How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Maciej Zwolinski]

18 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Now this does not explain Mariupol where the RA had both numerical and firepower superiority but still likely had a worse than 1:1 loss ratio (could be as high as 2:1).

Mariupol had two distinct phases, first was a very active defence in the whole of the city, the second Ukrainian attempt at defence of the fortress Azovstal.

The second phase went quickly, Russians just bombed Azovstal with Tu-22s and cleared up with their infantry. Ukrainians after a few weeks surrendered, they had no way to bring in supplies and to defend against high-flying heavy bombers. The casualties did not seem too high at this stage and certainly not heavily skewed against Russians. 1:1 maybe or even somewhat in favour of Russians. Certainly in favour of Russians if you count the PoWs who surrendered at the end of the day.

So the majority of RUS casualties had to be incurred in the first phase. Actually it seems possible, the deciding factor being troop quality. Azov was elite, whereas the RUS at first threw at them low quality units, separatist militias and Chechen tik tok warriors. Also, the secret factor - Russianness. Russians usually manage to incur more casualties than anybody else fighting for the same thing.

[Haiduk]

We had usual FPVs, then "Mamont" - the "fat FPV" has appeared, now we have "Darts" - the "long FPVs". This is winged type-FPV, but not the same as Lancet - completely other architecture and control. 

M2 SBU unit already operates with them. Each "Darts" complex has 10 drones and control/transmitting equipment. There are no information except these drones can carry about 3 kg of load. Their range is more than usual FPV, but some less than Lancet. But this drone complex is more cheaper.

In other "serious" class of kamikadze-drones, some recently unknown UKR long-range jet drone was found in Russia

More evidences, that UKR has some new EW system, which can supress Shaheds and force them to land. One more almost undamaged UAV was found in Dnipropetrovsk oblast  

 

This statistic shows since Russians (or Iranians) two months ago made some improves in Shahed design - new black composite shell, integrated SIM card of UKR cellphone operators, which probably gives opportunity of inflight change of route wapoints, resultativity of UKR AD on Shaheds reduced on 1/3. Though, this can other reason - Air Forces Command didn't count supressed by EW and landed Shaheds as shot down. They are "drones, which didn't reach aims"

[Maciej Zwolinski]

33 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Mariupol might be another indicator of defensive primacy emerging because it definitely bucks historical trends.  What I would give for clear and valid data from Bakhmut and Adiivka…there is a best seller right there.

There is a recent book out by Lawrence of the Dupuy Institute on the Kiev battle during the initial phase of the war. I have not read it, but given the quantitative research background of the author, I hope for some solid data to be included.

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

I am sorry, I was joking:) I had no idea people could post the same thing seriously.

Ahah, you should put smiles )))

[Haiduk]

Friendly mine %)

 

[Haiduk]

Situation in northern part of Avdiivka became critical. Russians captured transport depo and now try to breakthrough to railway station (SE) and strongpoint around cafe "Brevno" (NW, yellow mark), guarding coke plant from the south.

General Tarnavskyi, commander OTUV "Tavria" wrote "we strenghthe the lines to hold back the enemy" - so no any words about withdrawal. If no happen something miraculous, Russians have all chances to cut Avdiivka on two parts and to block the coke plant.  

 

Edited February 10 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

"Magyar" has shared updated information about combined work of their EW unit and ELINT/EW units of marines and TD around Krynky

For four months of Krynky battle 2592 Russian FPV were spotted, 2016 destroyed/supressed (77,77 %)

For 31st of Jan to 10th of Feb - 380 drones spotted, 312 destroyed (82 %) 

 

[cesmonkey]

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/uves-realnij-dosvid-bojovih-komandiriv-i-brigad-maye-buti-re-88897
 

Quote

Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi – his focus is on unmanned systems and the development of utilization of drones by our soldiers, and Colonel Andriy Lebedenko – his focus is on innovation, specifically the technology component of the army and combat systems – have been appointed deputies of Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. Clear practice with new technologies is needed. There are more than enough theories; everything must work in practice for the sake of Ukrainian goals and the maximum preservation of the lives of our soldiers. Brigadier General Volodymyr Horbatiuk – his focus is on operational work, staff work, planning, management, in every staff, they must fully understand the front, Brigadier General Oleksiy Shevchenko – his focus is on logistics, ensuring maximum quality of logistics in our army, and Brigadier General Mykhailo Drapatyi – he will be responsible for the quality training of our military – have been approved as deputies of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. All the real-life experience of combat commanders, combat brigades, our units, who have built a quality training system for soldiers and evaluation and analysis of combat actions – all this experience must be implemented for the success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

 

[Haiduk]

We critically need F-16. Problem of KABs have been becoming more and more dangerous month by month

This serviceman writes from Novomykhailivka, where Russian intensivley attack and drop many gliding bombs:

For the hour 17 KABs impacted, and I more and more looking for F-16 on the horizon 

Autumn photo of Novomykhailivka with two gliding bomb craters

The same serviceman: "Then [in Autumn] about 30 KAB were arriving for a day. More than 200+ bombs were dropped. No one di...k can't sit there. Two years Russians have been grinding it, the cities have fall, but Novomykhailivla still stood"

This is article of UKR OSINT group "Information resistance" (alas in UKR only) about number of KAB usage by Russians: https://sprotyv.info/analitica/taktichna-aviacziya-rf-rekordno-zbilshila-vikoristannya-kabiv/

According their information November of 2023 became a record month of KAB strikes - 1200 and one day - Nov 25th had daily record - 120 KABs. 

