How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[JonS]

36 minutes ago, sburke said:

I endorse this message ...

... but only if it comes as part of a 28-slide deck.

[danfrodo]

5 minutes ago, JonS said:

... but only if it comes as part of a 28-slide deck.

If you could read me the slides, word for word, that would great.  And have each bullet point slow-reveal.  And also spend weeks wordsmithing it because that is actual work.  (I had manager 2 levels up that would spend day upon day wordsmithing slides instead of just putting the basics & supporting data there and then simply telling the dang story

[sburke]

5 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

If you could read me the slides, word for word, that would great.  And have each bullet point slow-reveal.  And also spend weeks wordsmithing it because that is actual work.  (I had manager 2 levels up that would spend day upon day wordsmithing slides instead of just putting the basics & supporting data there and then simply telling the dang story

LOL That was one of the reasons I retired.  I just couldn't handle spending one more minute of my life trying to figure out how to make a binary choice into three options.  That was a McKinsey thing, they always had to have 3.  I wondered if some high level partner had simply read Rendezvous with Rama* or something.

 

*the big line for the sequel was "The Ramans do everything in threes."

Edited December 4, 2023 by sburke

[Harmon Rabb]

AFU assault and the aftermath of the assault. Video shows some RU KIAs at the end.

[Kraft]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

Speaking of ... I havent heard much about the 777 recently. Are they still in use?

Shell shortage due to much of the supply going into Gaza

https://www.axios.com/2023/10/19/us-israel-artillery-shells-ukraine-weapons-gaza

[JonS]

Oookay. So that would mean that most western medium artillery is sidelined now, then, not just the 777?

(Also; the article explicitly says it wouldn't affect ops in ukraine, let alone halt them completely. Also, Gaza is ~6 weeks old but the 777 seems to have been quiet all year.)

Edited December 4, 2023 by JonS

[JonS]

3 hours ago, danfrodo said:

If you could read me the slides, word for word, that would great.  And have each bullet point slow-reveal.  And also spend weeks wordsmithing it because that is actual work.  (I had manager 2 levels up that would spend day upon day wordsmithing slides instead of just putting the basics & supporting data there and then simply telling the dang story

M'kay. And I'll be sure to go right ahead and put a TPS report cover sheet on that.

Edited December 4, 2023 by JonS

[Haiduk]

Guys, I have a problem with forum sign in on my PC. I can sign in on my phone w/o problems, but on PC I have notification about wrong name, email, password, though I changed password and deleted old cookies. 

While I will figure out what's happened I can only read the forum or sometime write small messages, because it's completely awkwardly for me to write big posts and repost pictures from the phone 

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, sburke said:

LOL That was one of the reasons I retired.  I just couldn't handle spending one more minute of my life trying to figure out how to make a binary choice into three options.  That was a McKinsey thing, they always had to have 3.  I wondered if some high level partner had simply read Rendezvous with Rama* or something.

 

*the big line for the sequel was "The Ramans do everything in threes."

It's just like image processing.  Oversample your option space into 6 options, then average each of the two adjacent pairs.  Voila, two options resampled into three.

[Beleg85]

27 minutes ago, JonS said:

Oookay. So that would mean that most western medium artillery is sidelined now, then, not just the 777?

(Also; the article explicitly says it wouldn't affect ops in ukraine, let alone halt them completely. Also, Gaza is ~6 weeks old but the 777 seems to have been quiet all year.)

M777's were badly beaten up already during Lysychansk battles. Wolski counted long time ago something like 1/3 of initial batch as dysfunctional in this or other way (mostly destroyed or in long repairs), now it stands at Oryx at 77 guns as of September; unofficially, amount is higher and there were additional transports from Uncle Sam in this regard. The former source also admitted "from internal rumours" (he usually has good sources here) that most Krabs and large part of fleet of M109 are now damaged or destroyed. Particulary M109 had bad luck lately; several videos of them being hit with Lancets resurfaced in last week alone.

