did we really have great generals?

[DaveN]

After playing CM for a while and finding pretty much the Germans outnumbered by a wide margin in alot of these scenarios kind of got me thinkin..did we really have these great Generals of WW11 kicking the enemys behind with brilliant tactics (Patton,Bradley..etc..) or was it pure American propaganda?...The way I see it, it looks like they just threw vast numbers of equipment and men at the Germans and defeated them by pure numbers.. sort of like what Grant did in the Civil War..

My asbestos suit is on

[Michael Dorosh]

This has been discussed a lot already - I always bring up John Ellis' book BRUTE FORCE, and yes, the Allies won because of their industrial and manpower superiority. However, they did field some good generals, and brave men. And some bad generals and cowards. So did the Germans. There is no single correct answer - and everyone use propaganda (back before it was a dirty word), not just the Americans.

[Mr. Johnson--]

Well said Dorosh.

But how do you define a great general? Would the same general who you think is great done better than another general in a diffrent situation? Would Patton have had such a great kill ratio if he was a Russian general on the southern front in 1941?

I find it very interesting looking at how much the Americans learned from the Germans after WW2.

[Michael Dorosh]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mr. Johnson--:

Well said Dorosh.

But how do you define a great general? Would the same general who you think is great done better than another general in a diffrent situation? Would Patton have had such a great kill ratio if he was a Russian general on the southern front in 1941?

I find it very interesting looking at how much the Americans learned from the Germans after WW2.<hr></blockquote>

It's a great question. Patton almost resigned his commission in the US Army so he could come north and join the Canadians. He obviously didn't, but what would have happened if he did? Interesting to ponder. He was already quite old, and probably wouldn't have been given a command overseas, even if he could transfer in to our army as a general (which in itself was unlikely).

[Sgt Colon]

Having recently watched "Hell in the Pacific" , and the film "Patton", it made me wonder, would Patton have been so enamoured of war had he served in the Pacific?

[ 01-29-2002: Message edited by: Sgt Colon ]

[ 01-29-2002: Message edited by: Sgt Colon ]</p>

[Fairbairn-Sykes]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mr. Johnson--:

I find it very interesting looking at how much the Americans learned from the Germans after WW2.<hr></blockquote>

Agreed. Just take a look at the current American helmet design. Strikingly similar to the Wehrmacht's famous "coal scuttle" shape.

[Generale_Pasquini]

if only there was no eastern front.... the allies would not have stepped foot in germany. If you think about it... German forces held off the entire West for some time with a VERY VERY depleted army. If you were to put Germans in the place of allies from d-day to berlin would have taken 3 weeks.

[Warphead]

Yes, WE had great generals...

[Stixx]

Interesting subject but i don't feel there is any right answer.

It depends how you define a "great" General.

Most countries have fielded some good Generals in their time and those same country's have had some bad Generals.

As mentioned you have to give credit to the Germans who through many means (Equipment, Tactics, Propaganda, etc) accomplished a lot with very little.

Great Generals: McArthur comes to mind straight away. Still one of the best in my opinion.

[Chupacabra]

I think what defines a good (or great) general is that he knows how to win.

Grant may not have had flashy victories the way Lee did at Chancelorsville (to think of one), but he knew how to lick Lee and he did.

Ditto the Allied generals in WW2. They knew how to win and they did.

In both cases there were miscues along the way - Cold Harbor and Market Garden were screw-ups just about any way you look at them. But in the end they won, and won decisively.

[Stacheldraht]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The way I see it, it looks like they just threw vast numbers of equipment and men at the Germans and defeated them by pure numbers.<hr></blockquote>

That seems to be partially true from what I've read--not to denigrate the efforts of the US troops and commanders.

Even at its height, the German war economy had little on the Soviets or the Americans. The Soviets miraculously moved most of their heavy industry eastward as the Germans pushed deeper into their territory. They literally took their massive factories apart, loaded them on trains, and rebuilt them in new locations.

The US provided massive Lend-Lease aid to both the Soviets and the British. (And the British also supplied aid to the Soviets). If it weren't for the countless trucks, locomotives, and similar equipment, things would have gone very differently for the Soviets. Those supplies enabled them to (re)build the infrastructure needed to move their vast armies ever westward as the war turned in their favor. And remember that the Soviets tied up the vast majority of German troops for about four years. It was in the East that the Germans suffered most of their casualties and POW's: around 10 million of 13 million total.

