had turned south to deal with the critical situation developing around Dubno. [...]the Soviets were able to create a fairly firm defense line running north and southeast of Lutsk to just north of Rovno. [...] At this juncture the routine nemesis of the Soviet forces again arose - renewed shortages of fuel and ammunition. lack of fuel threatened to turn difficulty into desaster.

Of the 29th:

Disaster loomed for the Soviets on the 29 June. During the morning 13th Panzer Division advanced eastward out of Rovno. Soviet forces were still withdrawing north and south of the city, literally along routes parallel to 13th Panzer's advance.

According to Glantz, the Soviets had about 2,300 tanks (576 heavy T-34 and KV-1) on the southern flank of the German axis on 22/6, against a total number of 636 German tanks. The Soviets were further reinforced during the battle. The German tank compliment was made up of Panzer II, III short 50 and 37mm, and Panzer IV short 75. Something must have happened rendering these heavy tanks useless in combat, because they did not stop the German advance.

It certainly was not for want of trying - here is another quote from the history of the 13.PD (by Ia AG South on 26/6):

The realisation that the opponent in his will to fight, his toughness in combat, and seemingly also in the quality of its leaders was an in every respect serious adversary.

[Midnight Warrior]

I would imagine that much of the discrepency between Russsian and German performance was due to Russian incompetence and/or lackof experience at higher levels above the CM scale. This could be modeled in the scenarios by giving the Russian player dumb objectives and/or unrealistic time schedules to achieve them that woud preclude even a very good Russian CM frommaking the most tactically sound moves. For instance if it would take 30 min to move X far with Y force against Z opposition, the (wicked, devious, and warped) scenario designer could require the Russian player (who was he? Ah yes,Y) to do it in 15 min so as to reflect bad direction from above. This may force him to move directly to his objective without making good use of cover because of the reduced time schedule. This (plus the other suggestions in this thread) would up his losses without having to jack with his combat factors.

(my apologies if this suggestion has already been made in the thread)

[Battlefront.com]

Grisha,

Not to worry. Reread everything I said in previous posts and then think about how this would affect a bunch of T-34s lying in wait to ambush attacking Germans. I think you will see that there are no special problems with this, and in fact I stated that a few times.

The real problem is when they had to get out and move, which was more often the case than lying in wait on the ambush. On the move all the various problems the Soviet tankers had stacked up against them were exposed to maximum (negative) effect, while at the same time the Germans were at the top of their game in terms of mobility and related tactics.

Steve

[Tiger]

Though I haven't gotten to read it yet, Alan Clark's Barbarossa : The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45 is supposed to argue that Hitler was a better strategist than he was given credit for in that context.

It's been a good read so far but focuses mostly on the German side of things (so far up to Kursk).

Mr. Clark's book is revealing in describing the problems on the German side of things, in particular the political and professional infighting between the numerous Nazi party members and offices all vying to control their new "conquests" in Russia as well as the personal and professional grudges between generals.

More often than not Hilter's orders were simply ignored or circumvented by the German generals as they saw fit, until he would personally come to the front to hold a 'conference'. As early as 1943 before Zitadelle there was an attempt on Hitler's life by officers in Army Group Center. They actually got a bomb on his plane for the flight back and it triggered but the detenator malfunctioned!

There was more often than not friction between Army Commanders, Group Commanders, Army Group Commanders: Leeb being ordered to send his panzers south to reinforce AG Center for an attack, only to use the last couple of days before the order had to be followed in using these panzers to assault Leningrad and thus wear them out before he had to transfer them.

The Artillery branch ammending Guderian's authority when he became inspector of the armored forces after learning he wanted to take assault guns (artillery branch) and add them to panzer formations to bring up the numbers.

The whole German war effort in the east seems to be one long story of constant in-fighting that led to one disatser after another.

