How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Grigb]

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

We have zero proof of this. 

 

You have zero proof regarding most of your claims. I am constantly putting quotes from front lines. 

 

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

In fact we have counter proof in last summers US offensive.

Kursk grouping is vastly different than in last summer offensive. That grouping was remnant of Cold War. This one is modern one.

 

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

Of course the fundamental disagreement we have in this is ISR.  If you believe that RA ISR is all tactical UAS then effective EW will create blind spots that can be exploited anywhere.  I do not believe this and am supported by numerous sources, including pre-war assessments.

You are not supported by anything factual sources. You throw at me bunch of claims that failed to materialize at the battlefield. You was proven completely wrong when claimed that it is impossible to mass even company without magic eye see it (UKR massed far more than company and achieved complete surprise).

Ypu claimed that you cannot mass anything without wonder OTH. Yet for a week of fighting we have 1 confirmed OTH strike at RU columns and we have RU columns arriving for a week. 

Let me requote for you RU Nat (who unlike you is there) describing that classical column movement is still pretty much possible. 

 

Quote

I'm telling you right now, I just have the opportunity to assert this. The enemy columns, blyat, are moving in the Kursk border area in a columns, blyat. Just the distance between the vehicles, blyat for 150 m and they do not stop in columns, that is, they drive in a column together and where they reach the destination they begin to disperse...That is, there is no problem in riding in a column. There is a problem in standing in a column in the range of high-precision enemy weapon.

 

Let me simply quote him again:

Quote

the tactics of the enemy look like tactics in the 21st century should blyat look like. If someone is offended by my words now, well, I'm sorry. A bunch of people ****ing told me that you can't attack with tanks, you can't attack with IFVs, can't covertly mass [ formations]. It turns out you can!...

I understand that many military leaders have already lost the habit of thinking blyat in therm of 15 of kilometers [deep] distances. They are used to a war of Loaf vans, I do not want to offend anyone, I just state the fact that it turns out that war can be fought not only between [units equiped with] vans. It turns out that tanks can fight and not a single tank/BMP, but [formations] of tanks/BMPs can fight, mechinized columns [can fight] and move,  [mechinized columns] can deliver troops [to where they are needed], [mechinized columns] can evacuate damaged vehicles...

By the way, where am I? I am in Kursk. Where was I yesterday? In Kurchatov, and practically in Rylsk, and so on. I mean, I'm kind of on the spot and I do understand a little bit what I'm talking about.

Capt, you do not have anything factual. You have claims of experts who unlike me were grossly mistaken about RU army before war. And who have no idea what is really going on the front lines now. Because all info that is coming directly from front lines grossly contradict your claims. 

 

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

EW is not going to stop airborne ISR platforms or space based.

What do you know about RU airborne and space based ISR? Keep in mind that they just missed concentration of few brigades. 

Never mind you outright ignored two my recent quoted from Mashovets and Serhi Flash that confirmed my previous RU Nat quote that RU Iskanders strikes rely mostly on long range drones (and not on airborne or space ISR). They are litteraly blind without these drones.

 

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

So what.  Well the UA went where the RA had weaker forces and ISR.  

Capt, stop BS people. Long range ISR wasn't weakest there. I would say it was one of the strongest becasue it was shortest path to UKR rear areas.

 

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

And we even know that there the RA likely knew of the force build up but failed to respond.

And that exactly what I told you when you claimed that magic eye can detect everything - I told you brains behind eye can be confused. And you just backpedaled from your magic all seeing eyes position to my brains can be confused position all while declaring that I am wrong and you are right. 

 

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

An Bde attack like this down south would have likely been seen and countered with high losses for the UA, with very little gains…that is why they did not do it there.

Capt, less than year ago RU battalion attack using similar methods (but on foot) collapsed Avdiivka defense in days. Pokrovkse direction is the direction where these RU guys are operating. And this is the only RU direction where RU have success. 

Let's that sink it - Pokrosvke direction (where best RU EW guys are operating) is the only direction where RU have success.

But I know what you will claim:

• It is an accident
• RU Nat do not know anything
• Your experts who have no clue what is going on say otherwise

We need to stop talking, Capt. While I am constantly bringing fresh description (that always contradict your claims) from the front lines you just recycle your old claims that it cannot be becasue you ignorant pre-war experts said otherwise.

[hcrof]

15 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

I still think that the maneuver is more dead than alive and Kursk attack does not disprove the hypothesis. Basically, the Kursk attack is made in a secondary, weakly defended direction. If you can maneuvre only in a secondary direction, which the enemy did not choose to defend, then  the maneuver cannot be decisive. 

