Grigb Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 2 minutes ago, Kraft said: I dont understand what you mean. Data is jan23->jan24, so ~3 months of heavy city fighting would be included. This was done by convicts and the dats shows the lowest desert numbers at that time, with which the '10' fold had been calculated. Also we are talking about a number that at its monthly highest, is a quarter of the daily killed and maimed, if taking the official estimates. We are talking about army corps at most, and it might have an impact for a few months at most. There is also the issue of latency. It is tough to desert from the front line. It is considerably easier to desert from the rear. Most Wagnerite deserters would flee once Bakhmut's attack ended, and they were settled in rear areas (end of summer). But by that time, it was a shattered army corp. The impact cannot be that significant. Whether we consider Wagnerites or not, the trend of large increases in desertion during the last year is significant (if we use the limited data from the project). 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Grigb Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 BTW we forgot about this boi @The_Capt 3 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Grigb Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 (edited) I'm looking at RU MOD directives on how to defend vehicles from FPV. Interesting bit: FPV-suicide drones «Hawk» airplane type - max speed 120 kmh «Kross» quadcopter type - max speed 60 kmh [Insane speed] Warheads PG-7L PG-7M PG-9C PG-18 [Bar armor and spall liners are still effective. RU vehicles do not have either that or ERA] P.S. I checked it. Well, the directives are not really interesting to us. They describe how to build cope cages and install RU crappy EW devices on various RU vehicles. The diagrams of Cope Cage installation would be interesting if the RU intelligence officers understood how the FVP attacks in practice. But they don't. So, the diagrams have glaring mistakes and are mostly useless. Edited February 26 by Grigb 3 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
zinz Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 https://kyivindependent.com/der-spiegel-germany-india-ammunition/ Well looks like proper sourcing of all world wide ammunitions is actually happening 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Carolus Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 There is an online rumor that Igor "Strelkov" Girkin was found dead in his cell. Hanged. 3 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Beleg85 Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 Probably NASAMS launcher hit by Russian fire. Explosions after strike point it to be real this time. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Grigb Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 27 minutes ago, Carolus said: There is an online rumor that Igor "Strelkov" Girkin was found dead in his cell. Hanged. RU Nats close to Girkin (including his wife) say it is not true. Lets wait. 3 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Grigb Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 RU Nats video about effectiveness of fish nets. Quote ...anti-drone nets are working. They are all full of holes [caused by drones]. Angry neighbors [drones] frequently get into them. I wanted to share this news with all of our friends. Your efforts are not in vain; they literally save the lives of our youngsters on the front lines. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
The_Capt Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 3 hours ago, Grigb said: BTW we forgot about this boi @The_Capt Daaaammnn. So that extends the range of the String Ray from 8-11 kms by another 80kms if the tech specs hold up. If you mount this system on a small boat (which could also be unmanned) we are talking over the horizon strike capability. 2 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 (edited) 48 minutes ago, The_Capt said: Daaaammnn. So that extends the range of the String Ray from 8-11 kms by another 80kms if the tech specs hold up. If you mount this system on a small boat (which could also be unmanned) we are talking over the horizon strike capability. Suicide boats with drone-delivered Torpedoes, plus some boats with FPV drones with EFP, and plus suicide UUS are coming, for sure . The BSF is very unprepared for this kind of multi-axis multi-domain attack. Even USN, RN will have issues, but I assume their stronger sensors and networking effects will help their defence. The only thing lacking for the UKR Navy is quantity, and even that is soon going to fade back. Edited February 26 by Kinophile 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 4 hours ago, Grigb said: We are talking about army corps at most, and it might have an impact for a few months at most. There is also the issue of latency. It is tough to desert from the front line. It is considerably easier to desert from the rear. Most Wagnerite deserters would flee once Bakhmut's attack ended, and they were settled in rear areas (end of summer). But by that time, it was a shattered army corp. The impact cannot be that significant. Whether we consider Wagnerites or not, the trend of large increases in desertion during the last year is significant (if we use the limited data from the project). Is any data on the ranking breakdowns of desertions? 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Hapless Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 I'm surprised no-one's tried fitting an ASROC to a maritime drone yet. Nothing like extending the range of a torpedo another 20km by jamming a rocket up it's arse and firing it into the air. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
