1944 question

[coe]

few questions:

I was just reading on the Summer Offensive of 1944 (Bagration) that the Germans concentrated most of their armor in AG North Ukraine. So what happened to that armor as the Russian offensive developed - did it ever get employed northward (or did the travel time make it too late to have an effect?).

Second of all I'm just curious on this: anyone have a thought about where a submachine gun would be better than an assault rifle (I was just thinking about how submachine guns have disappeared from modern field forces).

Conan

[zmoney]

I can take a stab at the second question. Sub machine guns were only good for like 50-100m. I believe most of them were mostly only good on fully auto as well which wastes ammo. Where as assualt rifles are exactly that. Rifles with the option of fully auto. They are in general good to about 300-500m. Plus they can be fired accuratly on semi auto.

There are still good uses for sub machine guns. Like the mp5 and other sub machine guns. Like close quarters combat. But in general sub machine guns are only good for special circumstances. So the average infantrymen would carry the better all around weapon type.

Hope this helped a little.

[Andreas]

Armour was shifted into AGC from AGNU, but it arrived too late to stop the breakthrough. It arrived in time to slow the Red Army down though, and eventually contributed to stopping it on the Vistula.

[Bone_Vulture]

Continuing the second question:

Submachineguns are not versatile enough to be a modern infantryman's weapon - considering that the idea behind assault rifles was to find a combination of a bolt action rifle's range and accuracy, and the SMG's firepower.

Today, submachineguns are most likely issued to special branches that do not take part in standard frontline maneuvers, like combat divers and military police / counter-saboteur forces.

[Panzer76]

Originally posted by Bone_Vulture:

Submachineguns are not versatile enough to be a modern infantryman's weapon - considering that the idea behind assault rifles was to find a combination of a bolt action rifle's range and accuracy, and the SMG's firepower.

I think it's safe to say that while a nice idea, it so far has not found the optimal balance, and I think it will never do so either. That is why you see a lot of more "specialised" weapons coming back and back again with each new war.

Like in Iraq, the grunts found the standard M16 quite unsuited in the Urban insurgent environment and has picked up quite a few other weapons along the way.

[flamingknives]

The M4, however, is considered suitable. A bit weak at long range but handy enough for FISH (Fighting In Someone's House)

Bullpups are more balanced, IMHO, especially those that are ambidextrous.

[zmoney]

Panzer what weapons are you talking about. US troops aren’t allowed to use weapons that aren’t issued to them. I’ve been to both Afgan and Iraq and never saw any US solider carrying anything other than M4 or M16.

The bull pup in my opinion is good. But a lot of the royal marines I talked to liked the M4 better. I think its just a case of the grass is greener on the other side.

[Sergei]

They should reintroduce armbearers. Or maybe some sort of baggage boy who would hand out the weapon most appropriate for the situation from his gun cart.

[roqf77]

zmoney. i think its a matter of the situation. the sa-80 is more like the m-16 ive been told. Better for the longer range. up close on full auto it has to be held on the waist and is right handed only. the preference for the m-4 maybe in city fighting due to ease of use not neccisarly performence. im not a soldier so i dont know but a few of my mums friends who were in the us army had some complaints about the m-4, nothing to serious though.

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/SA80.htm

there is an interesting link. remeber to read all of it though. just another point though, what are the differences between the m4, m-16 and m-14?

[Shmavis]

Have you ever tried loading a bull pup, though? Those rear magazines are damned awkward.

[roqf77]

well depends on the model. the sa-80 a-2 was issued with a standard colt magazine. but my brother who had about 3 years experience, including bosnia and kosovo said that the clip is very easy. So no i havnt but infact the a-1 had a different clip to the original. which version did you use?

[juan_gigante]

Duh! Have any of you ever played a first person shooter? You can carry like 8 guns at once! Why, I'd have my pistol, and my SMG, and my sniper rifle, and my rocket launcher, and... what? You mean that's not how it works in real life? Did Half-life teach me nothing?!?

[zmoney]

@ Sergi, you mean like a squire in the mid evil days. The guy who carried around the deferent swords and lances for the knights. That would be cool.

@roqf77 M14 was a 7.62 rifle. It was heavy and came out in the fifties after the M1 grand’s and before the M16. The M14 was and still is pretty accurate. Some regular army units still use it in the sniper teams mostly for the spotter’s weapon.

The M16 is 5.56 and it came out in the early 60s late 50s. There are many variants of the M16. Like the Car15 which is a smaller version of the M16 and used in Vietnam or the M16A2, which is, the three round burst version rather than the fully auto version and so on and so forth.

The M4 is basically the same as the M16 except with a butt stock, which is adjustable. I believe the M4 came out in the mid 90s. It also has other small improvements but is basically just a carbine. Where as the M16 is a long rifle.