In theory, manoeuvre warfare is all about striking the enemy where he is weak! But I agree that we are not seeing a lot of hope for sweeping operational movements in the near future - Kursk is deliberately very limited and other areas are much harder nuts to crack. 

I think we need to see autonomy at scale before we see real maneuver warfare returning. Ukraine needs to shut down all Comms with EW then sanitize an area with hundreds of swarming drones to perform the breakthrough, then exploit the confusion with fast moving units, then know when to stop before the enemy is able to react with counter EW and massed aviation. Pretty much what they are doing in Kursk but with a more intense concentration of drones and other supporting elements to beat stronger russian defenses. 

[Battlefront.com]

30 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Capt, you do not have anything factual. You have claims of experts who unlike me were grossly mistaken about RU army before war. And who have no idea what is really going on the front lines now. Because all info that is coming directly from front lines grossly contradict your claims. 

You're overstepping.  First, The_Capt was here at the beginning correctly calling those experts idiots.  I know, because I was right there with him. 

Second, unlike you (or me or most of us here), The_Capt is a military professional with sources the rest of us do not have access to.  And however asleep they were in 2022, they are wide awake now. 

Third, and this is VERY important for you to understand, is that frontline reports are excellent sources of information (and thank you very much for bringing us the Russian accounts), but they are also very often wrong.  Sometimes hilariously wrong.  And not just because they may be tainted with propaganda, personal opinions, and just piss-poor information, but because they often lack context to base their opinions on.  This is also assuming that the source really is who they say they are and really is where they say they are.  Which, in this war, is more difficult to know for sure than in previous wars (i.e. we have seen social media accounts with cult like followings that turn out to be complete frauds).

I've been hammering on this last point for 27 years here because frontline reports have always been, and will always be, pieces of information that must be taken into consideration with other pieces.  Frontline reports DO NOT immediately mean the information is credible.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

I strongly dispute that. The similar force in the Donetsk region would have substantial success overcoming Russian defenses several kilometers deep in hours. However, the overall effect would be limited because the remainder of the UKR army lacks comparable EW capabilities and cannot support it.

This is ignoring a couple years of evidence as to why "maneuver is dead".

As I have been arguing over and over and over again... Ukraine succeeded on this sector of front because it cherry picked the conditions to fight against.  They chose a sector of front that had (on the Russian side):

1.  extremely low density of forces with no mobile reserves of any note

2.  what forces were there were of exceptionally poor quality.  I'd go so far as to say "non-combat"

3.  just about no supporting arms.  No artillery, no drones, no EW, nobody on the ground to direct air, apparently little AT assets, etc.

4.  low density defenses directly opposite Ukraine's forces.  There definitely was a minefield, but they didn't have squat providing overwatch.  As we've discussed in great detail last summer, a minefield that has effective overwatch is very difficult to deal with.  The opposite is true.

5.  no defenses in depth.  Besides the thin strip of defenses on the border, there's nothing between there and Vladivostok

6.  a local Russian command structure that was not set up for combat

7.  an area that was not in any way, shape, or form mentally prepared for being attacked in this way

8.  terrain that wasn't wide open and full of natural kill zones

MOST IMPORTANTLY

9.  a sector of front that had nothing in its inventory to disrupt the Ukrainian buildup before it happened or to deal with it after it happened.  No massed fires of any sort.  Since massed fires, especially precision based, is the key element in neutralizing maneuver warfare, the complete absence of it is a critical factor to note

 

This combination of elements provided Ukraine with the basic ingredients for success.  Nowhere in Ukraine can these conditions be found in total.  Some sectors, here and there, may have a few of these elements.  But it was the totality that offered Ukraine the opportunities to do what it did. 

From that base, Ukraine then determined how to leverage the existing Russian deficiencies to hinder a counter attack.  Namely, flooding the space with EW, AD, and too many small groups (targets) operating in too many places all at the same time.

 

I will say this again.  If Ukraine tried this sort of attack in most places within Ukraine it would have been significantly disrupted, if not crushed, before it even got started.  Whatever force did manage to push into the Russian lines would have been significantly attrited without making much progress.  The reserves would have then been required to breach more than exploit.  In other words, a repeat of 2023's summer offensive.

 

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

Moving front line back for several km in few hours would look like Blitzkrieg but will have negligible overal effect. Well, it would have a negative overall effect since other UKR units without the same EW capabilities would be forced to defend unprepared terrain against RU counterattacks.