The US also played a major role in keeping the British from starving to death during the U-boat campaign. Britain had long needed to import much, if not most, of its food. And, as you see in CM, the Americans supplied much military materiel to Britain as well: witness their reliance on Sherman tanks.

Either way, the US economy grew enormously during the war years and provided more than enough raw material and goods to supply both itself and its allies. Of course, the Americans and Soviets also had massive populations with which to build armies and support them in the factories.

There are many books and studies on the economics of the war. Alan Milward's War, Economy, and Society, 1939-1945 is supposed to be good.

[ 01-29-2002: Message edited by: Stacheldraht ]</p>

[Splinty]

One of the lessons we learned on our own is the importance of logistics and supply towards victory. So although I can see why some people can doubt the quality of American fighting Generals,I beleive we had some of the best logisticians in the world at that time,and the truth of the matter is;logistics win wars,commanders win battles.

[Berlichtingen]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by DaveN:

After playing CM for a while and finding pretty much the Germans outnumbered by a wide margin in alot of these scenarios kind of got me thinkin..did we really have these great Generals of WW11 kicking the enemys behind with brilliant tactics (Patton,Bradley..etc..) or was it pure American propaganda?...The way I see it, it looks like they just threw vast numbers of equipment and men at the Germans and defeated them by pure numbers.. sort of like what Grant did in the Civil War.<hr></blockquote>

We had both geniuses and bumbling fools. So did everyone else... except the Finns (they were all geniuses). Grant is a bad example as he was one of the best generals of the ACW. Unlike many of his flashy counterparts he looked toward winning a war... not a battle

[tiborhead]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't we (US) run in to logistical problems in late '44 during the Huertgen campaign? I seem to remember from a book I read about the battle (The Bloody Forrest) that supplies began to dwindel as supply lines lengthend over such a short period of time.

[Marlow]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by DaveN:

The way I see it, it looks like they just threw vast numbers of equipment and men at the Germans and defeated them by pure numbers.. sort of like what Grant did in the Civil War..

<hr></blockquote>

Grant is highly underrated as a General (might have something to do with the Lee/Jackson Cult that has grown up around the American Civil War). He lost a few battles (not all that many), but never a campaign. His actions in the West were superb (except maybe Shiloh, which he still won). Yes he took higher casualties than Lee in their battles in Virginia, but Lee was on the defensive, and Grant did what was necessary to win (unlike some of his predecessors).

A quick note on Lee. Why exactly is he so well regarded? He was very good on the defense, but he didn’t do very well on the attack. His two offenses into the North were both disasters. His greatest victory (Chancellorville (sp?)) only occurred because he was fighting a General who shouldn’t have been given command, and was on top of that knocked senseless by an explosion. In that battle, Lee violated a number of principles of warfare, and should have been defeated in detail had the Union General been even halfway competent.

[ 01-29-2002: Message edited by: Marlow ]</p>

[Brian]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Stixx:

Great Generals: McArthur comes to mind straight away. Still one of the best in my opinion.<hr></blockquote>

Personally, I'd put him rather further down, towards the bottom. His performance in the Philippines and the SW Pacific left a great deal to be desired IMO.

[Brian]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Sgt Colon:

Having recently watched "Hell in the Pacific" , and the film "Patton", it made me wonder, would Patton have been so enamoured of war had he served in the Pacific?<hr></blockquote>

In a word, yes. He'd also have enjoyed it a great deal more, one suspects.

[Urban Shocker]

This is sort of like the Most Valuable Player debate in sports. How much of the team's success is one player responsible for? How much is a good general worth in terms of victories, friendly and enemy casualties, and confidence inspiring?

Let's do a little thought experiment. Consider each of the following Generals and whether or not they would have excelled to the same level if they were leading the armies of a different nation.

(1) Montgomery leading a Soviet army at the

beginning of Barbarossa.

(2) Rommel leading an American army in Tunisia.

(3) Patton leading the Italian Army against the

Brits in early 1941.

(4) Guderian leading the Polish army in 1939.

How would they have done?

