How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[chrisl]

10 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Well on the plus side, I think this serious threat just imploded.

I didn't see any ducks imploding last night.

[ArmouredTopHat]

Ukrainians claim the recent Su-30 shoot down was achieved by a sea based manpad.
 

 

[Kraft]

"#Su30Leaks" - InformNapalm has published information obtained from russian and kazakh companies that show how the critical French Thales/SAFRAN equiptment present in the ~130 Su30s is being maintained despite sanctions.

For the full read here, no black magic involved - a shell company providing since june 2024 up to Intermediate Level Maintanence to russia, funded by russia with contracted Thales specialized equiptment and schooling.

Thales/. engagement with this shell company dates back to the withdrawl of Thales from russia in 2022.

The point of these leaks is to pressure Thales/SAFRAN to terminate its contract with the shell company.

Edited Thursday at 10:00 AM by Kraft

[Kraft]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

think you're taking what The_Capt said too literally. 

Is that not the complaint lodged here?

As he is taking things very literally himself when he wants to.

Asking about departure airports, flight plans etc nobody can know unless actively involved in Romania and nitty gritty detail before making "claims" and the possibility of passing judgement. (Which is based on a 2.5-20 year trend and not a singular occurance, might I add)

Ps: why does the forum not let me mute him in return? It says I cannot mute this user. I dont want to read statements I cannot reply to.

Edited Thursday at 10:06 AM by Kraft

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think you're taking what The_Capt said too literally.  I doubt he was saying there is some master list of how to escalate and why.  That would not only be hard to conceive of doing ahead of time, but it would also be foolish because it presupposes knowledge nobody has.  i.e. a crystal ball.

Instead what he's saying (and he can correct me if I'm wrong) is that the West knows it has only so many things to hold back from Ukraine.  If it gives Ukraine everything all at once, then there's nothing left for the West to negotiate with Russia about.  And it is very safe to assume there are negotiations going on behind closed doors on a consistent basis.

Think about it this way.  Russia does something the US told it not to do or Ukraine is in a tight spot.  The West goes to its drawer full of withheld stuff, looks for something that is appropriately sized for the situation and puts it into play. 

Some of them, no doubt, have been explicitly withheld with Russia being warned that withholding it further is dependent upon doing or not doing something general or specific.  These somethings are likely the big ones like F-16s, long range ATACMS, new precision stuff that's not in the fight yet, etc.  That way the West can go to Russia and day "if you do this or don't do that, guess what?  Ukraine will be flying F-16s.  Do you really want that to happen?"

This is the correct way to deal with Russia if one doesn't want to run the risk of trampling over a red line or two.  My criticism is that some of these with holdings should have been put into play earlier.  Like authorization to use Western weapons to hit back on military assets attacking from Russian soil.  I don't think it should have been approved in February 2022, but I think it should have by February 2023.  The fact that it happened in 2024 is where I think the escalation strategy is flawed.  Concept is sound, execution is not always what it should be.

Despite all of this, we should remember that Russia explicitly warned the West about giving Ukraine Javelins and that happened before the invasion even happened.  Russia has also warned the West about not giving Ukraine any number of things which the West in fact provide to Ukraine.  Some of which were also provided very early.  HIMARS were in play summer of 2022 for example.  That was a HUGE deal at the time and it seems forgotten now.

Steve

Well first off anyone tossing Latin phrases around as window dressing to show us all how very smart they are will most definitely remain on my ignore list.

This is pretty much it. There is no master schedule, that would assume there some sort of deterministic framework here. Escalation is conditions based and a form of negotiation. We have posters on this thread who continue to call for rapid, bordering on uncontrolled, escalation every time Russia violates a norm. They then claim the West is cowardly, complacent and/or negligent in its response. This is not true.

In reality the US and West have managed the escalations in this war about as well as can be expected. This is an extremely complex and volatile strategic situation. We have a regional partner we are supporting in an existential war for them, while being a proxy war to re-exert western rules based order. At the same time Putin seems intent on playing chicken with his entire nation on a brutal quagmire war that may very well destroy it. Repeatedly, the US and West have tried to shape things to ensure Russia that there are consequences on the board while also leaving off-ramps for them to find another way out. While never perfect this effort has been well played as we have seen Russian red lines slowly pushed back - thought experiment: how do we think things would have gone down if the US was supporting ATACMs strikes directly into Russia in 2022?