Strong EW on Ukraine's part certainly helped, quite a lot, but it wasn't the deciding factor.  The poor disposition of the Russian defenders (in total) was.

Steve

[Chibot Mk IX]

Regarding the scale of the current Kursk offensive, IMHO more and more signs show this is a limited scale operation.

So far Ukraine’s offensive relies on one main road H07 and one secondary road pass through Snagost. With Sumy function as the logistic center, one highway can support 3 full brigades for a limit time, then got to R&R or rotate.

[Lieutenant Ash]

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/satellite-images-show-destruction-at-sudzha-gas-metering-station-in-russia/ar-AA1oFmfW?ocid=socialshare&pc=NMTS&cvid=74ef8cf555a94e60b101765e613cd358&ei=128

Report that gas metering station at Sudzha has been destroyed.

[cyrano01]

17 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

4.  low density defenses directly opposite Ukraine's forces.  There definitely was a minefield, but they didn't have squat providing overwatch.  As we've discussed in great detail last summer, a minefield that has effective overwatch is very difficult to deal with.  The opposite is true.

 

This is one that keeps comming into my mind and I don't think I've seen it mentioned much, although I may just have missed it.

Do we have any idea what the prevelance and depth of mine defences on the Kursk sector border was. The UKrainians seem to have gone through them very quickly.

[Battlefront.com]

The Kursk attack shows us a severe limitation of precision massed fires.  Specifically that it is not immune to all of the traditional problems that come from having to deploy into an active and unfavorable combat zone.  As mobile as these resources are relative to other combat arms, they require a lot of connectivity.  Especially with ground forces.  This is a difficult thing to establish in a fluid environment.

We've seen this countless times in wars past.  We should not be surprised to see that it is still true even in 2024.

As we all know, coordination is not one of Russia's strongest attributes (yeah, I'm being VERY kind!).  They lack all sorts of equipment, personnel, and doctrine for quick and effective connectivity to be fully effective.  Even when they have the time to set up shop somewhere, it's still not up to the sort of standard NATO would find acceptable.  It's also very brittle.

Ukraine picked a spot that had just about nothing in place and therefore nothing connected.  Russia reacted as could be predicted... piecemeal, uncoordinated, and desperate.  The results have been as could be expected, which is an uneven and inadequate response to Ukraine's pushes.

The downside of this for Ukraine is contained in the caveat I just wrote.  Russia can pull together the various forms of maneuver defeating fires given time.  Russia is over the shock and is well along scrambling to confront it.  It will soon get to a point where Ukraine is finding maneuver to be, once again, difficult if not impossible.  It is at that point we'll know if this is a raid or a traditional offensive because we'll see if Ukraine stays or withdraws.

Steve

[Billy Ringo]

And now, a quick humor break.

Huge thanks to all for the discourse, even when a tad heated it provides fantastic reading and great content.

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, cyrano01 said:

This is one that keeps comming into my mind and I don't think I've seen it mentioned much, although I may just have missed it.

Do we have any idea what the prevelance and depth of mine defences on the Kursk sector border was. The UKrainians seem to have gone through them very quickly.

We don't, but I think we can presume it was a fairly thick belt of mines along the border and then nothing after it. 

Oh, and those dragon's teeth that I ridiculed back in 2022 were seen pushed off to the sides of the breach lanes.  As I said way back then, they are militarily useless.  "Cope defenses".  Look great from the sky, though.

What we haven't seen is the sort of trenches/dugouts/firepits that might have been covering this sector.  I'm sure there were some, but given the images of surrendering Russian troops and totally wide open roads connected to the immediate frontline area, I think we can presume that the defenses were thin and manned by inadequate forces.

Steve

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

 

You have zero proof regarding most of your claims. I am constantly putting quotes from front lines. 

 

Kursk grouping is vastly different than in last summer offensive. That grouping was remnant of Cold War. This one is modern one.

 

You are not supported by anything factual sources. You throw at me bunch of claims that failed to materialize at the battlefield. You was proven completely wrong when claimed that it is impossible to mass even company without magic eye see it (UKR massed far more than company and achieved complete surprise).

Ypu claimed that you cannot mass anything without wonder OTH. Yet for a week of fighting we have 1 confirmed OTH strike at RU columns and we have RU columns arriving for a week. 

Let me requote for you RU Nat (who unlike you is there) describing that classical column movement is still pretty much possible. 

 

 

Let me simply quote him again:

Capt, you do not have anything factual. You have claims of experts who unlike me were grossly mistaken about RU army before war. And who have no idea what is really going on the front lines now. Because all info that is coming directly from front lines grossly contradict your claims. 

