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What is the story about the air attack on the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on the 8th at Kursk? I have that the 2GTC started with 198 tanks, was engaged on the 6th, was attacked by up to 68 HS129 on the 8th while attacking Totenkopf, was withdrawn from combat on the 10th and committed to the tank battle on the 12th at which point it had around 120 tanks. That gives losses of 78 tanks for the period with 50 claimed by the Luftwaffe on the attack on the 8th. Sources Zetterling and Glantz.

cheers

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Originally posted by tools4fools:

BTW, has anyone penetration data for the BK 3,7 of the Ju87G-1 for tungsten shot?

Yes thanks.

"Aggressors Volume 1: Tank Buster vs. Combat Vehicle", by Alex Vanags-Baginskis & Rikyu Watanabe (Airlife, 1993) credits it with 120mm at 30 degrees and 100 metres (plate type and penetration criterion unspecified).

"Handbuch der Flugzeug Bordwaffenmunition", originally published by the Erprobungstelle Rechlin and collected by Matthias Braun in 1977, gives 140mm and 95mm at 100m and 600m respectively at normal impact, 68mm and 47mm at 100m and 600m at 30 degrees, against hard armour (penetration criterion again unspecified).

All the best,

John.

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Interesting, there is quite a difference in 120mm/30°/100m and 68mm/30°/100m...

Compare to our BB Pak36 (65mm/30°/100m), which one could be more accurate? To me the 120mm look awfully powerful compared to Pak36.

47mm/30°/600m seems to look somehow OK compared to BB Pak36 with 42mm/30°/500m

But then, as you mention, God knows what critter(ion)s where used...

*****

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Originally posted by Der Alte Fritz:

What is the story about the air attack on the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on the 8th at Kursk? I have that the 2GTC started with 198 tanks, was engaged on the 6th, was attacked by up to 68 HS129 on the 8th while attacking Totenkopf, was withdrawn from combat on the 10th and committed to the tank battle on the 12th at which point it had around 120 tanks. That gives losses of 78 tanks for the period with 50 claimed by the Luftwaffe on the attack on the 8th. Sources Zetterling and Glantz.

cheers

I don't think it is possible to deduct anything other than that 2nd Guards Tank Corps had had losses from those two numbers, and that the numbers do not immediately show the Luftwaffe claim to be wrong. It is possible that it received replacement tanks in the meantime, a number of tanks could simply be mechanical breakdowns, and it is impossible to say what caused any combat losses.

All the best

Andreas

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The man to talk to about cannon armed Stuka tankbusters, assuming he's still alive, is former tanker and ordnance man James (Jim) Steuard, formerly, publisher of the great AFV-G2 magazine. He had all the Luftwaffe ammunition manuals, special ammo for 3.7cm BK18 box warnings (nur fur gegen panzer--only for use against tanks), detailed descriptions of aircraft handling limitations (fatigue from wrestling the overloaded, marginally manueuverable plane killed more pilots than enemy action did; aircraft couldn't properly jink, only weave from side to side), open fire ranges, penetration data, aimpoints, etc, as well as the full set of formerly classified Chinn volumes of THE MACHINE GUN, one of which is devoted to cannon installations on aircraft, right up through the Pak 40. Back in the 1970s he gave a long talk to the local I.P.M.S. (International Plastic Modeler's Society) chapter on this topic, and I wish I had it on tape.

Wanted to mention also that Rudel was extensively interviewed, as the premier aerial tankbuster, during the development of what eventually became the A-10, as to how he killed Soviet tanks during the war, open fire ranges, rounds per kill and so forth. This information may be available online.

The Ju-87/G tankbuster carried 6 rounds per gun, since it was found that were feed problems if a full clip of 7 rounds was loaded. Thus, compared

to just about all the tankbusting aircraft of the period, the Stuka tankbuster relied on precision fire rather than volume of fire to get hits. Just as well, considering that the muzzle blast was so severe as to practically cause the barely flyable aircraft to stall. Not good when already practically on the deck!