But the real problem is again ammo shortages. For example last clip of Ukrainian position being overrun and defenders executed by muscovites was reportedly, according to commander of that area, caused by inability of local artillery to respond. Drones saw Russians at their staging area, but big guns are only allowed to shoot until attack tmaterialize (note, this is not necessarly situation along whole frontline). Despite this, position was retaken and assaulters reportedly "dealt with". I guess they didn't end in prisoner exchange fund...another interesting feature of drones, btw. - ability to livestream and record  enemy's (or own) warcrimes.

[chrisl]

6 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Well I suspect that “yes” the RA have gotten a better grip on C4ISR.  I am not sure that has translated into tactical offensive effects - eg we have not seen stream after stream of UA soldiers getting chased around trees yet and Russia would be posting that with glee.  So we have what both the Ukrainian CHOD and president have admitted - a somewhat static tactical/operational battlefield.  No one appears to have figured out how to break this deadlock and I am not sure we can in a short term as the technology really does not exist en masse yet.

This is a good clue as to whose side China isn't on. Even if you're not talking about pre-built DJI drones, China can supply all the various control parts and lightweight batteries, transceiver pairs, controllers, displays, etc. that are going into the local custom built drones.  But either they're not, or they are and Russians still have too much vodka to be able to do anything useful with the parts.  I'd bet on the former, since they do manage to get Shaheds off the ground and pointed at Ukraine.

[danfrodo]

57 minutes ago, Kraft said:

Shell shortage due to much of the supply going into Gaza

https://www.axios.com/2023/10/19/us-israel-artillery-shells-ukraine-weapons-gaza

I am hopeful because I can't see the Gaza need for 155mm continuing indefinitely.  

[Kraft]

11 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Guys, I have a problem with forum sign in on my PC. I can sign in on my phone w/o problems, but on PC I have notification about wrong name, email, password, though I changed password and deleted old cookies. 

Not to turn this into a tech support thread but the same is the case for me, I can only use mobile.

[Battlefront.com]

First of two reports from the Washington Post about what went wrong with the summer counter-offensive.  First one is about higher level problems and differences between US and Ukrainian view points.  The article is very long and paywalled, but here are the top level points they explored:

Part One:

Quote

Key elements that shaped the counteroffensive and the initial outcome include:

● Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan. But Washington miscalculated the extent to which Ukraine’s forces could be transformed into a Western-style fighting force in a short period — especially without giving Kyiv air power integral to modern militaries.

● U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over strategy, tactics and timing. The Pentagon wanted the assault to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional weapons and training.

● U.S. military officials were confident that a mechanized frontal attack on Russian lines was feasible with the troops and weapons that Ukraine had. The simulations concluded that Kyiv’s forces, in the best case, could reach the Sea of Azov and cut off Russian troops in the south in 60 to 90 days.

● The United States advocated a focused assault along that southern axis, but Ukraine’s leadership believed its forces had to attack at three distinct points along the 600-mile front, southward toward both Melitopol and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov and east toward the embattled city of Bakhmut.

● The U.S. intelligence community had a more downbeat view than the U.S. military, assessing that the offensive had only a 50-50 chance of success given the stout, multilayered defenses Russia had built up over the winter and spring.

● Many in Ukraine and the West underestimated Russia’s ability to rebound from battlefield disasters and exploit its perennial strengths: manpower, mines and a willingness to sacrifice lives on a scale that few other countries can countenance.

● As the expected launch of the offensive approached, Ukrainian military officials feared they would suffer catastrophic losses — while American officials believed the toll would ultimately be higher without a decisive assault.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most

 

Part Two:

Quote

Key findings from reporting on the campaign include:

 

● Seventy percent of troops in one of the brigades leading the counteroffensive, and equipped with the newest Western weapons, entered battle with no combat experience.

 

● Ukraine’s setbacks on the battlefield led to rifts with the United States over how best to cut through deep Russian defenses.