Now as to the clever Latin fluent children in the back - so what are the metrics to demonstrate that escalation has been a failure? Or are we in some post-fact world where nothing is true? We can safely remain critical of everything and never be wrong, which I am betting is the real aim here. The simpler way to describe their point without sounding like a second year philosophy major is causation versus correlation. So my position is that this latest escalation is a direct result of a conditions based consequence of a Russian action - the Iranian short range ballistic missiles is what my news is saying this morning:

Of course we have no direct evidence of this until governments admit it. But I think that until a better theory comes along this one is workable. That is causation, not correlation, and it appears deliberate and measured.

So the real question here is: is the Western strategy working? Well the criteria are stiff on this one. On one hand this war has not suffered uncontrollable escalation despite the conditions for this to happen. At the same time the US/West have escalated and the pressure on Russia has increased. On the other hand, this war has not ended. Russia has not taken an off ramp and continues to hammer on Ukraine. While not the primary objective of western escalation strategy, it is an overarching objective this approach supports. So, as normal in these things, all we know right now is that we are in a messy middle. We have not driven off a cliff but are still in the mess. Strategy is warfare is almost never good and bad, it is bad and worse. The US/Western strategy still lives in bad but has avoided worse. That is irrefutable as of today in that this war has not blown out of control. Could it have been better? Probably/maybe but this is very hard to determine from the outside without the full suite of information available.

So this latest move fits the pattern of deliberate escalation management strategy conducted by the US/West pretty much from the beginning. It will always be “too little too late” for some but in the end it is better than “worse”. And while I know it has become au fait [oh my, this Capt fella must be pretty smart because he knows other language terms too] that to worry about uncontrollable escalation with an unstable nuclear power is “sooo Boomer” - complete with teenage eye rolls - now checking cellphone to fill hole in soul. The reality is that it is a hard factor. It is in fact built into the revised post-WW2 nature of warfare. And no amount of post-modern rationalization is going to change it. The old red gods are back in the driver seat on this one. And from history (and my childhood) it is best to tread carefully when this happens.

 

 

Edited Thursday at 01:07 PM by The_Capt

[Lieutenant Ash]

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/fire-erupts-at-russian-plant-producing-flamethrowers-and-tanks/ar-AA1qs7N6?ocid=socialshare&pc=NMTS&cvid=5ab39e75a0f942e1bb63506831e82103&ei=110

Another smoking incident.

[Lieutenant Ash]

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/poland-receives-powerful-south-korean-k2-tanks-and-k9-howitzers/ar-AA1qqTiS?ocid=socialshare&pc=NMTS&cvid=5ab39e75a0f942e1bb63506831e82103&ei=145

Poland receives deliveries of new tanks and SPG's from South Korea.

[photon]

Things that have surprised me over the past couple of years (perhaps a reflection on me and my prior knowledge base, rather than world events) and questions I have no answers to:

1. Ukraine has punched way above its weight. I was initially thinking there'd be a transition to "insurgency from hell" defense. But the AFU is still holding the line and mauling the RUAF. If the AFU breaks, is there the political will in Ukraine for an insurgency?

2. If you'd asked me what's the casualty number that causes serious civil unrest in Russia, my number would have been somewhere south of the Soviet casualties in Afghanistan or US casualties in Vietnam. The complacency with which Russia has absorbed casualties in excess of either in a such short period of time is stunning.

3. Cope cages turn out to have been forward looking, a realization that the threat environment for AFVs had fundamentally changed, and that top protection mattered much more than in the past.

4. No one has been able to deny pervasive battlefield networking (it seems?). I'd've figured this would have been priority number one for both sides. Maybe this is just not possible?

5. Tanks and IFVs are regularly (?) engaging at ranges that my CM experience would lead me to classify as "totally pants-on-head suicidal" given the notional prevalence of hand held AT weapons. Modeling problem in CM distorting my priors? Artifact of open source bias? Meaningful change in tactics forced by... something?

6. The phase transition from "drones as valuable asset" to "drones as munitions" was... fast. Faster than I would have expected.

7. Neither side is prosecuting total war, and the escalatory ramps seem well under control. Is there a breaking point where Ukraine starts to escalate out of step with its western allies? (For example, unrestricted SeaBaby warfare sinking tankers carrying Russian oil?)