Regards,

John Kettler

[ June 12, 2006, 04:53 PM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

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Not to dispute the central point JasonC makes, but the sortie count for Normandy is a bit exaggerated.

Taking statistics from http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/aafsd/aafsd_index_table.html I find that from Table 128, that there were 11,320 Bombing and Strafing sorties flown by fighter aircraft in all of June, 1944 in ETO.

Fighter losses in June 1944 were 540, of which 147 were attributed to enemy aircraft, 226 to AAA, and 167 due to "other causes." (Table 159) This is not broken down by type of sortie, but I would imagine that ground attack aircraft were more susceptible to loss due to AAA than enemy aircraft. Keep in mind that the loss statisitics also include losses of escort fighters in the strategic bombing campaign.

The official claims of the Ninth Air Force in regard to ground target destruction are in table 197. The source is listed as Ninth Air Force, Statistical Control Unit, so I will presume that these have not been correlated with German loss figures. For the Normandy campaign (6-Jun to 25-Jul), the claims (among others) are for 1,945 motor transport, 155 Armored vehicles and tanks, 194 locomotives, 2,117 railroad cars and 365 horse drawn vehicles. They claimed a lot more for the pursuit across Northern France... This needs to be correlated with the data presented above WRT actual German losses.

Note that this covers only the US air forces, but they represented the bulk of the air power.

BTW, the relevant tables are in the "Operations" section.

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Ah, no. According to that source (Table 119: Airborne and Effective Sorties Flown in European Theater of Operations, By Type of Airplane : Aug 1942 to May 1945) the figures for June 1944 are:

Total:

Airborne: 96,096

Effective: 82,369

Heavy Bomber:

Airborne: 28,925

Effective: 22,713

Medium & Light Bomber:

Airborne: 11,711

Effective: 8,908

Fighter:

Airborne: 55,460

Effective: 50,748

Which ignores the transport a/c (which make up a good chunk of the ~12,000 sortie total for June 6) and the RAF completely (as you pointed out) which did not make up "1-the bulk" of the AEAF at this point - the RAF and the USAAF were roughly equal in size at this time.

Regards

Jon

Edit: Ah, I see. You loked at Table 128.

[ June 13, 2006, 07:20 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

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Another article on airpower in Normandy

An optimistic view

Canadian article

NZ Official history - no NZ ground troops were at Normandy, but there were considerable numbers of Kiwis in the RAF and RN.

Overall the bit I like the most is a quote in the last article:

Widespread confusion and delay were caused to the enemy attempts at supply and reinforcement from farther afield.
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Tried this twice yesterday, only to lose the same post twice via system lockup. Hoping third time's the charm!

Here's a most useful bio of Stuka pilot extraordinaire Hans-Ulrich Rudel. Not only does it chronicle his amazing military achievements, but we learn Stalin put a 100,000 ruble price on his head and are presented with a truly remarkable set of combat statistics (under Experience As A Pilot) from which JasonC and others should be able to figure out all sorts of interesting things. The amount of ordnance Rudel delivered is phenomenal, for example, over a million kg of bombs. Of course, that was over more than 2350 sorties.

http://www.answers.com/han-ulrich%20rudel

There's some overlap of info here, but offsetting this are illos of the Ju-87G, some information on Ju-87G tactics, and a nice shot of captured and modded T-34 in German markings.

www.achtungpanzer.com/gen9.htm

While there's a certain amount of joshing and zinging here, this is a remarkably deep look at many aspects of aircraft vs. tanks (Ju-87G, Il-2, Typhoon, P-47, Hurricane w/ 40mm, P-38, Me-110, etc.) in WW II, to include tactics, techniques, unusual ordnance, drawings, combat reports, OR studies, and more.

So far, I've read the first six pages and then about five more starting on 38 or 39 (where Google took me in the first place). The info content is astounding, and if you register (couldn't because my computer kept locking up), then lots of pictures and even period Ju-87G strike video are there to see. This thread picks up where one in the archives left off.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/best-tank-killer-ww2-continued-625.html

Still haven't found the interview done with Rudel

during the AX (became A-10) development process, but these should be of great interest to some of you.