 

What do you know about RU airborne and space based ISR? Keep in mind that they just missed concentration of few brigades. 

Never mind you outright ignored two my recent quoted from Mashovets and Serhi Flash that confirmed my previous RU Nat quote that RU Iskanders strikes rely mostly on long range drones (and not on airborne or space ISR). They are litteraly blind without these drones.

 

Capt, stop BS people. Long range ISR wasn't weakest there. I would say it was one of the strongest becasue it was shortest path to UKR rear areas.

 

And that exactly what I told you when you claimed that magic eye can detect everything - I told you brains behind eye can be confused. And you just backpedaled from your magic all seeing eyes position to my brains can be confused position all while declaring that I am wrong and you are right. 

 

Capt, less than year ago RU battalion attack using similar methods (but on foot) collapsed Avdiivka defense in days. Pokrovkse direction is the direction where these RU guys are operating. And this is the only RU direction where RU have success. 

Let's that sink it - Pokrosvke direction (where best RU EW guys are operating) is the only direction where RU have success.

But I know what you will claim:

• It is an accident
• RU Nat do not know anything
• Your experts who have no clue what is going on say otherwise

We need to stop talking, Capt. While I am constantly bringing fresh description (that always contradict your claims) from the front lines you just recycle your old claims that it cannot be becasue you ignorant pre-war experts said otherwise.

Ok, we are not going to go down this road again.  There really is no point trying to outshout each other and neither of us can really prove or disprove anything here on a wargame forum in the outer rim of the internet.  We have both been exposed to information and have come up with deductions and conclusions.  You have your opinions which you have presented, and I have mine.  We both have sources we have cited and the veracity of those sources is really up to the reader to decide for themselves.

Now the one missing piece in all this is background credibility.  I do not really know your background but clearly you have got some good sources in the RUSINT sphere, and you speak the language which is a very big plus.  Where you got your expertise in translating what you are seeing in that sphere, you have never shared but it is obvious to me that you are familiar with military operations.

Ok, now as to me.  Funny thing, I just released from the military so I can be more open about what I did at work.  So the reader can take my opinions at face value but they should understand where they are coming from.  Most here know I served at our staff college as DS/Instructor, but I have never made public here what my day job in fact was.  For the last ten years I have been a strategic advisor to three commanders of Canadian SOF.  I will not go into details as to what that means but readers can perhaps get a better understanding of where I am coming from when I say "fully illuminated battlefield" is a reality, and a reality in Ukraine.  Again, I will not go into details but it is no great secret that the architectures I am talking about have been operationalized in this war, before it actually, and on both sides though to a more limited extent for Russia.  There is plenty of open source evidence and indicators of this so I encourage people to go out and find answers for themselves.

So while your viewpoint is no doubt valid, from your point of view, I can say with authority that there are pieces of the larger picture you are not seeing.  Pieces that soldiers on the ground on either side of this war are not seeing.  Modern militaries are very large systems within larger systems. The character of those systems has evolved significantly in the last twenty years as we went into CT operations world wide.

No point yelling back and forth at each other, we in fact likely agree on more than we disagree.  I can tell you that the C4ISR reality I describe exists, and there is plenty of evidence if one looks around a bit - not everything in this war occurs on Telegram.  It is not available to social media at all.  The impacts of these systems are in fact consistent with the phenomenon we have seen in this war, pretty much from the first day.  What was surprising was just how broad and impactful these new systems were, no one really expected this.

So there it is.  I will let the reader decide on these issues for themselves.  Both sides can be presented without us trying to tear the other down. That is a BS Reddit trap that I already fell for once but frankly it just stifles discussion and gets really tedious.

[Fernando]

39 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is ignoring a couple years of evidence as to why "maneuver is dead".

As I have been arguing over and over and over again... Ukraine succeeded on this sector of front because it cherry picked the conditions to fight against.  They chose a sector of front that had (on the Russian side):

1.  extremely low density of forces with no mobile reserves of any note

2.  what forces were there were of exceptionally poor quality.  I'd go so far as to say "non-combat"

3.  just about no supporting arms.  No artillery, no drones, no EW, nobody on the ground to direct air, apparently little AT assets, etc.

4.  low density defenses directly opposite Ukraine's forces.  There definitely was a minefield, but they didn't have squat providing overwatch.  As we've discussed in great detail last summer, a minefield that has effective overwatch is very difficult to deal with.  The opposite is true.