[The_Capt]

24 minutes ago, photon said:

Things that have surprised me over the past couple of years (perhaps a reflection on me and my prior knowledge base, rather than world events) and questions I have no answers to:

1. Ukraine has punched way above its weight. I was initially thinking there'd be a transition to "insurgency from hell" defense. But the AFU is still holding the line and mauling the RUAF. If the AFU breaks, is there the political will in Ukraine for an insurgency?

2. If you'd asked me what's the casualty number that causes serious civil unrest in Russia, my number would have been somewhere south of the Soviet casualties in Afghanistan or US casualties in Vietnam. The complacency with which Russia has absorbed casualties in excess of either in a such short period of time is stunning.

3. Cope cages turn out to have been forward looking, a realization that the threat environment for AFVs had fundamentally changed, and that top protection mattered much more than in the past.

4. No one has been able to deny pervasive battlefield networking (it seems?). I'd've figured this would have been priority number one for both sides. Maybe this is just not possible?

5. Tanks and IFVs are regularly (?) engaging at ranges that my CM experience would lead me to classify as "totally pants-on-head suicidal" given the notional prevalence of hand held AT weapons. Modeling problem in CM distorting my priors? Artifact of open source bias? Meaningful change in tactics forced by... something?

6. The phase transition from "drones as valuable asset" to "drones as munitions" was... fast. Faster than I would have expected.

7. Neither side is prosecuting total war, and the escalatory ramps seem well under control. Is there a breaking point where Ukraine starts to escalate out of step with its western allies? (For example, unrestricted SeaBaby warfare sinking tankers carrying Russian oil?)

Excellent points. Jumping on this bandwagon because it is a good one - things I have learned:

- War is about learning-as-you-go. It is rare to show up with what you planned and execute as such. I think the Persian Gulf War was a very bad false positive that way. Warfare is as much competitive adaptation as anything. Come as you are but bring a needle, thread and pair of scissors.

- War is mostly drudgery. It is one thing to read about it, but we see through the lens of history all the famous battles and glamourous stuff. The months and years of daily grind never really sunk home foe me until this war.  War is slow...

- Until War is fast. When stuff happens it looks and feels like the result of months of pressure building. The sudden bursts can create whiplash. We have continually had to exert self-expectation management in this thing.

- War is about options. This war has reinforced in my mind that war is about competitive options spaces. All sides in this are desperately trying to sustain or expand their options, while compressing an opponents.

- Certainty, communication, negotiation and sacrifice stand. These four fundamental components seem to underlay everything we see.

- War is about understanding what you don't know. So much about this war has been just trying to wrap arms around known unknowns. It is also been about trying to understand new unknowns as they emerge.

Finally, Clausewitz was not the final word, nor was he entirely correct in my opinion. But when he was right...he was really right. I hope we get a Ukrainian Clausewitz after this war because I think we need one.

[billbindc]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Well first off anyone tossing Latin phrases around as window dressing to show us all how very smart they are will most definitely remain on my ignore list.

This is pretty much it. There is no master schedule, that would assume there some sort of deterministic framework here. Escalation is conditions based and a form of negotiation. We have posters on this thread who continue to call for rapid, bordering on uncontrolled, escalation every time Russia violates a norm. They then claim the West is cowardly, complacent and/or negligent in its response. This is not true.

In reality the US and West have managed the escalations in this war about as well as can be expected. This is an extremely complex and volatile strategic situation. We have a regional partner we are supporting in an existential war for them, while being a proxy war to re-exert western rules based order. At the same time Putin seems intent on playing chicken with his entire nation on a brutal quagmire war that may very well destroy it. Repeatedly, the US and West have tried to shape things to ensure Russia that there are consequences on the board while also leaving off-ramps for them to find another way out. While never perfect this effort has been well played as we have seen Russian red lines slowly pushed back - thought experiment: how do we think things would have gone down if the US was supporting ATACMs strikes directly into Russia in 2022?

Now as to the clever Latin fluent children in the back - so what are the metrics to demonstrate that escalation has been a failure? Or are we in some post-fact world where nothing is true? We can safely remain critical of everything and never be wrong, which I am betting is the real aim here. The simpler way to describe their point without sounding like a second year philosophy major is causation versus correlation. So my position is that this latest escalation is a direct result of a conditions based consequence of a Russian action - the Iranian short range ballistic missiles is what my news is saying this morning:

Of course we have no direct evidence of this until governments admit it. But I think that until a better theory comes along this one is workable. That is causation, not correlation, and it appears deliberate and measured.