For the 10 day of February 2024 Russians aviation already dropped 460 gliding bombs. And this month can beat the previous record. Despite Russian gliding bombs don't have the same precisiosn like JDAM, but their quantity already turning to quality and our troops feel this on their own. 

Russian industry produce up to 50 gliding kits per day for FAB equipping. France is going to give us 50 AASM per month. Feel a difference...

The quantity of US JDAMs likely was also in dozens of bombs. And all they already dropped.  

 

Edited February 10 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

7 hours ago, pintere said:

In this sense we can call this a positive development. The idea of the interview was probably to garner sympathy from US citizens to the Russian POV after all. This is just a theory, but I like to think that your average curious individual in the US would’ve started to watch this interview and then gotten so bored by Putin‘s history lesson that they stopped watching before the half hour mark. 

It is much worse than that, the right wing has been selling this fantasy that Putin cares deeply about the same things as an enthusiastic Fox News viewer. Putin just shredded that in in his own words. Anybody who watches this interview is wondering what PLANET Putin is from, and how can he possibly be in charge of anything.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, a quick glance at this and I have a couple issues.  This body of work was largely on Operational Research (OR) done in exercises during the Cold War.  There are WW2 references but a lot of this research was conducted in what were largely canned exercises, which come with obvious issues:

https://www.cold-steel.org/2013/stress-of-battle-part-2-op-research-on-urban-battles/

For example - on exercise the surrender calculus is fundamentally different than the real thing.

The one real urban fight we have in this war was Mariupol - although one cannot discount Bakhmut or Adiivka, which had urban elements.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Mariupol

Mariupol highlights something that most of these narrow body count studies completely miss - attrition of time.  Mariupol looks like it comes in at 1:1.5 for the UA defenders on body count (I am not going to believe Russian figures for a second) which matches most mainline studies for high intensity warfare.  But what that number does not show is context or temporal attrition. 

The thing urban is most costly for is not manpower as much as it is time.  Urban combat, if one does not want ridiculous losses, must be deliberate and sloooow.  Unless a defender decides to simply not dig in and fight (see Bagdad in '03)  an urban fight attrition is time.  The RA forces tied down at Mariupol (which come to 5-10% of the overall invasion force) were not available on those axis of advance and critical fights around Kyiv and Kharkiv.  They were tied down for 3 full months fighting for inches.  Manoeuvre in urban terrain is very hard, and slow compared to open terrain.  This means tempo is hard to build, let alone sustain.  

Any battlefield commander will tell you that time is a critical resource.  Wasting it on street fights can hurt a campaign more than enemy artillery.  In this temporal dimension the attacker is normally far more vulnerable.  The attacker is trying to sustain momentum and has timetables to meet in order to dislocate an opponent.  Urban terrain acts as an incredible friction multiplier which almost always favours the defender. This is the real threat of urban operations.  Even in low intensity warfare - the longer an insurgency can make it look like the force in power is not really in control, the better.

Edit:  As to Bakhmut - no one really knows.  We have a pretty good idea that RA/Wagner losses were insane.  UA losses are not public and subject to rumor.  My bet is that the loss ratios fall firmly against the RA based on the reckless tactics.  The vehicle and equipment losses were almost definitely in the UAs favor.  Beyond that we simply do not know.  A lot of factors go into loss ratios - training, logistics, C4ISR, context.  My guess is that the UA stayed because the ratios favored them but we will likely have to wait until well after this war to find out.  Kinda puts WW2 into perspective.  We look back at the mountains of information and study, but while it was happening people knew next to nothing beyond what the news told them and lines on a map.

 

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I am not sold on that last part...but clearly it can and has happened.  I think the answer may lie deeper in elements of that urban battle.  For example at Ortona, the Canadians suffered over 2:1 casualties as attackers.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ortona

Sarajevo 3:1 in favor of attacker.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sarajevo

Gorzny round 2 - 1:1 but only have Russian reports

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Grozny_(1999–2000)

Leningrad 5:1 against the defender.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Leningrad

Berlin 1945 - looks like about 3:1 against the attacker.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_in_Berlin

And of course the big one...Stalingrad.  Looks to be 1:1 but this one was wild as both sides were attacker and defender at different points.  Here the biggest issue was "who" was lost.  The Russians lost conscripts, while the German Army lost 2 x 1st Tier Armies.  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad#Casualties

What all this is telling me is that casualty ratios are not the core metric by which to judge a battles outcome in urban warfare.  Nor can anyone really create a "rule of thumb" with respect to casualties based on loss ratios.  Urban fights are definitely costly in many dimensions but losses vary wildly.  One trend is that urban combat is a bit of an equalizer.  Troops built for high tempo manoeuvre warfare lose a lot of advantages in a street fight.

