How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

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Kursk. UA seems to have captured a command post of the 28th Battalion, 60th Motor Rifle Brigade (в/ч 16871, previously: Urozhaine).

https://t.me/Tsaplienko/58575

The logo is very similar to the Leningrad District. 60th Brigade shouldn't be up there or in LMD. was this battalion for conscripts? I'm not convinced the 60th MRB has moved.

[ArmouredTopHat]

6 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

The fact they are occupying command centres should tell you how much abject chaos is ensuing in Kursk right now. Looks like it was abandoned in a hurry too!

[akd]

2 hours ago, FancyCat said:

AFAIK, most brigades have one battalion that is like 80%+ conscripts.

Edited August 14 by akd

[dan/california]

 

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https://www.reddit.com/r/DroneCombat/comments/1erlklp/ua_international_legions_uav_pilots_posted_video/

M

UA International Legion's UAV pilots posted video from recent operations on the Kinburn Spit, Kherson region, using FPV strike drones to hit Russian infantry, "meat" riding atop a BTR, enemy MG and AT crews, Tigr armored car, trucking (&c.), totaling 17 strikes. Published August 13, 2024

 

Ukraine continues to do things at the Kinburn Spit. I assume it is just to distract the Russians, well except for the ones that are actually targeted, it is significant for those poor fools. On the other hand I didn't think Ukraine was going to launch a divisional sized operation at Kursk. So maybe it is shaping instead. It is as far from from Kursk as they could go and still find Russians, so it makes a certain kind of sense.

[dan/california]

 

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, FancyCat said:

 

 

Ok,ok…now this is something.  It is but a hint and would need a lot more evidence but if the RA has lost air denial, and the UA can gain air superiority…now that is something.  I am struggling to remember another CAS strike in this war.  Attacking over a barely manned frontier is one thing.  Breaking the air deadlock would be something else entirely, even for a short period.

Very early days but this would be one to watch.

[sburke]

5 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ok,ok…now this is something.  It is but a hint and would need a lot more evidence but if the RA has lost air denial, and the UA can gain air superiority…now that is something.  I am struggling to remember another CAS strike in this war.  Attacking over a barely manned frontier is one thing.  Breaking the air deadlock would be something else entirely, even for a short period.

Very early days but this would be one to watch.

Not sure what it reflects.  Tektino is just over the border and some 60 kms west (yes west) of Sudzha.  Basically, the very point of the bulge if the UA intends to "straighten the border".

[chrisl]

12 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

IIRC Russia has 2 “modern” opto-electronic spy satellites, both of which may not be working. So there’s a real chance Russian space-based ISR is non-existent.

That's been my take since this started. They did the pre-invasion ASAT test as a way to try to blind NATO, and at no risk to themselves because the few EO systems they had were already non-functional.

[dan/california]

3 hours ago, Fenris said:

Another indicator RU is running out of equipment

 

 

So according to Wikipedia Belarus has ~500 T-72s of various types, ~300 SPGs, and ~900 BMP-2s. Almost all of it is Soviet vintage. Does anyone care to speculate what percentage of their fleet can move under its own power? I am envisioning Putins depleting Belarus's operational vehicles to the point that the Polish boy scouts can seize Minsk as a summer project by next year.

[Vanir Ausf B]

8 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 Does anyone care to speculate what percentage of their fleet can move under its own power?

Forty-two percent.

Edited August 14 by Vanir Ausf B

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, akd said:

AFAIK, most brigades have one battalion that is like 80%+ conscripts.

Heh, you of all people should not question your knowledge   You are correct, at least according to prewar doctrine.  1st Battalion is supposed to be 100% contractors, 2nd Battalion mostly contractors, 3rd Battalion mostly conscripts.  Readiness levels go along with this concept, with 1st being combat ready all the time and 3rd being mostly a pool of replacements.

Let's think about the Belarus vehicle transfers.  Who is going to crew them?  Raw recruits with a few days training?  That seems likely.  More importantly, it would seem that Russia probably shouldn't have lost so many vehicles in Avdiivka and Kharkiv.  Doesn't sound like they had any to spare to start with.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, dan/california said:

 

Ukraine continues to do things at the Kinburn Spit. I assume it is just to distract the Russians, well except for the ones that are actually targeted, it is significant for those poor fools. On the other hand I didn't think Ukraine was going to launch a divisional sized operation at Kursk. So maybe it is shaping instead. It is as far from from Kursk as they could go and still find Russians, so it makes a certain kind of sense.

This is an excellent time for Ukraine to launch VERY SMALL and VERY FOCUSED attacks to grab a bit of terrain that has military and/or political significance.  Those are the sorts of things Ukraine would likely be able to keep once the dust settles.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Forty-two percent.