So the real question here is: is the Western strategy working? Well the criteria are stiff on this one. On one hand this war has not suffered uncontrollable escalation despite the conditions for this to happen. At the same time the US/West have escalated and the pressure on Russia has increased. On the other hand, this war has not ended. Russia has not taken an off ramp and continues to hammer on Ukraine. While not the primary objective of western escalation strategy, it is an overarching objective this approach supports. So, as normal in these things, all we know right now is that we are in a messy middle. We have not driven off a cliff but are still in the mess. Strategy is warfare is almost never good and bad, it is bad and worse. The US/Western strategy still lives in bad but has avoided worse. That is irrefutable as of today in that this war has not blown out of control. Could it have been better? Probably/maybe but this is very hard to determine from the outside without the full suite of information available.

So this latest move fits the pattern of deliberate escalation management strategy conducted by the US/West pretty much from the beginning. It will always be “too little too late” for some but in the end it is better than “worse”. And while I know it has become au fait [oh my, this Capt fella must be pretty smart because he knows other language terms too] that to worry about uncontrollable escalation with an unstable nuclear power is “sooo Boomer” - complete with teenage eye rolls - now checking cellphone to fill hole in soul. The reality is that it is a hard factor. It is in fact built into the revised post-WW2 nature of warfare. And no amount of post-modern rationalization is going to change it. The old red gods are back in the driver seat on this one. And from history (and my childhood) it is best to tread carefully when this happens.

 

 

All great points by the Capt and Steve with just one thing to add: the US isn’t just managing escalation with Russia. It is also managing it with China and the EU…between how much aid we can forestall from the ambitions of the former and how much we can coax against the fears of the latter. It’s an extraordinarily difficult job that will be safely ignored…may I say post facto…by everyone who doesn’t bother to read the diplomatic history of these times. 

But feel free to critique from the cheap seats. It’s easy, fun and you don’t have to pay the price of being wrong.

[Blazing 88's]

4 hours ago, Kraft said:

...Ps: why does the forum not let me mute him in return? It says I cannot mute this user. I dont want to read statements I cannot reply to.

"Moderator".

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Kraft said:

Is that not the complaint lodged here?

As he is taking things very literally himself when he wants to.

Asking about departure airports, flight plans etc nobody can know unless actively involved in Romania and nitty gritty detail before making "claims" and the possibility of passing judgement. (Which is based on a 2.5-20 year trend and not a singular occurance, might I add)

IMHO the whole Romanian thing between you too was as boring as it was pointless after the first exchange.  However, it is standard practice that when one side makes a claim the other side is justified in asking for evidence to back it up.  In other words, the more specific a claim is, the more specific the evidence needs to be.  If the evidence isn't there, then the the problem is with the person making the claim and not the challenger asking for evidence.

4 hours ago, Kraft said:

Ps: why does the forum not let me mute him in return? It says I cannot mute this user. I dont want to read statements I cannot reply to.

You can ignore any Forum member.  There is nothing special about the ignore feature.  Although it is possible (probable) that you can't ignore a moderator.

Also, you can reply to anybody's posts.  It's just that, in theory, if that person is ignoring you then they won't see your posts.  The theory breaks down a bit because quotes can be carried forward in various ways that are still visible.  That is because the ignore feature only blocks the post themselves, not the content within them.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

50 minutes ago, billbindc said:

All great points by the Capt and Steve with just one thing to add: the US isn’t just managing escalation with Russia. It is also managing it with China and the EU…between how much aid we can forestall from the ambitions of the former and how much we can coax against the fears of the latter. It’s an extraordinarily difficult job that will be safely ignored…may I say post facto…by everyone who doesn’t bother to read the diplomatic history of these times. 

But feel free to critique from the cheap seats. It’s easy, fun and you don’t have to pay the price of being wrong.

Exactly.  Thanks for pointing out the need to take into consideration China and allied partners.  Not only do we not know what Russia's real red lines are, but we also don't know what China's or our allies' are either.  We are not sitting in those rooms with those people having those discussions.