So back to Bakhmut - all we really know is that the loss ratios could have been anywhere in a broad range.  The RA may have lost up to 3:1 as the attacker or the exact inverse.  Bigger questions remain unanswered - which troops?  which equipment?  what did Wagner and the RA not do because of Bakhmut.  What did they do while the UA was pinned down in that fight?  Inversely what did the UA do or not do?  This is before rolling in the political calculus.  I think we can say that the Wagner and the RA lost a lot...this we do know.  Now what did they gain?  I do not think we really know.

 

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

It absolutely is, so which battles is important.  It begs the question on modern military doctrine - why stress high force ratios for urban combat when this data shows one can theoretically have inverted ratios.  Of course this opens up the big question of what were the attacker/defender strength ratios in each of these battles? Were these all battles of overwhelming attacker force ratios?  A quick review of wiki can find urban battles over 1:1 so was the author being selective to prove a point?  

This was back in ‘06 and every discussion I have heard on urban combat over the last 15 years had not been “s’ok, attackers are golden based on history”. In fact it has been the opposite as smart cities start to kick in.  So something odd is going on here or mainstream has been extremely off base.

This result is so contrary to the conventional wisdom that it requires extraordinary proof. The other thing I haven't had time to work through though, is does his sample include any battles where the attempt to take the city failed? The only battles that come to mind are from Ukraine, but they might REALLY move the numbers. It seems quite possible to me that to extent that this data holds it is because no sane commander attempts to take a city unless he has overwhelming force available to do it with. The times it has been tried without massive overmatch seem a lot like sticking sensitive bits in a meat grinder.

Edited February 10 by dan/california

[Haiduk]

Bilohorivka (Kreminna sector)

Here Russian also use gliding bombs and main clashes is going for water pump complex east from the village, defending by 81st airmobile brigade. 

Most interesting aspect here is both sides actively dig underground tonnels to reach and surprise the enemy. The pump facility is partially is partially under our control, partilaly under Russians, partially in grey zone. Soldier of 81st brigade worte sometime they hear undergraiund works of Russians - how they hit the ground by picks. The facility have many underground tonnels and rooms, so both sides use it as start point to dig. But Russians have all plans of the facility, so their KABs hit in that places, where our soldiers provide underground work. But it enough deep beneath the surface it's not easy to penetrate. 

Russians after taking the pump facility is going to seize tall waste hip of chalk querry, but this point has tough fortifications. 

According to TG Officer+ for last two days in clashes around Bilohorivka one of our battalions lost 2 KIA and 20 WIA. Losses of Russians against that battalion 40+ KIA, 70+ WIA, 20 vehicles.

 

Edited February 10 by Haiduk

[Kraft]

110th. russian assault being destroyed.

Some new footage, I think? Definetaly less cuts than whatever ends up on twitter I think. There will be another part showing all the casulties

Edited February 10 by Kraft

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Mariupol had two distinct phases, first was a very active defence in the whole of the city, the second Ukrainian attempt at defence of the fortress Azovstal.

The second phase went quickly, Russians just bombed Azovstal with Tu-22s and cleared up with their infantry. Ukrainians after a few weeks surrendered, they had no way to bring in supplies and to defend against high-flying heavy bombers. The casualties did not seem too high at this stage and certainly not heavily skewed against Russians. 1:1 maybe or even somewhat in favour of Russians. Certainly in favour of Russians if you count the PoWs who surrendered at the end of the day.

So the majority of RUS casualties had to be incurred in the first phase. Actually it seems possible, the deciding factor being troop quality. Azov was elite, whereas the RUS at first threw at them low quality units, separatist militias and Chechen tik tok warriors. Also, the secret factor - Russianness. Russians usually manage to incur more casualties than anybody else fighting for the same thing.

Could simply be the flow of the battle phases.  Break in, isolating the enemy and then mop up.  Mariupol still should have not seen these sorts of casualties in the Break in phase as the RA had the entire city pretty much isolated.  And they had firepower superiority and even air power.  I do not buy into "Russia Sux" as a reason; that one is getting thin.  Especially after they showed an ability to learn at the 2nd battle of Grozy.  However, troop quality definitely counts we have seen that.

POWs, they are a form of attrition so I suppose they could be thrown in.  The reality is that urban warfare definitely favours the defender.  The employment of "body count" as a metric is pretty shaky at the best of times.  Urban combat is 1) slow, and 2) soaks up troops in high density terrain.  It reduces advances to feet, as opposed to open country.  The defender is buying time and increasing friction on an opponents system while also tying down significant troop numbers who could otherwise be advancing.

Now as to pers losses, well I think the jury is still out.  Obviously not all urban battles favour the attacker with respect to losses.  In fact there is evidence that rate of losses goes down in urban combat - largely because everything slows down.  The greatest danger to a defender is isolation and I am wondering what modern C4ISR is doing to that equation.