5.  no defenses in depth.  Besides the thin strip of defenses on the border, there's nothing between there and Vladivostok

6.  a local Russian command structure that was not set up for combat

7.  an area that was not in any way, shape, or form mentally prepared for being attacked in this way

8.  terrain that wasn't wide open and full of natural kill zones

MOST IMPORTANTLY

9.  a sector of front that had nothing in its inventory to disrupt the Ukrainian buildup before it happened or to deal with it after it happened.  No massed fires of any sort.  Since massed fires, especially precision based, is the key element in neutralizing maneuver warfare, the complete absence of it is a critical factor to note

 

Steve

Bad troops, low density of troops, no defense in deep, bad command structure, no mobile reserves, etc.
Are you speaking of Sedan 1940 or Kursk 2024?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sedan_(1940)

AFAIK Blitkrieg is based in attacking where the enemy is weak, bypass and isolate all strongpoints, and move as fast as you can creating chaos in the enemy rearguard, so the enemy never gets the whole picture of what's happening then it always reacts too late.
 

Edited August 13 by Fernando

[The_Capt]

11 minutes ago, Fernando said:

Bad troops, low density of troops, no defense in deep, bad command structure, no mobile reserves, etc.
Are you speaking of Sedan 1940 or Kursk 2024?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sedan_(1940)

AFAIK Blitkrieg is based in attacking where the enemy is weak, bypass and isolate all strongpoints, and move as fast as you can creating chaos in the enemy rearguard, so the enemy never gets the whole picture of what's happening then it always reacts too late.
 

Exactly.  So the key indicator we should all be watching for is how fast the RA can re-establish battlefield stasis on this situation. A week?  A month?  Never?  We know that it is longer than a few days, although they did start moving troops and resources very quickly but the UA still has freedom of manoeuvre at the moment.  This is not a "sign" of anything beyond the fact that if a traditional force attacks an empty frontier that they will advance...shocking.

The real question is how quickly will the enemy respond and re-establish battlefield symmetry?  That is a key indicator of the health of the RA system overall. It is an indicator of the effectiveness of the UA counters as their offensive begins to get real pushback pressures.

The good news is that the UA very likely has C4ISR superiority right now and can see and react faster, staying one step ahead....how long they can do that tells us a lot.  The next step/question is "can this be applied to fortified areas of the front to make them undefended frontiers and regain offensive manoeuvre?"  This we do not know yet.

[kimbosbread]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Of course the fundamental disagreement we have in this is ISR.  If you believe that RA ISR is all tactical UAS then effective EW will create blind spots that can be exploited anywhere.  I do not believe this and am supported by numerous sources, including pre-war assessments. RA ISR is layered from tactical to strategic. EW is not going to stop airborne ISR platforms or space based.  Nor will it stop ground radars.

IIRC Russia has 2 “modern” opto-electronic spy satellites, both of which may not be working. So there’s a real chance Russian space-based ISR is non-existent.

[dan/california]

7 hours ago, Holien said:

What do you do if you have an excess of Dragons without riders?

https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1823075378614968679

Two years late, but still fantastic if it happens.

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

Quick update (unfortunately without map) 

• Due to Tea Leaves I am leaning toward claims that RU abandoned Korenevo. However they seems to be firmly holding Glushkovo (51.342749, 34.632340) and attempting to counter attack from there toward Snagost (probably to cut UKR group in Korenevo).
• Due to Tea Leaves I am becoming confident RU abandoned  Kromskiye Byki but fighting is happening between Kromskiye Byki and Vasilyevka (51.596652, 35.252374)
• BTW UKR photo at Lgov sign most likely is fake (RU signs there seems to be of different design). Anyway RU most likely firmly control approaches to Lgov.
• Due to Tea Leaves I asses Bolshoye Soldatskoye is firmly in RU hands. 
• Due to Tea Leaves I asses there is a battle at Belitsa and Giri. RU are counter attacking toward Giri from Belya direction and also attempting to flank from Zabuzhevka (50.965865, 35.483106).
• I strongly suspects  that at least RU logistics rely on Yandex Navigator. I mean anywhere close to front line RU traffic makes no sense from civilian point of view but very logical from military point of view. As soon as something is abandoned next day you see flanking tentacle growing where previously there was no civilian traffic. 

Outstanding post, can we assume that Ukraine knows about Yandex,and that it is one of the many reasons Russians keep getting hammrred as they try to move up?

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is ignoring a couple years of evidence as to why "maneuver is dead".