I do not always agree with the decisions, but I believe they are well debated and being kept inline with much larger strategic considerations than this specific war.  That is what should be going on and nobody here should want it to be any other way.  Even if we don't like some of the specifics.

To get back to The_Capt's question about what would this war look like if, hypothetically, the West gave Ukraine everything it asked for on Day 1 *and* Russia didn't do anything significant in retaliation. 

My position is that we'd not see too much difference at the higher level.  I think the war would still be going on and the frontlines not too different than they are now.  The reason for this what Ukraine needs to change the equation in a fundamental way involves its soldiers getting into each Russian trench and dugout, killing everybody that's there, and then moving onto the next one.  All of the Western aid to Ukraine can help make this a little easier and perhaps less costly, but not dramatically so.

That said, I do think if everything had been thrown at Russia earlier on (and Russia had not retaliated in a dramatic way) that Russia would be closer to collapse than it is right now.  Which is one reason to at least consider the possibility that Russia would have retaliated in a dramatic way.

Steve

[Kraft]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

IMHO the whole Romanian thing between you too was as boring as it was pointless after the first exchange. 

I agree, I felt the need to respond as the accusations and animosity were strong and I hoped to resolve conflict by clarfying my position. I guess I am on par with John "Bucha CIA crisis actors" Kettler now though.

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

In other words, the more specific a claim is, the more specific the evidence needs to be

In general, yes.. but.. a shahed can be caught by a Cessna. I think the claim F-16s would be unable to catch up or the Ro Patriot not able to see them in time, when they get spotted before entering even Ukraine is a little .. far. You would have to assume a total failure on part of Ro for that.

300km from Odessa in a straight line, at ~120km/h thats ~2.5-3 hours time to "get response ready", before they even crossed the border to Ro. 

Edited Thursday at 03:53 PM by Kraft

[The_Capt]

53 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Exactly.  Thanks for pointing out the need to take into consideration China and allied partners.  Not only do we not know what Russia's real red lines are, but we also don't know what China's or our allies' are either.  We are not sitting in those rooms with those people having those discussions.

I do not always agree with the decisions, but I believe they are well debated and being kept inline with much larger strategic considerations than this specific war.  That is what should be going on and nobody here should want it to be any other way.  Even if we don't like some of the specifics.

To get back to The_Capt's question about what would this war look like if, hypothetically, the West gave Ukraine everything it asked for on Day 1 *and* Russia didn't do anything significant in retaliation. 

My position is that we'd not see too much difference at the higher level.  I think the war would still be going on and the frontlines not too different than they are now.  The reason for this what Ukraine needs to change the equation in a fundamental way involves its soldiers getting into each Russian trench and dugout, killing everybody that's there, and then moving onto the next one.  All of the Western aid to Ukraine can help make this a little easier and perhaps less costly, but not dramatically so.

That said, I do think if everything had been thrown at Russia earlier on (and Russia had not retaliated in a dramatic way) that Russia would be closer to collapse than it is right now.  Which is one reason to at least consider the possibility that Russia would have retaliated in a dramatic way.

Steve

The two main reasons so far seem to be glide bombs and Iranian missiles.

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/09/11/white-house-weapons-ukraine-00178673

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/12/world/europe/biden-ukraine-strike-russia.html

https://thehill.com/policy/international/4874327-cardin-biden-lift-restrictions-ukraine/

This lines up with what I have suspected from early on - Russia does not own the escalation ladder, we do. Russia is running out of options here. The US/West still have a bunch of steps left.

This thing is a like a street fight. You can go for the glamorous knock out. Or do the strangle hold. We chose strangle. Takes longer but keeps doors open.

As to my thought experiment? Maybe we would be in the same position. It may also have shocked the Russian's into something else. I am betting the powers that be were concerned about that something else, and that is why they held off. It may have also broken allied resolve in Europe - they are a lot closer to the problem - or led to China do something unpleasant. Regardless, I am fairly certain it was not emotional or manipulative. But people are going to believe what they want to believe.

[LongLeftFlank]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/sep/06/drones-russia-poltava-airstrikes

Why, after 2-1/2 years of these kinds of strikes are Ukrainians still holding formation parades and roll calls? (I gather this has been denied but not really sure I believe it).

