How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[billbindc]

Does anyone have a source for what current Russian arty usage looks like…as in for the last three months leading up to the last few days? I’m hearing that stockpiles of DPRK and Iranian rounds available to Russia are now depleted and I would like to see some actual evidence of such. If correct, we could be seeing a more general shell famine than public expectations of inevitable Russian offensives expect. 

[Holien]

10 hours ago, Offshoot said:

UK MoD saying that the Russian A-50 fleet is likely grounded

It will be interesting to see what options that opens for Ukraine.

It could be more Russian planes shot down if they still want to risk flying without an eye in the sky to watch over them.

I am hoping it opens a vulnerability that Ukraine ready to exploit.

[Haiduk]

37 minutes ago, photon said:

Question: what's the water-in-the-desert limited resource that would prevent the Ukrainian armed forces from establishing lots of small beachheads across from Kherson? I see a couple of candidates:

1. Units trained for light amphibious raid-disruption-corrosion operations.

2. Boats and drones to handle the logistics of more than one crossing.

3. Fires to support more than one crossing.

4. Suitable combinations of terrain and opposing force that render a crossing worth it.

5. Staff capacity to manage and support more than one crossing.

Do we have any sense which of those would be the hold up? It seems like lots of countries are giving Ukraine small boats.

This may be cynically, but Krynky and recently Antonovskyi bridge bridgeheads are just a bites for attrition of Russian troops on left bank, creating of tense here to prevent Russian troops to be moved as reservers in other place. 

We have no enough manpower in brigades (if companies have 50 % of personnel this considers as good result) to establish more crosses simultainously and we havn't enough artillery ammunitions to cover these bridgeheads as we cover Krynky (and tnen, big part of fire support are from various drones attack). So Krynky holds a force in about 2 dispersed companies equivalent, continously rotating personnel. No sence to land there more troops under endless artillery fire and gliding bomb strikes. For Russian generals lost village is a like red rag for a bull. Higher chiefs fu..k them very tough for lost settlements, so they have no choice except to drive soldiers to assault UKR positions and to lose company by company from UKR artillery and FPVs. 

UKR bridgehead slowly growing up but I doubt we will increasing troops number there more that this require this growing. Probably until F-16 appear in the sky or additional long range AD assets to protect bridgehead and probable crossing ways from aircraft and missile attacks.  

[Holien]

Perun does a bit of a deep dive on Arty towards the end of the video. 

 

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, photon said:

2. Boats .

 It seems like lots of countries are giving Ukraine small boats.

And more on the way. UK has been training UKR Marines in large numbers. 

Perhaps in 24 UKR will attempt to slowly give ground in East, but not break and burning through Russian surge, while creating 2-3 extra bridgeheads across from Kherson (6-10 feels excessive for the scale of this war?) in prep for an early Autumn offensive. 

If you want to cross into Crimea you need to 1)Neutralize the BSF and 2)Shove back the RuAF,  making it extremely expensive to attack the reconquest force. 

Autumn would tie in with f16s being in-country, stabilized shell supply, further destruction of BSF (40%?),  accumulated trained infantry and drone reserves. 

Edited March 3 by Kinophile

[Haiduk]

Bradley's ERA blocks protected vehicle after ATGMs hit (likely non-tandem). One missile hit the edge of turret without detonation, the second hit side block and activated it. Reportedly Bradley still operational, crew is ok.

 

 

Edited March 3 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

M1150 assault breacher lost in Avdiivka area

 

[The_Capt]

12 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

We have no enough manpower in brigades

This part I do not understand.  First off, western militaries have invested a lot of effort into supporting UA force generation efforts.  10's of thousands of Ukrainian per have been put through training.

I understand attrition entirely.  I get that casualties are high.  However, how does a nation of pre-war 42 million people - now down to 36 million with mass exoduses, fail to find enough fighting aged troops to defend itself in what is clearly an existential war?

And then there is this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Ukraine#:~:text=According to the United Nations,as low as 28 million.

