How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

And you are basing this on...?

The RUS situation at Kherson was having mech forces on the wrong side of a river with a single LOC, that got blown up.  Now, I think it is possible but will take a lot of force generation and support to do it.  And some of what we are talking about has never been tried before.  But at this point it may be time to try something new because simply sitting back and letting Russia slowly grind away does not seem like the better option.

Frankly, I assess that Ukraine has a lower bar to go over for this sort of sustained light effort at Kherson than to try to do heavy-mech breaches further up the line.  

I suspect Ukraine will not regain the initiative if it fights like Russia needs it to.

If ZSU can be truly imaginative and break the offensive formatting, like @The_Capt is suggesting, then the RUS will not be able to adapt fast enough or at scale to counter it.

IF they redo the same types of heavy metal assaults then they will be fighting like Russia and Russia will inevitably, through sheer numbers, beat off the attacks.

But an assault formatted differently, that has a deep flexible, mobile FLOC and heavy back-up as needed, could work.

Edited February 27 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

This was the primary thought I had about the possibilities for the bridgehead.  Modest territorial ambitions = modest men, material, logistics, and time.  And once more ground is taken, it is the sort of ground that will be very hard for Russia to regain because to do that will take more than a modest effort.

I'm very sure something will happen with Krynky in 2024.  Maybe Ukraine will wait until Russia launches some sort of general offensive this summer.  Waiting until your enemy has committed is a time honored tradition because, if done right, can pay off handsomely.  Kharkiv was certainly made a lot easier by waiting for Russia to commit more forces to Kherson.

Steve

An offensive south out Krnky could also be a lure for the BSF. If Ukraine starts doing coastal ops to support/link up then the BSF might come out and play.

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3832273-no-russian-missile-carriers-in-black-and-azov-seas.html

Edited February 27 by Kinophile

[Vet 0369]

3 hours ago, JonS said:

Well, yes. Is there somewhere else you think it should rest?

Here in the U.S., it rests with the Legislative Branch (Congress), not the Executive Branch (President). That is how it is specified in our Constitution. Only Congress can declare war! Of course, the Executive Branch has found ways to get around that little speed bump and Congress has lost the guts to stop the President from doing it, but I don’t think even the Cowardly U.S. Politicians in Congress can claim it is not a war if NATO declares an Article 5.

[Kinophile]

Danger close... 

[Kinophile]

Seriously, 10 in 10?

 

 

[dan/california]

57 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Danger close... 

These guys are doing their job as well as iit can be done. But the thing that always blows my mind is the fact that everyone of those bullets is going to land somewhere. That the risk associated with that are acceptable is just the clearest possible indication of the difference between a real war and anything else.

Edit: The fact these guys were almost directly under the drones path indicates how good the Ukrainian system for tracking drones and employing their AD assets is. That wasn't blind luck.

Edited February 27 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

42 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Seriously, 10 in 10?

 

 

Me thinks Ukraine has changed something, and it isn't their pithy sense of humor!

Seriously, this is a huge and unsustainable loss rate.  Russia might still have a few hundred fighters at its disposal, but losing even 10 a month means their airforce will be at 50% strength in a year.  And of that 50% much of it will not be available for Ukraine because Russia must maintain some presence elsewhere AND there's always some % of aircraft that aren't operational at any given time.

Ukraine was already shooting down planes faster than Russia can build them.  So there's no catching up from these losses.

It is also nice to see it's Russia's newer plans that are falling to the ground.  Remember what we've learned... all new production is supposed to be replacing the older SU types, not replacing losses of the newer types.  Which means every SU-34 or SU-35 that Ukraine drops out of the sky, that's 1 more aging SU-24 or SU-27 that gets another year beyond its expected service life.

Steve

Steve

[Harmon Rabb]

Quote

Israel’s ambassador to the UN, Gilad Erdan, delivered a speech in which he totally torched Russia. He not only announced that Israel is going to provide an early warning systems against missiles for Ukraine but also called Ukraine an “ally”. He also equates Russia with Hamas and attacks Russia for hosting another visit of Hamas in Moscow.

