American and Commonwealth Tactics on Sicily through German eyes

[Simon Fox]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by aragorn2002:

Especially the information about the allied preference for night fighting, since that is supposed to be a German speciality.

Not according to the Soviets, it wasn't. </font>

[Kingfish]

The 2-cm anti-aircraft gun proved itself as a valuable weapon. Against various armoured types, e.g. Curtiss-Tomahawk and Mustang, the incendiary-explosive shell No 40 was found to be of insufficient power of penetration.

The report is dated Sept 43, but the earliest date I could find of the Mustang in combat was Dec of that year, and only then as Bomber escorts in NWE. Does anyone know of P51s being used in Sicily?

[Michael Dorosh]

Interesting point, Kingfish. Perhaps the original German reports were mis-translated by the Canadian Army's Historical Section?

I did find this on the Web though:

June '43 - A-36's with USAAF in MTO, Sicily

The first U.S. unit to fly the Mustang in combat was the Morocco-based 154th Observation Squadron, which used 35 P-51-2NA's for a few weeks in April-May, 1943.

300 A-36A's (a variant of the Mustang known as "Apache" and "Invader") made a larger impact, when the 27th and 86th Bombardment Groups began flying them. In June, 1943, the 27th BG flew missions against Pantelleria, in the build-up for the Sicily invasion. Dive bombing was a challenge, the recommended technique being a dive from 8,000 - 10,000 feet at 90 degrees, with dive brakes extended to keep speed below 400 MPH. At 3,000 feet, the pilot dropped two 500-pound bombs and pulled out at 1,500 feet. With this extended straight-in bomb run, they were vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire.

German and Italian fighters engaged also engaged them. One A-36 pilot, Lt. Mike Russo of the 27th BG, made ace, the only man to do so while flying an Allison-powered Mustang. He counted four different types among his five aerial victories: two Fw-190's, a Bf-109, a Ju-52, and a Fieseler Storch.

The 27th and 86th were reduced to three squadrons each in September, due to the heavy losses they had incurred. As the Italian campaign progressed, they increasinlgy used strafing and glide bombing tactics, which reduced their losses to flak. In early 1944, both Groups transitioned to P-47's and turned over their A-36's for training.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

That's your only comment on this thread? Tsk, tsk, Andreas, they even mention artillery observation techniques...

I am still digesting it, much as I am still digesting 25 pizzas from Naples. Very nice find Mike.

I liked the official use of the word 'Indianerkrieg'. If the Germans did not even have a proper word that does not conjur up children's games, no wonder they consider their opponents better at it. Anyone else reminded of von Mellenthin's remarks about how the Soviet soldier was much better at individual camouflage and digging in? Sounds like this could have been a weakness on the German side.

The bit on artillery observation is very interesting. Use of OPs forward of own lines is not something that I have seen in any of the German maps of OP/LP systems that I have seen, but I have not studied the ones for Italy/Africa.

[SgtMuhammed]

The bit on artillery observation is very interesting. Use of OPs forward of own lines is not something that I have seen in any of the German maps of OP/LP systems that I have seen, but I have not studied the ones for Italy/Africa.

Well I know that a couple of FOs I worked with would often pick the best observation position regardless of its position on the line or ahead or behind it. I guess there is no reason to assume they weren't as crazy during the big war.

Plus it does give the ability to begin interdiction fire without exposing the MLR to discovery. An important consideration in the open terrain of NA, while the terrain in Italy (South and central) would have provided ample opportunities for FOs to place themselves ahead of the line an still remain relativly secure.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Nippy:

Not sure what to make of the story of the Lightning being shot down by an SMG, damn he must have been low!

During the Aleution wars here in Alaska, one fellow brought down a Japanese Zero with a M1911A1 :eek:

Bah! That's nothing. Spike Milligan (God rest his soul) brought down a Lightning with little more than a stern look.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I liked the official use of the word 'Indianerkrieg'. If the Germans did not even have a proper word that does not conjur up children's games, no wonder they consider their opponents better at it. Anyone else reminded of von Mellenthin's remarks about how the Soviet soldier was much better at individual camouflage and digging in? Sounds like this could have been a weakness on the German side.

Given the German mania for natty camouflage uniforms, beginning with their use of splinter material on the 1931 tent quarter that would certainly be ironic. (Oddly enough, their well-spoken of allies the Italians were IIRC the first to adopt camouflage patterned cloth in the use of military uniforms.)