Four years ago, it looked like this:

And this:

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ukraine/

Conservatively, Ukraine should be able to muster 1.5-2 million pers in its own defence in a crisis without breaking a sweat...and if this is not a "crisis"...what is?  They have only tapped into less than half that number.

Large numbers appear to have run away and others are resisting mobilization.  If one rolls in women (it is easy to see the UA is largely male dominated) those capacity numbers get even better.  Yet here we are being told formations and units are at 50%...seriously guys...WTF?  Is it the FG pipeline?  Are recruits being turned away?  Why are the numbers on the battlefield so low?  The Ukrainian president has admitted to 31k dead, so lets say 100k wounded to the point of being out of battle or KIA.  That is a lot but Ukraine should be nowhere near the bottom of human capacity in all this.

Is it moral?  Motivation?  Force Generation capability?  I mean we are two years into this thing and the UA is faltering manpower-wise...why?

 

[hcrof]

31 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Does anyone have a source for what current Russian arty usage looks like…as in for the last three months leading up to the last few days? I’m hearing that stockpiles of DPRK and Iranian rounds available to Russia are now depleted and I would like to see some actual evidence of such. If correct, we could be seeing a more general shell famine than public expectations of inevitable Russian offensives expect. 

I heard there have been no further deliveries, but I would be surprised if all those shells are already spent, unless the rumours about ever second shell being a dud are actually true. For now I will not be optimistic on this front for another few months yet, but what do I know...

[The_Capt]

47 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Does anyone have a source for what current Russian arty usage looks like…as in for the last three months leading up to the last few days? I’m hearing that stockpiles of DPRK and Iranian rounds available to Russia are now depleted and I would like to see some actual evidence of such. If correct, we could be seeing a more general shell famine than public expectations of inevitable Russian offensives expect. 

Really hard to find good unbiased stuff.  Forbes is saying they are at around 10k shells per day, which is way down from early war.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/02/15/three-million-shells-thats-how-much-more-artillery-ammo-russia-thinks-it-needs-to-defeat-ukraine/?sh=6a8a2d4e5a5b

And about 2/3rd of what they think they need.

Bigger picture view from RUSI on the materiel war.

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024

[Haiduk]

8 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

fail to find enough fighting aged troops to defend itself in what is clearly an existential war?

Mobilization campaign failed + Russian PsyOps trageted on mobilization is working. Zelenskyi substitued all chiefs of oblast enlistment centers and appointed there mostly wouded officers from frontline. But this was bad decision. Corrupted chiefs didn't forget about opwn pocket, but on other hand mostly performed mobilization plan. They were "bureacrats", which knew all theses 100500 regulation papers. New chiefs not "bereaucrats", they are "warriors". They need a many time to understand all this inner "kitchen" how mobilization process is working. And substitiution didn't change such disgusting happens of abduction of people from the streets by enlistment offices patrols. 

These stories as well as stories from frontline about higher command doesn't carrying on about lives of soldiers, about typical soviet army "dolboyebizm", about enlistment offices, who don't interest that mobilized man would be effective soldier and send for example good specialist in radioelectronic as usual infantryman, protracted war, which contrasted with "stupid Russians" stories on TV, powerful Russian PsyOps cmapaign against government and mobilization - all this gave on fruits. Government really don't know what to do and where to take a people in order to do not cause social explosion. 

Now is upgrading for mobilization law is preparing, but from enough radical and tough project deputies removed many things, which can be dangerous for power stability. 

As a good news and right direction - military units themselves started to attackt motivated people on service via recruiting offers on different work finding boards. Some "new-type" and media-known units already have own recruitment centers ("Azov ", 3rd assault, "Da Vinci Wolves" etc) and wow - people come to them without forcing! And many young people go, which by the law can't be mobilzed (18-26 y.o), except own will. But on other hand we havn't recruitment law. And often enlistment offices and recruitment centers hadn't communication. 