You can be sure that this speech comes in coordination with the Israeli Prime Minister. It clearly marks the end of the relationship between Putin and Netanyahu. This whole instance reminds  when Amir Weitmann delivered his viral statement in RussiaToday where he announced that “Russia is going to pay the price” (check out the repost). I think we are witnessing what this means.

 

Israel’s pro-Ukraine position will also have ramifications in the US and the ongoing discussion for military aid.

Some of the strongest language I have heard from Israel directed at Russia so far.

 

[TheVulture]

Ukraine seem to be getting very good at this "asymmetrical conventional war" approach.

The Black Sea Fleet, which vastly overmatched the Ukrainian navy, has been pretty much neutralised. In the early says they were launching cruise missile strikes from near Odessa. Now they won't even go as far as Sevastopol, and operationally seem to be limited to ferrying supplies with their decreasing supply of landing ships.

The Russian air force also has massive superiority in numbers and modern equipment, and yet are losing aircraft at an impressive rate and have lost two of their A-50 planes (and no-one seems to know really how many airworthy ones they actually have now). Of course the air force is still a problem and not neutralised (hello, glide bombs and cruise missile salvos), but it's obvious that Ukraine are forcing the Russians to be more cautious and conservative with their air power than they'd ideally like.

[Kinophile]

49 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Me thinks Ukraine has changed something, and it isn't their pithy sense of humor!

Seriously, this is a huge and unsustainable loss rate.  Russia might still have a few hundred fighters at its disposal, but losing even 10 a month means their airforce will be at 50% strength in a year.  And of that 50% much of it will not be available for Ukraine because Russia must maintain some presence elsewhere AND there's always some % of aircraft that aren't operational at any given time.

Ukraine was already shooting down planes faster than Russia can build them.  So there's no catching up from these losses.

It is also nice to see it's Russia's newer plans that are falling to the ground.  Remember what we've learned... all new production is supposed to be replacing the older SU types, not replacing losses of the newer types.  Which means every SU-34 or SU-35 that Ukraine drops out of the sky, that's 1 more aging SU-24 or SU-27 that gets another year beyond its expected service life.

Steve

Steve

Very salient last point, for sure. Also, the no A50s have flown since the 2nd downing. 

[Kinophile]

 

Macron for the rhetorical win. I had regained some hope in Scholz, but man, fool me once... 

[JonS]

2 hours ago, Vet 0369 said:

Here in the U.S., it rests with the Legislative Branch (Congress), not the Executive Branch (President). That is how it is specified in our Constitution. Only Congress can declare war! Of course, the Executive Branch has found ways to get around that little speed bump and Congress has lost the guts to stop the President from doing it, but I don’t think even the Cowardly U.S. Politicians in Congress can claim it is not a war if NATO declares an Article 5.

That would be compelling, if only the last formal DOW were not over 80 years and many many conflicts - including the only one to rely on Article 5 - ago

[Kinophile]

Hmmm

 

[omae2]

1 hour ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Some of the strongest language I have heard from Israel directed at Russia so far.

 

The amir weitmann video is not form today its from October or November. Just saying.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Me thinks Ukraine has changed something, and it isn't their pithy sense of humor!

Seriously, this is a huge and unsustainable loss rate.  Russia might still have a few hundred fighters at its disposal, but losing even 10 a month means their airforce will be at 50% strength in a year.  And of that 50% much of it will not be available for Ukraine because Russia must maintain some presence elsewhere AND there's always some % of aircraft that aren't operational at any given time.

Ukraine was already shooting down planes faster than Russia can build them.  So there's no catching up from these losses.

It is also nice to see it's Russia's newer plans that are falling to the ground.  Remember what we've learned... all new production is supposed to be replacing the older SU types, not replacing losses of the newer types.  Which means every SU-34 or SU-35 that Ukraine drops out of the sky, that's 1 more aging SU-24 or SU-27 that gets another year beyond its expected service life.

