American and Commonwealth Tactics on Sicily through German eyes

[Michael Dorosh]

From a report by the Canadian Historical Section, in English, dated 1948. Translation of a German document used to support Canadian historical study. Translated from a copy appering in Appendix 207 to War Diary of 16 Panzer Division.

Interesting that the Italian Arty is singled out for praise. The Iraqi army - like the Italians, often accused of cowardice due to their propensity for surrender - has also been mentioned for their technical skill in Gunnery. Wonder what it is about third rate armies that makes them devotees of St. Barbara - or is it just coincidence?

Panzerdivision Hermann Goering

Ia No. 552/43 Secret

Div H.Q., 24 Aug 43

Brief Experience Report on the Fighting in Sicily

ENEMY

1) Neither command nor manner of fighting excelled in bold decisions or especial bravery of the British and Americans, the method of fighting was one of pronounced caution with massed employment of superior material.

Whenever the enemy planned to attack he prepared strong arty positions end tried to "shoot out" our infantry. Sometimes his fire assumed the character of the heavy barrages of the First World War. The enemy succeeded in this “shooting out” whenever our own troops on account of the lava or the rocky nature of the ground did not succeed in digging themselves in fast or deep enough.

Conclusion: As soon as the troops have occupied a position they must dig in with all energy "right up to the neck".

2) Tank tactics in the German sense, namely the commitment of massed armour at the center of gravity, were not used by the enemy in Sicily, although this would have been well possible in the plain of Catania. The enemy employed the armour by assigning tanks to accompany the infantry in the strength of about one company (maximum 16 tanks) and that on all parts of the front where the ground was reasonably favourable for the movement of armour. The enemy did not seek out pronounced tank country.

Conclusion: Anti-tank defences must be installed wherever tanks might possibly come. Mobile anti-tank guns and tank reserves must be held in readiness.

3) The Infantry of the enemy does not know attack in the German sense, but after hours of arty preparation advances haltingly to occupy shot-up ground. They shun close combat which only took place in a few cases where the enemy succeeded in outflanking our troops. The enemy attacks mainly at night and conducts himself very cleverly. The British are very sensitive to counter-attacks. Wherever counter-attacks were executed with energy they succeeded in cleaning up local penetrations.

Most important for the training of our infantry for battle with the British:

night fighting, counter-attacks in platoon and company formation.

4) Once the continuous front line had ceased to exist as a result of the attacks of the enemy on both sides of Mount Etna, the enemy in very clever fashion tried time after time to turn our wings and to appear in our backs during the night. In doing so the enemy sealed heights of up to 6000 feet and in the comparatively great rapidity of his advance through the mountains showed remarkable athletic accomplishments.

Conclusion: Reconnaissance and protection of flanks and rear even in difficult country.

5) Enemy reconnaissance was awkward and not elastic enough. The British and the Americans did not scout on foot but by vehicle; in accordance with German concepts this would have been correct only as far as the plain of Catania. Disengagements of our own troops were never noticed right away by the enemy; every time he reconnoitered with tanks or scout cars that were always put out of action.

Conclusion: Leave armour-breaking arms with the hindmost rearguards.

6) The enemy Air Force had complete air supremacy, the damage done however is in no

relation to the magnitude of the forces committed. Only on a few days did the enemy use the air force like the Russians in support of the ground forces as close support airplanes. The enemy confined his low-level attacks to vehicle traffic on the supply routes, and used massed high-altitude bombing for the destruction of localities end the harassing of supply traffic. With the low-level attacks the enemy had a certain amount of success because where there were no anti-aircraft defences he put columns and

single vehicles on fire. However, his low-flying airplanes are exceedingly sensitive to anti-aircraft fire.

And the only result the enemy obtained, with the high altitude bombings was the complete destruction of numerous localities. In no case did he succeed in causing a prolonged blocking of the roads. Even after Randazzo had been attacked 21 times in one day with waves of 12 planes, it was possible to reopen this through traffic after only four hours. To be sure in this particular case special forces (including Engineers) had

been held in readiness for the purpose.

Conclusion: Light anti-aircraft arty should not be placed near the front lines but along the routes of supply. Sufficiently large forces (including inhabitants of the region) with engineers under the command of forceful officers must be used to clear traffic lanes end especially localities.