As the MP44 thread shows, it is interesting how we sometimes take things based on what we know today, and assume the World War Two soldier knew it. The day to day nuts and bolts existence of those men is extremely misunderstood, not as a result of our ignorance, but through a lack of documentation at the micro level. Reports like this are a good start at recovering some of that kind of info.

It's like the re-enactor who spit shines his jackboots, not realizing the German soldier hadn't known of that practice in the 1940s.

I wonder if it doesn't also apply to personal camouflage and concealment. It's funny to see an SS man in camouflage smock and helmet cover, going off into battle with shiny pink ears and hands. Today, it is second nature to apply camouflage paint to exposed skin - behind the ears and all (unless you're Clint Eastwood) - "camming up" is a standard part of battle procedure today. Aside from the burnt cork used by commandos and paratroopers, one doesn't read much of individual camouflage practices being used by others in WW II.

If the Germans were behind in that regard, I don't think the western allies were really much further ahead (though Mellenthin was right about the Soviets, from what I have read).

The actions of men in battle evolved an amazingly great distance in an astonishingly short time (say the 150 years preceding WW II). Officers in the Napoleonic wars admonished their men for lying down before artillery fire, considering it unmanly and demanding that fire be received standing up. In the 1860s they still fought in closed ranks. But lying down wasn't so much of a sin, especially when being cannonaded.

The proud soldier of WW II had no problem burrowing like an animal every time his unit stopped for more than five minutes; it's interesting (perhaps significant?) that apparently so few of them felt the need to hide their faces from the enemy.

I would suggest it not as a weakness on the German part (though in starkly practical terms, of course it was), but as a part of the evolutionary process, where men wish to diminish the dehumanizing aspects of warfare, or in other words, to "fight like men" on the battlefield.

Ask a trooper from the 3rd US Infantry Division whether or not a suicide bomber "fought like a man" in Iraq - he would likely give the same answer that a British soldier would give regarding American colonials in the War of Independence, or the French about the Viet Minh - or indeed, the German about the Russian in WW II.

Think about it - the entire concept of "Fight Like A Man" involves some element of risk. We revere Bomber Command not because they roasted German women and babies alive, but because they took such severe losses doing it. Had Bomber Command been able to do what it did without suffering a single loss, how would history view them?

This is why the suicide bomber is despised; there is no risk. He is going to die, and moreover, those that he is going to kill have no idea when or where he will come, since he is in civilian clothes. There is no "fighting chance."

It's taken centuries for man to see war for what it is - wholesale slaughter - and we're not even there yet. The German inability to camouflage themselves as well as the Russians - is this due to some stupidity on their part - or is it just willingness to Fight Like A Man?

Wasn't there a scene in Cross of Iron (the book) where Steiner comes upon some Russian soldiers in a factory building (he was ordered to take the flag down), but balks at shooting them in the back? IIRC he makes a noise to announce his presence first. Then he guns them down. It came out the same in the end, but the element of personal risk to himself made the way he did it somehow acceptable.

I haven't read Mellenthin's actual quote - was he admiring the Soviet ability to hide themselves- or was he lamenting the fact that they were not fighting like "men" should?

[ May 06, 2003, 03:55 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Gyrene]

Originally posted by aragorn2002:

Fascinating to read. Especially the information about the allied preference for night fighting, since that is supposed to be a German speciality. I love articles like these, they are seldom found in books and give such a good impression about the fighting.

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Since the enemy is clever and quick in the execution of his landings, any formation which is held in readiness in the interior for alternative possible landings will arrive too late. Only where German soldiers are placed right on the coast will it be possible with certainty to prevent an enemy landing.

Rommel must have studied these reports too... </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I wonder if it doesn't also apply to personal camouflage and concealment. It's funny to see an SS man in camouflage smock and helmet cover, going off into battle with shiny pink ears and hands. Today, it is second nature to apply camouflage paint to exposed skin - behind the ears and all (unless you're Clint Eastwood) - "camming up" is a standard part of battle procedure today. Aside from the burnt cork used by commandos and paratroopers, one doesn't read much of individual camouflage practices being used by others in WW II.

I have seen a contemporary painting of a US Marine standing in a landing craft presumably headed for the beach and wearing camo paint on his face and (I think) hands. So the practice, while extremely rare as you note, was not entirely unheard of.

The actions of men in battle evolved an amazingly great distance in an astonishingly short time (say the 150 years preceding WW II). Officers in the Napoleonic wars admonished their men for lying down before artillery fire, considering it unmanly and demanding that fire be received standing up.

Interesting that at Waterloo Wellington ordered his men to lie down as long as the enemy was at a distance. This not only gave them the opportunity to rest during the course of a long day, it provided them some protection from gunfire.