Regards,

John Kettler

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Originally posted by Joachim:

Nice sig line. I feel honored.

Gruß

Joachim

Greatness has to be acknowledged. To be honest, I hope that your head swells and explodes because of all the praise, giving me an easy victory.

Then I will honour Jochen in my sig, hoping for the same result. But maybe Elvis is next. Or Holien.

All the best

Andreas

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John,

I have seen this Ju87 vid, unfortunately it is a Wochenschau propaganda thingy, the "destroyed" IS-2 can be from a different sequnce. Only thing interesting to see is the shallow attack angle plus only one/two shots fired, which fits with other reports saying Ju87 was actually used with (few) well aimed shots insteads of bursts.

Best info on the net about Ju87 tankbuster tactics seems to me that Russian site someone here partially translated once (if it's best it has to be found here.. ;) ) Some of it seems contradictionary, but still gives some clues.

Particular those notes:

Tank-destroying Ju-87 G planes were widely used on the Eastern front, especially in the battles of Kursky Duga. The Ju-87 G-2 was the aircraft flown by the famous German pilot, Heintz Ulriech Rudel - he alone destroyed 519 units of enemy armored vehicles."

I read Russian and looked at the site. It is a fairly detailed description the development and fielding of the Ju-87G Stuka.

The site appears to be run by two aviation enthusiasts somewhere in Russia. Here is the list of sources cited at the bottom of the Ju-87G article (I have translated the Russian-languages sources cited):

Aviation and Aerospace, A. Perov and A. Restrenin

Aviation and Aerospace, A. Demin

Wings of the Motherland, S. Tsvetkov

Combat Aircraft, A. Medved'

Wings of the Luftwaffe, William Green

Junkers Ju 87 Stuka, LuftArchiv.de. Squadron/Signal. AC No: 73.

Ju 87 Stuka in Action, Brian Filley.

Ju 87 Stuka, Aero technika lotnicza.

Ju 87 Stuka

AJ Press. Monografie lotnicze. Marek Murawski.

Junkers Ju 87 Stuka, Start-Verlag, Bad Zwischenahn.

As to the article's contents, it is almost as if JasonC had written it. The article is quite long so here some of the high points or assertations that seem to me to be pertinant to this discussion:

1. The Ju87G-1 had more armor than the standard Stuka, speficially, a 20mm plate behind the pilot.

2. The plane had no MGs, although sometimes a 20mm remained installed. If it was there it was used as an aimer for the 37mm.

3. The plane's slow speed and lack of maneuverablity made it an excellent gun platform.

4. The plane was incapable of performing a dive attack. Gun runs were at an angle of 10-12°. To get a roof hit the plane required 30° or more - an impossible task for the plane given the weight of the cannon and the need to get the cannon close to the target. Also, the plane had no dive brakes.

5. Pulling out of even the shallow gun run was physically difficult for the pilot.

6. The 3.7mm AT gun's practical rate of fire was 1 rounds every two seconds.

7. The maximum number of rounds fired in a gun run was one or two rounds.

8. Strong recoil made a second shot practically impossible without realigning the aircraft on target.

9. The plane's 3.7 cm gun needed to be under 200m. from the front of a T-34 tank to have a chance of pentrating it at normal attack aspects. For flank attacks the distance was 400m.

11. The plane did not threaten Soviet tanks with roof hits, because as a practical matter the plane only could attack in a shallow dive.

12. Due to shell flight speed the plane had between 1.3 and 4.4 seconds to fire. (Fire too soon and you won't penetrate, fire too late and the rounds impact past the tank.)

13. Even if the round hits and penetrates, it's a dinky 37mm round, and T-34 generally laughed off hits from that weapon.

14. T-34/85 was, naturally, more resistant.

15. Soviet statisticians estimated the chances of a Ju-87G1 actually making a KO hit on a Soviet tank in combat conditions as between 2 and 3 per cent per sortie, if it actually attacked and expended all its ammunition against a Soviet tank.