I like the mag on the bull pup. I like the fact that it is see through so you can see how many bullets you have left. Like I said earlier everyone is basically happy with their own rifle but the other guys is always better. I’ll put it to you this way, say you have a girl friend and your perfectly happy with her, but one day you see another girl that you haven’t seen before and all the sudden your like wow I bet she would be better than my old hag. Even though you have no experience with her you just think she’s better because she’s new. Same with your gun, your perfectly happy with it until you see some one else’s. So I’m sure if the Royal Marines used my M4 and I used there pup we would want to switch back and fourth every week or so just to try the others gun.

[flamingknives]

'the bull pup'

Well gee, that narrows it down.

I presume that you mean the Steyr AUG. The SA80 uses M16 STANAG magazines, which are pressed metal and quite opaque.

The M4 also has a shorter barrel than the M16

[Grisha]

coe,

To answer your first question, German panzers ended up reacting to a well executed series of Soviet moves, primarily in the area of deception, but not limited to it. The Soviet plan was to hit AGNU all along--just not when the Germans expected it. It all began up north (and a little bit down south near Romania) when the STAVKA continued operations there into late winter and early spring. This was to distract the Germans of a massive build-up in Belorussia where AGC was going to get hammered. During this same period, much movement was made known (by the Soviets) of Soviet tank units deploying down south opposite AGNU, thereby 'assuring' the Germans of the validity of their own intelligence assessments. Once all the pieces were in place operations commenced in a north-to-south manner roughly. It started up in the Baltic, then Belorussia, then Ukraine, then Romania. This succession was meant to progressively draw the panzers away from the Ukraine, which it did to a respectable degree. Once, the Germans realized just how bad AGN/AGC's situations were, panzers started shifting north. That's when the Lvov-Sandomir operation began in the Ukraine. A couple weeks into this operation the Yassy-Kishinev operation commenced into Romania.

Regarding the Belorussian operation, it did finally stop along the Vistula after an advance of about 500km, accomplished over a period of about a month or so. Not sure the panzers had much to do with the halt, rather than the Soviets being at their absolute maximum operational tether, as it were. The Germans tried to eliminate the bridgeheads across the Vistula (about three major ones in all), but this failed.

[Shmavis]

Originally posted by Grisha:

coe,

To answer your first question, German panzers ended up reacting to a well executed series of Soviet moves, primarily in the area of deception, but not limited to it. The Soviet plan was to hit AGNU all along--just not when the Germans expected it. It all began up north (and a little bit down south near Romania) when the STAVKA continued operations there into late winter and early spring. This was to distract the Germans of a massive build-up in Belorussia where AGC was going to get hammered. During this same period, much movement was made known (by the Soviets) of Soviet tank units deploying down south opposite AGNU, thereby 'assuring' the Germans of the validity of their own intelligence assessments. Once all the pieces were in place operations commenced in a north-to-south manner roughly. It started up in the Baltic, then Belorussia, then Ukraine, then Romania. This succession was meant to progressively draw the panzers away from the Ukraine, which it did to a respectable degree. Once, the Germans realized just how bad AGN/AGC's situations were, panzers started shifting north. That's when the Lvov-Sandomir operation began in the Ukraine. A couple weeks into this operation the Yassy-Kishinev operation commenced into Romania.

Regarding the Belorussian operation, it did finally stop along the Vistula after an advance of about 500km, accomplished over a period of about a month or so. Not sure the panzers had much to do with the halt, rather than the Soviets being at their absolute maximum operational tether, as it were. The Germans tried to eliminate the bridgeheads across the Vistula (about three major ones in all), but this failed.

Any minute now, a Finn should be posting a message that they were attacked first.

[coe]

Interesting stuff I just read on those other operations too. I wonder though even if the Germans concentrated in AGC it seems like they probably would not have been abel to have stopped it (for instance as in the Spring of 1944 in the South even though there the Soviets had alot of casualties)...I just think there was enough german forces to go around it seems - even if they concentrated at the proper points.

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Armour was shifted into AGC from AGNU, but it arrived too late to stop the breakthrough. It arrived in time to slow the Red Army down though, and eventually contributed to stopping it on the Vistula.

The armor wsa moved north just in time for the Soviets to launch their attack against AGNU and knock them back too. Lack of armor was a problem for the Germans, after Kursk, on any and every front.

[Grapeshot]

I have a question to pose, would the advantages of the M16 over the M4 be offset by modern warfare? Because of modern communications would most target at ranges where the M16 exceeds the M4 in performance be hit by other assets? Infantry are now used to pinpoint targets for M1abrams/bradley/apache/f-16 and then close to finish the job. So wouldn't the M4s of the world (carbines) be more productive option for modern infantry?