So, now we started a way of enlistment tarnsformation, but now we at the point, when old Soviet type syetem already showed own insolvency in modern conditions, and new system is just appeared and can't maintain 100 % of army need in manpower. 

Other aspect - despite we have 880 000 in Defense Forces (jourmalists "rounded this number to million") - Army, National Guard, Border Guard, Police, SBU, GUR, State Special Transport Service, State Special Communication Service,  many of personnel never have seen frontline. Of corse we don't talk about AD crews or techniclal specialists, or logistic service. But now the audit started in Armed Forces and already spotted 8000 servicemen, which just mobilized "as disposal of General Staff", but in real they don't serve anywhere. And this is only beginning. There are also enough units, which never (!!!) were on frontline or were there for short time and more time sit in the rear or guarding Belarus border, than fighting with Russians in that time when the same 110th brigade spent 1,5 years without rotations in Avdiivka. And this probably was another reason to substitute Zaluzhnyi.   

[kimbosbread]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Logistics is the big one.  One would need numerous logistical nodes on wheels on the home side to push resupply and pull back casualties.

To give some perspective on the supplies needed, lets look at fuel consumption and payload:

• Yamaha Grizzly - 1 pax, 17L fuel tank, 160km range, 2x1.2m footprint
• Yamaha Viking - 2-3pax + flatbed, 37L, 300km range, 3x1.5m footprint

Absolute efficiency isn’t great; we are talking 11L of fuel per 100km, so about double that of a Humvee, but these things are light and small. Even with cutting the range in half due to payload, that’s a lot of range given the terrain in Kherson, and carrying another 10-20L of fuel is no big deal. If two boats successfully landing per week can supply fuel and ammo for your raiders, that’s pretty awesome.

On the other hand, fuel and ammo and food are relatively compact; the stupid vehicles are the bulky things to fit on boats, so you’d need a decent amount of boats if you wanted to load 20 of these things in any one spot. 

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

This may be cynically, but Krynky and recently Antonovskyi bridge bridgeheads are just a bites for attrition of Russian troops on left bank, creating of tense here to prevent Russian troops to be moved as reservers in other place.

Manpower shortages aside, I don’t think it is necessarily cynical, especially if it is wating for a Scipio moment (F16s, more weapons, more trained troops, freeing up troops from borders and pow duty when euros step in etc).

If Russia can be induced into multiple major phyrric victories a year, that is probably the most efficient way to win the war.

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

The Ukrainian president has admitted to 31k dead, so lets say 100k wounded to the point of being out of battle or KIA.

Add here 15000 MIA and about 6000 POWs. Number of wounded from these digits I suppose 4:1, so 200K from which let 20 % were retired from service due to heavy woundings + 40K. Many of wounded soldiers were moved to rear duties. 

Also let take usual mech brigade of pre-war shtat. From 4500 men only about 2000 roughly are "line infantry" (three mech.battalions + one mot.inf battalion), which "sit in the trench". You can't to drive all rear services, artilelrists, drivers etc, to trenches (though in summer 2022 and now we often have this situation and this doesn't add effectiveness to brigades). Also more and more voices that enlisting of 45+ men to infantry and even to air-assault or marines units is fu...g sh...t, because these dads can't be so effective as young people, but on other hand you can see that we have "demograpy pit" among 20-30 y.o. male population, more capable to war. If you now pass a law about mobilization of 21+ you will risk to get real uprising of dissapointed and scared by skilled Russian propaganda population. Also 18-30 years generation is mostly indifferent to policy, patritiotsm, social activity - this is usual generation of consumers, affected by comfort life, globalization and cosmopoltism.

Also we have not so many desparated povetry like in distant Russian regions, where people see in army service and war last opportunity to fix own financial problems even with high risk for own life. Even if Russian die on battlefield he will think "well, my family now can buy new appartment or the car"   

Edited March 3 by Haiduk

[The_Capt]

18 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Mobilization campaign failed + Russian PsyOps trageted on mobilization is working. Zelenskyi substitued all chiefs of oblast enlistment centers and appointed there mostly wouded officers from frontline. But this was bad decision. Corrupted chiefs didn't forget about opwn pocket, but on other hand mostly performed mobilization plan. They were "bureacrats", which knew all theses 100500 regulation papers. New chiefs not "bereaucrats", they are "warriors". They need a many time to understand all this inner "kitchen" how mobilization process is working. And substitiution didn't change such disgusting happens of abduction of people from the streets by enlistment offices patrols. 