16. Thus, the Soviets figured it took 40-50 Ju87G sorties to destroy a single T-34.

17. The key to effective use of the Ju87G was exceptional pilot skill, as an average pilot would just miss.

18. Field experience by the air group "Weiss" and "Panzerversuchskommando" on the Kuban led the Germans to conclude that even if the pilots of the planes were first rate, the only time AT aircraft like Ju87G or Hs-129B would do any good at all would be in massed aircraft attacks, in a very "target-rich" environment, free of Soviet AAA.

19. German claims of tank kills using these aircraft were inflated to the point of absurdity.

Here is the full text of the web site's review of the Luftwaffe's AT experience at Kursk:

"...Hauptmann Rudel announced that on the first day of battle, 5 July, he destroyed twelve Soviet tanks. What's more four of those, by his own words, were destroyed in the first sortie. In all German pilots claimed they destroyed 64 Red Army tanks.

On 7 July 1942 the pilots of StG77, StG2 и Sch.G1 reported they destroyed 44 tanks, 20 cannon, and roughly 50 light vehicles. In the course of 8 July the pilots of these same squadrons and anti-tank groups claimed damage or destruction to 88 tanks, 5 artillery and 3 AAA cannon, 2 M-13 rocket launchers, and around 40 light vehicles. What's more, more than 80 units of Soviet armored vehicles were allegedly destroyed by the Hs129B of FuPz.

We note that the claims of the German pilots of destruction of Soviet tanks were, as was the case for most other ground targets, supported by nothing more than the pilots' own words. In the majority of the aircraft gun cameras were absent, and if they were present, they showed only the the fact of firing, the strike of shells onto a tank. As one would expect, the real losses of Soviet tankers from bombs and gunfire of German aviation in reality was distinctly more modest, than is characterized in the reports of German pilots.

According to the staff reports of the Soviet 1st Tank Army of the Voronezh Front, against which were active the squadrons from FuPz, the irreversible combat losses of T-34 from enemy aviation, from the period of 5 to 20 July 1943, was a total 7 combat vehicles.

This was 1.6 per cent of all T-34 losses for the period. Moreover, Luftwaffe bombs or aerial cannon destroyed around 30 light T-60 or T-70 tanks. The combat losses of units and formations of the entire central front from bomb attacks by German aviation from July to August 1943 was 187 tanks and assault guns of all types, or 6.3 per cent of all losses. Of these, given Soviet repair averages, roughly 70 tanks were irreversibly lost and written off as a result of these attacks.

19. The article goes on to point out that the German air units suffered significant losses to achieve this result, for instance 30 per cent casualties in FuPz in 11 days of combat, and 89 per cent losses over 8 months of combat by StG2 (Ju-87)

20. Kursk was especially dangerous for the best fliers in Ju-87 units on AT duty. StG2 lost 2 squadron commanders, six wing commanders, and two group adjutants during the battle - ten pilots with a total 600 combat flights under their belts. The German officer cited for this is the StG2 commander E. Kupfer.

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Getting into quite the bunfight at wikipedia's page on the Ilyushin Il-2, although it seems some serious posters/editors/historians are entering the discussion. Any other viewpoints would be welcome.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Ilyushin_Il-2#17th_Panzer_Division_losses_at_Kursk

[ June 18, 2006, 01:49 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

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tools4fools,

Thank you very much for your comments, but a few of the site excerpts strike me as either odd or flatly contradictory of what I've heard or read before. I have no problem, for example with the lack of a dive attack, not only because the dive brakes were removed, but because I clearly recall Jim Steuard's having said that the plane attacked at a shallow angle and couldn't even jink properly, only weave.