Ask a trooper from the 3rd US Infantry Division whether or not a suicide bomber "fought like a man" in Iraq - he would likely give the same answer that a British soldier would give regarding American colonials in the War of Independence, or the French about the Viet Minh - or indeed, the German about the Russian in WW II.

Indeed. People fight, if they must fight, with the means that come to hand, especially if they offer some hope of success. The Arabs have yet to show themselves to be very good at Western style stand-up mechanized warfare, something at which the Israelis for example excel. So now they have found another weapon, against which the West is relatively defenseless. Calling them names is not going to dissuade them from using it, I don't think.

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Aside from the burnt cork used by commandos and paratroopers, one doesn't read much of individual camouflage practices being used by others in WW II.

Don't knock burnt cork. That is what I was given during basic training in 1988 in the Bundeswehr. Plus ca change.

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

If the Germans were behind in that regard, I don't think the western allies were really much further ahead (though Mellenthin was right about the Soviets, from what I have read).

I just thought it was interesting that here we have a report from fighting the western allies mentioning their superiority in fieldcraft, and one from the east, mentioning the Soviet's superiority in fieldcraft.

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I haven't read Mellenthin's actual quote - was he admiring the Soviet ability to hide themselves- or was he lamenting the fact that they were not fighting like "men" should?

He just commented about it, linking it to some racial attribute, AFAICR, something along the lines of Russians being closer to nature. Oh, and those mud-brown uniforms. So yes, he was admiring it, and thought it caused the Germans no end of trouble. I don't think that either of the two reports really stands as a comment on bravery. The only time I have seen any German complaint about not fighting fairly was with regard to Allied artillery in Normandy, I think that was in an AAR on the Hill 112 battles by 10.SS PD. I did not even think of this bravery aspect WRT these quotes.

[DBaron]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh

I haven't read Mellenthin's actual quote - was he admiring the Soviet ability to hide themselves- or was he lamenting the fact that they were not fighting like "men" should?

Mellenthin had this to say about Russian camouflage, perhaps this is the quote you are referring too?

From the section where he talks about Red Army tactics in Panzer Battles

"... He is quite content with a handful of millet or rice and for the rest he takes what nature offers him. This nearness to bnature is also responsible for his ability to become part of the soil; one may say that he allows himself to be sucked up by the soil. The russian soldier is a past master of camouflage, of digging and shovelling, and of building earthworks. In an incredibly short time he literally disappears into the ground, digging himself in and making instictive use of the terrain to such a degree that his positions are almost impossible to locate. The russian soldier properly dug in, hugging Mother Earth, and well camouflaged, is an enemy doubly dangerous. Even after long and careful scanning it is often impossible to detect his positions. One is well advised to exercise extreme caution, even when the terain is reputedly free of enemy."

taken from Panzer Battles, by Maj. Gen. F.W. von Mellenthin, First Ballentine Books edition: June 1971, pg 352.

I had this book in front of me (reading about his desert war expeirences), and saw this mention of Mellenthin so I thought I would post that excerpt. If he mentions it anywhere else I do not know of it.

[ May 06, 2003, 06:24 AM: Message edited by: DBaron ]

[Andreas]

That's the one, thanks for doing the digging (no pun intended) and typing.

[Grisha]

Actually, regarding German perceptions of Soviet fieldcraft, von Mellenthin isn't the only one. I have an OOP book from the US Army historical studies from WWII that covers German perceptions of Soviet camouflage. The author, a high ranking German staff officer whose name escapes me, had pretty much the same thing to say about Soviets.

What many don't realize is that by the time war broke out in 1941, about half of the USSR's population was urban. Soviet abilities at digging in were not due to a 'racial affinity with nature,' but practice and training at entrenching.

[Hat Trick]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

(snipped)

Ask a trooper from the 3rd US Infantry Division whether or not a suicide bomber "fought like a man" in Iraq - he would likely give the same answer that a British soldier would give regarding American colonials in the War of Independence, or the French about the Viet Minh - or indeed, the German about the Russian in WW II.

Think about it - the entire concept of "Fight Like A Man" involves some element of risk. We revere Bomber Command not because they roasted German women and babies alive, but because they took such severe losses doing it. Had Bomber Command been able to do what it did without suffering a single loss, how would history view them?

This is why the suicide bomber is despised; there is no risk. He is going to die, and moreover, those that he is going to kill have no idea when or where he will come, since he is in civilian clothes. There is no "fighting chance."