-john

[KEEF888]

Being an avid ASL player myself for many years, (began when it switched from SL in @ 1982...God, I'm showing my age!), I understand the temptaion to debate. But, to qoute Rodney "Ow, that hurts!" King: "Can't we all just get along?"

[Yeknodathon]

I'm looking to forward to discover how the new new command abilities / disabilities will affect tactics on the battlefield.

Just a brief question: will fatigue be modelled (eg reduction in fire rate, command delays, low morale) or is this outside the scope of CB:BB?

Alex

[Prinz Eugen]

Originally posted by Yeknodathon:

Just a brief question: will fatigue be modelled (eg reduction in fire rate, command delays, low morale) or is this outside the scope of CB:BB?

On what I've heard, yes. The troops will have a "fitness" rating, if you will. This will enable to make a difference between, say, German veterans exhausted in many years of fighting - veteran troops, but really worn out, and newly deployed green Soviet troops, young, fit, but ill-trained.

And excessive fatigue adds to the command delay, too.

[John Kettler]

This is a most interesting thread, but I believe parts of it may be based on a misconception concerning flag communications. If memory serves,

the Soviet tanks had special small hatches specifically for using flag signals while buttoned.

Even if not having the greatest visual arrangements in the world for long range threat detection, the Soviet tanks certainly had the ability, using the commander's periscope (and turret vision ports on early T-34s) to watch the platoon commander's vehicle for signals. I'd also add that even in the 1980s the Soviets routinely practiced flag signals for maneuver control under radio silence.

Great emphasis was laid during the War and up to the Soviet Union's collapse upon mission prebriefing of potential battle situations, the planned scheme of maneuver, and orientation by terrain reference points. Tactical regulations during the War and through the 1980s mandated buttoning up well before reaching the line of contact. Another tool of control we've utterly failed to discuss is the use of tracer fire to point out targets, which at range might well be subjected to platoon or company volley fire as SOP.

In short, I believe that BFC may (note conditional)

be overstating the penalties associated with flag based maneuver. Tanks don't have to be unbuttoned to use flag signals.

The lot of a radioless Soviet tank platoon leader is not a happy one, and it takes some major thought adjustment, but having played the Soviet side in a CMBB sneak preview using lousy troops against dug-in German infantry, AT guns and apparent mortars, I can assure you that it is not only doable but winnable. We broke through the German defenses and shot them up from behind while most of our infantry attacked from the front. We won big, and that was in spite of multiminute command delays, tank losses, broken infantry on several occasions, etc.

As an interesting aside, I'd like to observe that the Americans got a huge radio break in CMBO. According to TANKS FOR THE MEMORIES (available online at www.tankbooks.com), only two tanks in each platoon had transceivers, the platoon leader's and the assistant platoon leader's, while the rest just had receivers. That might change the game outcomes a bit, were it modeled. Sure was a shock to read about it.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Speedy]

Got halfway through the first post and thought to myself.. Christ we've gone through all this countless times before..

[Bruno Weiss]

Ah dog-gone-it, you mean CMBB's no good?

[Prinz Eugen]

Originally posted by Bruno Weiss:

Ah dog-gone-it, you mean CMBB's no good?

Yea, I'm well 'n truly afraid that CMBB will fall into "The Trap awaiting all tactical, Eastern Front wargames " since Germans may not win ALL the early war fights/ Soviets ALL the late war fights...Oh dear !

Most ahistorical !

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Yeknodathon:

Just a brief question: will fatigue be modelled (eg reduction in fire rate, command delays, low morale) or is this outside the scope of CB:BB?

Since it is modeled in CMBO why wouldn't it be in CMBB?

:confused:

Michael

[John Kettler]

Here is a link I found (appears to trace ultimately to an issue of online pub AFV INTERIORS) which talks about the flags and the Soviet tank radios, the abysmal quality of many of the latter, and has some excellent photos showing many of the matters discussed.

http://www.wlhoward.com/sovrad.html

Regards,

John Kettler