[Fernando]

9 hours ago, The_Capt said:

WW1 - you are confusing outputs with outcomes.  Of course there was movement in WW1 but none of it was decisive.  There was plenty of defence in WW2 but none of it was decisive either.  All war is a combination of each, however, which form of warfare that is decisive in creating outcomes shifts overtime.  I do not debate that offensives happened in WW1, I debate the idea that any of them created decisive outcomes.  WW1 was an attritional and positional war in the majority. Not decided by manoeuvre - even if it was happening in a bunch of sideshows.  To try and force that war into an offensive primacy lens is to attempt to bend the facts to fit a perception/dogma, not the other way around which is how it is suppose to be done.

Gettysburg.  Lee broke his military in that battle and never recovered.  His entire campaign buckled and collapsed after that fight.  He decisively lost a Union defensive battle.  What is so hard about this?  It happens all the time in war.  The consequences of Gettysburg were significant.  European sentiment toward the Confederacy went cold, Southern force generation started to fail and Lee’s gilding was tarnished.  That battle set the conditions for a Southern defeat - this is not really debated (except here).  But because it was a defensive victory and does not fit this strange offensive-cult mindset we are going to dismiss it?

Victory.  I have provided numerous historical examples but somehow the idea that most military “victories” are negotiated endstates that neither side can declare total continues to elude.  Turn your binary equation around, “If Ukraine can only achieve 80% of its political and strategic objectives…this is a defeat?”  

Here is another English saying for you “take the f#cking win you can get”.  If Ukraine pursues a blind “total victory or death” strategy here they could easily wind up with the latter.  They could break themselves on those southern minefield belts while western support grows cold.  They could kill hundreds of thousands of their own people until domestic support grows cold.  That could easily set conditions for that 80-20 ratio to flip violently.

Grown ups do not think this way.  They realize the stakes are much higher.  All war is a violent negotiation.  Victory is not some simplistic binary calculation.  It is linked broader political objectives, some which do not become clear until after the war is over.  This war will very likely end much like the majority of wars have, with a mixed outcome where both sides will declare victory for themselves and defeat on their opponent.  Then the wrangling will continue to try and use that as a foundation for what comes next.

I think what you, and other purists, find offensive is the idea that war is not a decisive political tool.  Well I hate to be the one to break it to you but the evidence of this is pretty overwhelming.  Wars rarely are the “last argument of kings” without becoming the first argument for what happens next.  All victories and defeats are messy human affairs.  Anyone seeking clear and definitive results due to warfare is chasing fantasy.  In fact this is the central flaw in all Clausewitzian thinking - war is not rational, nor is it decisive. Or at least very rarely so. So rarely that when looking through a long lens, all wars are in fact largely indecisive.  Nazi Germany was totally defeated, yet Germany is the major power in the EU.  We won the Cold War and are living with this. The North won the Civil War but the seeds of discontent never really went away.  

This war is not going to end in total Russian military defeat. Ukraine is not going to march on Moscow or remove Russia as a threat on its eastern border.  So we had better start figuring out how to live with whatever the outcome of this thing is and stop treating it like the skewed historical fictions we have created.

 

1. Gettysburg was a Union victory that had no short-term consequences. Between October and December of that year, two Meade's offensives were blocked by Lee, who was clearly not finished. It wasn't until Grant was named commander in chief of the Union armies that things changed. Why did they change? Not because of Gettysburg, which was then seen as a wasted victory, but because Grant was a more aggressive and determined commander than his predecessors. Let us not forget that in the Wilderness Grant suffered more casualties than his predecessors, but unlike them, he did not retreat or cease his offensive. He kept up the pressure until he emerged from the Wilderness and found more favorable terrain to maneuver. When he encountered an impenetrable defense, as at Cold Harbor, he simply maneuvered past it and Lee had no choice but to retreat to another position closer to Richmond until there were none left. It was those maneuvers that ended with Lee trapped at Petersburg and his eventual surrender at Appomatox, not the approximately 25,000 men he lost during the Gettysburg campaign.

2. Regarding WWI, in 1918 things changed dramatically on the Western Front (and in 1917 on the Italian front, at Caporetto), which had been largely immobilized between 1915 and 1917. What was the cause? Attrition? New weapons? In the German case, emphatically NOT. Except for the conversion of some MG08s into crude and primitive LMGs, the Germans did not use weapons that were not already available in 1916. What broke the stagnation of trench warfare were new ideas and new infantry and artillery tactics. Infiltration tactics, with well-trained small storm groups bypassing strongpoints and enveloping them, and use of artillery in intense but short bombardments, designed not to destroy the enemy but to incapacitate them. This made it possible to break the stalemate of trench warfare. Right now, in the context of the war in Ukraine, there seem to be NO new ideas.

