How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

Just now, Bulletpoint said:

This argument seems to hinge on Putin being a Western style politician who does what his PR guys tell him what to do.

Clearly he is not…so then what was the point of the Carlson thing…to speak to his own people?  “Hey look the American comes to me for history lesson”?  Whatever it was it sure as hell did not work over here.  Let the memes begin.

[Bulletpoint]

2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Clearly he is not…so then what was the point of the Carlson thing…to speak to his own people?  “Hey look the American comes to me for history lesson”?  Whatever it was it sure as hell did not work over here.  Let the memes begin.

I'm just saying there might not have been this whole clever PR plan behind it. Just that Putin believes in his own message and he wants to tell that message.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

20 minutes ago, Fernando said:

t may be too late, but it seems clear that if the current situation does not change, a war of attrition strategy leaves the initiative entirely in Russian hands, which IMHO clearly harms Ukraine.

If the set of new ideas/technologies required to break the stalemate is not there, adopting a defensive strategy is better than attacking just for the sake of initiative. Better retreat to the Hindenburg Line than remake of the Somme.

[dan/california]

1 minute ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

If the set of new ideas/technologies required to break the stalemate is not there, adopting a defensive strategy is better than attacking just for the sake of initiative. Better retreat to the Hindenburg Line than remake of the Somme.

THIS!

[Bulletpoint]

3 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

If the set of new ideas/technologies required to break the stalemate is not there, adopting a defensive strategy is better than attacking just for the sake of initiative. Better retreat to the Hindenburg Line than remake of the Somme.

I completely agree, but I think this was essentially what got Zeluzhny fired.

Now, with the new general, I expect to see a new and more brutal offensive by Ukraine in the spring. And this time, they won't call it off even when the casualties really start to mount.

[The_Capt]

Just now, Bulletpoint said:

I completely agree, but I think this was essentially what got Zeluzhny fired.

Now, with the new general, I expect to see a new and more brutal offensive by Ukraine in the spring. And this time, they won't call it off even when the casualties really start to mount.

Unless Ukraine can find a way to break this defensive primacy, that could be a bad end of the war.  A shattering offensive that goes nowhere might break Ukraine and will damn sure shake western resolve.  We start seeing Ukrainian meat assaults and this thing could break.  They keep down that road and they can really lose a war of attrition. That is a gamble.

But if they could break the defensive primacy, well we could get a new ballgame.  I am not sure how to do that beyond massive unmannned strikes down to individual soldiers.  Unless…maybe a water crossing assault?  But how does one hide that in this day and age?  

 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

1 minute ago, Bulletpoint said:

Now, with the new general, I expect to see a new and more brutal offensive by Ukraine in the spring. And this time, they won't call it off even when the casualties really start to mount.

So far I am willing to give Syrski the benefit of the doubt and hope that the "Butcher" image has been unfairly created by the hostile wing of the highly politically divided Ukrainian public opinion. Maybe he will be able to placate the politicians with some actions of high propaganda value and low casualty risk, basically adopting the age old strategy of "let's don't but say that we did"

[Maciej Zwolinski]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

But if they could break the defensive primacy, well we could get a new ballgame.  I am not sure how to do that beyond massive unmannned strikes down to individual soldiers.  

This is pure guess, but I am hoping for a breakthrough in the ECM domain. Likely because I know the least about it, so it is relatively the easiest to suspend disbelief and imagine an invention of some sort which makes Russian drones fail over a big area, while Ukrainian ones fly true.

This would have to be exploited very quickly, because to every ECM its proper ECCM is soon created, but maybe there would be a sufficient time and space window to blast russians with concentrated drones and rush mechanised forces through the gap, with sort of a rolling barrage of drone swarm buzzing in front of and to the flanks of the attack force. Pure sci-fi stuff.

[JonS]

3 hours ago, Fernando said:

2. Regarding WWI, in 1918 things changed dramatically on the Western Front (and in 1917 on the Italian front, at Caporetto), which had been largely immobilized between 1915 and 1917. What was the cause? Attrition? New weapons? In the German case, emphatically NOT. Except for the conversion of some MG08s into crude and primitive LMGs, the Germans did not use weapons that were not already available in 1916. What broke the stagnation of trench warfare were new ideas and new infantry and artillery tactics. Infiltration tactics, with well-trained small storm groups bypassing strongpoints and enveloping them, and use of artillery in intense but short bombardments, designed not to destroy the enemy but to incapacitate them. This made it possible to break the stalemate of trench warfare. Right now, in the context of the war in Ukraine, there seem to be NO new ideas.

I don't recognise this description of the second half of WWI, other than as a general outline.

The British had shown several ways to break in to solid defences in 1917 at Messines, at Passchendaele, and at Cambrai. Bite and hold is fundamentally attritional, but it's also really productive. At least in the context of 1917.