These stories as well as stories from frontline about higher command doesn't carrying on about lives of soldiers, about typical soviet army "dolboyebizm", about enlistment offices, who don't interest that mobilized man would be effective soldier and send for example good specialist in radioelectronic as usual infantryman, protracted war, which contrasted with "stupid Russians" stories on TV, powerful Russian PsyOps cmapaign against government and mobilization - all this gave on fruits. Government really don't know what to do and where to take a people in order to do not cause social explosion. 

Now is upgrading for mobilization law is preparing, but from enough radical and tough project deputies removed many things, which can be dangerous for power stability. 

As a good news and right direction - military units themselves started to attackt motivated people on service via recruiting offers on different work finding boards. Some "new-type" and media-known units already have own recruitment centers ("Azov ", 3rd assault, "Da Vinci Wolves" etc) and wow - people come to them without forcing! And many young people go, which by the law can't be mobilzed (18-26 y.o), except own will. But on other hand we havn't recruitment law. And often enlistment offices and recruitment centers hadn't communication. 

So, now we started a way of enlistment tarnsformation, but now we at the point, when old Soviet type syetem already showed own insolvency in modern conditions, and new system is just appeared and can't maintain 100 % of army need in manpower. 

Other aspect - despite we have 880 000 in Defense Forces (jourmalists "rounded this number to million") - Army, National Guard, Border Guard, Police, SBU, GUR, State Special Transport Service, State Special Communication Service,  many of personnel never have seen frontline. Of corse we don't talk about AD crews or techniclal specialists, or logistic service. But now the audit started in Armed Forces and already spotted 8000 servicemen, which just mobilized "as disposal of General Staff", but in real they don't serve anywhere. And this is only beginning. There are also enough units, which never (!!!) were on frontline or were there for short time and more time sit in the rear or guarding Belarus border, than fighting with Russians in that time when the same 110th brigade spent 1,5 years without rotations in Avdiivka. And this probably was another reason to substitute Zaluzhnyi.   

Yeesh.  Well on the bright side, Ukraine is infinitely better than the other major war partners we had over the last 25 years (governments of Iraq and Afghanistan).  But it won't be Western support that kills Ukraine in this war - it can damn well hurt it and create really terrible end-states.  But the mess that is western support at times, pales in comparison to what will happen if Ukrainians lose the will to fight.  As we learned in both Iraq and Afghanistan - we can send people all the money and guns, but if the will to create their own future is not there it will all mean nothing. 

If Ukraine loses the will to fight, we could easily see Kyiv fall.  The West will retreat to Poland and draw some pretty stark lines - because it will have to.  It will create a political "out" for the West, "it wasn't us, it was them...oh well."  Russia will stay boxed up.  Western political parties will frame the outcome as a gross negligent failure for "them" and a resounding endorsement of "us", the blame game will go into overdrive.  And we will deal with the post-war mess.  Meanwhile Ukraine will be in for retributions and dark days out of the middle age as Russia enjoys it new gains and make a show of it...all the while the rot and pressure will build to a breaking point later.

 

[Haiduk]

11 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

But the mess that is western support at times, pales in comparison to what will happen if Ukrainians lose the will to fight.

I doubt we will loose a will to fight, but this also depends from western ammunition supply. Our authority representatives hints directly - if we don't get enough technological weapon, we will be forced to mobilize more people. Taking into account how many "old Soviet school" officers in brigade, corps and OSUV HQs, with their "you have to take this tree-plant and I don't interst how you will do this", this can lead to much more the same known episodes like 7th company of 116th brigade attack near Robotyne, when all this unit remained on battlefield...    