3. A common mistake among Americans (and being a Canadian, it seems to me that you are almost one) is to disregard the morale of the forces and tactics as decisive factors at the operational and strategic level, and believe that almost everything is resolved by counting heads and weapons. If you manage to collect many more weapons, more soldiers and more ammunition than your enemy, you will necessarily end up winning. This type of mentality completely kills tactical and operational thinking and perverts strategic thinking, ending up reducing everything to a war of statistics, where only attrition prevails and where it is only about destroying more material end men/women than the enemy can destroy us and he can replace. Things don't work like that. If they were so, the French campaign of 1940 should have been won by the Allies, and Barbarossa should have collapsed in front of Smolensk and not at the gates of Moscow. It was the new ideas and tactics of the Germans that gave a decisive advantage that triumphed over the simple attrition strategy of the French generals 

4. With respect to Ukraine, I do not defend a strategy of all-out attack, as the French did disastrously in 1914. You have to know when to attack and how. But always, always, always with the idea of maneuver in mind. Only with movement and maneuver, maintaining the initiative, can the enemy be unbalanced. If you do what the enemy wants and expects from you, if you only dedicate yourself to maintaining your defensive lines, and your offensives are reduced to taking the next line of trenches, without depth, without idea of maneuver, you will only be able to take one line of trenches and you will get your fantastic war of attrition that I strongly think favors the Russian side.

The Kharkov offensive en 2022 is an almost perfect model of what should be done (but perhaps it is too late for it). The Ukrainians took advantage of the distraction of the Russians focused on defending Kherson. They attacked in an unexpected place, where the enemy was weaker, with the idea of attacking in depth and advanced as much as they could with the available forces. If you attack in the most predictable place, where the enemy defenses are strongest, you only make things easy for the enemy by greatly favoring the defense and turning the confrontation into your beloved, inevitable battle of attrition.

New ideas are needed, new von Hutier tactics devised, and above all, not surrender to the strategy of attrition, which is just what we, Spaniards, call "lighting a candle for the Virgin" (poner una vela a la Virgen), that is, not doing anything effective, and hoping that things will magically be resolved by praying. The problem is that I'm afraid it's already too late. Russia has had too much time to reinforce itself, and no matter how incompetent they are, they now have enough forces to completely avoid a military collapse, while in the Ukrainian case that is not so clear to me.

Edited February 10 by Fernando

[benpark]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Mystery deepens.  Another quick look, wiki-deep, and we see more anomalies:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Aschaffenburg_(1945)

2:1 casualties against attacker (US), unless one counts POWs then it skews back to roughly 1:1.

No to civilians, they are handled separately in a column below.  Possible, to non-urban combat.  These totals do not seem to fully delineate solely urban combat.  In fact that might be impossible without some pretty deep archival research on daily losses by unit/formation.  Stalingrad may have been much different in the city as outside it.

Aschaffenburg is a further anomaly, as the Germans had a 4:1 advantage over the attacking US forces. Quality and motivation counts for a great deal, obviously.

Lots of ciphering on this example here (though not formatted for most human eyes):

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA212023

[Maciej Zwolinski]

50 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The other thing I haven't had time to work through though, is does his sample include any battles where the attempt to take the city failed? The only battles that come to mind are from Ukraine, but they might REALLY move the numbers. It seems quite possible to me that to extent that this data holds it is because no sane commander attempts to take a city unless he has overwhelming force available to do it with. The times it has been tried without massive overmatch seem a lot like sticking sensitive bits in a meat grinder.

As I wrote, the sample is from WW2 Italy and North-West Europe. The only  failed attempt by the Allies to take a city that I can find off the top of my head in that period is Arnhem. Although even that battle can be described in reverse way as a successful German attempt to storm it from UK/Polish defenders rather than failed Allied attack. So certainly the majority of actions from Allied side would be successful attacks, and those which failed, are probably temporary repulses (e.g. 1st and 2nd Monte Cassino). If German battles are included (will try to check that) you may have Bastogne from the Battle of the Bulge

You are right that an failed attack on a city would probably have significantly different outcome in terms of casualty ratios, because for the attacker, the desired return on his investment in the form of POW harvest at the end does not happen. 

Also, I agree that these big success rates/low casualty rates in urban attack must be to a large degree the result of commanders knowing it is a difficult fight, preparing for it particularly well and going slowly. in addition to those second-order effects, the other factors are abundance of cover for the attacker and the posture of the defender, who is often determined to defend a city even from encirclement, so at the end of succesful attack, there is a large crop of POWs and all unevacuated wounded men and damaged equipment become permanent losses.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

47 minutes ago, Fernando said:

What broke the stagnation of trench warfare were new ideas and new infantry and artillery tactics. Infiltration tactics, with well-trained raiding parties bypassing strongpoints and enveloping them, and use of artillery in intense but short bombardments, designed not to destroy the enemy but to incapacitate them. This made it possible to break the stalemate of trench warfare. Right now, in the context of the war in Ukraine, there seem to be NO new ideas.

What's particularly pertinent for the Ukranian war, the Germans were able to break the stalemate of the trench warfare for a short distance only. They were incapable of restoring operational maneouvre which would allow them to enter the operational depth of the enemy. That required not only some new ideas, but a bigger breakthrough using the new technology of tanks, starting to come together at Amiens but really coming into effect in 1939

[FancyCat]

Something to reinforce, Russia is winning the war of attrition as far as we can tell at this time. Something to keep in mind for Ukraine, is the real possibility as shown of Western resolve, arms, aid just not being sufficiently being enough or leveraged by the West for Ukraine, so sure, Ukraine can turtle and go defensive, but the real issue exists that Russia feels that it can grind down Ukraine, and more importantly, if Ukraine relies on defensive strategy,  Putin, can both choose to make advances where needed, make ceasefires and peace negotiations with the eye of merely preparing for another resumption of warfare. 