I think the main reason that the suicide bomber is despised is because of his (usual) choice targets, and only secondarily because of his methods. Deliberately targeting innocent civilians is abhorrent, and this is what makes suicide bombers so despicable. The fact that "those that he is going to kill have no idea when or where he will come" make him feared, but not necessarily despised. Japanese kamakazi pilots were not considered to be acting outside the rules of war, but they were greatly feared, and maybe even admired.

[Spook]

Off on a tangent, but anyway.......

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Think about it - the entire concept of "Fight Like A Man" involves some element of risk. We revere Bomber Command not because they roasted German women and babies alive, but because they took such severe losses doing it. Had Bomber Command been able to do what it did without suffering a single loss, how would history view them?

"We"?

Mind you, Mike, I've plowed through a few odds-and-sods references related to BC's campaigns that I too have developed no small amount of respect for the BC crewmen for what they accomplished under the hazards that they faced.

But on a larger scale, it seems a mixed verdict as to how well the "we," in the postwar allied nations' populations, "revered" BC's efforts. It's my understanding that contrary to other services' veterans, BC crewmen were not awarded their own postwar campaign medal, and "Bomber" Harris was snubbed at being granted peerage. Even Churchill made one attempt to distance himself from the application of "terror bombing" in the waning war months when he thought it in his political interests to do so.

And in more recent times, in other forums, I've frequently seen some posters openly talk of the sum Allied (UK/US) bombing campaigns being in the same vein of war crimes as typically held against Nazism. That is heavily debated when brought up, of course, but some do broach it in that way all the same.

[Michael Dorosh]

Well, "we" from my own limited perspective. Battle of the Atlantic Day was just commemorated and made the national news. I can't remember if we have such a day for veterans of the air war or not. I know there is a Battle of Britain day commemorated in the UK.

By "we" I mean society, I guess specifically Canadian and I would assume British society - for at the least, kind words are spoken of the men of Bomber Command on Rememberance Day. When the TV series The Valour and the Horror came out a few years back, there was a lot of controversy over the episode "Death by Moonlight" and a lot of Canadians stepped forward to defend BC, or at the least, the very young men who chose to fly with BC.

I was just out at the Nanton Air Museum a few weeks ago; a Lancaster is there in all its glory being lovingly restored; photos and paintings of the great raids adorn the walls - not surprisingly, emphasis is paid to the courage of the crews (Ian Bazalgette, VC, et al) and the Dam Buster raids. Come to think of it, I don't recall any paintings of burning German cities. But that's hardly surprising either.

But I doubt anyone who runs that museum would consider it a monument to war criminals. They also survive on donations...

Perhaps the best way to resolve this apparent discrepancy between war crimes and legitimate acts of war is to go in reverse. By that, I mean we feel it is okay to kill soldiers in the field, but repugnant to roast babies alive in their cribs through area bombing. So we elevate the bomber pilots to heroes because of their devotion to duty. Maybe we need to do the reverse, and make the soldier in the field as repugnant a character as the area bomber, and view killing in the field not as legitimate acts of war, but as crimes versus humanity.

It won't work unless everyone in the world agrees on that...hmm, how hard could that be?

For what it's worth, I am sure many of those BC veterans have nightmares to this day of what they did. It's a burden I am thankful I don't have to live with.

[ May 06, 2003, 03:08 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Spook]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Well, "we" from my own limited perspective. Battle of the Atlantic Day was just commemorated and made the national news. I can't remember if we have such a day for veterans of the air war or not. I know there is a Battle of Britain day commemorated in the UK.

I know of that too, but I don't know if there are similar days of commemoration for the anniversaries of raids like for Leipzig or Nuremburg or for the "Battle of Berlin." The "Fabled Few" of RAF Fighter Command are always revered for their efforts in 1940, but of the 79,000 RAF crewmen who did not return, 55,000 came from BC.

By "we" I mean society, I guess specifically Canadian and I would assume British society - for at the least, kind words are spoken of the men of Bomber Command on Rememberance Day. When the TV series The Valour and the Horror came out a few years back, there was a lot of controversy over the episode "Death by Moonlight" and a lot of Canadians stepped forward to defend BC, or at the least, the very young men who chose to fly with BC.

Of course the BC veterans would step forward, as they are justified to do so.

Perhaps the best way to resolve this apparent discrepancy between war crimes and legitimate acts of war is to go in reverse. By that, I mean we feel it is okay to kill soldiers in the field, but repugnant to roast babies alive in their cribs through area bombing. So we elevate the bomber pilots to heroes because of their devotion to duty. Maybe we need to do the reverse, and make the soldier in the field as repugnant a character as the area bomber, and view killing in the field not as legitimate acts of war, but as crimes versus humanity.