7) The Airborne and paratroops of the enemy fought without system. They were not commited at centres of gravity. The reason for this may have been the fact that they had not yet received much training. At any rate the enemy succeeded in harassing our troops with his parachutists. Wherever these groups who had jumped somewhere were attacked with energy it was possible to clean up the situation very quickly.

Conclusion: Every unit, every transport or other column must be trained to fight against enemy paratroops. Any “waiting to see what the enemy will do” is wrong in principle since it means that the enemy gains time for the defence of the forces that have made the jump. It is necessary to have the whole rear areas systematically combed by reserves, personnel of transport services and alarm formations, even in areas where no enemy have been seen.

F R I E N D S

In Sicily the Italians virtually never gave battle and presumably they will not fight on the mainland either. Many units in Sicily, either led by their officers or on their own, marched off without firing a single shot. Valuable equipment fell into the hands of the enemy in undamaged condition. The good intentions of some commanders and the good appearance of some officers and non-commissioned officers must not lead one to overlook the fact that 90% of the Italian Army are cowards and do not want to fight.

The best branch of the service is still the Artillery. Their firing-technique in certain cases is excellent. One arty detachment - and the only Italian formation in Sicily to do so - fought valiantly with this division until the end of the retreat, showing commendable skill in gunnery.

The Italians fire on principle by unit, the same principle applies in our case too, but it is not

followed everywhere. But the mass of the Italian arty will not differ from the other formations when the Italians are amongst themselves. When framed by German units some small units will fight.

Conclusion: Future actions to be planned as if there were no Italians at all in the area. Italian heavy weapons which - as is well known - are left behind, must be manned by our own personnel when it is impossible to force their gun-crews to fire even when surrounded by German units.

Motor cyclists must never be allowed to proceed alone but must always be escorted by a side car-rider with small-arm, ready to fire. Italians must see as little as possible of our own positions, intentions, strength and formation.

In summary it is to be noted that the experiences in Sicily did not reveal anything new about the

methods of command and fighting of the enemy. With the greatest possible economy of human lives and when in strong numerical superiority, the enemy will apply his superior resources of equipment and ammunition and his supremacy of the air in such a manner that success falls into his hands as a ripe fruit. The German soldier does not need to fear a threefold British-American superiority as long as he is favoured by the ground. It must therefore be the concern of the command in Italy to choke off enemy landings in the initial stage through appropriate commitments. Since the enemy is clever and quick in the execution of his landings, any formation which is held in readiness in the interior for alternative possible landings will arrive too late. Only where German soldiers are placed right on the coast will it be possible with certainty to prevent an enemy landing.

signed: Conrath

For accuracy:

signd. Halstraeter

Lieut and Orderly Officer.

And this: Translated from a copy appearing in GMDS - No 42243/6, Appendix No 239 to War Diary of 16th Panzer Division.

REPORT of 15th German Panzer Grenadier Division

(Operations section – Ia)

ON THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGN

Div H.Q., 7 Sep 43 16 Panzer – Division

Ops sec Nr. 812-43 secret

COPY of 15 Pz Gren Div (new)

Ia No 1068/43 secr of 4 Sep 43.

Experience report for the Campaign in Sicily

1)British-American Methods of Fighting:

In General

Before every attack most careful reconnaissance and preparation with heavy weapons. Our own thin lines were penetrated by recce patrols, often up to company strength, provided with good and handy

radiotelephones and assisted by details from advance arty observation posts. During daytime thorough recce in front of our own main battle lines with armour up to 20, some of them armoured scout cars.

Armoured vehicles, under the protection of heavy tanks from a distance of 1500 - 2000 metres,

advance right into closest proximity of our main battle line.

In attack, intention to save blood by use of considerable material. Any heights on which there might possibly be positions, even in the depth of the main battle zone, are covered with sudden concentrations of fire from all calibres.

In the case of tank attacks they advance first into the middle distance before our main battle line in order to draw the fire of our defences. The Infantry is usually carried on vehicles within the range of our own arty, then advances in loose formations. Attacks are supported by heavy weapons, especially with fire concentrations from medium and heavy mortars.

