Brian

As usual for my posts, dead silence. </font>

Wondered where you'd got off to. Not like you to be so quiet. You'll be gratified to know that while thumbing through one of my books on MGs that I came across a rare photo of a Bren mounted on an actual TRIPOD! I even posted the fact, but it was while you were gone, so you missed it. Michael</font>

I'm in the middle of moving house and have been off line for the last fortnight. I note the release date has finally been set but I can't find any reference to a price. Has it been mentioned yet? Will the sale of my children into indentured labour be necessary? [ July 31, 2002, 01:43 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

Out of a matter of interest, surely the Germans would have been using beet sugar, whereas the Allies would have utilised cane sugar. Surely this would have made a difference in the sweetness of the rounds fired, for as we all know, beet sugar is notoriously less sweet than cane derived sugar. BTW when was saccarine developed? Not that I'd ever accuse John of coating his results in that substance.

This has been discussed before. Some factors which should be considered and which are not, in the game are: Trajectory; Windage; Angle of strike; The role of the weapon; The nature of CMBO combat. The 95mm CS was a low velocity weapon. Therefore its utilises a high trajectory, much higher than is actually dipicted in the game. High trajectory, low velocity weapons are notoriously harder to judge ranges for, that flat trajectory, high velocity weapons. Therefore, the accuracy of a vehicle utilising this weapon will be quite a lot lower, purely because prediction of range become a great deal more crucial than for medium or high velocity weapons. Because of this low velocity and high trajectory, this sort of weapon is a great deal more affected by windage as well, particularly at longer ranges. CMBO does not, in the present model, include windage within its calculations. When considering the penetration of HEAT rounds, the angle at which the round strikes becomes crucial. A medium to high-velocity round will tend to strike much more square on than does a low velocity round. Therefore, actually angling the armour becomes a disadvantage, compared to not-angling. Any penetration will more than likely also be highly variable, depending upon range, because the trajectory will determine the strike angle against the defending plate. The 95mm CS tank was a support tank. Its role was to provide smoke and direct HE support. Effectively, it was a turreted assault gun. It was not utilised to hunt tanks. Any effort to use it for such a role would come up considerable resistance from both its crews and superiors who would feel that it was being misused. It was meant to destroy enemy strongpoints and eliminate enemy AT guns. Effectively, it was a hangover from the early war period when tanks did not fire HE. The nature of CMBO's combat model is too much IMO emphasis upon close ranges. This is very artificial. The 95mm's disadvantages are not as obvious as its advantages and thus, CMBO creates a very artificial tactical environment for it. [ July 06, 2002, 10:55 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

Errr, the gun in the Panzerjaeger I was a Czech 47mm, not a French one, Jason. Furthermore, the French had relatively few of their 47mm weapons. I believe their main infantry AT weapon was the little 25mm Hotchkiss, which wasn't a bad weapon, in itself, except it was too lightly constructed to survive much towing.

Not completely true. By 1945, many battalions had re-equipped with 17 Pdrs IIRC. Further, the Airborne Battalion had from the major reorganisation in early 1944, 17 Pdrs and 6 Pdrs. The choice of which to take on a given operation was taken by the CO. Usually they took a mix. At D-Day, Arnhem and VARSITY, both types were present. However, even so, the majority of heavier AT assets were not held by the infantry but by the RA. This division isn't quite as artificial as it seems, afterall, did the US Army have something similar with Tank Destroyer Command or what ever it was called, also holding most of the heavier AT guns, both towed and self-propelled? Its interesting though, that despite the presence of such AT guns in the British battalion, that when I pull out my venerable copy of British and American Infantry Weapons of World War 2 by Lt.Col.A.J.Barker, published in 1969, he states: The good Lt.Col, was between 1954 and 1956, the Infantry Weapons Instructor at the Royal Military College of Science, as well as having served in the British Army from 1936 to 1958 and in various theatres, in Europe, East Africa, the Middle and Far East. So, should AT guns be considered infantry weapons or not?

While I've always believed the T-44 never saw service during WWII, basically arriving, like the JS-III, too late to see action, the Red Steel website claims otherwise: Does anybody else have any information on the possible use of the T-44?

While I have not specifically heard of Tigers being utilised by the Red Army, I have read IIRC in one of Zaloga's books, of them pressing into service Panthers quite happily, along with Panzer IIIs and IVs.

Appears to be up and working again. Try this URL.