cesmonkey Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Grigb Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 2 minutes ago, Kinophile said: Is any data on the ranking breakdowns of desertions? No. but we have: 40% mobiks 50% contract soldiers who signed contract after start of the war 10% contract soldiers who signed contract before start of the war 10% others Mobiks and contract soldiers can be privates or low-ranking non-commissioned officers only. As a result, officers could only make up 10% of the total. 2 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 Trent really should have his account taken away. The boy is a fool. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 7 minutes ago, Grigb said: No. but we have: 40% mobiks 50% contract soldiers who signed contract after start of the war 10% contract soldiers who signed contract before start of the war 10% others Mobiks and contract soldiers can be privates or low-ranking non-commissioned officers only. As a result, officers could only make up 10% of the total. Thank you. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 https://mil.in.ua/en/news/eu-to-transfer-nearly-170-thousand-shells-to-ukraine-by-the-end-of-march/ https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/02/25/7443602/ More indicators that the shell hunger will end/reduce in a month or two. Cold comfort but still... 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 (edited) Hope the crew got out. Edited February 26 by Kinophile 3 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
LongLeftFlank Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 This may have been posted before but a thread search didn't find it. Important points here though by Watling. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024 The Russian military began 2023 with a highly disorganised force in Ukraine comprising approximately 360,000 troops.... By the beginning of 2024, the Russian Operational Group of Forces in the occupied territories comprised 470,000 troops.... Russian forces have reverted above battalion level to the traditional Soviet order of battle of regiments, divisions and combined arms armies, but have been significantly altered below the level of the regiment. Battalions are organised as line and storm battalions, and tend to operate in company groups which fight in small, dispersed detachments [due to a] shortage of trained officers able to coordinate larger formations, with a significant proportion of Russian junior officers currently being promoted from the ranks.... Units can generally be rotated out of the line once they have taken up to 30% casualties – the point at which they are judged to be ineffective – and are then regenerated.... In this way, the Russians are maintaining a consistent pressure on a number of points.... If Ukraine's partners continue to provide sufficient ammunition and training support to the AFU to enable the blunting of Russian attacks in 2024, then Russia is unlikely to achieve significant gains in 2025. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
squatter Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 23 hours ago, Battlefront.com said: The most likely place for Ukraine to do something significant this year is in Kherson. Not only has Russia repeatedly failed to eliminate a fairly small bridgehead, they have repeatedly lost ground (even if very small amounts) over the many months of struggle there. Russian forces committed to this area haven't been their better units (I use that term very relatively!), but that doesn't fully explain their weakness. In any case, the units there now remain in poor condition. I can easily picture an operation where Ukraine engages in a "shock and awe" operation where artillery, drones, and airstrikes smash Russian frontline and real logistics in the immediate area, land a fairly modest amount of fresh forces (1-2 battalions), then push to expand away from the river (primary) as well as expanding their hold of the left bank (secondary). As this happens more forces are brought over, including heavier stuff, in order to keep up the momentum. A couple more battalions would make a big impact. I feel like the idea of a major UKR operation across the Dniepr river that yourself / the Captain and others are imagining is just fantasy land I'm afraid. Sending anything sizeable across is just going to be creating a huge vulnerability for the Ukrainians, and a great opportunity for the Russians. You're going to be sending forces into relatively confined bridgeheads of unfortified territory where they will be battered by glide bombs and artillery. The unfortified aspect is particularly important, as we've seen in this war. Losses in the bridgeheads and crossings would be immense. They'll have to be supplied by boats and pontoons (all of which will be constantly attacked) and after a few firefights local fuel and ammo will be constrained. You guys are arguing that UKR should deliberately put itself into the situation from which RUS forces were forced to withdraw from under duress when they were the other side of the river. I think the RUS would lick their lips at this. Wouldn't be surprised this explains why RUS has allowed a small bridgehead to develop already. Even if there was some kind of breakout, the bigger the breakout, the bigger the