Edited March 3 by Haiduk

[Kraft]

18 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

But it won't be Western support that kills Ukraine in this war - it can damn well hurt it and create really terrible end-states.  But the mess that is western support at times, pales in comparison to what will happen if Ukrainians lose the will to fight.  As we learned in both Iraq and Afghanistan - we can send people all the money and guns, but if the will to create their own future is not there it will all mean nothing. 

Chicken and Egg.

This war would be over had any major western power fully commited on day 1, instead of discussing if sending 3 boots and a bandage more would upset putin.

It will be over if the political games in US and Europe continue on and on, that kill service men and women every day. 

Edited March 3 by Kraft

[ASL Veteran]

13 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

I doubt we will loose a will to fight, but this also depends from western ammunition supply. Our authority representatives hints directly - if we don't get enough technological weapon, we will be forced to mobilize more people. Taking into account how many "old Soviet school" officers in brigade, corps and OSUV HQs, with their "you have to take this tree-plant and I don't interst how you will do this", this can lead to much more the same known episodes like 7th company of 116th brigade attack near Robotyne, when all this unit remained on battlefield...    

I read somewhere that Ukrainian males aged between 18 and 26 can't be mobilized / aren't draftable or something although they can choose to enlist if they want to.  I've also read / heard that the average age of a Ukrainian soldier is something like 44 years old - which is nuts.  You can't even enlist in the US army if you are older than 35.  If true, it sure seems like the individuals that you want most are the ones that can't be had for some unknown reason.  I'm with The Capt though - nobody has more at stake than Ukraine and if Ukraine can't even get enough recruits into the service then that's a big issue.  There are plenty of fingers that are getting pointed at various political parties, countries, and 'issues', but if Ukraine doesn't even have the willpower to get their 18 to 26 year olds into military service then I would think the biggest finger has to be pointed right at Ukraine.  Assuming that information is accurate.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, hcrof said:

I heard there have been no further deliveries, but I would be surprised if all those shells are already spent, unless the rumours about ever second shell being a dud are actually true. For now I will not be optimistic on this front for another few months yet, but what do I know...

It's been my opinion that the deliveries to Russia by its partners would mirror that of Ukraine and its partners... a big bump in supply that is limited and rapidly depleted leading to "shell hunger" again.

Russia's like a typical materialistic, but not all that rich, showoff that splashes money around on fancy cars, watches, expensive dinners, etc.  Eventually he can't keep living the lifestyle he wants, so he starts doing things to keep it going (embezzling is a favorite for such types).  For a while the scheme works and the lavish lifestyle appears to continue on.  At some point it collapses because it wasn't ever sustainable.

What Russia should have done was cut back its artillery usage so that the big boost of artillery rounds would ensure it a steadier supply over a longer period of time.  But that's not the Russian way.  When they got those shells the increased their daily use rates again and that obviously meant burning through their new supply.

Everything Russia does is designed to try and get over the hump and cause Ukraine to surrender.  That translates into maximum EVERYTHING short term with very little eye towards the long term.  That is not a sustainable attitude, but obviously they've not completely run out of capabilities yet.

Steve

[The_Capt]

10 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

To give some perspective on the supplies needed, lets look at fuel consumption and payload:

• Yamaha Grizzly - 1 pax, 17L fuel tank, 160km range, 2x1.2m footprint
• Yamaha Viking - 2-3pax + flatbed, 37L, 300km range, 3x1.5m footprint

Absolute efficiency isn’t great; we are talking 11L of fuel per 100km, so about double that of a Humvee, but these things are light and small. Even with cutting the range in half due to payload, that’s a lot of range given the terrain in Kherson, and carrying another 10-20L of fuel is no big deal. If two boats successfully landing per week can supply fuel and ammo for your raiders, that’s pretty awesome.

On the other hand, fuel and ammo and food are relatively compact; the stupid vehicles are the bulky things to fit on boats, so you’d need a decent amount of boats if you wanted to load 20 of these things in any one spot. 