Steve

Steve

When it comes to AirPower, Russia is even in deeper trouble.  The RUAF has to be ready to control and defend all Russian airspace and still project threats…at the same time.  As they have become more jerkish in Ukraine, they have be worried about escalation but that means they need an airforce to do something about it.  For example say - as some have been going on about - Russia does decide to invade Poland.  And as we all know the weak kneed and pitiful West will simply let that happen (“NATO means nothing…blah, blah”).  Well the problem will be that Russia won’t have enough air power to actually create air superiority in that war either.  In fact after all these losses they will be in a worse position for a follow on war than they were in Ukraine.  As you note modern airplanes take a long time and a lot of resources to build so that pushes the horizon of any flexing out even further.

Frankly we would be nuts not to get behind whatever this is turning into.  AirPower and Seapower are all viable strategic targets in this war and Ukraine has demonstrated acumen at these targets.  The repercussions of these actions transcend this war and impact Russian ability to wage the next one. 

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, TheVulture said:

Ukraine seem to be getting very good at this "asymmetrical conventional war" approach.

The Black Sea Fleet, which vastly overmatched the Ukrainian navy, has been pretty much neutralised. In the early says they were launching cruise missile strikes from near Odessa. Now they won't even go as far as Sevastopol, and operationally seem to be limited to ferrying supplies with their decreasing supply of landing ships.

The Russian air force also has massive superiority in numbers and modern equipment, and yet are losing aircraft at an impressive rate and have lost two of their A-50 planes (and no-one seems to know really how many airworthy ones they actually have now). Of course the air force is still a problem and not neutralised (hello, glide bombs and cruise missile salvos), but it's obvious that Ukraine are forcing the Russians to be more cautious and conservative with their air power than they'd ideally like.

Considering many Ukrainians speak Russian and understand the culture that makes it a subversive and asymmetric warfare nightmare for Russia.  I am betting Ukrainian SOF teams are operating deeply in Russia.  Now, have they linked up or supported the creation of organized resistance at scale?  That would be the next step.

[Sojourner]

39 minutes ago, omae2 said:

The amir weitmann video is not form today its from October or November. Just saying.

He cites the Hamas attack on Israel as "143 days ago", that would make it today, just saying

 

ETA: Or did you mean the 2nd video?

Edited February 27 by Sojourner

[Sojourner]

22 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The RUAF has to be ready to control and defend all Russian airspace and still project threats…at the same time.

Might this be a good time for US, and maybe Finland, to step up air patrols on the edge of Russian airspace, or would that be too provocative? It might encourage Russia to divert some resources away from Ukraine.

[Lethaface]

13 hours ago, Rokko said:

I think we are not talking about invoking Article 5 over some RAF specialists getting targeted in Western Ukraine in a missile strike but rather about Russia launching Kalibrs at London "decision making centers" in retaliation for UK involvement in providing target data for Storm Shadows. I don't know what people like Scholz would otherwise mean (and be fearful of) by "direct involvement" in the war.

Lol why is Germany always such a strange topic on here. Scholz says that Germany doesn't want to get directly involved in the war, he didn't say that he fears direct retaliation by Russia as a reason for not getting directly involved. He just said that they don't want to get directly involved as a policy. Now whether one agrees with the policy, or whether one does agree assisting Ukrainians with Taurus is actually being directly involved in the war isn't a relevant subject for speculation about Germanies involvement in article 5. Article 5 is in a whole other ballpark universe.

Now one can also speculate about article 5, but going there based of the supposed background reason for a policy not wanting to get directly involved in the war (given that one believes sending Tauris would be doing so), is rather farfetched to say it diplomatically. It is an attribution error based of speculative judgments, about what the reason might be for a certain policy and whether that policy might come from a tendency inside Germany to not uphold to their treaties. They certainly DON'T have treaty which obliges them to send cruise missiles to Ukraine and assist Ukraine with firing them,  neither does UK and FRA seeming to do so has any relevancy to Germanies interpretation of stuff and their sovereignty position (also neglecting any potential technical differences between Taurus / Stormshadow which might have impact; do I think that is the case? no but I don't have information to confirm/deny that premise).