At this point, relying on Russia being exhausted by war to come to the peace table, is probably not the right assumption to focus on.

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I am not sure what Putin's best play here was, but it sure as hell wasn't what happened. 

I think the play is to emphasize that Russia will always seek to retake what it rightfully sees as theirs. Basically inform the Western public that the Russian capacity to wage war for Ukraine is infinite or infinitely enough that the West should cut their support or force a peace that gives Russia what it wants mostly. Including the ability to conquer it in due time without NATO needing to intervene, or lose too much face in not supporting Ukraine in the future. Current pro-Kremlin Western mouthpieces are continuing to spout stuff that encourages the West to concede for peace terms that basically tilt Ukraine into Russian orbit. 

At the risk of opening prior Pandora's boxes on this thread, the goal for the West and Ukraine at the minimum for a "victory" is NATO membership of unoccupied Ukraine into NATO. Anything less is a loss, anything less increases the risk of Russia feeling like it can challenge NATO through hybrid warfare, it will bring untold economic and social damage to Ukraine to say the least, and give worldwide a enduring impression of the inability of the West to engage in long term conflict. 

Edited February 10 by FancyCat

[Maciej Zwolinski]

1 minute ago, FancyCat said:

At the risk of opening prior Pandora's boxes on this thread, the goal for the West and Ukraine at the minimum for a "victory" is NATO membership of unoccupied Ukraine into NATO. Anything less is a loss, anything less increases the risk of Russia feeling like it can challenge NATO through hybrid warfare, it will bring untold economic and social damage to Ukraine to say the least, and give worldwide a enduring impression of the inability of the West to engage in long term conflict. 

There must be also consideration of what are minimum viable borders for the Ukraine after the armistice. At the risk of opening an even bigger Pandora box, getting back the lands in Donbas occupied by the Russians or being on the frontline would probably not be much of a difference to the Ukraine - they are either ruined or have been removed for 10 years from Ukrainan economy and are full of separatists. Huge economic and political investment would be required to make them useful again .

But in the Azov Sea area, Russians are currently sitting in Melitopol, Mariupol and Berdiansk, very significant cities. Could an armistice with borders drawn along the current frontline in the south ever be a "victory" for the Ukraine? I am doubtful.

[sburke]

Massive Explosion Hits Russian Plant Making Nuclear Capable ICBMs (msn.com)

Quote

 

A powerful explosion was reported in Russia's Udmurt Republic at a weapons plant that produces nuclear weapons components and ballistic missiles, local media reported on Wednesday.

Residents shared videos of the blast that is reported on social media platform Telegram to have occurred on the grounds of the Votkinsk weapons factory. The factory is located some 30 miles from the capital of the Udmurt Republic, Izhevsk.

The weapons factory produces nuclear weapons components and ballistic missiles, including the RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and strategic ballistic missiles for the Topol-M and Iskander systems, the Kyiv Post reported.

The incident was reported by Russian state-run news agency Tass, which said a local emergency services agency announced that the blast was caused by "a scheduled test of rocket engines," calling it "a planned event, not an emergency."

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) noted that there was no mention of a scheduled test on the website of Russia's Ministry of Emergency Situations, where such notices are typically posted.

According to independent Russian news outlet Mediazona, at about 11 p.m. local time, the official Telegram channel of the Ministry of Emergency Situations for Russia's Udmurtia Republic wrote: "The Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia does not confirm a powerful explosion on the territory of the Votkinsk plant near Izhevsk."

The publication reported that this message was deleted a few minutes later. A half-hour later, the ministry published another post, which said: "No emergency or abnormal situations have been registered on the territory of the Udmurt Republic, no socially significant incidents have occurred."

After the blast, a massive fire broke out at the plant. It's unclear if there were any casualties.

Newsweek has contacted Russia's Defense Ministry for comment by email.

Weapons produced by the factory have been used by Russia's military in President Vladimir Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The facility published, at the end of 2023, 19 government contracts for the production of nuclear weapons components, RFE/RL reported, noting that when Putin visited the plant in 2011, he described it as "one of the leading enterprises in Russia's defense industry."

 

 

Edited February 10 by sburke

[FancyCat]

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Nazi Germany was totally defeated, yet Germany is the major power in the EU.  We won the Cold War and are living with this. The North won the Civil War but the seeds of discontent never really went away.  

So I see your point, but I question this notion that the continuity of the German people in the present (vs being destroyed), or that some sort of successor state of the German Reich existing today represents anything but total defeat of Nazi Germany, considering the goals of the war, and the goals of the state, because at least for the people leading the country, and the opinions of those living in it in the past, would probably see it as only total defeat, if shown the current reality. 

You bring up Hitler from the dead, or Himmler or probably a good chunk of those believing in the Nazi ideology and detail the present day, I'm sure they would consider their loss as total defeat. 

Same probably would apply to the Southern elite. 