 

● The commander of U.S. forces in Europe couldn’t get in touch with Ukraine’s top commander for weeks in the early part of the campaign amid tension over the American’s second-guessing of battlefield decisions.

 

● Each side blamed the other for mistakes or miscalculations. U.S. military officials concluded that Ukraine had fallen short in basic military tactics, including the use of ground reconnaissance to understand the density of minefields. Ukrainian officials said the Americans didn’t seem to comprehend how attack drones and other technology had transformed the battlefield.

 

● In all, Ukraine has retaken only about 200 square miles of territory, at a cost of thousands of dead and wounded and billions in Western military aid in 2023 alone.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-stalled-russia-war-defenses/

Both articles are solid.  There wasn't anything in either that would raise eyebrows here.

Stepping back and looking at everything, from the preplanning to the end result, I think both the US and Ukraine were correct.  The problem was each had concepts that were in opposition with each other.  It boiled down to the US saying Ukraine needed to strike fast and in one place, Ukraine said it needed more time and had to keep Russian forces elsewhere occupied.  Ukraine said it needed more forces to achieve anything significant, the US said they had what they needed if they concentrated.  US said they had to fire and move, Ukraine said they found moving didn't work without first firing.  Ukraine wanted more ammo than the West could supply, the US said they wouldn't need as much if they concentrated on one place.  Etc. etc.

Both sides underestimated how difficult the Russian defensive lines would be regardless of how they were attacked.  The US underappreciated the role of drones (attacking and being attacked), Ukraine didn't seem to grasps that F-16s couldn't just be thrown into the battleplan. Etc, etc.

My takeaway from this is that the big failing of the US and Ukraine was not understanding that both views were simultaneously correct and wrong.  This should have indicated that they needed to come up with a third option (sorry sburke if this makes you shudder!).  Something that both sides could agree was optimized for the situation as both perceived it to be.  Instead, Ukraine went with their strategic concept hoping that the West's training and equipment would make up for various shortcomings and the US reluctantly supported them because they were the ones doing the dying.

I have NO idea what the "third way" might have been, but I agree with the US' assessment that not trying something would have made things worse.  Russia would have reinforced its defenses even more and been able to reconstitute its offensive power to a far greater extent than it did.

Ukraine's decision to abandon the initial concept of the counter offensive was wise.  This likely prevented Ukraine from suffering the same fate as the Germans in Kursk 1943.  In both cases the attacker was surprised and humbled by the scope and scale of the defenses, but in the German's case they threw everything they had, the Soviets counter attacked, and the German lines collapsed.  In Ukraine's case, they reconfigured their attack plans, the Russians counter attacked for months without success, and the war grinds on without Ukraine collapsing.

Steve

[Beleg85]

10 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

I am hopeful because I can't see the Gaza need for 155mm continuing indefinitely.  

Are they really for Gaza? There was and article in Haaretz last month that claimed ammo was chiefly to replenish stocks that are their Iron Rations in case of bigger war with Hezbollach. They have real strategic problem there, being stretched on ropes by Iran both in South and North. Hell, even Houthis are flying missiles at them.

 

A thread from soldier fighting in battalion Aidar, nothing particulary new but worth to autotranslate to meet view from the trenches.

 

Edited December 4, 2023 by Beleg85

[Kraft]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

Oookay. So that would mean that most western medium artillery is sidelined now, then, not just the 777?

(Also; the article explicitly says it wouldn't affect ops in ukraine, let alone halt them completely. Also, Gaza is ~6 weeks old but the 777 seems to have been quiet all year.)

1 yes and mortars

2 US officials say that, which they always will. UA was always in a situation where shells were needed and every additional one would find its use immediately.

Large US stockpiles meant for Israels defense were tapped and to be sent to Ukraine. These are now being backordered and the flow of fresh shells split between the two countries.

As for 777, I have seen plenty footage of Shahed used against them this year, so they were active.