The rule to shun the highest mountain tops and to occupy lower heights further ahead has proven itself. During the night it is necessary to change positions and to guard all valleys, ravines and depressions.

Time of attacks: Frequently about 2 hours before nightfall with the attempt to gain his successes through bypassing of heights which are neutralized by arty fire. Rarely attacks in the early hours of the morning. Chooses moon-lit nights for attack.

Owing to his rigid tactical doctrine the enemy did in no instance succeed in exploiting favourable positions won in battle. When an attack failed the adversary disengaged himself and reformed in assembly positions far away from our advanced lines.

In Particular

a)Infantry

Good soldier material. English and Canadians harder in the attack than the Americans. In general fair ways of fighting. In fieldcraft (Indianerkrieg) superior to our own troops. Very mobile at night, surprise break-ins, clever infiltrations at night with small groups between our strong points.

On the whole the American infantry especially is far inferior to the German. Sensitive to artillery mortar fire and tanks. Immediate counter-attacks of even numerically inferior detachments of our own troops always succeeded.

Shun close combat. Determined leadership can compensate for many inferiorities of numbers and material.

b)Artillery

Enemy arty far superior in numbers and ammunition. In spite of considerable expenditure of ammunition we had relatively few casualties with the exception of areas where rocky ground made it impossible to dig in. Artillery, since not hindered by aircraft precautions, was led cleverly and shot well.

Concentrations of fire from battalion and brigade formations. Intermittent harassing fire from heavy long-range arty by day and night far into the rear areas (on road junctions, winding roads and localities), with relatively small results however.

High-burst ranging, smoke or incendiary ammunitions. Also in action frequent use of incendiary ammunition to fight artillery.

Anglo-American arty-recce mainly by sound and very good. Arty-recce aviation available in sufficient numbers. Use of arty groups exclusively to combat arty since ammunition plentiful. Scattered fire with high expenditure of ammunition on all areas where gun positions or observation posts might possibly be.

Very good and sturdy radio equipment, excellent direction finding, advanced observation posts and

arty-recce details in sufficient numbers with inf and with definite tasks.

Very elastic and clever observations posts, sometimes far advanced without any protection from infantry. Expenditures of ammunition inconceivable for German circumstances, e.g. firing of whole groups on single scouts.

c)Armour

Owing to the mountainous nature of the area armour on the whole is confined to action on the roads and the ground immediately beside the road. The American carries out sudden tank attacks mainly along the roads after short, violent arty preparation.

Formation of the attack: Armoured point, 8-10 light "General Stuart" tanks with an attacking speed of about 50 km, firing continuously with guns and IMGs while travelling. Followed by heavy tanks.

Initial shock effect upon our own troops. But with determined, action of close combat groups, anti-tank guns and flanking attacks by our own tanks always bound to fail. Enemy has anti-tank formations too.

The American avoids when possible fighting tank against tank. Armoured rearguards will :generally not be attacked by American tanks at night. The cross-country mobility of American tanks at night is amazingly great. Fighting value smaller than that of our armoured formations. American tank formations nearly always abandon attacks after relatively light initial losses.

American fighter-bombers are exceedingly active in the search for tanks in assembly positions. Best possible camouflage, absolute obliteration of all traces, placing of guards to ensure disciplined behaviour of all crews, will go far, even without active anti-aircraft defences, to prevent enemy attacks on assembly positions. American fighter bombers have repeatedly made low-flying attacks on armour without success. Fighting enemy aircraft with the turret machine gun caused them frequently to turn away.

d)Air Force

Complete enemy mastery of the air. Heavy use of fighter bombers with bomb and aircraft armament,

mostly against supply traffic. Attacks on columns as well as on single vehicles. Excellent flying with very good use of ground (hedge-hopping). Ceaseless air-recce, use of bomber formations at centers of gravity, on localities, bridges, defiles and supply depots. Lively air activity at night also. Decreased airactivity up to about one and one half hours after daybreak and during the early dusk. At night parachute flares followed by bombing. During moon-lit nights also low level attacks with bombs and aircraft armaments on columns and individual vehicles. The initial e1an of the opposing pilots, who attacked partly from low levels or with nearly vertical diving attacks was noticeably dampened as a consequence of the high number of planes shot down in the first days.