It won't work unless everyone in the world agrees on that...hmm, how hard could that be?

For what it's worth, I am sure many of those BC veterans have nightmares to this day of what they did. It's a burden I am thankful I don't have to live with.

I don't really debate the notion of BC crewmen being heroes, Mike. They were. In fact, their kind of war, flying at night, throughout the year, in typically inclement European weather, and against a determined and capable Luftwaffe opposition, probably took a toll on human nerves in no less way as what beset a typical combat infantryman.

And after a 30-mission tour, it was sometimes "expected" of many BC crewmen to "volunteer" to do another such hellish tour.

They were a special kind of "army" in their own way (as was the USAAF), and the story of BC could deserve better telling than seems the typical case even today.

The choice of city-bombing at night was not that made by the BC crewmen, it was made by the British leadership, and that's where any debate over its "morality" should be directed.

EDIT: On that last note, I personally understand the rationales as to why RAF opted for area-bombing as it did. But further discussion on same, by those inclined, would be better done in a separate topic thread than in here.

[ May 06, 2003, 03:32 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

[Pfc Driscole James E]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Actually, regarding German perceptions of Soviet fieldcraft, von Mellenthin isn't the only one. I have an OOP book from the US Army historical studies from WWII that covers German perceptions of Soviet camouflage. The author, a high ranking German staff officer whose name escapes me, had pretty much the same thing to say about Soviets.

I think the Pamphlet you are refering to is the Historical Study "Russian Combat Methods in World War II" which the preface says was prepared by a committee of former German officers in late 1947 and early 1948.

I decided to try ot the OCR function of my multifunction Printer and here is chapter 13.

Chapter 13

Camouflage, Deception, and Propaganda

Camouflage, deception, and propaganda were expedients much used

by the Russians. These, too, reflected in every aspect the oriental

character of the people. The Russians carried out measures conform-

ing to their natural talents, such as camouflage and deception, with

great skill and effectiveness. Their front propaganda, however, was

crude and naive for the most part. Because it did not correspond to

the psychology and mentality of the German soldier in any way, it

was ineffective. Although pursued zealously, and with a great variety

of media, it attained no appreciable success for precisely those reasons.

I. Camouflage

The Russians were excellent at camouflage. With their primitive

instinct they understood perfectly how to blend into their surround-

ings and were trained to vanish into the ground upon the slightest

provocation. As illustrated in the preceding pages, they skillfully

used darkness, vegetation, and poor weather conditions for concealing

their intentions. Their movements at night and their advances

through wooded terrain were carried out with exemplary quietness.

Now and then they would communicate with each other by means of

cleverly imitated animal cries.

Noteworthy, too, was their camouflage of river crossings by the con-

struction of underwater bridges. For this purpose they used a sub-

mersible underwater bridging gear, which could be submerged or

raised by flooding or pumping out the compartments. The deck of

the bridge was usually about 1 foot below water level, and was thus

shielded from aerial observation.

Artificial camouflage was another device used by the Russians.

Even at the beginning of the war the Germans came across Russian

troops wearing camouflage suits dyed green. Lying prone on the

grass, these soldiers could be spotted only at a very short distance,

and frequently were passed by without having been noticed at all.

Reconnaissance patrols frequently wore "leaf" suits of green cloth

patches, which provided excellent camouflage in the woods. Rus-

sians wearing face masks were no rarity.

The Russians enforced strict camouflage discipline. Any man who

left his shelter during the day was punished severely, if it was for-

bidden for reasons of camouflage. In this way the Russians were

GERMAN REPORT SERIES

able to conceal the presence of large units even in winter, as the

following example illustrates.

In January 1944- the Russian First Tank Army attempted to take

the important railroad hub of Zhmerinka in a surprise attack. The

attack was repulsed, and the army encircled to the southeast of Vin-

nitsa. It broke out of the encirclement during the very first night,

and disappeared. The bulk of this Russian army escaped completely

unnoticed through the gaps left by the insufficient German forces

engaged in the encirclement. In spite of deep snow and clear weather,

it could not even be determined in which direction the Red forces had

escaped. From the situation, it was to be assumed that they had

hidden in the immediate vicinity in a group of numerous, rather large

villages with extensive, adjoining orchards. Since German armored

units had previously driven through those villages, the tank tracks

gave no reliable evidence that the Russians were hiding there. For

2 days and nights the Luftwaffe scouted for the whereabouts of the

First Tank Army, and in this connection took excellent aerial photo-

graphs of the entire area in which the villages were located. But

neither aerial observation nor the study of aerial photographs pro-

vided any clue. Not until the third day, when a strong German tank

force pushed into the group of villages, was the hiding place of the

entire army established in that very area. All tanks and other ve-

hicles had been excellently camouflaged in barns, under sheds, straw

piles, haystacks, piles of branches, etc. and all movements during the

day had been forbidden, so that nothing gave away their presence.