strain put on cross-river logistics, the bigger the opportunity for RUS forces to crush/pocket UKR forces. You're imagining UKR amour pontooning across the river, driving 10s of kms into zones of exploitation - they would be absolutely smashed by drones/ATGM/helicopter aviation. Getting supplies up to the front would be a nightmare. A sizeable operation across the Dniepr under current conditions is surely a complete fantasy? A catastrophe in the waiting. Neither side is going to be able make any further sizeable breakthroughs/maneuvers in the south of Ukraine, unless massive attrition/collapse in the other's ability to field drones/artillery has already occurred. Which isn't looking likely any time soon. The only way to end this war is continuing and horrendous grinding attrition to the point one side can no longer continue, or negotiation. 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Grigb Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 Alexe Kopytko, collegue of UKR Mashovets wrote several posts about losses. I am not going to translate them as they are aimed at the general public. However, I am going to translate relevant information. UKR is a significantly more open society and country. So, it is much easier to find and count deaths using open sources. The oldest community in Ukraine that monitors War deaths is "The Book of Memory of those who fell for Ukraine". Quote from the UKR news article [I recommend but I am not going to translate for now due to lack of time] about UKR losses up to November 2023 Quote Summing together all of the data on the Defense Forces' combat and non-combat casualties, we can claim that on the day of publishing [23 November 23], there were 24,500 verified dead (deceased), whose identities are known, 15,000 missing, and 3,400 POW. Second article [for the same period] Quote As you can see, the majority of those who died were between the ages of 26 and 45. And there aren't many persons above the age of 56 or under the age of 21... The Book of Memory of Those Who Fell for Ukraine includes 146 women in its list of the deceased... Thus, according to data publicly disclosed by one of the defense department's heads, the Armed Forces have more than 820,000 military troops by October 2023. There are 117,000 officers, 178,000 sergeants, 516,000 troops, and the remainder are cadets... That is, we today [23 Nov 23] have 820,000 military men, excluding the National Guard of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service, combat units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SBU, and so on. It is apparent that the overall number of Defense Force fighters exceeds one million... How unrecoverable losses of 50 or perhaps 70-80 thousand relate to a million troops, taking into consideration health commissions working for almost two years? If we merely talk about dry facts and military statistics, we get a good result. One may say that the Ukrainian army' "living force" is essentially intact... The "Book of Memory of Those Who Fell for Ukraine" database includes information on 2,266 fallen officers from Ukraine's Armed Forces, Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Guard, State Border Guard Service, and other military levels. Approximately 100 additional dead officers have yet to establish their military ranks, hence they are not included in these numbers... There are many junior officers among the deceased, particularly lieutenants, senior lieutenants, and captains. Despite the emotional impact of young people's deaths, the losses of junior officers are not critical for Ukraine's Armed Forces. First and foremost, because of the vast number of conscripted second lieutenants (graduates of military departments), sergeants, and higher-ranking officers who are assigned to junior jobs. Another interesting fact: from 2014 to 2021, the proportion of officers who died was 13.7%. Today, it is 9.6%... The following conclusion should be derived from the information gathered by the community "Book of Memory of Those Who Died for Ukraine" and from information stated by representatives of the state authority...The amount of combat and non-combat losses experienced by Ukraine throughout the 21-month conflict had no significant impact on the country's defensive capacity. From Kopytko posts Quote I am not sure what category is included the number - 31 thousand deceased [Zelensky number]. [Those who died] Only during battle? All who died? I could guess, but I don't see the point. However, I know that the figures tossed in [by RU propagandists] in the summer [2023], "70 thousand killed, 120 thousand wounded," which are being used as a comparison, are rubbish... So, we have 50-55 thousand [losses] as the most, whereas they have 45 thousand as the lowest. Russia conceals the casualties; the true number of dead/killed, according to indirect signs, might be four times more than officially reported... The President cited a total of 180 thousand killed Russian servicemen. According to our own methodology, there is a comparable number of people killed. The order of the numbers is same, however there may be accounting peculiarities. For example, those L-DPR citizens who have previously formally served in the Russian army or who have died [for all causes], as well as those who died in the army for different reasons, all might be or might not be included. Total unreturnable losses might be significantly bigger (particularly discharged owing to serious wounds) [comparing to both numbers - from Zelensky or from Kopytko]. Military experts believe that Russia will lose the war if the loss ratio is one to five. We may make an informed judgment that the current unreturnable loss ratio is between 1 and 3.5/4. Although the Russians have more of our POWs, they also have a disproportionate number of missing people. That is, our condition is difficult, but the enemy's situation is tense. The numbers debunk the idea that defeating Russia is impossible. We are very near to the edge. That is why I repeat: unity and concentration of all forces are required; there is no hopelessness. And [we need] weapons. I am confident that the major partners' analysts understand all of these calculations and report them to their superiors. As a result, postponing political choices appears even more disgusting and counterproductive.