Manpower shortages aside, I don’t think it is necessarily cynical, especially if it is wating for a Scipio moment (F16s, more weapons, more trained troops, freeing up troops from borders and pow duty when euros step in etc).

If Russia can be induced into multiple major phyrric victories a year, that is probably the most efficient way to win the war.

Taking the Viking as the example, it comes to roughly 1 x assault boat per vehicle (plus driver):

 https://www.utvdriver.com/yamaha/viking/

https://shop.tacticalinnovations.ca/military-series-assault-boat-140/

You would have to adapt the boat but that is not a serious problem.

So 20 boat rides to get 20 of these beasts across.  Say another 20 for ammo, crews and supplies.  A 40 x boat crossing (say 50 - for redundancy and losses).  Now do you do them in a single lift?  Yes, if you can, but that is likely too big and will get picked up.  So this is likely a 2-3 trip operation.  

Given the width of the Dnipro:

Lets call it 1km on average.  Boat with a decent 40 hp motor and that kind of weight, we are looking at decent walking speed - so say, 5 km/hour - taking into account wood and Styrofoam silencers around engine which cuts efficiency.  So 20 min crossing (give or take).  Offload - 10 mins, trip back 20 mins.  If you want to shift sites (say a km or two up or down stream) you will have to relocate, which takes time.  I am thinking 3-4 hours to get 20 of those beasts over the water with crews using 20-30 assault boats.

So operation in phases:

- Combat divers and swimmers go first to link up with LRPs you already have in place.  They clear bank, setup offload points and beach management.  Need at least 3-4 sites.  They then roll into bridgehead force with what they can carry on their backs - so small arms, drones etc.

- Main body bridgehead force goes first.  So, vehicle crews etc, with heavier weapons.

- Then vehicles in waves, likely 2-3.  Offload and clear the beaches/landing sites.  Get em into hides and patrol bases.

Pick your night.  Foggy/rainy is best, stormy second best.  Sound will be a major issue.

Once you get them up and over the follow on support op gets a lot easier.  You can set up rolling far bank DPs and caches.  Troops can source water locally.  Ammo, food, fuel and medical will be the major issues but with this light a force, manageable.  Now you have roughly a light company with wheels who can make trouble up to 20-30 kms deep.

Now do that 3 more times and you have a raiding battalion.  Each of those small teams with FPVs and Javelins (and maybe some mines but they take weight) could make serious trouble in the Russian backfield.  Heavy UAS re-supply and casevec would make a significant difference. 

Russian troop density is in and around 100 troops per km, which is really thin.  Almost zero depth, no real rotations and thin c-moves.  Then you go conditions based on the planning - if the raiding bn is getting serious pushback, let them just make trouble (hit and runs etc).  If they can actually get RA forces to fall back, well you have a bridgehead for something larger, but that is a whole other thing.  

Risky and may not work.  But to my eyes it has a better chance in the risk/opportunity space than trying mechanized breaches over incredibly dense minefields with higher Russian troop densities. 

But...and it is the major one, you have to resource it. 

[kimbosbread]

14 minutes ago, Kraft said:

This war would be over had any major western power fully commited on day 1, instead of discussing if sending 3 boots and a bandage more would upset putin. 

If 80%* of the materiel sent over pre-war hadn’t dissappeared in the morass of corruption, maybe more would have arrived on day 1. The reality is that a lot of things went wrong in the run-up to this mess (including pre-2014), and as much as I’d have liked more support to given faster, Ukraine has had missteps on their side too.

*Secondhand, but trustworthy source who was involved pre-war.

[Battlefront.com]

20 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

I doubt we will loose a will to fight, but this also depends from western ammunition supply. Our authority representatives hints directly - if we don't get enough technological weapon, we will be forced to mobilize more people. Taking into account how many "old Soviet school" officers in brigade, corps and OSUV HQs, with their "you have to take this tree-plant and I don't interst how you will do this", this can lead to much more the same known episodes like 7th company of 116th brigade attack near Robotyne, when all this unit remained on battlefield...    