Edited December 4, 2023 by Kraft

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

A thread from soldier fighting in battalion Aidar, nothing particulary new but worth to autotranslate to meet view from the trenches.

Yes, an interesting read.  Three major themes:

1.  Russia has vastly more resources and has decided to commit all of them, despite horrendous losses, into this war.  However, those resources aren't unlimited and so at some point Ukraine might be able to kill enough of them to change Russia's thinking.  But that is a long way off and in the meantime it is important to not allow the West to think "what's the point of supplying Ukraine with weapons if Russia will always have more to commit?"

2.  Ukrainian defense industry needs to be further expanded to produce the basic needs of its forces.

3.  Mobilization of the population needs to be rethought and improvements implemented soon because 2024 is going to be a difficult year.

Steve

[The_MonkeyKing]

47 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

First of two reports from the Washington Post about what went wrong with the summer counter-offensive.  First one is about higher level problems and differences between US and Ukrainian view points.  The article is very long and paywalled, but here are the top level points they explored:

Part One:

 

Part Two:

Both articles are solid.  There wasn't anything in either that would raise eyebrows here.

Stepping back and looking at everything, from the preplanning to the end result, I think both the US and Ukraine were correct.  The problem was each had concepts that were in opposition with each other.  It boiled down to the US saying Ukraine needed to strike fast and in one place, Ukraine said it needed more time and had to keep Russian forces elsewhere occupied.  Ukraine said it needed more forces to achieve anything significant, the US said they had what they needed if they concentrated.  US said they had to fire and move, Ukraine said they found moving didn't work without first firing.  Ukraine wanted more ammo than the West could supply, the US said they wouldn't need as much if they concentrated on one place.  Etc. etc.

Both sides underestimated how difficult the Russian defensive lines would be regardless of how they were attacked.  The US underappreciated the role of drones (attacking and being attacked), Ukraine didn't seem to grasps that F-16s couldn't just be thrown into the battleplan. Etc, etc.

My takeaway from this is that the big failing of the US and Ukraine was not understanding that both views were simultaneously correct and wrong.  This should have indicated that they needed to come up with a third option (sorry sburke if this makes you shudder!).  Something that both sides could agree was optimized for the situation as both perceived it to be.  Instead, Ukraine went with their strategic concept hoping that the West's training and equipment would make up for various shortcomings and the US reluctantly supported them because they were the ones doing the dying.

I have NO idea what the "third way" might have been, but I agree with the US' assessment that not trying something would have made things worse.  Russia would have reinforced its defenses even more and been able to reconstitute its offensive power to a far greater extent than it did.

Ukraine's decision to abandon the initial concept of the counter offensive was wise.  This likely prevented Ukraine from suffering the same fate as the Germans in Kursk 1943.  In both cases the attacker was surprised and humbled by the scope and scale of the defenses, but in the German's case they threw everything they had, the Soviets counter attacked, and the German lines collapsed.  In Ukraine's case, they reconfigured their attack plans, the Russians counter attacked for months without success, and the war grinds on without Ukraine collapsing.

Steve

Protip, no paywall if you just register. I think you get like 5 free articles a month 

[Haiduk]

Video of night assault of Russian Volunteer Corps near Avdiivka. Likely RVC is attached to 47th mech.brigade, so they use their Bradleys.

Detailed describing what's going on is in long tweet. I just add, in this attack RVC assaulters killed 11 Russians, 16-18 injured and one was captured. Own losses - 1 KIA, 7 WIA

 

Damn, the video isn't embedded by the phone, just a link copy %)

[The_MonkeyKing]

49 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

First of two reports from the Washington Post about what went wrong with the summer counter-offensive.  First one is about higher level problems and differences between US and Ukrainian view points.  The article is very long and paywalled, but here are the top level points they explored:

Part One:

 

Part Two:

Both articles are solid.  There wasn't anything in either that would raise eyebrows here.