The 2-cm anti-aircraft gun proved itself as a valuable weapon. Against various armoured types, e.g. Curtiss-Tomahawk and Mustang, the incendiary-explosive shell No 40 was found to be of insufficient power of penetration.

Own conclusions:

Excellent camouflage, absolute security from disturbance for battle headquarters through the creation of a wide barred zone with guards who at the same time are serving as air sentinels and warning service, have been very successful and have facilitated the work of the staffs. On every halt installation of slit trenches as a matter of course. In a country so lacking in cover they also serve the troops following later on. Traffic wherever possible only at night and without lights; during the day only by single vehicles

with aircraft spotters on each vehicle.

In the case of attack from low flying planes immediate, stop, abandonment of vehicle and firing upon enemy craft with all arms.

The "Lightning" has shown itself to be particularly vulnerable to fire. Fire on

aircraft with all available weapons, including small arms. (One "Lightning" was downed with a submachine gun.)

In spite of causing occasional hindrances to traffic it has been found to be good practice to leave vehicles that have been burned out or rendered useless through low-level attacks, on the side of the road, as the enemy attacked these same vehicles time and again, in some cases with whole swarms of aircraft.

Firing positions not to be near easily inflammable objects (heaps of straw, stubble fields, underbrush), as a safeguard against incendiary ammunition and canisters of phosphorus. Munition in emplacements to

be well distributed, vehicles with alcohol and ammunition to be parked well away from other parking places. When travelling maintain good distances, during the day 300 metres, at night at least 100 metres.

Intense air recce by low-flying aircraft may point to special intentions of the opponent in the sector concerned.

In spite of the ceaseless employment of the air force the campaign has proven that the air force alone can not force decisions in battle. After initial losses the troops did adapt themselves to the air superiority of the enemy to a degree that could never be reached in training.

2)Own Experiences

Frequent lapses of vigilance as a result of over-exertion and over-fatigue. Organization of combat-zone observation with smallest number possible and with frequent reliefs especially important. Rifles with telescopic sights desirable equipment promising particularly good results in view of the cautious manner of fighting of the opponents.

Own 7.5-cm and 7.62-cm anti-tank in mountainous territory of insufficient manoeuvreability. Mortars have proven to be especially useful in mountain regions. Difficulties in finding arty positions for ourselves owing to enemy air superiority.

Our own demolitions and road-blocks were overcome rather quickly by the enemy as a result of his great superiority in material. Only after the demolitions had reached a certain depth through our gradual withdrawal, could a more definite retarding effect be observed.

The laying of mines, including stray mines and Ample use of anti-personnel mines contributed noticeably to the delaying of the enemy's advance.

Our own troops experienced high casualties from malaria. The supply service for casualties was made difficult through the constant air attacks on the ambulances... The placing of a Red Cross sign of the largest possible size with the sign of the Red Cross over the whole roof and the sides-has proven effective. Deliberate attack on ambulances by low-flying aircraft was only noticed in isolated instances.

Telephone lines were sabotaged frequently. Radio communications were rendered completely impossible between 1900 hrs and 0400 hrs through atmospheric disturbances. Radio stations of any kind always to be located far away from command - or observation posts.

3)Peculiarities of fighting in the mountains

In spite of insufficient equipment and of being unused to mountain warfare our troops adapted

themselves comparatively well to the situation. Difficulties especially with the water supply.

The mountainous and intersected country was favourable for withdrawals. Limitation of the possibilities for gun emplacements through ground impassable for arty. Radius of wireless transmission reduced in mountains. Wireless equipment to be located on heights as far as possible.

4)Co-operation with the Italians

Only to a small degree was it possible to work together with the Italians. The infantry, moderately well led, insufficiently equipped with heavy infantry weapons and, in accordance with national character showing little soldierly deportment, was soon represented on the front by a few units only.

Great inclination to desert.

Much better was the collaboration with the artillery. Under German command (Joint bservation posts, ranging by German officers), the Italian arty fought well even under heavy arty fire from the enemy.

Close co-operation after initial mistrust had been overcome.

The average Italian artillery officer is reasonably well trained. The conception of the advanced observation post with the infantry is unknown to them. Fire is map fire from emplacements. Italian artillery badly equipped with signal equipment. To a large degree equipped with obsolete types of guns.