II. Deception

Prior to offensives the Russian made extensive use of deception.

In order to mislead the enemy as to the time and place of impending

large-scale offensives, the Russians feigned concentrations in other

sectors by preparing a great number of fire positions for artillery,

mortars, and rocket projectors. They strengthened this impression

by moving smaller bodies of troops into those sectors by day and

night, as well as by setting up dummy artillery pieces, tanks, and air-

craft, and making appropriate tracks leading up to them. The Rus-

sians also were known to place an entire tank army behind an un-

important sector, so as to create the false impression of an impend-

ing attack from that point. By running their motors at night'

they sought to create the impression that tank and motorized columns

were on the move. Artillery trial fire and the use of roving guns

likewise were among the most commonly used Russian deceptive

practices.

For purposes of deception on a more limited scale, the Russians

frequently used German uniforms for whole units as well as for in-

dividuals. That method of deception was almost always successful

PECULIARITIES OF RUSSIAN TACTICS 89

In the summer of 1943 a German-speaking Russian in the uni-

form of a German officer succeeded in driving a German truck right

up to headquarters of the Rowne military government detachment

(Ortskommandantur), and in obtaining an audience with the com-

mandant, a general. He gagged the commandant, wrapped him up

in a big rug, carried him out of the truck which he had left idling

outside, and delivered him to the partisans. Only by the words,

"Thanks, comrade"--words that an officer in the German Army simply

would not use in addressing a private--did he arouse the suspicion

of the kidnapped officer's orderly, who had innocently helped him

load the heavy carpet into the truck. Although an immediate report

was made by the orderly, it did not lead to the apprehension of the

kidnapper.

In Lwow, in the spring of 1944, apparently the same Russian,

dressed as a German officer, succeeded by similar trickery in killing

the deputy governor of Galicia as well as a lieutenant colonel, and

later a sentinel who wanted to inspect his truck. Each time he suc-

ceeded in escaping.

Similar surprise raids and deceptions of combat troops through

the misuse of German uniforms occurred at all sectors of the front

in ever increasing numbers.

III. Propaganda

The propaganda of the Russians exploited military and political

problems and used all the technical means by which modern propa-

ganda is disseminated--radio, press, leaflets, photographs, planes fly-

ing by night towing illuminated streamers or equipped with loud

speakers and photographs, loudspeakers set up on the ground, leaflet

shells, rumors spread by agents, Russian PWs, and Germans pretend-

ing to have escaped from Russian captivity. Since there were also

Finnish troops on the Arctic Front, to whom different things were

of importance, Russian propaganda at that front sometimes met with

difficulties, and was not properly coordinated. One also had to dif-

ferentiate between propaganda aimed at higher military command-

ers, the troops, and the German people. The various groups to be

propagandized were dealt with and approached from entirely dif-

ferent angles. From a literary and artistic standpoint, much of the

Russian propaganda was of high caliber.

The Russian intelligence service covered events in the German

Army with amazing speed and accuracy. Photographs, for example,

taken by one of the German propaganda companies for various rea-

sons, appeared almost simultaneously in the pertinent Russian army

newspapers. The propaganda at the front, however, was crude and

clumsy. For that reason, it made but little impression. Political

and military satire was used a great deal.

90 GERMAN REPORT SERIES

The Germans obtained information on Russian propaganda ad-

dressed to their own troops from captured Russian army newspapers.

It, too, employed words and pictures. Nationalism and ideological

fanacticism were exploited with equal intensity. The Russians seemed

to criticize quite frankly some of the events at the front. Conditions

among German troops in opposing positions were treated satirically

for the most part. In the propaganda directed at their own front

lines, the Russians pounded into their soldiers' heads the story that

the Germans shot every PW on the spot. This propaganda-induced

fear of being taken prisoner was to make the Russians soldiers stand

their ground to the very end. The story was believed, and that partic-

ular line of propaganda accomplished its purpose. There were rela-

tively few Russian deserters. On the other hand, older Russian sol-

diers who had worked in Germany as prisoners during World War I

were immune to such atrocity stories and deserted very frequently.