The armor plate bit throws me, though, for we were told that the plane was so drastically lightened to carry the two 37mm guns that the oxygen system was torn out, along with ALL the armor plate and every other nonessential item. Thus, I have a terrible time understanding the logic of adding armor plate to an airplane so heavily loaded that it could barely fly. Far more Ju-87/Gs were lost when exhausted pilots tried to land them after wrestling them through the sky for hours than were lost to enemy action. I don't know of a single case where a Ju-87G attacked a tank from the front. Everything I've read said sides and rear, with rear being preferable since if something went wrong the plane was at least pointed toward friendly lines. ISTR the fuel drums on attacking tanks were favorite targets. Lack of maneuverability does not a good gun platform make, but having a stable aircraft does. I think the comments about the dinky round amount to whistling in the dark. Said dinky APCR round was perfectly capable of punching right through the rear or flank armor and completely wrecking the aluminum block engine (ex-dirigible design) of the T-34. Further, ISTR there was no complete bulkhead between the engine and the fighting compartment. Thus, bad things in the engine compartment tend to be, er, shared with the crew compartment, and the floor of it is full of ammo. The stats you provide are most interesting, but I wonder what the same Russian statisticians computed the Il-2 combat effectiveness numbers to be--if they dared.

I clearly recall that Marshal von Schoerner considered Rudel's Stuka Geschwader to be "worth a regiment of regular troops." Seems to me that as infantry poor as the Germans were by late 1944 when the Marshal had Rudel's services, that's saying a lot about the unit's combat power and value.

I'll return to this later, but I find what you've dug up to be most interesting and useful.

Regards,

John Kettler

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John,

as I said, lot of contradictiopnary things in there; first it says 400m no problem for 37mm on T-34, then it says T-34/85 was thougher... But rear armor on the two isn't much different if I recall right.

And how does this fit with T-34's laughing off 37mm hits? And hit (think means penetrating hit here) is dagnerours, especially rear with engine...

****

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Additional source for Andreas claim about the 17th PD being in Army reserve:

http://www.bmlv.gv.at/omz/ausgaben/artikel.php?id=142

The page is in German, it is an excerpt from the "Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Ausgabe 5/2003"

German quotes from this page. Tranlsation below is by me.

"Trotz des nachdrücklichen Einspruches des OB H.Gr. Süd, Generalfeldmarschalls v. Manstein, gab Hitler die unter Führungsvorbehalt [Ann. Führervorbehalt (?)] stehende Reserve der H.Gr. Süd (XXIV. Pz.K mit SS-Division Wiking, 17. und 23. Pz.Div)(FN28) nicht frei. Damit hätte, wie Manstein meinte, wenigstens ein Teilerfolg erzielt werden können.(FN29)"

Translation:

Despite the vigorous protests from the CinC AG South, Fieldmarshal v. Manstein, Hitler did not release the Reserve of AG Central (XXIV PzC including SS-Div Wiking, 17th and 23rd PD), which could only be released by explicit order of Hitler himself.

"(FN28) Zetterling. S.226. Die 23. PD wurde dem Korps am 7.7. zugeführt."

Translation:

(FN28) Zetterling p. 226. 23rd PD was attached to the Corps on 7 July.

This might be this book (could not find another one by Zetterling in the text)

(FN34) Vergleiche Zetterling: Statistical Analysis, Anlage 16, S.226ff., mit der Darstellung der Strukturen der einzelnen Divisionen bis zur Kompanie-Ebene in der Gliederung am 4.7.

cf Zetterling: Statistical Analysis, Appendix 16, p. 226+, giving the structure of the divisions down to company level as of 4 July.

HTH

Gruß

Joachim

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So that Rudel? guy ... did it really pop over 500 tank with his Stukas or is it aload of the smelly stuff?

Also how the hell did he manage to take a battleship out with a single bomb :S

You hear stuff like Pearl Habour and Taranto and its all torps or mass bombs etc ... so how he do it with one?

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Originally posted by the_enigma:

So that Rudel? guy ... did it really pop over 500 tank with his Stukas or is it aload of the smelly stuff?

Also how the hell did he manage to take a battleship out with a single bomb :S

You hear stuff like Pearl Habour and Taranto and its all torps or mass bombs etc ... so how he do it with one?

Only took one to take out the Arizona, too, why is it so hard to believe?
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