squatter

Yes of course that is true. But unmanned does not equal autonomous. And yes, of course autonomous weapons will offer huge advantages to those who employ them, but at what cost (see video I linked to above.)? Due to the cheapness and ease of manufacture of autonomous killer drones (once the tech has been developed), the implications of their use by bad actors are horrendous. The world did manage to get some level of control over nuclear proliferation (somewhat latterly and post-hoc) - should we not at aspire to learn the lessons from the successes and failures of nuclear non-proliferation and at least attempt to limit autonomous weapon development? If we don't then we are heading into an utterly terrifying world, and one most on here seem to have just shrugged and set off down the road towards at the first fork in the road.

Seems like the general feeling on here is that autonomous weapons are the way forward. No-one here feel like we should be arguing for the abolition of autonomous weapons, or are you all already in the 'well the bad guys are gonna do it, so we should do it first' camp? (ie the 'race to the bottom' scenario) I'm guessing you all caught this short film by the Future of Life Institute a few years back?

You are right and the penny needs to drop - this war has reached a brutal stalemate. Neither side can advance short of Western support either massively increasing/decreasing (neither of which scenarios likely). So the only humanitarian response is stop the violence now and use other means to reach a resolution that favours Ukraine.

I literally don't know where you are going with this any more? I am saying a) US will be pivotal whatever happens, and b) arguing for ceasefire doesn't make you automatically a MAGA nutjob These statements shouldn't be fodder for argument, they should be self-evident

Yes true. But what I mean is, there are plenty of people out there who see negotiations are inevitable, who have nothing to do with MAGA/Trump/Biden. The US will 100% be instrumental in how this war ends. It's just a case of in which fashion. Will Trump win the election and cut aid thus forcing Ukraine to the table and give Putin everything he wants? Will Biden win and force Russia to the table with increased threats of supplies to Ukraine and thus in position of strength? Will Biden win, not be able to procure enough weapons from Congress, and then Ukraine will be forced to the table in position of weakness cos no better options? The outcome of the war will be decided now in large part by what the US does or does not do. That's how it goes when you're the global hegemon.

Yes I'm not 100% sure what made me decide to post here recently - long time of lurking and just feeling like certain positions (that to me seem obvious) were not being expressed. Worth reminding yourself that there's a huge spread of opinions out there on how this war might end that exist outside of the MAGA/Biden US-centric paradigm: https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/global-perspectives-ending-russia-ukraine-war

That is actually very funny. Good post.

You are absolutely right, I posted what I think could lead to an end to the war and negotiations. It's called an opinion. Much of human interaction and discourse consists of them. I won't post what I think WILL happen, because that's completely outwith of my powers to predict. Who knows wtf state the USA will be in this time in 12 months.

It's amazing how confident you are in assessments of others character/motivation/psychology that are so hugely wide of the mark. I am from the UK, vote left-leaning and utterly despise Trump.

I'll take you up on this. I firmly believe it's within the power of the USA to end this war pretty much immediately (setting aside the madhouse of US domestic politics.) I believe Putin has been desperate to freeze this conflict pretty much ever since the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives raised the specter of total Russian defeat. For me, the USA has to threaten Putin with massive upscale of support to Ukraine - F16s, more himars/glsdbs/sams/amraams etc - if he doesn't come to the table. The kind of levels of support that would empower Ukraine to attrite RUS forces to such a level that will terrify Putin and his commanders. I believe Putin would take this chance. Once ceasefire is achieved, the West begins process of arming Ukraine to the point that Russian re-opening hostilities would be insane. In negotiations, West agrees not to take Ukraine into NATO, but accepts into EU, and makes concrete security guarantees to in any case. UN peacekeepers in along border. Russia gets symbolic non-NATO status for Ukraine. No future invasion of Ukraine for Russia. As for territory - Ukraine will have to accept some loss. Crimea for sure. Perhaps return to 2022 borders, with landbridge as demilitarised zone. This is difficult to accept for Ukraine obviously, but as of 2014, I don't Ukraine was ever going to get Crimea back. Continued sanctions and pressure on Russia to give up Putin for war crimes tribunal but he'll probably die before that happened I would guess. Reparations claims to go to international arbitration etc (obviously Russia owes immense reparations to Ukraine, but will that ever materialise under whichever circumstances this conflict ends, who knows?) So while there will have to be difficult concessions made in negotiation, just like in Gaza, I believe the USA has the power to end this conflict whenever it sees fit.

