How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I gotta be honest after Severodonetsk nothing the RA has done resembles an operational level offensive.

Sure, but why does that matter?  In the end it's about Russia deciding to attack somewhere and Ukraine being obligated to defend or yield ground.  If Russia threw 20-40k more bodies into trying to take Kupyansk I think they very well might have done so if Ukraine didn't mount a Bakhmut level defense.  Mountains of bodies is what got them Bakhmut, so why not Kupyansk?

Which is the point I've been making all along... Ukraine can only avoid a tactical battle of attrition of Russia's choosing if it opts to retreat.  How many times can Ukraine retreat tactically before there's an operational or strategic impact?

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

As to tackling those minefields....what were all those sexy UAS doing?  Maybe EW was working for the RA, but then you HIMARS the EW platforms, they are pumping out a lot of EM.  We did not see a single UAS strike on rubes laying minefields last winter.  It takes remarkably few infantry to get eyes on a minelaying op...they are not subtle.  Aggressive patrolling can disrupt it.

Yeah, as we talked about a couple of posts back this is gnawing at me quite a lot.  Laying thick minefields is no small effort.  It should be noticeable and it should be disruptable when noticed.  Yet it seems like the Ukrainian units in the south practiced a "don't ask, don't tell" policy.

This is an important thing for Ukraine's senior command to have a firm answer about because if they determine that their line forces dropped the ball, then they had better make sure they don't drop it again or retaking territory will be off the menu for the future.

Steve

[FancyCat]

23 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yeah, as we talked about a couple of posts back this is gnawing at me quite a lot.  Laying thick minefields is no small effort.  It should be noticeable and it should be disruptable when noticed.  Yet it seems like the Ukrainian units in the south practiced a "don't ask, don't tell" policy.

This is an important thing for Ukraine's senior command to have a firm answer about because if they determine that their line forces dropped the ball, then they had better make sure they don't drop it again or retaking territory will be off the menu for the future.

Steve

I am unsure how much expertise is needed for minefield laying, maybe Russia's mobilization surge accomplished the mine laying jobs? 

[poesel]

Question: after the Kakhovka dam was blown up, there was a lot of talk about the now empty reservoir becoming passable. At least now with frozen ground it should really be passable. There is of course still a river, but I have heard nothing from that front.

Why?

[Beleg85]

48 minutes ago, JonS said:

Density doesnt really come in to it. Doctrine and mindset does. If you are minded to patrol - if it's built into the core of your infantry ethos - then you will patrol aggressively regardless.

Yes, but over time you lose soldiers that may be difficult to relace in the long run. So tip for that; it seems a lot depend on individual commanders of brigades or even battalions and may be difficult to implement centrally, on the scale of entire front.

 

Finland closes last border with Russia to pedestrians for two weeks (cargo can still go through... really hope not many people will die in those lorries, soon).

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67555626

Very interesting if Kremlin will push for same scale of organized hybrid warfare as Lukashenka, or it will be just temporary attempt to search for weak spots/apply political pressure. Judging by TG trafficking rooms, migrants are delighted by Russian hospitallity and "all inclusive" trip to the north. There are professional observers of this market here who alarm numbers of participants in these chats grew 10-15 times in just over a month. Delay between first surge of interest and people actually crossing the border is usually one-three weeks, depending on reactions of attacked state. They may also judge it is not worth it, but it seems Putin wants to at least spoil the Christmas in the far north.

[Haiduk]

22 minutes ago, poesel said:

Question: after the Kakhovka dam was blown up, there was a lot of talk about the now empty reservoir becoming passable. At least now with frozen ground it should really be passable. There is of course still a river, but I have heard nothing from that front.

Why?

Winter in southern Ukraine is soft and wet. Dnipro near Kherson freezes very rarely. Basin of former reservoir is not only Dnipro itslelf, but several smaller rivers, many small lakes and swampy ground. This is don't freez enough for heavy vehciles passing. Though, Russians reportedly alredy build fortifications in Kamyanka-Dniprovska oppose to Nikopol, so they consider opportunit of UKR attack. Before WWII here was a bridge in this area and remains of it embankments can be used for something.   

Edited November 28, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Next Russian general is gone:

Major-general Vladimir Zavadskiy, deputy commander of 14th Army Corps of Northen Fleet coastal forces. Reportedly has blown up by mine on 28th Novemver 2023. 