A large part of the Russian propaganda effort was devoted to study-

ing and counteracting German propaganda activities. Reading and

passing on German propaganda leaflets was forbidden under penalty

of death.

By erecting signs, by loudspeaker messages, or by dropping propa-

ganda leaflets from aircraft, the Russians made extensive use of front-

line propaganda urging the Germans to surrender or desert. Often

the commander was addressed personally, sometimes by captured

German officers of all ranks, who allegedly belonged to the "Free

Germany" organization. Many propaganda leaflets were dropped

that represented pictorially the Russian superiority in men, weapons,

and material, as well as in armament potential. Also alleged German

atrocities and acts of destruction were shown. It was, however,

not quite clear just what propaganda purpose the exhibition of nude

women standing on the breastworks of Russian trenches was supposed

to accomplish. They supposedly were German girls who had fallen

into Russian hands.

The German command had little reason to be concerned over Soviet

propaganda. Neither the spoken nor the printed Russian propa-

ganda inspired and credulity, for it contained too many obvious lies.

Besides, the German soldier had seen the dubious blessings of Bol-

shevism at close range, and had discussed tills dictatorial system with

its opponents among the Russian people. There were a great many

anti-Communists among the Russian intellectuals. Those people

voluntarily joined in the German retreat in 1943, because they wanted

to have nothing more to do with the Russian system.

Even before the Eastern Campaign, strong anti-German propaganda

was disseminated. In the schools of many Russian cities and villages

German language texts were found which contained the most coarse

invectives aimed at Germany. That was the manner in which com-

PECULIARITIES OF RUSSIAN TACTICS 91

munism spiritually prepared for war against Germany. In a fairly

large village south of Leningrad, half-grown, German-speaking boys

naively admitted that they had been selected as Komsomoltsy (the

Soviet counterpart of the German Hitler Youth) for Magdeburg.

Occasionally the Russians also doubled back German PWs with

false reports. The Germans frequently picked up particularly well-

trained Russian deserters who were supposed to supply them with

false information. This type of propaganda was somewhat less than a

success. With the exception of individual non-German soldiers in

German uniform, instances of desertion from the German rank re-

mained limited to the acts of a few desperadoes.

During the first years of the war the Russians apparently had sought

to impress the German troops and lower their morale by committing

numerous atrocities against them. The great number of such crimes,

committed on all sectors of the front especially in 1941-42, but also

during later German counteroffensives, tends to support that

presumption.

On 25 June 1941, two batteries of the German 267th Infantry Divi-

sion near Melniki (Army Group Center) were overrun in the course

of a Russian night break-through and bayonetted to the last man.

Individual dead bore up to 17 bayonet wounds, among them even

holes through the eyes.

On 26 August 1941, while combing a woods for enemy forces, a

battalion of the German 465th Infantry Regiment was attacked from

all sides by Russian tree snipers, and lost 75 dead and 25 missing.

In a follow-up thrust, all of the missing men were found shot through

the neck;

In January 1942, an SS division attacked the area north of

Szyczewka (Army Group Center). On that occasion, a battalion

fighting in a dense forest area suffered a reverse and lost 26 men.

German troops who later penetrated to that point found all the miss-

ing SS men massacred. In April 1942, an elderly Russian civilian,

a carpenter, appeared at a German division headquarters southwest

of Rzhev, and reported that he had encountered a group of about 40

German PWs with a Russian escort in his village a few miles behind

the Russian front. The prisoners, he continued, had soon afterward

been halted at the northern outskirts of the village, where they had

dug deep pits. According to eyewitness reports, the prisoners had

subsequently been shot, and buried in those pits. A few days later,

the village was captured in a German thrust. The incident was in-

vestigated, and found to be true.

During the battle of Zhizdra, in early March 1943, a battalion of

the German 590th Grenadier Regiment was assigned the mission of

mopping up a sector overgrown with brush. The attack failed.

PECULIARITIES OF RUSSIAN TACTICS 93

Few Russian soldiers, on the other hand, believed German propa-

ganda. Whenever it fell on fertile soil, its effects were promptly

neutralized by counterpropaganda and coercion. Except during the

great encirclement operations, there were only isolated instances of

wholesale desertion of Russian units. If it did occur, or if the num-

ber of individual deserters increased, the Soviet commissars imme-

diately took drastic countermeasures.