Great dispersion, therefore usually only area fire possible.

[ May 02, 2003, 12:36 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Warmaker]

Good readin'

[Hortlund]

Very interesting reading.

[Ex Bellator]

Thanks Michael, fascinating. FWIW in Barrie Pitt's Crucible of War series I have read of desert actions where the Italian artillery fought it's guns to the last man, and he states that the artillery arm was always respected by the 8th Army.

It seems night attacks were a problem for the Germans in Sicily from your articles, which interested me as on one hand they seem to say that Allies are inflexible, but OTOH they say they excell at night fighting, which I would have thought required a lot of flexibility.

Not sure what to make of the story of the Lightning being shot down by an SMG, damn he must have been low!

[Kanonier Reichmann]

Interesting stuff Michael, thanks. I found this section particularly interesting.

Before every attack most careful reconnaissance and preparation with heavy weapons. Our own thin lines were penetrated by recce patrols, often up to company strength, provided with good and handy

radiotelephones and assisted by details from advance arty observation posts. During daytime thorough recce in front of our own main battle lines with armour up to 20, some of them armoured scout cars.

Being prepared to scout with armour and armoured cars up to the MLR rather than the ground pounders sounds fraught with danger. Risking valuable AFV assets to obtain information on the enemies disposition seems potentially rather wasteful I would have thought.

Regards

Jim R.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

From a report by the Canadian Historical Section, in English, dated 1948. [Much excellent stuff snipped]

Splendid!

Thanks for posting it.

All the best,

John.

[Michael Dorosh]

It does bring to mind the Canadian attack on Assoro - basically, an assault company of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment was assembled, scaled a mountain in the night, and held on to the summit during the next day while German artillery pounded them.

It makes me wonder just how much training the allied troops did regarding night fighting.

The question here, is whether the German officers doing the reporting had accurate perception of Allied training, or how widespread night attacks really were. They make it sound like a widespread part of Allied doctrine.

Was it?

I've added the reports to my MED web page and hope to glean more stuff from other historical reports for others to make use of.

The original PDF files can be found at

http://www.dnd.ca/hr/dhh/history_archives/engraph/ahq_e.asp?cat=1

Lots of good reports - I had no idea the British and Canadian infantry section started the war as a corporal and 7 privates. By 1943, it had becomea a corporal, a lance corporal and 8 privates. So there is interesting reading concerning early war organization as well.

I also like how the two writers here confirm the notions of historians today about allied reliance on firepower.

I do wonder though, the writers seem critical that Allied infantry didn't attack in the German sense - I suppose that "the German sense" would mean forgoing costly artillery support they didn't have?

[ May 02, 2003, 09:48 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[flamingknives]

Fighting enemy aircraft with the turret machine gun caused them frequently to turn away.

Would this be the co-axial mount or a dedicated AAMG?

[CombinedArms]

Thanks Michael. I agree that this is very interesting. Part of what's interesting are the contradictions. Rex notes the one about Allies being inflexible, yet excelling at night fighting. The flanking manuevers mentioned, isolating mountains heights by taking the lower levels, and deep raids into rear areas, also seem to contradict the notion of a tentative, inflexible approach. The first document says the Allies scout only with light armor, but the second points to aggressive infantry patrols as a recce technique.

The infantry-arty coordination and radio signals work are praised. Obviously the air/ground coordination needed some improvement and would get better later. There was no German criticism of THAT in Normandy!

The descriptions of tank fighting are interesting too, with reference to company sized commitments of tanks (more than we usually get in CM.)

Were there any Allied armored divisions in Sicily? What we may be seeing in this description is a reflection of the US tendency to have an tank battalion attached to infantry divisions as ground support. They tended to fight supporting infantry in company or platoon sized detachments.

It must have been tough to have the Italians for Allies. The Amis and Brits were lucky to have each other.

[PeterX]

Whenever the enemy planned to attack he prepared strong arty positions end tried to "shoot out" our infantry. Sometimes his fire assumed the character of the heavy barrages of the First World War. The enemy succeeded in this “shooting out” whenever our own troops on account of the lava or the rocky nature of the ground did not succeed in digging themselves in fast or deep enough.