[Fernando]

19 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

What's particularly pertinent for the Ukranian war, the Germans were able to break the stalemate of the trench warfare for a short distance only. They were incapable of restoring operational maneouvre which would allow them to enter the operational depth of the enemy. That required not only some new ideas, but a bigger breakthrough using the new technology of tanks, starting to come together at Amiens but really coming into effect in 1939

I completely agree. The Germans did not have enough specialized troops, and most of them were eventually lost in the offensives. Nor did they have sufficient means to quickly and effectively exploit the gaps achieved to turn them into operational and strategic successes. The important argument for me is that a situation that seemed inevitable, the impossibility of breaking an adequately garrisoned, entrenched front, could be overcome simply by means of new tactics coming out of new ideas.

It may be too late, but it seems clear that if the current situation does not change, a war of attrition strategy leaves the initiative entirely in Russian hands, which IMHO clearly harms Ukraine.

[The_Capt]

53 minutes ago, Fernando said:

3. A common mistake among Americans (and being a Canadian, it seems to me that you are almost one) is to disregard the morale of the forces and tactics as decisive factors at the operational and strategic level, and believe that almost everything is resolved by counting heads and weapons. If you manage to collect many more weapons, more soldiers and more ammunition than your enemy, you will necessarily end up winning. This type of mentality completely kills tactical and operational thinking and perverts strategic thinking, ending up reducing everything to a war of statistics, where only attrition prevails and where it is only about destroying more material end men/women than the enemy can destroy us and he can replace. Things don't work like that. If they were so, the French campaign of 1940 should have been won by the Allies, and Barbarossa should have collapsed in front of Smolensk and not at the gates of Moscow. It was the new ideas and tactics of the Germans that gave a decisive advantage that triumphed over the simple attrition strategy of the French generals 

Well first off let’s keep it above the belt. Calling a Canadian “basically an American” is akin to calling a Spaniard “basically Italian”.  

So your working theory is that tactics rule the battlefield and operational and strategic considerations are essentially window dressing?  US Civil War - so Lee and the South kept on fighting with great verve…but was essentially doomed strategically.  1918 - Germany had all the tactics…but still collapsed strategically.  I am not seeing your point.   It is not about “ignoring” tactics and morale at all; it is not allowing them to hijack the rest of the thing.

I think that you need to maybe read up on how the levels of warfare interact and create an interlinked machine.  Tactics are important but without operations to string them into coherent decisions while setting conditions for success, one gets nowhere - see our own performances in Iraq or Afghanistan as examples.  Strategy is the art of “hard options”.  How to sustain yours while compressing an opponents.  It goes deeply into the institutional spaces.  Lee and the Germans had better tactics (hell Lee was better operationally), however in both cases both sides were in a losing strategic position.  Both sides ran out of gas (attritional) at strategic and political levels…this decided the wars, not tactics or bracing moral.  Germany did have 1940…then it had 1945.  They were completely unable to translate success into sustainable strategic victory.

1 hour ago, Fernando said:

4. With respect to Ukraine, I do not defend a strategy of all-out attack, as the French did disastrously in 1914. You have to know when to attack and how. But always, always, always with the idea of maneuver in mind. Only with movement and maneuver, maintaining the initiative, can the enemy be unbalanced. If you do what the enemy wants and expects from you, if you only dedicate yourself to maintaining your defensive lines, and your offensives are reduced to taking the next line of trenches, without depth, without idea of maneuver, you will only be able to take one line of trenches and you will get your fantastic war of attrition that I strongly think favors the Russian side.

Well that is good because “all out attack” and manoeuvre is not going to happen on a battlefield which appears dominated by denial and defence.  In fact this is what is wrong with the western school of military thought - which while you besmirch the US, you are buying into their way of war, nearly completely.  If one can only think in terms of offensive and manoeuvre, with defence and attrition as “inconvenient interludes” you are in fact restricted in options.  You live in a box of your own making.  “We can’t attack…so the war must be over…hey why didn’t the Russians get the memo”

In addition, while poo-pooing attrition, the back end of your little thought piece here basically says “Russia has won by attrition”.  Grinding one trench at a time, by the perspective you are demonstrating, means Russia has “won” by adopting the exact opposite approach central to your philosophy.

1 hour ago, Fernando said:

New ideas are needed, new von Hutier tactics devised, and above all, not surrender to the strategy of attrition, which is just what we, Spaniards, call "lighting a candle for the Virgin" (poner una vela a la Virgen), that is, not doing anything effective, and hoping that things will magically be resolved by praying. The problem is that I'm afraid it's already too late. Russia has had too much time to reinforce itself, and no matter how incompetent they are, they now have enough forces to completely avoid a military collapse, while in the Ukrainian case that is not so clear to me.

Again…”except for the Russians”.  A strategy of attrition has worked brilliantly for them coming at it from this angle. Russia has “surrendered to a strategy of attrition” and Ukraine is now stuck…that is basically what you are saying.