Now to keep things much more simple, which I prefer and usually is good practice: it could just be that Germany / Scholz is less 'flexible' when it comes to interpreting whether assisting Ukraine firing Taurus is being 'directly involved in the war'.
UK and France might just 'bend the rules' in their mind and establish the position they are 'not' directly involved in the war even if they assist Ukraine firing their missiles, while Germany might feel it is if doing the same thing.
UK/Fra might reason that there is little difference between supporting Ukraine to use weapon system A or B, while Germany might reason there is a big difference.

In fact such differences are not surprising at all, if one has some experience within EU/countries in question. 

[Harmon Rabb]

2 hours ago, omae2 said:

The amir weitmann video is not form today its from October or November. Just saying.

Correct, I remember when that older video from a Russia Today broadcast was first posted here last October.

But Tendar was clearly writing about the new video in today's Tweet, as per the long quote I posted.

I do find the response in the new video more interesting. Because it is coming from an Israeli representative at the UN, which makes this statement more official.

 

While I am here, here is another video of a RU tank being demilitarized. We can never get enough of those here.

And some Wagner dirtbag was reportedly eliminated in Russia.

 

Edited February 28 by Harmon Rabb

[Lethaface]

11 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The next question is “can they do it, light?”  Can they upscale Krynki but not run afoul of the dangers of mass in this war?  This we do not know.  Light has done some pretty amazing stuff in this war, but mostly on the defence.  We saw hints at Kharkiv as Light forces broke out, not heavy.  But I am still not sure if light infantry, precision fires and unmanned can actually pull off a series of sustained raids that create (as opposed to enable) operational effects leading to decisions.  All I can say is that if I wanted to try out that theory, I would pick the Kherson sector.

My three points are 1) the value of the terrain is that it would put operational (and possibly) strategic pressure on Russia in an area of vulnerability. 2) The terrain favours a light force approach due to logistical and ISR realities, and 3) It expands Ukrainian strategic options, as opposed to locking them into a grinding war of attrition.

But as you say, we will have to wait and see.

Didn't they already do it, light? Kherson already has operational implications, as glide bombs and forces (etc) Russia deploys to that area can't be deployed somewhere else. 

Imo it's already a good opportunity for attriting Russia's capabilities in a favorable way. Sure the scale might not be same as other fronts, but every little bit helps. The risks are also not that high for Ukraine, sometimes one has to make a play with pawns / some pieces in one place, in order to force the opponent to react to it and enable other pieces/operations to come into play.
And indeed who knows what kind of options might come forth from it, surely Russia can't neglect it unless they want to test whether unopposed light might create an instance of deep infiltration and exploitation in the rear; this time without the traditional heavy mass breakthrough preceding it.

Not putting pressure on Kherson front would certainly be favorable for Russia, imo.

[sross112]

1 hour ago, Sojourner said:

Might this be a good time for US, and maybe Finland, to step up air patrols on the edge of Russian airspace, or would that be too provocative? It might encourage Russia to divert some resources away from Ukraine.

I honestly don't think Russia would respond with anything more than rhetoric. They've pulled key assets from the Finnish border and even key air defense assets from Kaliningrad to replace losses in Ukraine already. The leadership knows deep down that NATO is not an offensive alliance and they have no worries about being attacked by them without a provocation that couldn't possibly be ignored.  If they didn't truly believe that, they wouldn't still be in this war fighting a "second rate" power and wasting all their hard to replace assets that would be critical to the defense of their homeland in the event of a NATO attack. 

[Lethaface]

3 hours ago, TheVulture said:

Ukraine seem to be getting very good at this "asymmetrical conventional war" approach.