[Wilhammer]

Brian,

How strange that we are in agreement yet again. MacArthur was way over-rated. He played politics more than he played General, and he was more than willing, even pro-active at it, to slight others to further himself.

He, for example, made sure that every dispatch out of his command served him, and ignored the participants and the field commanders.

The whole drive to the Phillipines is a fascinating bunch of history, but so much of it is buried under the guys ego.

I think the guy is aptly named the "American Ceasar", for he was far more concerned with his personal glory than of the men of his army, his allies, and the war policy.

One could make a strong argument that his drive to the Philipines was a complete waste. What ultimately defeated Japan was the bombardment of Japan, and that was facilitated best by the drive through the central pacific to capture island airbases.

Maybe it was not a complete waste; it did divert Japanese resources, and the Phillipines proved to be the final battle that ended the military power of the IJN. But, one can't help but wonder if this defeat could not have been equally achieved with greater purpose off the coast of Japan.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

An excellent book on this topic's subject is "Their's a War to be Won".

The most amazing thing about our military in WW2 is that a small dedicated bunch of future commanders served us very well by embracing mechanized war and practicing for it (The Louisiana Manuevers) and when war finally claim, how quickly we trained for it, and how quickly we executed our policy.

Bravery was rampant. Most front line divisions suffered over 150% casualties in France for those who fought most of the campaign, and some had it even worse. The 29th Division commander in front of St. Lo made the comment that he really commanded 3 divisions; one in the field, one in the hospital, and one buried.

I think that the preponderance of resources definitely helped. It gave us more options, and much elan knwoing we had them.

Overwhelimg firepower was the order of the day. The description of the Elsenborn ridge battles is especially enlightening onhow effective this was. A battalion sized force was supported, IIRC, by 8 BATTALIONS of 155s, that just tore the SS to hell.

The bravery of the stalking bazooka teams and the proven use of the American TD concept there was awesome as well.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

...stay tuned as this thread shifts to the GD forum...

[ 01-29-2002: Message edited by: Wilhammer ]</p>

[Wilhammer]

"sort of like what Grant did in the Civil War.. "

Actually, this is an excellent example of bravery and a willingness to fight.

Bullets cannot replace the will to fight.

McClellan had the South by the throat, and his utter lack of will to prosecute the Peninisular Campaign to Richmond show his failings as a commander of a succesful military campaign.

The Cival War could of ended 2.5 years sooner if the guy was not so afraid.

1. When Lee took charge, this scared him. He had overwhelming fear of the man's abilities.

2. He used Pinkerton to reinforce his imagination..his conjuring up of a confederate army 2-3 thimes the size it was.

3. He was probalby a very good strategic thinker, but on the battlefield he was horrible.

Later, at Antietam, he was given the golden opportunity every great cptain wants, the chance to totally crush his enemy and the detailed enemy plans to pull it off.

enter Grant.

The guy was a ball room brawler. Totally fearless in execution; believing, correctly, that the best way to win the war was unrelenting pressure on th enemy, thus saving lives an treasure in the process. He ignored his critics, for Lincoln admired hid generalship.

As Linclon put it, "the man fights."

I feel that Grant and Sherman paved the way for defining what a great military captain was for war in the age of industry.

I don't intend to slight Lee or Jackson, or other confederate generals. The south won many battles because of great generalship. If they had just been a bit luckier, they could of pulled it off.

[Conscript Bagger]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Mr. Johnson--:

I find it very interesting looking at how much the Americans learned from the Germans after WW2.<hr></blockquote>

FSTK mentioned the helmet - what are some other examples? My post-war knowledge is rather sparse; were there significant changes made to TOEs, tactics, strategic thinking, logistics, etc. based on things the Germans had done better?

[Marlow]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Offwhite:

FSTK mentioned the helmet - what are some other examples? My post-war knowledge is rather sparse; were there significant changes made to TOEs, tactics, strategic thinking, logistics, etc. based on things the Germans had done better?<hr></blockquote>

I don’t think that the U.S. had all that much to learn from the Germans on the logistics front. As far as strategy goes, the U.S. was already learning from the Germans (or should I say a German), as Von Clauswitz was a very important influence on American military thought.