From 2018 to June 2021 he was a commander of elite 4th "Kantemirovskaya" tank division.

 

 

Edited November 28, 2023 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

25 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

I am unsure how much expertise is needed for minefield laying, maybe Russia's mobilization surge accomplished the mine laying jobs? 

It's not the skill as much it is the scale.  Pretty much anybody you don't care about can lay a minefield.  Especially one on the surface, which with tall grass becomes almost as effective as being buried.  The issue is the SCALE of the minefields.

The amount of time and labor it takes to lay minefields of this depth, density, and scale is massive.  This is not "sneak a couple of guys forward in the middle of the night" sort of thing.  Cripes, the transportation of the mines to the deployment area is no small feat!  This either took months with significant manpower effort or weeks with massive effort.  There's no way Ukraine could have NOT seen it happening and disruption should have happened soon after.

I suspect part of the reason Russia was successful is that Ukraine has very limited artillery and attack drones available to it.  The south has always been low priority since before the war began.  This meant that the line infantry would have had to disrupt the efforts by venturing out of their trenches and engaging in hit and run ambushes.  My guess, and it is only a guess, is that local commanders didn't want to do this and so it wasn't done.

Steve

[dan/california]

12 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Yes, but over time you lose soldiers that may be difficult to relace in the long run. So tip for that; it seems a lot depend on individual commanders of brigades or even battalions and may be difficult to implement centrally, on the scale of entire front.

 

Finland closes last border with Russia to pedestrians for two weeks (cargo can still go through... really hope not many people will die in those lorries, soon).

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67555626

Very interesting if Kremlin will push for same scale of organized hybrid warfare as Lukashenka, or it will be just temporary attempt to search for weak spots/apply political pressure. Judging by TG trafficking rooms, migrants are delighted by Russian hospitallity and "all inclusive" trip to the north. There are professional observers of this market here who alarm numbers of participants in these chats grew 10-15 times in just over a month. Delay between first surge of interest and people actually crossing the border is usually one-three weeks, depending on reactions of attacked state. They may also judge it is not worth it, but it seems Putin wants to at least spoil the Christmas in the far north.

 I agree Russia will push this fairly hard. If nothing else is is good propaganda for Russian TV. The sting in the tail though, will be when this little campaign of aggravation has run its course. I fully expect all of these poor migrants to be forcibly mobilezed into the Russian army when they are no further use otherwise. 

[JonS]

23 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Yes, but over time you lose soldiers that may be difficult to relace in the long run.

I mean ... yeah? Bringing everyone home at the end of a tour is great, but if that's your sole aim then you're probably in the wrong line of work. Soldiers are like ammo; they get expended to achieve objectives. If the objective isn't worth the expenditure, then change - or rethink - the objective.

 

Edited November 28, 2023 by JonS

[Letter from Prague]

I'm not sure why you'd say "Russia is done".

Russia is winning in all metrics they care about - they wanted a piece of Ukraine and they got it, they will get to keep it forever and try again in a few years after West pushes Ukraine to give up this round. They got to send thousands of prisoners, poor men from undeveloped regions and minorities to their deaths. They wanted to show NATO in particular and Western world order in general as a shams and the whole West as weak and corrupt, and they succeeded. They strengthened their relationships with similar regimes like China and Iran as well. Common Russians even get to bully Ukrainian refugees when they visit West for vacations.

The only price they had to pay for that was some sanctions that do nothing, and that's about it.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Which is the point I've been making all along... Ukraine can only avoid a tactical battle of attrition of Russia's choosing if it opts to retreat.  How many times can Ukraine retreat tactically before there's an operational or strategic impact?

Or attack somewhere else.  I guess this is my point.  Ukraine got pulled into a tactical battle of attrition of Russia's choosing and then Russia went and created massive defences elsewhere.  To my mind that is not a win no matter how much the RA of Wagner lose in that initial battle, unless it can break the Russians overall.  It clearly did not.  So I think we are trying to make a virtue out of circumstances that were not optimal.