Stepping back and looking at everything, from the preplanning to the end result, I think both the US and Ukraine were correct.  The problem was each had concepts that were in opposition with each other.  It boiled down to the US saying Ukraine needed to strike fast and in one place, Ukraine said it needed more time and had to keep Russian forces elsewhere occupied.  Ukraine said it needed more forces to achieve anything significant, the US said they had what they needed if they concentrated.  US said they had to fire and move, Ukraine said they found moving didn't work without first firing.  Ukraine wanted more ammo than the West could supply, the US said they wouldn't need as much if they concentrated on one place.  Etc. etc.

Both sides underestimated how difficult the Russian defensive lines would be regardless of how they were attacked.  The US underappreciated the role of drones (attacking and being attacked), Ukraine didn't seem to grasps that F-16s couldn't just be thrown into the battleplan. Etc, etc.

My takeaway from this is that the big failing of the US and Ukraine was not understanding that both views were simultaneously correct and wrong.  This should have indicated that they needed to come up with a third option (sorry sburke if this makes you shudder!).  Something that both sides could agree was optimized for the situation as both perceived it to be.  Instead, Ukraine went with their strategic concept hoping that the West's training and equipment would make up for various shortcomings and the US reluctantly supported them because they were the ones doing the dying.

I have NO idea what the "third way" might have been, but I agree with the US' assessment that not trying something would have made things worse.  Russia would have reinforced its defenses even more and been able to reconstitute its offensive power to a far greater extent than it did.

Ukraine's decision to abandon the initial concept of the counter offensive was wise.  This likely prevented Ukraine from suffering the same fate as the Germans in Kursk 1943.  In both cases the attacker was surprised and humbled by the scope and scale of the defenses, but in the German's case they threw everything they had, the Soviets counter attacked, and the German lines collapsed.  In Ukraine's case, they reconfigured their attack plans, the Russians counter attacked for months without success, and the war grinds on without Ukraine collapsing.

Steve

To me this article confirms the biggest single mistake is the absolute "no boots on the ground" approach of the USA. That is something that has huge first and second order effect on pretty much everything.

This article confirms with all the person friction and differences in the situational picture that both sides were in the dark without even realising it. Interestingly the intelligence community had the better picture this time than the Pentagon.

The largest "proxy war" in recent history demands the largest in-country liaison officer and monitoring mission in recent history. And no, the couple of CIA guys and British spec-ops do not cut it at all.

Much of this could have been prevented and rethought with working information flow. The Pentagon did not understand the Russians or the Ukrainians or the nature of warfare there.

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Video of night assault of Russian Volunteer Corps near Avdiivka. Likely RVC is attached to 47th mech.brigade, so they use their Bradleys.

Detailed describing what's going on is in long tweet. I just add, in this attack RVC assaulters killed 11 Russians, 16-18 injured and one was captured. Own losses - 1 KIA, 7 WIA

https://x.com/albafella1/status/1731787787953750016?s=20

Damn, the video isn't embedded by the phone, just a link copy %)

Hmm interesting- to my knowledge this unit along with other smaller "legions" was to be used for special operations, sabotage and strategic missions, at least half a year ago it was strongly underlined by its members. Although detachments did participated in several ground assaults from that time inlcuding Zaporizhia.

 

On lighter note:

 

[Sojourner]

4 hours ago, sburke said:

they always had to have 3

 

[Kraft]

Counting exercise

[kimbosbread]

2 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

To me this article confirms the biggest single mistake is the absolute "no boots on the ground" approach of the USA. That is something that has huge first and second order effect on pretty much everything.

This article confirms with all the person friction and differences in the situational picture that both sides were in the dark without even realising it. Interestingly the intelligence community had the better picture this time than the Pentagon.

1000 times this. The intelligence agencies had a better idea partly because of their not insubstanial presence on the ground near the front.

[cesmonkey]

A look at Palmer Lucky's defense startup, including brief interviews with him and his executives.