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Der Alte Fritz

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About Der Alte Fritz

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  • Birthday 11/06/1961

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  1. Lets be realistic here. The first CMRT module will be at least 3 YEARS AFTER LAUNCH. That is way slower than CMN or CMFI and with the new CMN+ (CMFB) out and demanding a module as well.... It is obvious that sales of CMRT were not good enough to put it on the 'fast track'. Any additional items that we may see will be launched first in other modules, snow in CMFB, Waffen SS in CMN and so if we get a Vistula-Oder module it will have a couple of new Soviet vehicles and all the other bits from other modules, As for early war, that will never come out so go back to CMBB. Best yo
  2. I notice that the drivers foot still comes through the floor of the GAZ MM
  3. I think we have fundamentally different definitions of what constitutes a "war of machines". As JasonC said so i just do not see the German war on the Soviet Union in 1941 and 1942 as a "war of machines". 300 Divisions most of which are horse drawn and of which 15-20 could really be called motorised (remember Panzer Divisions had been cut in half to double their numbers just before the invasion). That is 5% of the force. For every encirclement, Infantry Divisions were needed to do the fighting, the Panzer Divisions made the breakthrough and caused the confusion but were too weak to destro
  4. One interesting aspect of his argument is that in many ways the Heer did not attempt to fight a High Tech war against the Soviets but fought a Traditional war against them while the Kreigsmarine and Luftwaffe did fight a High Tech war in the West. The reason for this was their belief that you needed mass armies not small armies with high tech weapons. By the way does anyone have a copy of this article that they could post here or say at the Axis History Forum (which accepts bigger file uploads)? So that people could read it in full.
  5. The several issues with using "economic activity" as the measure of military capability can be summarised as: 1) High tech items do not produce the same level of military capability as economic cost. A heavy bomber is expensive to produce from an economic point of view but produces a military effect that is less than an equivalent number of say, tanks. Of course it produces and economic effect by destroying factories but overall technology increases the cost of killing an enemy soldier it just allows you to do it at range or with less cost to your own soldiers. The V1 and V2 programmes are a
  6. The O'Brien argument is certainly well crafted but it has a number of issues which lessen its authority. 1) He only counts 1943 onwards and ignores the fact that the Russo-German war was won by mid 1943 2) His assertion that WW2 was a war of machines really only applies to the Western powers, many other countries successfully fought a war based on man power. 3) Given this economic output is not the only measure of military activity 4) Writing in 2000 post-Bosnia one of his objectives is to rehabilitate air power which had been shown to be less than effective in destroying ground forces in
  7. This is an interesting report on the allocation of trucks in the Red Army: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=79&t=158313 One key point is that the vehicle park was not used fully due to lack of fuel and other reasons such as lack of spares so that an average of 55-60% availability was achieved.
  8. There are good accounts for both the US (Ruppenthal) and the British (21st AG) logistics as you are no doubt aware and it is well covered in Creveld's book. I think that the only point to be made about this is the varying supply demand depending on the type of Operations. Planners allowed 750 tonnes but demand for heavy fighting around the beaches could be higher mainly in ammunition while normal fighting advance was found to be a bit less more like 600 tonnes average while the pursuit phase could be even less at around 250 tonnes when ammunition resupply dropped to zero but fuel rose enorm
  9. I think you know what I mean, these were civilian lorries taken up from trade and were the road version of the military trucks like the 6x4 Mercedes-Benz L 4500 A
  10. I think this is shown in the table I posted earlier. The US Army in August 1944 has just 5,600 supply trucks supporting a force at 200 miles and they manage a turnaround in 3 days. The Soviet force in Jan 1944 has x4 the supply need at a distance of 300 miles so you expect them to have around 30,000 tricks to account for the larger force and slightly longer distance. Instead they have 72,000 and they do not meet as much of the need as the US forces. The reason is that they are using 1.5 tonne vehicles while the US are using 2.5 tonne vehicles (often loaded on roads to 5 tonnes and later
  11. Hope you had it on a tablet or something similar 'cos if you print it out it is huge. For Operation Barbarossa, 1 POL unit (VS) = 50-70km = 200 cu m Pz.D (160 m cu PzGr.D) 3 VS units in depots at the Polish border, 3.5 VS units on vehicles, 1 VS unit on fuel column, GTR Handkoffer (suitcase) 2-3 VS units for a total of 8 VS units with the Pz.D or 400 km. 1 cu m of gasoline converts to 0.8 tonnes so a VS weighs 160 tonnes. The Handkoffer GTR units were part of the GTR Regt and 616.Grosstransportraum Regiment (this unit was raised from civilian lorries taken up from trade and conscript
  12. Another good source is at Fold3 which has the following Foreign Military Studies papers: P-041R-T and T-8 Problems of Supply in Far Reaching Operations and T-7 Comments of Russian railways and roads. I did send these over to Sturmpanzer.com but I do not think he has got round to posting them on his site yet.
  13. With regard to the supply of fuel to the Panzer Corps, they were given a specific part of the GTR around 7,000 tonnes if memory serves me to act as a mobile fuel dump. They travelled with the Panzer Corps and off loaded their fuel as the advance continued and then hurried back to the nearest fuel depot to fill up again. They were know as "suitcases". However they was a tendency during the campaign for all the GTR to be used in support of the Panzer Corps as the lorries broke down. By the autumn the GTR was in a sorry state and was not able to support the advances to any great degree. The Ge
  14. JasonC in reply to your post Nr.112, I would agree that the early part of the war saw dismal Soviet logistics and the turn around only began in August 1941 and took much of 1942 to accomplish. But by 1944 they did have a good logistics system able to support their offensives of 300km depth and with 3 or 4 offensives running in sequence - all of which was a better result than the Germans. However this was an army that was managing to fight a war by the best use of limited resources. A comparison of American and Soviet offensives shows that the western campaign with its better communications rou
  15. I re-read page 1 seeking enlightenment but only found the same old arguments and that is the problem with these Lend Lease discussions, the Russians roll out their line of "Lend Lease was only 4 % of the total war economy" while the Americans roll out their line of "we sent you SPAM Studebakers, Bostons, locomotives and radios". The problem with the Russian line of reasoning is that it is simply irrelevant, key deliveries such as food and aircraft could not be produced in the USSR and were aggregate increases to their war effort which were significant. But you can understand why their noses
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