The German attacks worked - ever so briefly - in early 1918 because they had good force concentration and ratios as a result of moving forces from East to West, and because the Allied - especially British - forces they faced were themselves heavily attrited. Lloyd-George had deliberately withheld replacements from shipping to France as a way of preventing Haig mounting another offensive. However that also left the British lines wildly undermanned, and when combined with a poor defensive doctrine that hadn't previously been tested the British front line positions collapsed. Yes; the new tactics definitely helped. But the Germans would have - at least they should have - been able to advance even without them.

But the Germans couldn't sustain their own offensive. Why? Because they themselves had been so heavily attrited at the tactical, operational, strategic, and political levels. Ze Germans didn't stop in front of Ameins because they're such good sports. They stopped because they were tactically and operationally spent. Ludendorff deliberately eschewing an overarching operational plan didn't help either. "Let's just attack and take it from there! Let's see what happens!" I mean ... WTF?

The latter German attacks through to July were even stupider operationally, and wildly unsuccessful tactically. Shall we, for example, talk about the wonderful "new ideas" and "infiltration tactics" on display on 15 July? Probably best not to, eh?

Overall the main effect of the Spring offensives was to inflict such severe attrition on the German forces that, when the French and British went on to the offensive from August, they had all the defensive coherence of a wet paper bag. At that point attrition had truly done it's thing, and operational movement recommenced.

Edited February 11 by JonS

[Beleg85]

6 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Absolutely on air/fire superiority.  The Battle for Manila as an example:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Manila_(1945)

US has air supremacy and ratios against the defender were crazy skewed.  

Now this does not explain Mariupol where the RA had both numerical and firepower superiority but still likely had a worse than 1:1 loss ratio (could be as high as 2:1).

Digging into this one now:https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA424898.pdf

Interestingly the author notes that in his study DCRs do drop in urban combat but due to the longer time spent in these battles overall casualties could be higher than non-urban.  Urban combat appears to slow everything down, which of course favours the defender.  Mariupol might be another indicator of defensive primacy emerging because it definitely bucks historical trends.  What I would give for clear and valid data from Bakhmut and Adiivka…there is a best seller right there.

Just to add to this discussion about Urban combat- troops density vs. environment seemed to be a little unusual in lack of continous lines across the city in 2022. I saw several detailed interviews with guys who survived Mariupol, and basically all underlined that it was more hit-and-run battle, with single squads (not platoons) sometimes covering hundreds of meters if not km of perimeter, with part of their force being rotated at any given time. Sometimes they could even leave urban terrain and hit Russians from the flank (there were videos with effects of such actions) or conduct small mechanzied raids. Battlespace seemed to be rather empty of masses of troops, at least that was their perception, up to the time when they were closed inside Azovstal itself.

[pintere]

6 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, so what were the urban combat loss ratios then?  Also, on German losses…so it was what?  A draw?  German losses were not significant?  

I might be a little late to the party, but I’d point you in the direction of Robert Forczyk‘s excellent 3 part series on the battle.

At the end of book 2 (the one covering the city fighting), he reports that the Germans suffered 20,300 casualties within the city itself (including 4,600 dead/missing) in the time period 1 September — 20 November.

Soviet losses are a lot harder to pin down. From September—November the Stalingrad Front suffered about 400,000 casualties, around half of which were dead/missing. Forczyk estimates that about a quarter of these losses were sustained in the city itself.

So for the actual urban combat in Stalingrad from September to October, we have 20,300 German losses against ~100,000 Soviet losses. An approximate loss ratio of 5:1 in favour of the attacker, or 10:1 if only dead/missing are counted.

I‘m beginning to get the impression that the actual city fight for Stalingrad was indeed a bloodbath, but clearly not a German one… At the very least it clearly shows that urban combat doesn’t necessarily produce higher losses for the attacking side.

Edited February 11 by pintere

[FancyCat]

1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:

I completely agree, but I think this was essentially what got Zeluzhny fired.

Now, with the new general, I expect to see a new and more brutal offensive by Ukraine in the spring. And this time, they won't call it off even when the casualties really start to mount.

There are other deficiencies in the military that need working on, including mobilization, training, logistics that maybe Zeluzhny might have not been able to handle after 2 years of service that required his replacement. 

[Kraft]

3 hours ago, Fernando said:

Infiltration tactics, with well-trained small storm groups bypassing strongpoints and enveloping them, and use of artillery in intense but short bombardments, designed not to destroy the enemy but to incapacitate them. This made it possible to break the stalemate of trench warfare. Right now, in the context of the war in Ukraine, there seem to be NO new ideas.

Im not trying to get pulled into this discussion too much but there have been significant changes in the way infantry attacks due to the prevelance of artillery, drones and low amount of soldiers.

These sort of small groups were already used to great effect by wagner more than a year ago, attacking with just small squads of 5-8, a waste for artillery and without drones they still manage to overcome small group defenders often enough. Progress is just at a snails pace.