During the protracted period of position warfare along the upper

course of the Donets in the spring of 1943, a front-line unit of the

German XI Infantry Corps south of Byelgorod was able to take

a large number of prisoners. The prisoners were taken in midday

raids, since it had been ascertained from deserters that the Russians

in this terrain sector--which could be readily observed from the

western bank of the river--were allowed to move only at night, and

therefore slept during the day. The prisoners admitted that many

of their comrades were dissatisfied and would like to desert; however,

they were afraid of being fired upon by the Germans and would have

difficulties crossing the deep river to the German lines. Contact with

the company of malcontents was soon established, and the necessary

arrangements made. Unobstrusive light signals on the chosen night

informed the Russian company that the necessary ferrying equip-

ment was ready, and that German weapons stood ready to cover their

crossing. All necessary precautions had been taken in case of a

Russian ruse. Just the same, the company really dribbled down

to the banks of the river, and in several trips was ferried across the

Donets in rubber boats; the company commander, an Uzbek first

lieutenant, being the very first. Part of the company, however, ran

into Russian mine fields, suffering considerable losses from exploding

mines as well as from the fire of the alerted Russian artillery.

The result of this undertaking and the above-mentioned incidents

was that, having become unreliable, the 15th Uzbek Division was im-

mediately withdrawn from the front, disciplined, and committed

elsewhere.

[Michael Dorosh]

These, too, reflected in every aspect the oriental character of the people.

[William amos]

quote from that other thread I had.It's about italian gunners

"Frightened, dazed or desperate Italians erupted from tents and slit trenches, some to surrender supinely, other to leap gallantly into battle, hurling grenades or blazing machine-guns in futile belabour of the impregnable intruders," wrote G. R. Stevens in his history of 4th Indian Division. "Italian artillerymen gallantly swung their pieces on to the advancing monsters. They fought until return fire from the British tanks stretched them dead or wounded around their limbers. General Maletti, the Italian commander, sprang from his dugout, machine-gun in hand. He fell dead from an answering burst; his son beside him was struck down and captured." More than 2,000 PoWs and 35 tanks were captured...the Indians lost 56 officers and men.

5th Indian Brigade jumped the Tummar Camps from behind, hieing the mostly native 2nd Libyans. At Tummar, Italian artillerymen fought to the last, but their shells bounced off British tanks. Nearly 4,000 Italians were captured, along with considerable wine stocks.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by William amos:

quote from that other thread I had.It's about italian gunners

"Frightened, dazed or desperate Italians erupted from tents and slit trenches, some to surrender supinely, other to leap gallantly into battle, hurling grenades or blazing machine-guns in futile belabour of the impregnable intruders," wrote G. R. Stevens in his history of 4th Indian Division. "Italian artillerymen gallantly swung their pieces on to the advancing monsters. They fought until return fire from the British tanks stretched them dead or wounded around their limbers. General Maletti, the Italian commander, sprang from his dugout, machine-gun in hand. He fell dead from an answering burst; his son beside him was struck down and captured." More than 2,000 PoWs and 35 tanks were captured...the Indians lost 56 officers and men.

A little "Boy's Own", don't you think?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />These, too, reflected in every aspect the oriental character of the people.

</font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />hurling grenades or blazing machine-guns

A little "Boy's Own", don't you think? </font>

[JonS]

Originally posted by Andreas:

... one of the things that always puzzled me about Sicily was the complete failure to prevent the Germans from evacuating across the Straits of Messina. I guess it happened because the Canucks were not involved.

Ah, but they were

Bidwell puts it down to a 'lack of grip' by Alexander, Patton wandering off on self-aggrandizing but militarily pointless tangents (Palermo, etc), and Montgomery 'dawdling.'

I guess the Germans may have had something to do with it too

The successful evacuation by the Germans was a great piece of work and improvisation by ... I forget his name. Pemberton mentions that the Allied airforce wasn't able to intervene because of the very, very high concentration of AA over the narrow straights at Messina. I don't know why the Allied navies didn't get in there - an aversion to narrow waters and mines maybe?

The comments about the Germans lack of interest in intel gells with stuff I have seen elsewhere. Obvious examples are the intel preparation - or lack thereof - before Barbarossa and Citadel, and the sidelining of the Abwher(?) as the war progressed. Or rather, in the case of Citadel, the decision to ignore intel and go with the operational plan anyway.

Regards

JonS

[ May 07, 2003, 07:27 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:

Bidwell puts it down to a 'lack of grip' by Alexander, Patton wandering off on self-aggrandizing but militarily pointless tangents (Palermo, etc), and Montgomery 'dawdling.'

All true to form then. Sounds a bit like the explanation why the Germans lost in the east. According to some schools, it appears the Red Army had little to do with it - those Uebergermans did it all by themselves