I agree with all of this. Genuine question: is this true? Are RUS forces outnumbered/outgunned in Ukraine? Does Ukraine have superior reserves? Analysis of the Avdiivka battle suggests Ukraine is suffering shell hunger. And while UKR has a large head count in its armed forces, average age of their soldier is reported as 43. I don't read this as positive signs for UKR overall strength. Yes, but if you think that doesn't mean RUS forces in the zone are well fortified, you are bat**** crazy. Do they teach you at Canadian staff college to "assume the enemy is inept and unprepared, and plan accordingly?" Have you both considered that what the single beleaguered toehold Ukraine has managed to cling onto at Krynky is actually evidence of how hard it is for them to cross this river in any significant force? The fact they have just this one marginal battered bridgehead (at the point of the river that's most suited with overwatching higher bank the friendly side, etc) and not several of them is exactly evidence against what you are proposing, not in favour? If Krynky is going well, where are the other bridgeheads? Have you stepped back and considered whether it might be your cognitive bias that is turning Krynky into evidence of exactly what it is not? You are absolutely wrong on this point. Total word twisting. I mean get real: when did I ever "admit that I don't want a southern option to be workable?" You really ought to retract that crap. I don't want RUS to win this war. I revile Putin and his regime. My belief the war should be ended now comes from my analysis that neither side can meaningfully advance anymore, and that now we are into permanent static/attritional war. Not the other way round. Your cod psychological profiling and personal defamation/denigration of those who disagree with you is copium that allows you to write off their views as being invalid. "Rule # 4 - no one cares what you think. They care what you can prove." This is not a debate in which anyone can 'prove' anything. We can just speculate. And when your 'evidence' includes links to George Washington crossing the Delaware, or D-Day, that is just laughable My 'evidence' is the thousands of videos we've seen of how drones / modern ISR has utterly transformed the battlefield, and how precise munitions can be directed to any place on the battlefield in a short amount of time. How to move is to be seen, and to be seen is to be killed. And how one of the most easily seen movements is that across water on boats/pontoons whatever. Meaning that of all the military maneuvres/operations that is now lightyears more difficult and dangerous than it was before this war, open water crossings/bridgehead sustaining on rivers as large as the Dniepr is among the worst. That's my view. This is a perfectly reasonable argument to make, and one which has a good chance of being correct, as I'm sure many on here will agree. Yet you turn the debate into a series of personal denigrations/defamations - "you're a Russian stooge, you're a ****ing idiot, you're a bull****ter, you are illogical." Its a pattern. Have a look a yourself mate, take a moment to reflect. Sorry - which ground that Ukraine gained with light forces this year are you referring to? Is this a forum for only those who blindly believe in inevitable Ukrainian victory, no matter what their eyes tell them? (And again, please don't mistake a belief that Ukraine can no longer 'win' this war by recapturing its lost territory with a hope that Ukraine cannot win this war. Don't insult me with that one again please.)

My point to you here is to throw in the bin all your examples of amphibious crossings from previous wars, because what the last two years have shown is that war has changed immensely (as you of all people know). You may as well dig out examples of fall of France and Barbarossa to try justifying an argument for massive armoured schwerpunkts as a viable strategy in the current environment It's not called 'a fortress of opinion', it's called drawing conclusions from what we are seeing play out on the battlefield. You on the other hand are bringing obsolete examples as evidence to the table. At risk of boring everyone else with constant back and fourth, I've got no doubt what light forces can achieve against an overextended poorly organised attacker (Kyiv) or a depleted, unprepared, unentrenched defender (Kharkiv). Again, I say these are poorly selected examples for the discussion at hand. Sorrywhatpardon?! I must be fantasising this discussion then! That is close to my position, yes. I do believe the time to close down hostilities has arrived. If anything I am concerned that Ukraine's position will only deteriorate from here (unless Western supply delivery ramps up massively, which doesn't seem likely currently). I think the West will continue to do enough to keep Ukraine in the war, but will not supply enough to kick the Russians out. But arriving at this position is the product of drawing conclusions from observing how this war is playing out, not the other way round. I've been an admirer of a great many of your posts as a long time lurker here, but you do have a propensity to go ad-hominem with people who don't agree with your opinions. But going below the belt in an argument is not a good look for your position. You seem to believe anyone who disagrees with you is either a f*cking idiot, or a Russian stooge. I reject both accusations - I am a very stable genius!