[MikeyD]

They say an army has a 'tooth-to-tail ratio'. Maybe a good general had his own tooth-to-tail ratio as well.

Eisenhower was promoted straight from inter-war burocratic pencil-pusher to Supreme Commander of All Allied Forces on the strength of his administrative skills. Rommel is known as much for his amazing ability to keep the Afrika Corps fighting on minimal supplies as he is for his tactical genius. Montgomery's afforts to rebuild his forces before El Alemain are almost as famous as the battle itself.

A good deal of good generalship takes place well before the battle happens, and a good deal of BAD generalship takes place well before the battle happens. To say we won this battle or that battle simply because our logistics chain was shorter missis the point of the General's duties as administrator up to the point of battle. Dull but important.

[JasonC]

Yes, but not all those propaganda played up were good generals. And on the whole, professional or competent was where they topped out as a class, rather than brilliant. Patton is an obvious one - his achievements were stunning and not simply a result of always having superior force.

Ridgeway is another one - though never played up as much in press, which prefered ascribing everything to the men under him (cf. the airborne corps in the Bulge). It is easy to overlook how much the US airborne achieved and how new that level of achievement was. Each also had quite talented subordinates - Wood and Abrams under Patton, MacAuliffe and Gavin under Ridgeway, for example.

Geiger and Vandegrift in the Pacific made the US Marine Corps a formidable weapon, from a quite limited pre-war force. Amphibious operations were developed into a military art in the course of the war, beyond anything there had ever been before in any army. Curtis Lemay had enourmous impact on the development and use of strategic air power, especially against Japan. The US also had some stand-out admirals - Nimitz and Halsey, for example.

Another one who is often overlooked is George Marshall, who is ignored simply because he wasn't a field commander. But his strategic direction of the war, of the creation of the army (there was almost nothing at the time of US entry), ensuring unity of command and rational staff work at the top (completely and ruinously lacking in the German army), were extremely important in bringing US industrial power to bear. He was also something of a statesman in the aftermath, as secretary of state, and that is what he is most commonly remembered for.

MacArthur on the other hand was mostly press. He was certainly capable of brillance, as he showed in Korea with the Inchon operation. His operations in New Guinea were effective, though not exactly speedy. Bradley was mostly press, no more than competent. Eisenhower was professional and generally sound, but uninspired - no important plan or development really originated with him. He just managed professional staffs, really. Clark was not very effective in Italy.

There is a definite tendency of press coverage to follow simple rank, and to ascribe military virtues to whoever is in charge of a lot, whether his impact there is particularly notable or not. Patton is about the only case where the degree of press coverage and the actual accomplishments are more or less in line with each other.

But creating the army of WW II, directing strategic operations in two hemispheres, the main strategic conceptions, the ascendency of allied airpower, naval and then amphibious mastery in the Pacific, airborne operations, and the best of the students of modern armor doctrine - these are certainly not nothing.

They are not mere reflections of industry or numbers. They were difficult military problems, and on the whole addressed rather well. Or more accurately, the US had a few men who excelled at them, though not all high ranking US officers did so. Without such intelligent use of the numbers US industry provided, our causalty rolls might have looked more like those of the Russians. Whereas in fact, US losses were quite low.

You can find examples of particular campaigns that look as bad as that (meaning, just wearing them down with sheer numbers, with a Russian-style loss toll to pay for it) - Cassino and Anzio, the push to St. Lo in Normandy, the Hurtgen. But they are not the rule, let alone the only thing that happened.

[Gyrene]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> Ridgeway is another one - though never played up as much in press, which prefered ascribing everything to the men under him (cf. the airborne corps in the Bulge). It is easy to overlook how much the US airborne achieved and how new that level of achievement was. Each also had quite talented subordinates - Wood and Abrams under Patton, MacAuliffe and Gavin under Ridgeway, for example. <hr></blockquote>

Ridgeway has to rank among the best "Soldier's Generals" in this Century. His most telling accomplishment was how he turned the US Army in Korea from a very ineffective and demoralized force into a very efficient and aggressive one, which was from early 1951-on able to meet, counter and push back the Chinese Army that had so humiliated it in 1950.

The Army was the same, only the leadership changed.

He was very popular with his troops, even the Marines loved him.

Gyrene