Now how the UA got pulled into this? - e.g. Bakhmut but unable to attack anywhere else.  Is a major question. Did they over extend last Fall?  The UA needed to defend Bakhmut and attack to disrupt the obstacle mess the RA built.  Better yet attack elsewhere along the line to pull the RA laterally and cause direct stress.  If they could not do that while the RA could do the inverse then there is a deeper problem here.  Russia can continue this cycle until they have locked up the entire front, and then still pick and choose where to attack.

This also does not track as we know that both forces are roughly the same size in country.

[Beleg85]

7 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I agree Russia will push this fairly hard. If nothing else is is good propaganda for Russian TV. The sting in the tail though, will be when this little campaign of aggravation has run its course. I fully expect all of these poor migrants to be forcibly mobilezed into the Russian army when they are no further use otherwise. 

If they would try to mobilize them, their sources would soon collapse; trafficking channels in Middle East react immediatelly to every change in the matrix. Forced mobilization may be limited to long-time workers from Central Asia in Russia, not people who can afford to pay expensive all-inclusive trips with bikes.

3 minutes ago, JonS said:

I mean ... yeah? Bringing everyone home at the end of a tour is great, but if that's your sole aim then you're probably in the wrong line of work. Soldiers are like anmo; they get expended to achieve objectives. If the objective isn't worth the expenditure, then change - or rethink - the objective.

And they do this occassionally, usually on individual-unit basis.

Just from stories of several volunteers (all from more commando-like units) aggresive patroling itself may change its meaning during course of this war, too. Drones, mines, snipers, even tanks hunting for single soldiers are regular feature here. So-so possible across porous northern border and forested regions, on the verge of unsustainability in Zaporizhia/Donietsk.

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

22 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

If they would try to mobilize them, their sources would soon collapse; trafficking channels in Middle East react immediatelly to every change in the matrix. Forced mobilization may be limited to long-time workers from Central Asia in Russia, not people who can afford to pay expensive all-inclusive trips with bikes.

Long term thinking has not been Russia's strong suite.

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

I'm not sure why you'd say "Russia is done".

Russia is winning in all metrics they care about - they wanted a piece of Ukraine and they got it, they will get to keep it forever and try again in a few years after West pushes Ukraine to give up this round. They got to send thousands of prisoners, poor men from undeveloped regions and minorities to their deaths. They wanted to show NATO in particular and Western world order in general as a shams and the whole West as weak and corrupt, and they succeeded. They strengthened their relationships with similar regimes like China and Iran as well. Common Russians even get to bully Ukrainian refugees when they visit West for vacations.

The only price they had to pay for that was some sanctions that do nothing, and that's about it.

Well, that's about as wrong as wrong can be

We've gone over this many times already.  Russia entered this war for a variety of reasons, none of which it has successfully accomplished.  Worse (for Russia), it has lost ground on many things it cares very deeply about.  I'm tired and don't care to go through the same old laundry list we go through every time we get into this, so here's a quick list of things Putin and Russia care deeply about:

1. Russia wants the world to fear it and obey it like other super powers.  Instead much of the world is laughing at how incompetent and ineffective Russia is.
2. bringing Ukraine back into Russia's orbit.  Nope, the opposite has happened.
3. if Ukraine can't be conquered, then it should be dismembered and destroyed.  That didn't happen either.
4. if Ukraine can't be conquered or dismembered, then it needs to be made toxic and isolated.  The opposite has happened.
5. NATO needs to be shown pointless and impotent.  While I agree Russia has shown certain areas of weakness within NATO, more people believe in the purpose of NATO now than before the war started.
6. Russia wanted to leverage undermining NATO so it could get the Baltics under its thumb.  Instead he got NATO to enlarge by two nations, including strategically important Finland.
7. part of the reason Russia wanted Ukraine was to exploit it economically to benefit his power base in Moscow.  Instead he wrecked much of the Russian economy and cost the oligarchs he didn't murder a lot of money.
8. the influence campaign to disrupt the world order was supposed to be strengthened by attacking Ukraine, instead it was wrecked.
9. Russia's entire economy is based on energy exports.  Those customers are gone and it has not found replacements.  Certainly not lucrative ones like Europe (see recent article on China beating up Russia on pricing).
10. energy has been a primary weapon of choice for Russia.  With the loss of European customer base that's gone now.
11. the arms export market for Russia was an important part of its defense strategy as well as national pride.  Nobody wants to do business with Russia now because it isn't clear that Russia can deliver.  And even if it can, countries have reason to question it's a good investment in their defense capabilities.
12. nowhere on Putin's agenda was becoming dependent upon Iran, North Korea, and most of all China.  And yet, it now is.
13. nowhere on Putin's agenda was spending down 40 years worth of accumulated military power, and yet it has done just that.
14. sanctions prior to 2022 were damaging to Russia's economy and sense of national pride.  Now, it's put them back decades.  Sure, they can still get much of what they need to keep their economy going, but it costs more and is less certain.  People who expected sanctions to crush Russia within 1-2 years were always wrong to think that way.  Sanctions take a long time to work, even longer if the goal is regime change vs. kneecapping the nation's ability to project power.