It doesn't appear that the current CM can simulate this phenomenon. Rocky terrain doesn't have any inhibiting effect on creating or using foxholes.

Interesting piece, though.

[Aragorn2002]

Fascinating to read. Especially the information about the allied preference for night fighting, since that is supposed to be a German speciality. I love articles like these, they are seldom found in books and give such a good impression about the fighting.

Since the enemy is clever and quick in the execution of his landings, any formation which is held in readiness in the interior for alternative possible landings will arrive too late. Only where German soldiers are placed right on the coast will it be possible with certainty to prevent an enemy landing.

Rommel must have studied these reports too...

[flamingknives]

Actually, you can't dig in to 'rough' terrain.

[tar]

Were there any Allied armored divisions in Sicily?

US 2nd Armored division was the only one, IIRC.

The British and Canadians did not have an armored division.

[KanaljeFätter]

It doesn't appear that the current CM can simulate this phenomenon. Rocky terrain doesn't have any inhibiting effect on creating or using foxholes.

I guess it depends on what kind of rocky terrain is considered; if it's normal soil only with a lot of rocks added, it will be easier to dig in than e.g. in a forest (you can't imagine what a pain it is to dig through roots). However, if it's bedrock or lava, you'll need dynamite to dig in Guess we'll have to see if BFC can make anything of this in CMAK

[Other Means]

interesting i think how what we would consider one of the strengths of the allied doctrine, i.e. a retreat upon counter attack & the application of firepower, is here seen as a weakness.

it seems that the German doctrine at the time saw attack/defeat as ground gained/lost, rather than the Allied one of an assisted opportunity for a multiplication of attrition.

[KanaljeFätter]

true.. but remember, the entire Blitzkrieg doctrine was aimed at avoiding the atrittion warfare that WWI spawned, and revive maneuvering warfare in a new guise.. but the point is that Russia is the WORST place to use that kind of doctrine since the distances makes maneuver warfare nearly obsolete (at least in the long run). Had it been Germany vs. the western Allies, things would probably have been vastly different...

[Aragorn2002]

In fieldcraft (Indianerkrieg) superior to our own troops.

I wonder what "fieldcraft" or "Indianerkrieg" (war of the Indians)exactly means. Is it digging in or close combat or what?

[Kanonier Reichmann]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I also like how the two writers here confirm the notions of historians today about allied reliance on firepower.

Not much has changed in roughly 60 years has it.

Regards

Jim R.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by aragorn2002:

I wonder what "fieldcraft" or "Indianerkrieg" (war of the Indians)exactly means. Is it digging in or close combat or what?

I don't know how accurate a rendition of "Indianerkrieg" it is, but "fieldcraft" means essentially the "hide-and-seek" part of military skills -- camouflage, stalking, being able to see things other people can't.

All the best,

John.

[Nippy]

Not sure what to make of the story of the Lightning being shot down by an SMG, damn he must have been low!

During the Aleution wars here in Alaska, one fellow brought down a Japanese Zero with a M1911A1 :eek:

He hit the oil line and the pilot was forced to crash land. Only problem was the pilot never learned about Alaska's "lovely" silty/boggy ground and the second he touched down with the landing gear deployed the plane flipped over and the crash killed the pilot. Monthes later the plane was found and taken mostly intact to the lower 48 for study.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by aragorn2002:

I wonder what "fieldcraft" or "Indianerkrieg" (war of the Indians)exactly means. Is it digging in or close combat or what?

I don't know how accurate a rendition of "Indianerkrieg" it is, but "fieldcraft" means essentially the "hide-and-seek" part of military skills -- camouflage, stalking, being able to see things other people can't.

All the best,

John. </font>

[NCOIC]

oops

[ May 04, 2003, 08:43 AM: Message edited by: NCOIC ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by aragorn2002:

Especially the information about the allied preference for night fighting, since that is supposed to be a German speciality.

Not according to the Soviets, it wasn't.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by aragorn2002:

Especially the information about the allied preference for night fighting, since that is supposed to be a German speciality.

Not according to the Soviets, it wasn't. </font>

[Mikelas]

"It must have been tough to have the Italians for Allies. The Amis and Brits were lucky to have each other."

We had the French tho, so on balance I would say the Germans came out ahead.

Mike