It occurred just after the Iraq campaign. Slim's brigade was moved from Eastern Syria to Iran, IIRC. Well, he did take control of ABDA command when it was created after the Japanese attack (more because the Americans knew they were on a losing wicket and didn't want to be associated with a defeat I suspect than necessarily they believed Wavell was necessarily the best man for the job) but he was already on the decline mentally, I suspect by that point. He couldn't seem to grapple with the fact that the Indian troops he was commanding in Malaya and Burma were not of the same standard as those he'd known in the Middle East. The result was a serious over-estimation of their abilities versus those of the Japanese and when reality intruded, he found he couldn't really come to terms with the results as the Japanese defeated his forces. He appeared to suffer a serious mental decline after that point. He did though, publish his anthology of poetry, Other Mens' Flowers after that, which makes interesting reading. He was a bit too intellectual in some ways for the British Army IMO. Oh, I agree, they got the job done but all too often at a cost which wasn't very good IMO. It was a problem I suspect with overtraining in the UK for previous 3 years. The units which were brought back from the Middle East for the invasion faired better but still had to come to grips with the changed environment (and foe). Yes, well there is "flair" and there is "flair". I sometimes wish that de Guingard's wish had been answered. I often wonder how the 9 Div AIF would have done in Normandy. Yet, Wingate himself did not utilise them in the manner, himself. His final operations were directed more towards establishment of a semi-permament base in the enemy's rear. Therefore, it anybody is guilty of "misuse" of the Chindits, you'd have to blame him. However, as Slim points out, there was this massive outlay in resources which he believed, as theatre commander could have been better utilised in pushing the enemy back. I suggest you read Slim's views on that, as well as George McDonald Fraser's Quartered Safe Out Here for an interesting view of what it was like to become mixed up with the sorts of odd chaps that those sorts of private armies attracted. Well, Guderian always maintained that it was his copy of the provisional training pamphlet for the British Mechanised Force exercises of that period which was one of his inspirations for his theories on all-arms warfare. I think the biggest problem is that the British have always made such an effort at maintaining their air of amatuerism that they have convinced many people that they were all bumblers and fumblers. In reality, while the peace-time hangers-on who were in control for the first period of the war might have been, with some notable exceptions such as Wavell and O'Connor, etc. by the middle of the war, just as in the previous conflict, that had largely been replaced by a cold, calculating, efficient military machine, which while it might still have not quite got the hang of how to wage modern war, was on the verge of doing so. [ June 23, 2002, 02:01 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

You are most likely correct. I can't recall if the later models had some means of altering elevation, but the basic technique was that you motored in to a determined distance from the beach, pointed the boat at your designated target and let fly. Remember, these were area saturation weapons and not very precise anyway. Presumably that's why the 5" was included on the LSM®s: to take care of point targets. Would have been very nice to have at Omaha. Michael</font>

I think you'll find they were primarily LCT®s, not LCM®s which would have been a bit small to really carry enough rockets. The LCT®s were utilised from Sicily onwards. Interestingly, while I was looking the LCT® up, I came across the LCI®, which I'd never heard of before:

Actually there was, I believe Jon. The Italians had constructed a coastal railway which extended well into Cyranecia, IIRC. Problem with it, it was frequently attacked and cut by raiding parties. [ June 16, 2002, 03:02 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

Ok, just makeing sure you weren't refering to: "Force forwards.... pure willpower" The statement could be easily (mis?)understood as a criticism of extreme aggression on the part of the US commanders, not too little.</font>

Which contention would that be? </font>

You do appear to have had an enjoyable afternoon, Jon. BTW, the excerpts you sent were interesting. This appears to support my contention. Perhaps Jason might like to reply (hopefully without using too much bandwidth).

Jason, you know, its because of this sort of thing people get more than a trifle annoyed with you. It adds nothing to the debate and merely raises the temperature. It also indicates IMO a deep-seated insecurity complex in that you appear unable or unwilling to take onboard any criticism, either positive or negative of the US military or its methods in WWII. Such a retreat to nationalism is IMO completely out of place here. Now, as the start of this debate was a comment by someone else who attempted to make a disparaging claim that the US Army was indeed "gadget happy" I'm increasingly at a loss as to why you're upset that I've been attempting to refute that claim by suggesting it was actually a great deal more conservative than that original poster claimed. Do you really want to see the US Army viewed as being "gadget happy", despite IMO there being no evidence to prove it?? :confused:

mmm, doublepost. Not sure why. [ June 15, 2002, 02:42 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

But they did not develop nor utilise it themselves, relying upon the British to supply both vehicles and crews, Michael. It was the CRA, Michael, Ivor Maxe (again I think that was the spelling of his name, perhaps John or Jon could supply more detail) who was quite critical of the emphasis placed upon long and large pre-attack bombardments by most commanders during the mid period in WWI (ie after the Somme and before the 100 days). Its mentioned in I believe Bidwell's Firepower.

Isn't it important that they failed to satisfy their superiors who had a view of the battlefield which was not supported by reality? Their superiors believed that the "one shoe fits all" technology should have worked and it was a lack of either ability or aggression on the part of the commander, rather than in reality that it was not until innovation, be it in superior tactics or technical means (ie the Cullin device) that they were were able to actually push forward. You should also remember we are talking about the outlook of an organisation, the US Army, rather than the views of individuals within that organisation. Jason has yet to explain why the upgunnng of the Sherman was resisted, as was the introduction of a heavy tank with an adequate gun, in favour of the "one shoe fits all" 75mm gun tank. Robert J. Icks was quite scathing in his criticism of the conservatism he faced within the US Army's heirachy, both pre and during the war WRT the development of armour. Its a pity my copy of Hastings is on loan at the moment. However, I'm surprised someone else has not referred to it. Moreover, I'm surprised at the way in which Jason is making this such a storm in a teacup. Remember, we are afterall, in the long run talking about my impressions... Its an indication IMO that the US commanders were desperately searching for a means to achieve a breakthrough and hit upon the one weapon at their disposal that seemed to work - overwhelming and massive firepower. Again, if anything, it reminds me of the mid-years of the Great War, when the British came to rely overly much on the use of artillery to shoot them onto their objectives, something the CRA, Maxe (I think that was his name) noted dryly during that conflict in criticism of that misuse of artillery. Now, here's a different sort of take - how long do you think the German defences in the Bocage would have lasted if the US Army had developed and utilised the Crocodile or the AVRE? [ June 15, 2002, 02:13 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]