I got that reference, I think

Well, whatever numbers are out there in the public domain may be, if they don't include how many vehicles Russia stripped off of them in 2022 then the numbers are pointless.

Steve

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I got that reference, I think

Well, whatever numbers are out there in the public domain may be, if they don't include how many vehicles Russia stripped off of them in 2022 then the numbers are pointless.

Steve

Oh I understand that, the Wikipedia numbers just give vague place that we can start subtracting from, due both the Russians taking them, and simply wearing out. I mean I am sure that Belarus has excellent maintenance protocols.

 

Edited August 14 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

I don't know what "swift and severe response" means in this context, but those two words associated with Iran possibly transferring missiles to Russia is definitely a good thing to see:

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4825856-us-threatens-swift-and-severe-response-if-iran-sends-ballistic-missiles-to-russia/

Steve

[sburke]

Russia might announce new mobilisation wave following large losses on the front – Bloomberg (msn.com)

Bloomberg has reported that the Russian army is seeing a deficit of manpower to continue fighting its war against Ukraine, which might prompt a new mobilisation wave in the Russian Federation.

Source: Bloomberg, citing sources in Russia

Details: Three sources close to the Kremlin and the Russian Defence Ministry told Bloomberg that the Russian military is not getting enough new soldiers to keep pace with frontline losses that are at their highest since the February 2022 invasion began. "Regional officials are leaving more than a third of their recruitment quotas unfilled on average," Bloomberg reported.

This situation might force Russia to consider a new mobilisation. According to one source, officials might disguise this as "rotation" designed to allow the soldiers currently fighting on the front to take a break, while another source said that the new mobilisation might be called for as early as this year.
Bloomberg also reported that Ukraine’s Kursk Oblast incursion, which was not met with great resistance, underscores the challenges the Kremlin faces in this war.

"Russia’s failure to defeat the Ukrainian attack so far and restore control of its border has exposed a lack of defensive reserves. Moscow has hundreds of thousands of troops on the frontline in eastern and southern Ukraine where it faces mounting casualties with fighting largely at a stalemate," Bloomberg wrote.

A source told Bloomberg that the scale of Russian losses and inadequate replacement levels make it increasingly difficult for Russia to sustain its current strategy in Ukraine.

There is no longer talk of seizing Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities because Russia does not have the manpower, the source said.

Background:

・On 12 August, Alexei Smirnov, acting Governor of Kursk Oblast in Russia, informed Russian leader Vladimir Putin that 28 towns and villages in Kursk Oblast were "under enemy control".

・As of 12 August, the Ukrainian army might be controlling up to 44 towns and villages in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, according to DeepState military analysts.

・During the meeting of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on 12 August, Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said that Ukrainian forces were conducting an offensive operation in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. "As of now about 1,000 sq km of Russian territory is under our control… The situation is under our control," he said.

 

 

 

[NamEndedAllen]

One hopes this is just the beginning of much more:

“Russia is withdrawing some of its troops from Ukraine in response to Ukraine's counter-invasion into Russia that started last week, the Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday, citing unnamed US officials.

Politico Europe also reported on Tuesday that an official in Kyiv said a "relatively small" number of Russian units were withdrawn to respond to the incursion in Kursk. US officials told the Journal it was still unclear how many troops Russia was pulling back from Ukraine.”  https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-withdraws-some-troops-from-ukraine-after-counter-invasion-wsj-2024-8

[Beleg85]

4 hours ago, dan/california said:

So according to Wikipedia Belarus has ~500 T-72s of various types, ~300 SPGs, and ~900 BMP-2s. Almost all of it is Soviet vintage. Does anyone care to speculate what percentage of their fleet can move under its own power? I am envisioning Putins depleting Belarus's operational vehicles to the point that the Polish boy scouts can seize Minsk as a summer project by next year.

I don't recall exact numbers, but Rochan who is world-recognized epert on the topic claimed these wiki numbers are bollocks and  they had less modern vehicles than claimed but way more older Soviet equipment conserved before the war. The issue is how much of it was already sent to Russsia during these years.

Generally, despite silly advertising and outdated equipment overall, Belarus keeps more tidy and compact military than muscovites so I would expect better condition of conserved stuff. They already shared their ammo stocks which surprised many observers with their depth. This recent transfer may be a PR stunt to a large extent.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

15 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Generally, despite silly advertising and outdated equipment overall, Belarus keeps more tidy and compact military than muscovites so I would expect better condition of conserved stuff. They already shared their ammo stocks which surprised many observers with their depth. This recent transfer may be a PR stunt to a large extent.