As I have been arguing over and over and over again... Ukraine succeeded on this sector of front because it cherry picked the conditions to fight against.  They chose a sector of front that had (on the Russian side):

1.  extremely low density of forces with no mobile reserves of any note

2.  what forces were there were of exceptionally poor quality.  I'd go so far as to say "non-combat"

3.  just about no supporting arms.  No artillery, no drones, no EW, nobody on the ground to direct air, apparently little AT assets, etc.

4.  low density defenses directly opposite Ukraine's forces.  There definitely was a minefield, but they didn't have squat providing overwatch.  As we've discussed in great detail last summer, a minefield that has effective overwatch is very difficult to deal with.  The opposite is true.

5.  no defenses in depth.  Besides the thin strip of defenses on the border, there's nothing between there and Vladivostok

6.  a local Russian command structure that was not set up for combat

7.  an area that was not in any way, shape, or form mentally prepared for being attacked in this way

8.  terrain that wasn't wide open and full of natural kill zones

MOST IMPORTANTLY

9.  a sector of front that had nothing in its inventory to disrupt the Ukrainian buildup before it happened or to deal with it after it happened.  No massed fires of any sort.  Since massed fires, especially precision based, is the key element in neutralizing maneuver warfare, the complete absence of it is a critical factor to note

 

This combination of elements provided Ukraine with the basic ingredients for success.  Nowhere in Ukraine can these conditions be found in total.  Some sectors, here and there, may have a few of these elements.  But it was the totality that offered Ukraine the opportunities to do what it did. 

From that base, Ukraine then determined how to leverage the existing Russian deficiencies to hinder a counter attack.  Namely, flooding the space with EW, AD, and too many small groups (targets) operating in too many places all at the same time.

 

I will say this again.  If Ukraine tried this sort of attack in most places within Ukraine it would have been significantly disrupted, if not crushed, before it even got started.  Whatever force did manage to push into the Russian lines would have been significantly attrited without making much progress.  The reserves would have then been required to breach more than exploit.  In other words, a repeat of 2023's summer offensive.

 

Strong EW on Ukraine's part certainly helped, quite a lot, but it wasn't the deciding factor.  The poor disposition of the Russian defenders (in total) was.

Steve

See below

 

46 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Exactly.  So the key indicator we should all be watching for is how fast the RA can re-establish battlefield stasis on this situation. A week?  A month?  Never?  We know that it is longer than a few days, although they did start moving troops and resources very quickly but the UA still has freedom of manoeuvre at the moment.  This is not a "sign" of anything beyond the fact that if a traditional force attacks an empty frontier that they will advance...shocking.

The real question is how quickly will the enemy respond and re-establish battlefield symmetry?  That is a key indicator of the health of the RA system overall. It is an indicator of the effectiveness of the UA counters as their offensive begins to get real pushback pressures.

The good news is that the UA very likely has C4ISR superiority right now and can see and react faster, staying one step ahead....how long they can do that tells us a lot.  The next step/question is "can this be applied to fortified areas of the front to make them undefended frontiers and regain offensive manoeuvre?"  This we do not know yet.

A Ukrainian advantage that we have not talked about in quite while is the fact that they have interior  lines relative to the Russian forces. Due to both the fact that they are defending the inside of the broad arc that is the line of contact, and I would argue because Ukraine seems to have a more flexible system from top to bottom. They can simply move resources from southern Donestk to the Kursk front far more easily than the Russians can. Furthermore they can move them back south more quickly as. well if that becomes advantageous. 

This is where we will learn a lot about the overall state of Russian reserves, and the condition of the Russian army over all. If Ukraine really doesn't face any competent opposition until Russia can pull its better Units out of Donestk, and ship them around the outer edge of the arc of contact by rail, well they really are 100% committed, and that has real implications going forward. The opposite is also true.

Edited August 13 by dan/california

[Astrophel]

Theory here today is that the attack is a dress rehearsal to see if all the training is delivering before executing the real counter attack.  It sounds plausible to me after last year's counter came unstuck but perhaps you military experts have a different opinion?

[The_Capt]

34 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

IIRC Russia has 2 “modern” opto-electronic spy satellites, both of which may not be working. So there’s a real chance Russian space-based ISR is non-existent.

That was my thinking too but there are three issues - China, India and commercial.  I have zero proof or evidence that China is feeding Russia any ISR but if there was a nation state with the capability and demonstrated "intent to sell" it would be China.  And then there is India:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indian_satellites

That is a lot of birds and anything "Earth Observation" given technological advances can be repurposed.  Again, ISR-for-cash is a very real possibility and I would be very surprised if Russia has not already made some deals.