The C in C needs to ban these gatherings for the duration, with instant demotion to a frontline posting for any Col. Blimpenchuk who flouts the order, for any reason whatever. That includes funerals, honours and any other 'morale related' or spit and polish events. Trainees included.

Should have been done bloody years ago.

I mean, wtaf?

Edited Thursday at 05:42 PM by LongLeftFlank

[Butschi]

4 hours ago, billbindc said:

All great points by the Capt and Steve with just one thing to add: the US isn’t just managing escalation with Russia. It is also managing it with China and the EU…between how much aid we can forestall from the ambitions of the former and how much we can coax against the fears of the latter. It’s an extraordinarily difficult job that will be safely ignored…may I say post facto…by everyone who doesn’t bother to read the diplomatic history of these times. 

But feel free to critique from the cheap seats. It’s easy, fun and you don’t have to pay the price of being wrong.

The only thing I have to disagree with is this constant acting as though the US are the only grown up in the room and have to manage the squabbling or fearful children. It is easy to scoff at the fear of others when you are far away on a different continent and armed to the teeth with nuked and not next door neighbor with Russia (and no, Alaska doesn't count! ).

[The_Capt]

15 minutes ago, Butschi said:

The only thing I have to disagree with is this constant acting as though the US are the only grown up in the room and have to manage the squabbling or fearful children. It is easy to scoff at the fear of others when you are far away on a different continent and armed to the teeth with nuked and not next door neighbor with Russia (and no, Alaska doesn't count! ).

Alaska fears no man.

 

[Battlefront.com]

22 minutes ago, Butschi said:

The only thing I have to disagree with is this constant acting as though the US are the only grown up in the room and have to manage the squabbling or fearful children. It is easy to scoff at the fear of others when you are far away on a different continent and armed to the teeth with nuked and not next door neighbor with Russia (and no, Alaska doesn't count! ).

Like it or not, the US is the glue that holds everything together.  Not because it has to be that way but because the Europeans prefer it to be.  Or, perhaps, because they are incapable of coming up with an alternative.  Or a combo.

Without US leadership it is probable, if not certain, that European support for Ukraine would be overall lower and far more fractured.  Not to bash Germany on its own, but I think it's a fair thing to say that for 20-30 years Germany has been institutionally predisposed to letting Russia off the hook.  Events in 2021 and 2022 indicate, I think, that this would have continued without US pressure.  As it is, Germany has absolutely transformed itself, even if imperfectly, towards holding Russia accountable even if it comes at a price for the German economy.

That said, my previous point is that the US has been successful largely because it is acting collaboratively with Europe and others.  For all we know the US wanted to give Ukraine long range strike capabilities and authorizations long before now, but key European leaders aren't warm to the idea.  So while it might appear to be the US making a call about US policy, it could very well be that it is not that clear cut.

That's a core point of this discussion that often gets lost.  There is a large coalition of nations helping Ukraine, not just the US.  Therefore, the US policy should be (and likely is) coordinated with its partners/allies.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

12 hours ago, chrisl said:

I didn't see any ducks imploding last night.

 

I can never visit Philadelphia without being reminded of QUACKUACKUACKUACKUACK!

First, they came for the Cats.....

Edited Thursday at 07:29 PM by LongLeftFlank

[billbindc]

41 minutes ago, Butschi said:

The only thing I have to disagree with is this constant acting as though the US are the only grown up in the room and have to manage the squabbling or fearful children. It is easy to scoff at the fear of others when you are far away on a different continent and armed to the teeth with nuked and not next door neighbor with Russia (and no, Alaska doesn't count! ).

I have never described it that way but rather as an ongoing process involving lots of well informed military and diplomatic bureaucracies that are doing their best with both triumphs and constraints that we don't necessarily see. What I *do* scoff at is the arm chair quarterbacking from folks who admit to neither. It's unserious, too easy and entirely unenlightening. 

[A Canadian Cat]

On 9/11/2024 at 10:36 AM, Battlefront.com said:

Yeah, saw that last night and my first thought was "OK, time to pack it in".  Although it took Russia longer to get to this point than any of us thought, it was inevitable.  Russia might not have been in a hurry to retake its territory, but nobody should have been under the impression that they would stop trying.

Well the overall goal of the AFU is to kill as many RA personnel as possible. They have consistently used a strategy of pull back and make them pay for every inch of Ukrainian territory. It could be that they are just more willing to pull back and cede captured Russian territory faster. After all they really want to keep Ukrainian territory but don't feel the same about captured Russian territory.