I don't mean to suggest that there was a peace settlement in reach in 1916, but there could be one today. Er, yes, and it was won by the Allies of course, but not sure your point here?

Well I'm not sure that a bunch of musketmen successfully crossing a river is a helpful analogue to attempting to cross in a modern near-pear environment observed by drones, attacked by FPVs, PGMs, glide bombs etc. Neither are the WW2 comparisons where the crossing points were more or less unmolested because the enemy didn't have the means to interdict. I would say "adding this all up" it hasnt and can't be done. Of course the 'cant' can be argued over but this is precisely our point of difference. You believe it can, I disagree. I think we have to assume RUS has built sufficient defences to handle light forces. They have been there two years now. Yes 'russia sux' but if you're banking on them being unprepared for what you're describing, you're most likely walking into a trap. It's this idea that UKR can get a bunch of WW2 SAS type flying columns buzzing around RUS LoCs that I find totally fanciful. Anything moving on this battlefield is subject to any number of lethal threats. To be seen is to be killed. In any case, likelihood is anything light that gets across will very quickly bump up against fortifications they will be unable to pass. Comparisons to the Kharkiv counteroffensive are unrealistic cos completely different circumstances (RUS forces depleted, not dug in, etc). Considering cross-river operations as a way of extending the front and testing the size of RUS reserves is an interesting point to raise. Genuine question: which side UKR or RUS would benefit most from extending the battle front? ie which side has greater reserves? Ultimately I think you are engaging in semantics here. The question absolutely is 'can it be done', because 'it' is 'crossing the river at scale', exactly what we have been debating. But you are right we will see. My position is that it is copium to imagine that UKR has the ability to make significant advances in any sector of the front (short of significant change in balance of forces via either Western supplies or ongoing attrition taking effect in ways it hasn't yet produced), Dniepr or otherwise. I get that folks want to be positive about UKR's position in the war, but I think that's leading some to dream impossible dreams. And that's why I think we need to bring about an end to this carnage because we are well and truly into 1916 territory in terms of senseless slaughter over minimal gains.

Well, I'm basing this on my belief that sustaining any scale of operations across a massive water obstacle with no permanent crossings in a near-peer environment is effectively impossible. As long as the RUS have sufficient drones and artillery and aviation, I don't believe UKR light forces would be finding themselves at the advantage trying to push inwards from the left bank, but at a huge disadvantage. These light forces would be bumping up again RUS fortifications, they would be vulnerable to everything from AK47 upwards, they would have extreme difficulty receiving resupply without serious interdiction, and they would have no fortifications, no armour support. They would have almost no CASevac and would know that they are on a near suicide mission. And what would they actually meaningfully do in their 4x4 buggies and on foot other than spot for fires (something drones are doing anyway)? Even if some kind of 'shock and awe' multiple crossing and heavy fires assault as put forward elsewhere was mounted successfully, I don't see how it ends up in anything other than a reverse Kherson as experienced by the RUS. UKR troops cross Dniepr in shock and awe assault > UKR light forces penetrate 10/20/30kms into RUS LOCs > RUS regroup, reassign reserves to the zone, pile on the drone/artillery/aviation support > UKR forces running low on supply/support and reinforcement with river crossings under constant attack and any vehicles trying to run supplies from river to the front under drone assault > RUS start turning bridgehead into the next Bakhmut/Avdiivka only here the defenders aren't fortified and have extreme difficulty in receiving resupply/reinforcement and have no armour support > UKR forced to retreat back to Dniepr having lost large numbers of crack troops and with national morale depleted You of course will probably have a more positive vision for the outcome from UKR point of view, and I understand the impulse in searching for a better way than smashing one's head against RUS fortifications elsewhere along the front. But I don't think there's anyway UKR can successfully prosecute an operational offensive any more (without huge change in facts on the ground - ie massive RUS attrition or huge injection of advanced western weapons for UKR). Which is why if we were both in the room back at UKR high command, I'd be making this argument lest out of desperation we launch the next Market Garden, or Dien Bien Phu.