And then there are numerous commercial satellites that likely do not care who is buying the data, or are not going to look too closely.  We had guys using that FIRMs thing to track artillery concentrations in Ukraine, Russia has deeper pockets and can simply buy this stuff.  Even data a day old is still useful as large troop concentrations take longer to marshal and stage.

That is space.  There are strategic ISR assets available for hire and we know Russia has operational assets.  Now how degraded that system is or is not is a very interesting question.  I do not know.

I do know what the US/Western ISR complex looks like, and it is humbling.

[The_Capt]

4 minutes ago, Astrophel said:

Theory here today is that the attack is a dress rehearsal to see if all the training is delivering before executing the real counter attack.  It sounds plausible to me after last year's counter came unstuck but perhaps you military experts have a different opinion?

So there is a very real possibility that this entire Kursk thing is a shaping exercise.  The UA is testing the RA's reaction times while spreading them thin by forcing reallocation of forces.  At the same time they are very likely testing new TTPs (Tactics, Training and Procedures) to see how they fair in a lower risk environ.

My honest hope is that, like us, the RA has got all eyes on Kursk but the UA is quietly pushing forces further down south.  ISR is still a problem but if the UA does say three concentrations, the RA does not know which one is real or decoy.  Further, based on reaction times, the RA might not even be able to process these new concentrations in time to do anything about it.

If that is the play, we might see a breakout attempt further south...which is genius...if they can pull it off.  In order to do it, the UA needs more than EW.  They need a new concept for the FPVs that essentially makes them a manoeuvre unit that can sanitize a swath of the front.  Or they need new tech, fully autonomous.  Or the RA needs to collapse...or be made to collapse.  Or a combination of all of them.

But we have no idea what the UA has left in the tank.  Maybe all the reports of 50% line units and force generation problems was all smoke designed to hide the Division they have ready to exploit this whole sideshow. I do not assess this as high but if they could pull that off, we are indeed in game changing territory.

[dan/california]

11 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

That was my thinking too but there are three issues - China, India and commercial.  I have zero proof or evidence that China is feeding Russia any ISR but if there was a nation state with the capability and demonstrated "intent to sell" it would be China.  And then there is India:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indian_satellites

That is a lot of birds and anything "Earth Observation" given technological advances can be repurposed.  Again, ISR-for-cash is a very real possibility and I would be very surprised if Russia has not already made some deals.

And then there are numerous commercial satellites that likely do not care who is buying the data, or are not going to look too closely.  We had guys using that FIRMs thing to track artillery concentrations in Ukraine, Russia has deeper pockets and can simply buy this stuff.  Even data a day old is still useful as large troop concentrations take longer to marshal and stage.

That is space.  There are strategic ISR assets available for hire and we know Russia has operational assets.  Now how degraded that system is or is not is a very interesting question.  I do not know.

I do know what the US/Western ISR complex looks like, and it is humbling.

Could Western intelligence agencies potentially subvert the commercial feeds, at least for. day or two, and show the Russians an altered picture? It might be a really effective wy to through them off balance? It would probably only REALLY work once. But it would make them doubt everything, more or less forever, which is no bad thing.

Edited August 13 by dan/california

[Butschi]

I wasn't able to follow this as closely as I should have, so excuse me for repeating what everyone else has probably already said.

This incursion into Russian territory, as great and surprising as it is, how meaningful is it from a purely military point of view? I mean, we are talking about a salient of what? 1000 km2? To make yet another flawed WW2 comparison (we really didn't have enough of those of late), that is a fraction of the size of the bulge in the Battle of Bulge, if I'm not mistaken. Yet people sound like the Wehrnacht was already threatening Antwerpes and the allies close to retreating back to the UK.

As my ancestors, like many before them, discovered, taking a few thousand square kilometers of Russian territory means nothing by itself. (Things are different if, of course, if LOCs are severed, important  infrastructure seized/deatroyed, etc.)

So, the point of this - as Steve calls it - raid, is it really for military gains directly? In the long run, the units comitted there are missing elsewhere (just like for Russia) and I simply don't believe this time really, really, the Russian army is on the verge of collapse. Or is it more like signalling that a) Ukraine is still in the game, an important message, both for a domestic audience and for Western supporters and b) Russia is vulnerable, for the same reasons as a) plus embarrassing Putin? c) regaining the initiative, I guess?