There can be no "breakthrough" as the front is not static because of massive fortifications but because of the all seeing drone, that relays the location of any significant gathering and minutes later that gathering is gone, unless ofc republicans decide to block shells.

Not much you can do about drones atm, besides crawling 2km through a sewer pipe or dig tunnels as russians did - both times surprising defenders.

Until jammers are widespread on vehicles and infantry can be given a chance to clear mines somehow, the bog continues.

 

Edited February 11 by Kraft

[Kraft]

24 minutes ago, pintere said:

I‘m beginning to get the impression that the actual city fight for Stalingrad was indeed a bloodbath, but clearly not a German one… At the very least it clearly shows that urban combat doesn’t necessarily produce higher losses for the attacking side

I read a book by Anthony Beever (dont know his repuation) a decade ago in which he claimed the 13th guards rifle divisions that arrived to Stalingrad river bank had at the end of fighting ~300 out of 10000 of the original soldiers left.

[akd]

Ladies and gentlemen, we may have a small problem:

 

[Kinophile]

Probably the retaking of Mariupol would be the true signifier to the Ukrainian and Russian publics that the Feb Invasion had finally failed.

It's a simple geography and narrative to relay and understand, but with the city familiar to all sides immediately involved and of great political significance. 

All other cities (bar Sebastapol) are part of the military narrative (we need this to do this) but Mariupol is intensely emotive and puts the UKR armed forces back on the Sea of Azov. 

I'm really curious what a Crimea-equivalent air campaign against Mariupol would look like. 

Edited February 11 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

35 minutes ago, Kraft said:

I read a book by Anthony Beever (dont know his repuation) a decade ago in which he claimed the 13th guards rifle divisions that arrived to Stalingrad river bank had at the end of fighting ~300 out of 10000 of the original soldiers left.

Beevor is very good and his numbers are good. It's well documented in both state and personal records on the Russian side that the Soviets threw bodies as ammunition, and the statistics reflect it. 

[Offshoot]

25 minutes ago, akd said:

Ladies and gentlemen, we may have a small problem:

 

Is this old footage or new? I haven't seen Trump talk about NATO for a while so why now? Or is it a staple of his rallies and just hasn't been reported on recently?

[sburke]

1 minute ago, Offshoot said:

Is this old footage or new? I haven't seen Trump talk about NATO for a while so why now? Or is it a staple of his rallies and just hasn't been reported on recently?

that was today.  he is campaigning in South Carolina.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

1 hour ago, pintere said:

So for the actual urban combat in Stalingrad from September to October, we have 20,300 German losses against ~100,000 Soviet losses. An approximate loss ratio of 5:1 in favour of the attacker, or 10:1 if only dead/missing are counted.

But at some point in time all Germans left in the kessel surrendered and were shipped to Siberia. According to Polish Wikipedia there was 100,000 of them. That brings the total losses including POWs to approximately 1:1, right? 

Or does Forczyk distinguish the Stalingrad city fight (i.e. the part with Germans as the attackers) from Uranus +kesselschlacht (obviously, Russians as the attackers)? Actually it may be necessary as without such split it would be difficult to use Stalingrad for any attacker vs defender statistics due to the change of roles midway through the fight.

[pintere]

Just now, Maciej Zwolinski said:

But at some point in time all Germans left in the kessel surrendered and were shipped to Siberia. According to Polish Wikipedia there was 100,000 of them. That brings the total losses including POWs to approximately 1:1, right? 

Or does Forczyk distinguish the Stalingrad city fight (i.e. the part with Germans as the attackers) from Uranus +kesselschlacht (obviously, Russians as the attackers)? Actually it may be necessary as without such split it would be difficult to use Stalingrad for any attacker vs defender statistics due to the change of roles midway through the fight.

You are correct, these numbers are for the city fight before Uranus only. 

And for good reason, as the overwhelming majority of German casualties during the Stalingrad battle were from the third phase, the natural consequence of an encircled force being destroyed completely.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Corrosive Warfare is targeted, precise and rapid attrition directed at key nodes, connectors and capabilities.  We have already seen the UA do this on EW, C4ISR, artillery and logistics.

How does that concept differ from battlefield interdiction and isolation? As far as I understand, interdiction is also aimed at various enablers, and people doing it certainly try to make it targeted, precise and rapid.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

.

Edited February 11 by Maciej Zwolinski
Glitch - made same post 3 times

[Maciej Zwolinski]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

 

 

Edited February 11 by Maciej Zwolinski
Glitch - posted same post 3 times

[Maciej Zwolinski]

7 minutes ago, pintere said:

You are correct, these numbers are for the city fight before Uranus only. 

And for good reason, as the overwhelming majority of German casualties during the Stalingrad battle were from the third phase, the natural consequence of an encircled force being destroyed completely.

Thank you! Do you perhaps have the statistics for the 3rd phase, final surrender included ? I am wondering if the relationship between losses from 2nd phase was completely reversed