On 9/11/2024 at 10:36 AM, Battlefront.com said:

That being said, I really don't have a good sense of what's going on in Kursk in terms of each side's potential to decide the outcome short term.  For all I know this push by Russia is the only one they are capable of and that Ukraine is in no immediate risk of things going badly.  Or this is maybe this is the moment in the performance when the lights come on and "the show is over".

Could be but even if the overall show is over they can still withdraw in a way that they can make it cost a lot. I don't think they are going to just pack up and leave. I think they are going to pull back and blast the **** out of as many RA forces as they can hit and go a slow as they can manage.

[LongLeftFlank]

6 minutes ago, A Canadian Cat said:

Well the overall goal of the AFU is to kill as many RA personnel as possible. They have consistently used a strategy of pull back and make them pay for every inch of Ukrainian territory. It could be that they are just more willing to pull back and cede captured Russian territory faster. After all they really want to keep Ukrainian territory but don't feel the same about captured Russian territory.

Could be but even if the overall show is over they can still withdraw in a way that they can make it cost a lot. I don't think they are going to just pack up and leave. I think they are going to pull back and blast the **** out of as many RA forces as they can hit and go a slow as they can manage.

There's been a major uptick lately in Russian airstrikes (large glide bombs, possibly Shaheds?). So holding fixed positions in 'exposed' salients like Kursk seems to carry an additional cost.

[A Canadian Cat]

On 9/6/2024 at 6:15 PM, Kraft said:

We had the topic of covert influencers funded by russia

How about *russian* influencers sponsored and funded by.. Canada?

Anastasia Trofimova, previously known (to very few) for working for russia today(hint), somehow got the chance to produce a movie with ~350k Tax payer money from Canada that is being shown at the Toronto film festival and other places of questionable programs.

Well that is just gross. I will apologize for Canada's failing here even though I also didn't vote for the government responsible (not the one @acrashb blamed : - )

There are stories coming out of other issues involving RT and Canada too. That story that broke of alt right influences being funded by RT - yeah it was a Canadian Couple at the center of laundering the money for the project. At the same time it turns out several Canadian nut farm influences were also funded by them. I look forward to seeing them prosecuted.

I'm referring to this story: https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/what-we-know-about-the-two-canadian-influencers-accused-of-russian-propaganda/ar-AA1q8e9l

Looks like Canada has been a conduit for Russian propaganda. I hope there are prosecutions. 

On 9/7/2024 at 12:18 AM, acrashb said:

The current Prime Minister has determined, some time ago, that Canada is a "postnational state" with "no core identity".  Which makes it easier for us to shoot ourselves in the foot like this.

I'd apologize on Canada's behalf, but I didn't vote for this government. 

Well the PM and the federal government didn't have anything to do with funding that film. At least I cannot find any evidence of federal funding. Could be there I suppose but the story is that Ontario funded it via TVO:

https://globalnews.ca/news/10737637/ukraine-russians-at-war-film-tiff/

Quote

TVO Media Education Group, the Ontario Crown corporation that operates the TVO public broadcaster, said in a statement that it supported the film “because it is a documentary made in the tradition of independent war correspondence.”

It encouraged people to see the documentary for themselves, adding it will be shown on TVO in the coming months.

Yuck.

I would write my MPP to complain but I am afraid that would help them justify cancelling TVO - which despite this terrible gaff is a good organization.

Federal government is officially opposed to funding this - I do hope the finance minister checked to be sure the feds didn't contribute funds to it (https://globalnews.ca/news/10742444/ukraine-russians-at-war-funding-freeland/

Quote

Freeland, a Ukrainian Canadian and a staunch critic of Russia’s invasion, took a moment to comment on the film after taking questions from reporters outside the Liberal caucus retreat in Nanaimo, B.C., Tuesday morning.

“Ukrainian diplomats and the Ukrainian Canadian community have expressed really grave concerns about that film, and I do want to say I share those concerns,” she said.

“It’s not right for Canadian public money to be supporting the screening and production of a film like this.”

 

[BarendJanNL]

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-kursk-offensive-how-ukraines-operational-level-guerrilla-warfare-is-bringing-maneuver-back/

Interesting article on maneuver