… The President stated that it will be extremely difficult in March and April. I've already mentioned that there are direct parallels with the spring of 2022. The most dreaded month was May, when armament decisions had already been made yet everything was almost expended on the front lines. To help and not make things difficult [for us], these should be the fundamental values for the foreseeable future. Zelensky numbers are close to actual numbers. UKR is nowhere near the defeat. 8 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kinophile Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
LongLeftFlank Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 (edited) 1 hour ago, squatter said: I feel like the idea of a major UKR operation across the Dniepr river that yourself / the Captain and others are imagining is just fantasy land I'm afraid. Sending anything sizeable across is just going to be creating a huge vulnerability for the Ukrainians, and a great opportunity for the Russians. You're going to be sending forces into relatively confined bridgeheads of unfortified territory where they will be battered by glide bombs and artillery. The unfortified aspect is particularly important, as we've seen in this war. Losses in the bridgeheads and crossings would be immense. They'll have to be supplied by boats and pontoons (all of which will be constantly attacked) and after a few firefights local fuel and ammo will be constrained. You guys are arguing that UKR should deliberately put itself into the situation from which RUS forces were forced to withdraw from under duress when they were the other side of the river. I think the RUS would lick their lips at this. Wouldn't be surprised this explains why RUS has allowed a small bridgehead to develop already. Even if there was some kind of breakout, the bigger the breakout, the bigger the strain put on cross-river logistics, the bigger the opportunity for RUS forces to crush/pocket UKR forces. You're imagining UKR amour pontooning across the river, driving 10s of kms into zones of exploitation - they would be absolutely smashed by drones/ATGM/helicopter aviation. Getting supplies up to the front would be a nightmare. A sizeable operation across the Dniepr under current conditions is surely a complete fantasy? A catastrophe in the waiting. Neither side is going to be able make any further sizeable breakthroughs/maneuvers in the south of Ukraine, unless massive attrition/collapse in the other's ability to field drones/artillery has already occurred. Which isn't looking likely any time soon. The only way to end this war is continuing and horrendous grinding attrition to the point one side can no longer continue, or negotiation. Thanks for this, and as of 2022 I might have agreed with most of this. But consider the following: 1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs. 2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one. At a bare minimum, this zone is flypaper to chew up their best remaining troops (VDV/Spetsnaz) as sustaining mech is going to be a nightmare. Pure Sun Tzu. 3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here. The Cossacks invented these tactics hundreds of years ago. 4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake.... 5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have! Look forward to your reply, as none of the above is going to be easy.... Edited February 26 by LongLeftFlank 8 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kraft Posted February 26 Share Posted February 26 (edited) 1 hour ago, squatter said: the bigger the strain put on cross-river logistics Just CasEvac alone requires carrying a wounded soldier under FPV and artillery threat through 1.9kms of marshland, crossing 3 water obstacles that each require a boat and loading and unloading of the wounded. The boat, will either have to be carried too, or stashed somewhere, where it is likely to be hit by drones. Or you decide to follow the waterways, which requires only 1 boat but is significantly longer through the twisting river. All of that has a very finite throughput, putting more than a couple Marines at risk would be a great way to end up with piles of uncollected bodies. There's already enough videos of stretchers getting hit in that bog. The value of Krynki is that it is a very defensable position that funnels russian vehicles either through the few completely straight forest roads where they can bog down or get hit by drones or through the veery long river road, which is exposed and easily observable, leading to quick discovery and annihilation of russian forces. Edited February 26 by Kraft 3 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Recommended Posts
Join the conversation
You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.