The Black Sea Fleet, which vastly overmatched the Ukrainian navy, has been pretty much neutralised. In the early says they were launching cruise missile strikes from near Odessa. Now they won't even go as far as Sevastopol, and operationally seem to be limited to ferrying supplies with their decreasing supply of landing ships.

The Russian air force also has massive superiority in numbers and modern equipment, and yet are losing aircraft at an impressive rate and have lost two of their A-50 planes (and no-one seems to know really how many airworthy ones they actually have now). Of course the air force is still a problem and not neutralised (hello, glide bombs and cruise missile salvos), but it's obvious that Ukraine are forcing the Russians to be more cautious and conservative with their air power than they'd ideally like.

While the naval successes where/are impressive and had tangible strategic affects (grain corridor for one), those were imo not directly influencing the military operational reality. For that Ukraine would have to sink at least as much ships as they have done until now. Russia can (afaik) still launch cruise missiles and ferry supplies, just less then before.

The recent successes against the RU Air force are, however, going to have direct impact on the operational reality / military equilibrium if Ukraine can sustain these numbers. Because Russia, like others said, can't sustain these losses. 
And to my eyes at least it looks like these are not incidents anymore. Russia can't lose another couple of A-50s in a couple of weeks. 

Also, seriously degrading Russia's airborne early warning capability over Ukraine could have many implications, making life for Russian planes even harder then it already is. One can imagine planes dropping glidebombs getting ambushed by Ukr fighters, etc.
So, strategically the recent 'air show' is imo the most promising development with potential large strategic implications we have seen since, quite a while? 

Now add a few dozen f-16s in the mix and things might get even more interesting. Bye glidebombs, hi JDAMs. What might Ukraine be able to enable using those? I expect/guess/hope more then Ru can do with meat attacks supported by glidebomb artillery.

Anyway it's a bit too early to start a chant yet, but it's sure is looking promising imo!

Edited February 28 by Lethaface

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Lethaface said:

Didn't they already do it, light? Kherson already has operational implications, as glide bombs and forces (etc) Russia deploys to that area can't be deployed somewhere else. 

Imo it's already a good opportunity for attriting Russia's capabilities in a favorable way. Sure the scale might not be same as other fronts, but every little bit helps. The risks are also not that high for Ukraine, sometimes one has to make a play with pawns / some pieces in one place, in order to force the opponent to react to it and enable other pieces/operations to come into play.
And indeed who knows what kind of options might come forth from it, surely Russia can't neglect it unless they want to test whether unopposed light might create an instance of deep infiltration and exploitation in the rear; this time without the traditional heavy mass breakthrough preceding it.

Not putting pressure on Kherson front would certainly be favorable for Russia, imo.

They can do light…but can they upscale and pose an operational threat?  I think they can but there are some aspect that have never been tried before on offensives.  How far can light infantry, unmanned and fires go?  Of course they need ammunition for those fires.  I totally agree this is a good option.  A difficult one but probably the best of what is left on the table.

[sburke]

Putin bans petrol exports as Russia runs on fumes (yahoo.com)

 

The Kremlin has announced a six-month ban on petrol exports after Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries left Vladimir Putin’s regime scrambling to meet domestic demand.

The ban, which comes into force on March 1, was confirmed by a spokesman for deputy prime minister Alexander Novak who said it would allow for “planned maintenance” of refineries.

It follows attacks on Russian facilities by Ukrainian drones in recent months, which have harmed the country’s ability to refine crude oil into usable products such as petrol and diesel.

Russia previously imposed a similar ban between September and November last year in order to tackle high domestic prices and shortages.

Then, only four ex-Soviet states – Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan – were exempt. This time, more Russian neighbours will be exempt, including Mongolia, Uzbekistan and two Russian-backed breakaway regions of Georgia: South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Oil, oil products and gas are by far Russia’s biggest export and provide a major source of income for the Kremlin’s war economy.

Putin has been working with Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest oil exporter, to keep prices high as part of the broader Opec+ group, which includes the Opec cartel of oil producing nations and its key allies.