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.reddit.com/r/DroneCombat/comments/1eqagb5/ukrainian_225th_assault_battalion_black_swan_unit/

Ukrainian 225th Assault Battalion "Black Swan" unit drop grenades on russian supply trucks in Kursk Oblast, Russia.

 

Russian supply trucks getting whacked by GRENADE DROPS. They are parked on the road with ZERO COVER, and no evedence of any protective measures. The video is Crystal clear among other things. Which implies little or no EW. This is what happens when the response is completely uncoordinated.

Edit: In broad daylight, too.

Edited August 13 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Fernando said:

AFAIK Blitkrieg is based in attacking where the enemy is weak, bypass and isolate all strongpoints, and move as fast as you can creating chaos in the enemy rearguard, so the enemy never gets the whole picture of what's happening then it always reacts too late.

Sure, but that keeps avoiding the thorny topic of applicability.  Maneuver warfare, as practices by both NATO and the Soviets, is not predicated on only working in the most ideal circumstances on the entire battlefield.  The whole concept of "shaping" is turning a RELATIVELY weak sector of front into an opportunity for the size/scale of the operation you want to perform. 

Ukraine did not do that. 

Ukraine cherry picked a ABSOLUTELY weak sector and scaled their offensive to fit it, not the other way around.  They shaped nothing prior to the battle except deception.

Why am I continually pointing this out?  Because for someone to claim maneuver warfare is back in business they must first demonstrate that it can work at scale somewhere that matters.  There is zero evidence that what Ukraine did in Kursk would work anywhere else, but there's a ton of evidence to suggest it would not.

As someone else already pointed out, even when the WW1 Western Front was at its most static, there were still small successful attacks that gained ground through maneuver.  People can not think about warfare in absolute terms.

Steve

 

[Battlefront.com]

29 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

My honest hope is that, like us, the RA has got all eyes on Kursk but the UA is quietly pushing forces further down south. 

I hope so too, but for this to be successful I think we'd have to see the Russian military (not the rear border stuff in Kursk) degraded far more than it is.  A big part of the success in Kursk is the start conditions were optimal.  For sure some sectors in the south are pretty weak, but I'd say the weakest of those is stronger than what was at Kursk and the operational level resources far more readily available.

Steve

[acrashb]

16 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

This is what happens when the response is completely uncoordinated.

 

Which brings us to this:
"Someone in Ukraine knew what they were doing and exploited a weak seam in Russian C2" - which is credible.  This board has been discussing ISR, but the scrambling, uncoordinated response suggest weak points in C4 as well.

 

[Chibot Mk IX]

34 minutes ago, Butschi said:

I wasn't able to follow this as closely as I should have, so excuse me for repeating what everyone else has probably already said.

This incursion into Russian territory, as great and surprising as it is, how meaningful is it from a purely military point of view? I mean, we are talking about a salient of what? 1000 km2? To make yet another flawed WW2 comparison (we really didn't have enough of those of late), that is a fraction of the size of the bulge in the Battle of Bulge, if I'm not mistaken. Yet people sound like the Wehrnacht was already threatening Antwerpes and the allies close to retreating back to the UK.

As my ancestors, like many before them, discovered, taking a few thousand square kilometers of Russian territory means nothing by itself. (Things are different if, of course, if LOCs are severed, important  infrastructure seized/deatroyed, etc.)

So, the point of this - as Steve calls it - raid, is it really for military gains directly? In the long run, the units comitted there are missing elsewhere (just like for Russia) and I simply don't believe this time really, really, the Russian army is on the verge of collapse. Or is it more like signalling that a) Ukraine is still in the game, an important message, both for a domestic audience and for Western supporters and b) Russia is vulnerable, for the same reasons as a) plus embarrassing Putin? c) regaining the initiative, I guess?

I do feel it may payback military long termly. It will force Russia to re-think their defense strategy. Do they need to invest a significant amount of money and resource to dig trench along the border? Do they need more conscriptions to man the trench? Ukraine is already done these two works, so it won't hurt to drag Russia down to face the same problem that Ukraine is facing.

And more importantly, does Russia need mobile force station behind the conscripts? If so that would hurt Russia offensive capability.  But you will need mobile force behind the line to ensure a more reliable defense line.

Just look at the Russia Kharkiv offensive this summer. Ukr commands faced a lot of criticism. The built up was detected, Russia intention was known early on, but Ukraine side refuse to commit mobile reserves.  In the first day of offensive the TD bn stopped Russia in several section but was pushed back later on, just because they are lack of troops, resource to contain the Russia's continuous attack.

Edited August 13 by Chibot Mk IX