[zmoney]

The M4 is replaceing the M16. Just not enough to go around. So some branchs of the military ie. marine corp still use the M16 because they dont have enough funds to totally replace them.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Panther Commander:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

Armour was shifted into AGC from AGNU, but it arrived too late to stop the breakthrough. It arrived in time to slow the Red Army down though, and eventually contributed to stopping it on the Vistula.

The armor wsa moved north just in time for the Soviets to launch their attack against AGNU and knock them back too. Lack of armor was a problem for the Germans, after Kursk, on any and every front. </font>

[Andreas]

Further to what Greg was saying:

On the night of 14-15 July, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade (GTB), 8th GMC, as the forward detachment of the 1st GTA, joined the battle and was committed in the direction of Porytsk.67 Yet this was not the direction the 1st GTA followed.

While German intelligence sources did not identify the forward detachment of the 1st GTA immediately, they located and overestimated the size of the commitment. The OKH situation maps showed 100 tanks for a unit normally half that strength.68 While this erroneous estimate remained on the OKH situation map until 16 July, the XXXXII Army Corps took prisoners in the fighting on the 15th. By 2000, 15 July, the chief of staff of XXXXII Army Corps reported to Fourth Panzer Army "that the enemy committed elements of the 8th GMC against the front of the corps."69 At that time, the German corps expected the 8th GMC to commit more elements, estimating its strength at ninety-two tanks. The panzer army's daily war journal indicated that the presence of the 8th GMC raised the potential for the Soviets to commit a tank army: "We must expect the rapid commitment of enemy operational reserves. Their movement to commitment has not been detected yet, however."70

On 15 July, the 3d GA and 13th Army committed their second-echelon corps. The German Fourth Panzer Army believed that the sector on 15 July "is now under control."71 But, in the next twenty-four to thirty-six hours of fighting, the Soviets created a ten- to twelve-kilometer gap south of Gorokhov in the 13th Army sector, well south of the 1st GTB's commitment in the 3d GA fight.

General V. K. Baranov's CMG, consisting of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and 25th Tank Corps (TC), began moving through the breach made by 13th Army on 16 July. These corps, while identified as separate entities early on OKH situation maps, were never depicted as moving until 19 July.72 The Germans failed to identify the formation of cavalry mechanized groups in this operation. As Baranov's CMG moved into the gap, the Germans were confused by reports of the 25th Tank Corps, mingled with identification of other armored forces.

During the afternoon of 16 July, after the CMG had moved, the 1st GTA began moving toward the gap. The 1st GTB, with reinforcements, continued to fight actively in the 3d GA sector toward Porytsk (see map 7A). Based on the level of activity and the firm evidence of the presence of the 8th GMC, the deputy commander of Army Group Northern Ukraine shared his opinion with Fourth Panzer Army "that indicators for the commitment of the 1st Soviet Tank Army are on hand."73

By 17 July, the German estimate of the situation in the area of the 1st GTB was reduced to a more realistic forty tanks,74 and German intelligence identified other tank brigade-size forces moving into the widening breach, now southeast of Sokal. However, the Germans, after five days of combat with the 1st Ukrainian Front in the northern sector, had not identified Baranov's CMG or moved its corps on their maps. The 1st GTA remained unidentified on OKH's situation maps.75 The Fourth Panzer Army identified the 25th Tank Corps in contact but had not linked it to a CMG configuration. Also, the Fourth Panzer Army had not positively identified 1st GTA in its sector.

On 17 July, following the movement of Baranov's CMG southeast toward Lvov to assist in the encirclement of German forces at Brody, 1st GTA began moving through the breach. The 11th Guards Tank Corps, with two reinforced tank brigades in the first echelon, met no resistance and was followed quickly by the 8th GMC, minus the 1st GTB. The 8th GMC, which was screening the 1st GTA's right flank repelled counterattacks by the 17th Panzer Division and 291st Infantry Division. By 1200, the 1st GTA advanced into the operational depth of the German defense. The German command failed to identify and prevent the commitment of two Soviet mobile groups through the breach.

On 18 July, the 1st GTA finally appeared on the German OKH situation maps and had been placed correctly in the breach.76

However, by the end of the day, the 1st GTA forced the Western Bug River against relatively unprepared opposition-the tank army was on the loose in the German rear. The 1st Ukrainian Front's operation in the Rava Russkaya sector progressed better than the strike toward Lvov. Konev's creation of two major Front efforts paid off. The widening fracture in the north, combined with the solid thrust in the Front's center sector, crumbled the German defense.

In the Lvov sector, despite great difficulties from hard fighting and constrained maneuver, the 3d GTA and 4th Tank Army advanced through the four- to six-kilometer-wide "Koltov Corridor." In the area southwest of Brody, units of the 3d GTA began to encircle a large German grouping of seven to eight divisions. Baranov's CMG eventually closed the northern half of the encirclement.