How much of the problem is that related to the perceived "value" of the parts of the country that Russia controls?  If Russia were driving across the Dnepr towards Lvov, would that be different than driving around in the already ruined Donbas?

Steve

[Kraft]

4 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

If 80%* of the materiel sent over pre-war hadn’t dissappeared in the morass of corruption, maybe more would have arrived on day 1. The reality is that a lot of things went wrong in the run-up to this mess (including pre-2014), and as much as I’d have liked more support to given faster, Ukraine has had missteps on their side too.

*Secondhand, but trustworthy source who was involved pre-war.

How many tanks, planes, cruise missiles were lost prewar? Oh right, there were none.

I specifically mentioned day 1, today would look a lot different had there been the forces that ended up driving into a 40km deep minebelt, which was only possible because of weak and undecisive aid, ready in year 1 when russia was throwing ship crews into trenches.

Edited March 3 by Kraft

[ASL Veteran]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

It's been my opinion that the deliveries to Russia by its partners would mirror that of Ukraine and its partners... a big bump in supply that is limited and rapidly depleted leading to "shell hunger" again.

Russia's like a typical materialistic, but not all that rich, showoff that splashes money around on fancy cars, watches, expensive dinners, etc.  Eventually he can't keep living the lifestyle he wants, so he starts doing things to keep it going (embezzling is a favorite for such types).  For a while the scheme works and the lavish lifestyle appears to continue on.  At some point it collapses because it wasn't ever sustainable.

What Russia should have done was cut back its artillery usage so that the big boost of artillery rounds would ensure it a steadier supply over a longer period of time.  But that's not the Russian way.  When they got those shells the increased their daily use rates again and that obviously meant burning through their new supply.

Everything Russia does is designed to try and get over the hump and cause Ukraine to surrender.  That translates into maximum EVERYTHING short term with very little eye towards the long term.  That is not a sustainable attitude, but obviously they've not completely run out of capabilities yet.

Steve

Shell hunger is nothing new.  Some may recall reading about 'We Shall Shell' pamphlets circulated during WW1 while attempts were made to ramp up production.  The other half of the equation is barrel wear.  I'm pretty confident that these barrels are being pushed to their limits and accuracy must suffer.  Also much of Ukraine's artillery is 122, 152, and 130 so when the EU puts the stipulation that whatever they will supply will be domestically produced - well that's mostly going to be NATO standard 155.  However, even with every NATO member nation basically producing the same thing they could still only deliver half of what was promised. 

[Haiduk]

This comrade of Igor Girkin makes public an open letter of mothers and wives of servicemen of 1015th Territorial troops motor-rifle regiment from Kursk. He says secvicemen were assured they will serve only in Kursk oblast, but on peak of Avdiivka battle, regiment was divided on parts and moved to Ukraine. Servicemen were distributed to "Storm" assault units in differnet brigades and regiments, their military scecialities in documents were changed. Became knowingly from 2300 men of regiment only 30 remained intact, all other - killed, wounded or missed. 

This repeats other known story of 1487th territorial troops MRR of St.Peterburg, about which wrote Murz and some other milbloggers - this regiment also lost almost all personnel, so in last assaults were sent HQ and staff units. 

 

Edited March 3 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

If 80%* of the materiel sent over pre-war hadn’t dissappeared in the morass of corruption, maybe more would have arrived on day 1. The reality is that a lot of things went wrong in the run-up to this mess (including pre-2014), and as much as I’d have liked more support to given faster, Ukraine has had missteps on their side too.

*Secondhand, but trustworthy source who was involved pre-war.

80%?  Oh, I very much doubt that.  Flip that around and 20% is a number I can believe.

What I've read is that the pre-war problems weren't so much that stuff disappeared, more like it just went into a warehouse and didn't move from there.  Poor logistics and corruption of a different sort ("I get paid either way, so I choose to do the least amount of work for my paycheck").

Steve