Look, you are really muddled up here.  Clearly well read but it feels like you don’t have a good grasp on how to put all the pieces together.  We have gone from “tactics…you don’t understand the tactics”, to “boo attrition, it will never work - offensives and manoeuvre only”, to “ Ukraine is stuck and it does not look good.  And if they do not have complete victory they lose”.  Meanwhile ignoring the fact that by that thinking, Russia has won through adopting an attrition strategy when viewed through these lenses - regardless of how bad their tactics and operational art in fact are.

So let’s try this:

Ukraine can win a war of attrition, and likely do it better than Russia.  They can do it via smart, connected denial - same way they blunted, stopped and rolled back the RA in the first year.  They can, and are, projecting friction and attrition onto the RA (whose losses are simply brutal).  I call this Corrosive Warfare.  It is not simple old school Attrition Warfare, which is grinding the front end until  one side runs out.  Corrosive Warfare is targeted, precise and rapid attrition directed at key nodes, connectors and capabilities.  We have already seen the UA do this on EW, C4ISR, artillery and logistics.  If one can corrode an opponent in what essentially constitutes a manoeuvre via firepower then theoretically one can set the pre-conditions for an opponents operational system to collapse. Further you might be able to strain their strategic system to breaking as well.  What we really want to see is political collapse but in that one I am not sure.

Now that is the plan.  All tactics, operations and strategies should be directed at that.  Once they can do that, then the forces that are supposed to cover all those minefield will not matter because they will be unsupported and disconnected.  No magic bullet tactics or capabilities are going to solve this.  It will take a concerted and long term focused effort (and western support needs to align).  Smart defence and denial is definitely central to this but so are firepower offensives.

So outcomes..what really matters.  If Ukraine goes this way they can, at worst, freeze this thing.  A Korean Peninsula outcome is definitely a possibility, and frankly it is not a bad one…with provisos: Ukraine will need intense reconstruction, and will need to be pulled into a binding security alliance of some sort.  Now if Russia hits a tipping point we could also see another RA collapse (kinda what I am hoping for).  The bar is very low on defensive requirements right now, so I am honestly not sure if it will work.  But it has a far better chance than throwing more western ways of warfare at this problem.  If the RA collapse due to corrosion that would open the door to operational manoeuvre and offensives.  We might actually see that damned land bridge cut, at which point Russia is dangerously close to pre Feb ‘22 lines - we get that far and we can have the next argument.

And then there are versions in between.  There is a really worst case.  Ukraine loses the will to fight and begins to fracture politically.  Or the West does the same.  At that point Russia has a decent chance of pulling whatever this thing is, off.  And if they do they will have won this war through a grinding attrition strategy that frankly is humbling.  The level of losses they have been willing to spend on this are from another era.  This is why we cannot let them win.  It signals to every challenger that we will blink in the face of a real fight that last longer than a f#cking long weekend (that is where all this cult of offensive has gotten us).

Since we keep throwing cool sayings around, here is another English one “understand when you are in a hammer fight, and then make damn sure you don’t come in second.”  

 

 

[The_Capt]

43 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

I think the play is to emphasize that Russia will always seek to retake what it rightfully sees as theirs. Basically inform the Western public that the Russian capacity to wage war for Ukraine is infinite or infinitely enough that the West should cut their support or force a peace that gives Russia what it wants mostly. Including the ability to conquer it in due time without NATO needing to intervene, or lose too much face in not supporting Ukraine in the future. Current pro-Kremlin Western mouthpieces are continuing to spout stuff that encourages the West to concede for peace terms that basically tilt Ukraine into Russian orbit. 

Ok, why not just say that?  A freakin history lesson of 1939 Poland is not they way to get that message across.

14 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

So I see your point, but I question this notion that the continuity of the German people in the present (vs being destroyed), or that some sort of successor state of the German Reich existing today represents anything but total defeat of Nazi Germany, considering the goals of the war, and the goals of the state, because at least for the people leading the country, and the opinions of those living in it in the past, would probably see it as only total defeat, if shown the current reality. 

So every German died in that war?  Of course the modern German state is a successor of the Nazi Germany regime.  This does not mean modern day Germany’s espouses the Nazi beliefs or doctrine in the least (quite the opposite) but that entire experience informs their present day; it casts a long shadow on the psyche of a people.  One cannot divorce a national trauma like WW2 from the future behaviours or perspectives.  

We are haunted by our own ghosts.  Every war leaves something undecided and begins another cycle of negotiation.  In the case of Germany no small amount of negotiation was with itself.  We are watching Russia do this right now re: Cold War.  Even a total defeat is not the end of the argument.  Post war Germany did not decide to become Canada or Belgium.  They basic rebuilt and started the climb back up the power ladder in Europe…just like they had been trying to do since before WW1.  Now how they climbed back up that ladder definitely changed.

[Bulletpoint]

9 hours ago, The_Capt said:

You know we North Americans are often told that "we don't get Russia", or most of Europe for that matter.  What is clear from this fiasco is that cluelessness cuts both ways.  So the best PR guys Putin had all settled on the idea that the best way to shift US public sentiment was a detailed history lesson on Eastern (fine, Central) Europe?  Oh ya, all of our modern culture speaks to our deep reverence for European history minutia, claims and counter claims.

This argument seems to hinge on Putin being a Western style politician who does what his PR guys tell him what to do.