The command of the Army Group Northern Ukraine concluded that Lvov was the Front's objective. They believed that the 1st GTA would strike south across Zholkov and, in conjunction with the two tank armies attacking directly from the east, conduct a three-prong attack on Lvov (see map 7B).

In its assessment of the situation on 18 July, the Fourth Panzer Army concluded that "it is to be expected that the enemy will concentrate the mass of his armored forces (11th GTC and 25th TC) under concealment oriented to the west so that he may thrust through Zholkov and Lvov."77 The assessment also illustrates the Germans' inability to separate Baranov's tank corps from the 1st GTA. The German defenders simply could not read through the riddle of battlefield confusion and realize that two operational entities were moving through the breach in two different directions.

On 19 July, the Fourth Panzer Army committed the 16th Panzer Division and the 20th Motorized and 168th Infantry Divisions in the vicinity of Zholkov to block the 1st GTA's advance toward Lvov. But the 1st GTA, meeting no serious resistance, continued west and did not turn south where the Germans were waiting. By the end of the day, the tank army s forward detachment had advanced to a depth of thirty-five to forty kilometers and was approaching Rava Russkaya.

At the same time, the 1st Belorussian Front forces participating in the Belorussian operation to the north provided additional alternatives for the Germans to consider. The Germans could see a potential for the 3d GA and 1st GTA to move northwest and complement the 1st Belorussian Front's drive for Lublin and Brest that had begun on 18 July. Such a course of action conformed with the Germans' original assessment of how the Soviets would deal with the Belorussian balcony (see map 7C).

Still confused by the, Soviet order of battle, the Fourth Panzer Army assessed the situation on 19 July: "Employing elements of the Ist Tank Army (11th TC, apparently also the mass of 8th GMC, and probably one additional tank corps) supported by 5-6 rifle divisions, the enemy succeeded in crossing the Bug between Krystynopol and Ulvovsk and gaining ground to the west and northwest in our army right flank."79 Even on 19 July, the divergent paths of Baranov's CMG and the Ist GTA were not evident to the Germans.

Instead of moving as the Germans predicted, the 1st GTA advanced southwest to Yaroslava and forced the San River. Continuously moving on a westward path, the 1st GTA, by 30 July, secured important crossings over the Vistula River in the vicinity of Sandomierz, a sustained deep operation of nearly 400 kilometers.

The 1st Ukrainian Front succeeded in clearing German forces from the Ukraine and gained an invaluable foothold in southeastern Poland across the Vistula River. The success of this startingly swift operation owed much to operational-level deception. Despite an unwanted strategic focus and an initially poorly disposed force, Konev veiled the scope of his intentions and the scale of his operation. Putting into practice three years of war experience against the German Army, the Red Army forces, as exemplified by the 1944 operations, and in particular the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, ushered in an instrumental dimension to warfare at the operational level. Their capabilities and practice in deception set the stage for the final year of the war.

FMSO - Soviet Military Deception

As can be seen from this, it appears that it was less a matter of not having enough tanks for the Germans, more one of not using those present correctly.

But as Stefan once pointed out - thanks to von Mellenthin we all know that L'vov was lost because 8.PD took a wrong turn when committed...

[Grisha]

Andreas,

Thanks for posting that link to Armstrong's monograph. It's a particularly enlightening one, and only a fraction of the reading time compared to Glantz' work on the subject!

[Andreas]

Additionally on the 'not enough tanks' issue - in autumn 1944 the Germans assembled a large number of tank formations in Hungary and they acted extremely successfully - but there was not enough infantry to exploit the mobile formations' successes.

What the Germans were really lacking was infantry, in terms of combat arms. In particular infantry with some tactical and operational movement capacity at higher than slog speed, but in reality any infantry would have done, as long as it could defend itself successfully against tanks. But the total neglect of their infantry arm did a lot to finish them.

[coe]

Interesting, hmmm an adequate number of tanks? I am curious then as to the general retreat of Army Group South in the late 1943-spring 1944: an infantry issue then? From what I've read is that Manstein did handle (as much as he was permitted to) the forces there decently well but still they were pushed back.

What I do sense is that the German forces seemed to be less and less mobile compared to the Russians, or either that the ol' Stand and Fight orders from Rastenburg were probably in full effect.

The funny thing about operational attacks and deep penetrations into the opponents rear is that the forces you cut off and by-pass are also in your rear. I suppose those in the deep penetrations should face some of the same problems as those cut-off or bypassed but for some reason the cut-off or bypassed troops are at a disadvantage or more vulnerable (even supply wise?)

Conan