It could be significant if Belarus disarmed itself to the point when the risk of threat of renewed attack from Belarus to Kiev or West Ukraine could be downgraded from "very low" to "almost non existent" and additional Ukrainian units could be released from the Belarussian direction to the front.

[Beleg85]

24 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

It could be significant if Belarus disarmed itself to the point when the risk of threat of renewed attack from Belarus to Kiev or West Ukraine could be downgraded from "very low" to "almost non existent" and additional Ukrainian units could be released from the Belarussian direction to the front.

We are probably talking about symbolic help rather than some big transfer; dozen or so BTR's, maybe up to batallion size. But I can bet irony of a situation when despised Lukashenko must save superior Russian butt n-time in this war is not lost to many muscovites.

[panzermartin]

I'll give that to Ukraine

[dan/california]

6 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

It could be significant if Belarus disarmed itself to the point when the risk of threat of renewed attack from Belarus to Kiev or West Ukraine could be downgraded from "very low" to "almost non existent" and additional Ukrainian units could be released from the Belarussian direction to the front.

That is what I am hoping for...

5 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

We are probably talking about symbolic help rather than some big transfer; dozen or so BTR's, maybe up to batallion size. But I can bet irony of a situation when despised Lukashenko must save superior Russian butt n-time in this war is not lost to many muscovites.

But I was starting from zero in terms of understanding how significant this might be. Wikipedia was just a handy place to start

[FancyCat]

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“Long-range drones of the security service of Ukraine and defense forces carried out the largest attack on Russian military airfields of the entire war,” an official in the security service, the SBU, tells the @FT.

https://www.ft.com/content/0c98c8b1-0f1e-49f6-8152-7aed007e3166

Satellite images appear to confirm Ukraine's drone strikes and damage to targeted Russian airbases.

Schemes @cxemu got Planet Labs #satellite imagery from August 14, that shows the aftermath of Ukrainian drone strikes on the #Borisoglebsk airfield near the city of the same name in the Voronezh region of Russia.

According to the images, the northwestern part of the airfield was hit. In a commentary to Schemes, aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynsky explained that the technical and operational unit that repairs and maintains aircraft is located there.

A comparison of the images before and after the strike shows that several hangars of the technical part of the airfield were destroyed.

Well well...raid or more...Ukraine certainly likes to keep Russia guessing. Zelensky mentions occupation administrations for occupied Russian territory are in the cards?

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Meeting on the situation in the Kursk region. We discussed key issues: security, humanitarian aid, and, if necessary, the establishment of military commandant’s offices.

Ukraine is defending itself and the lives of its people in border communities while also taking active steps on Russian territory. Our forces strictly adhere to the requirements of international conventions and humanitarian law.

 

[The_Capt]

Just now, FancyCat said:

Well well...raid or more...Ukraine certainly likes to keep Russia guessing. Zelensky mentions occupation administrations for occupied Russian territory are in the cards?

 

The more this develops and I look at it, I am becoming convinced that the larger play here was to try and force Putin into a second mobilization.  We are still not sure how much is posturing as it will cost the UA a lot to try and hold onto Russian countryside once the RA gets rolling.  But in order for the RA to handle this and try to sustain offensive operations, I strongly suspect that a Russian mobilization will be required - we have seen hints of this already.

While this operation may still drive true believers into the RAs loving arms, I suspect that won't be enough.  Putin has desperately tried to avoid a second mobilization but this might be forcing him into one.  This creates more fragility and vulnerability in Putin's regime.

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The more this develops and I look at it, I am becoming convinced that the larger play here was to try and force Putin into a second mobilization.  We are still not sure how much is posturing as it will cost the UA a lot to try and hold onto Russian countryside once the RA gets rolling.  But in order for the RA to handle this and try to sustain offensive operations, I strongly suspect that a Russian mobilization will be required - we have seen hints of this already.

While this operation may still drive true believers into the RAs loving arms, I suspect that won't be enough.  Putin has desperately tried to avoid a second mobilization but this might be forcing him into one.  This creates more fragility and vulnerability in Putin's regime.

Putin COULD start actual negotiations instead, try to get out of this with Crimea, and his regime intact. If he does go for a second mobilization does that bring us to a final conclusion that the war will go on until Putin falls? Or wins I suppose, but that seems ever less likely if political trends hold in the U.S.? 

One the bigger questions about mobilization would seem to be China's response. Will Xi supply the basic war material Putin needs to put several hundred thousand more men in the field with winter coming on? Can Russia possibly do it without that help?

This seems like the next set of questions to consider, or at least some of them.