And lastly, this war was supposed to be an easy win like Crimea.  It was also intended to be the first of many expressions of Russian greatness.  Instead, it's mired in a massively expensive war with absolutely no chance, at all, of paying for itself or achieving any of Russia's national goals.

There's lots more, but the point is that "Russia is done" in terms of what Putin wanted it to be.  It's a wreck and every day it gets worse.

Steve

[Beleg85]

23 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Long term thinking has not been Russia's strong suite.

Sure, but the crucial issue here may be actual benefit for middle and low-level aparatchiks who organize trips. In Belarus they earn a lot of money on it, on average 5k$ for person probably already exceeding hundred million of dollars left in various pockets. Money may not be primary factor for Russian officials/businessmen in Petersburg or Moscow who would organize such channels, as they are relatively better off than both Belarussians or even rest of Russians. counting middle-men, 500 or 1k $ in single pocket for migrant is not that massive amount of cash, considering challanges of making this work: tickets, accomodation, fixers on both sides of border, equipment etc. It all costs.

So now we will observe probably levee en masse with green light from Kremlin rather than centrally coordinated half-military action like we witnessed on our and Baltic borders. If it will stick, Putin may be more interested in this kind of business. But overal, I am surprised that Kremlin did not try it on Finland before in larger scale.

On light side, if they really consider participation in organized trafficking as source of income even in petersburg/Moscow, it may be indicator that lower workers of regime are in true financial troubles.

Edited November 28, 2023 by Beleg85

[Kraft]

Not sure if it has been posted yet.

Russian military expenditure increased to 30% of GDP.

A 70% increase.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-approves-big-military-spending-hikes-russias-budget-2023-11-27/?utm_source=reddit.com

 

Edited November 28, 2023 by Kraft

[kimbosbread]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I do not see us making the same mistake twice.  Or at least I hope not. South Korea houses the US 8th Army, a similar situation needs to be set up in Ukraine, preferably with European nations taking stake.  This puts a chip on the table.  Russia can make duck sounds but what are they going to do?  Violate Minsk 3?  Like they were going to anyway.

Oh, I can definitely see my country making the same mistake. To quote my favorite political philosopher “Human beings, who are almost unique in having the ability to learn from the experience of others, are also remarkable for their apparent disinclination to do so.”

48 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

I'm not sure why you'd say "Russia is done".

Russia’s economy is in shambles, they’ve lost all their good high-skill people and they are now a Chinese vassal state. And as usual, everybody hates them even more.

Ukraine’s real peace dividend is all the mobiks returning home and causing chaos. I imagine Russia has not planned well for demobilization at all. That would provide a great opportunity for Ukraine to attack.

Edited November 28, 2023 by kimbosbread

[The_Capt]

50 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Well, that's about as wrong as wrong can be

We've gone over this many times already.  Russia entered this war for a variety of reasons, none of which it has successfully accomplished.  Worse (for Russia), it has lost ground on many things it cares very deeply about.  I'm tired and don't care to go through the same old laundry list we go through every time we get into this, so here's a quick list of things Putin and Russia care deeply about:

1. Russia wants the world to fear it and obey it like other super powers.  Instead much of the world is laughing at how incompetent and ineffective Russia is.
2. bringing Ukraine back into Russia's orbit.  Nope, the opposite has happened.
3. if Ukraine can't be conquered, then it should be dismembered and destroyed.  That didn't happen either.
4. if Ukraine can't be conquered or dismembered, then it needs to be made toxic and isolated.  The opposite has happened.
5. NATO needs to be shown pointless and impotent.  While I agree Russia has shown certain areas of weakness within NATO, more people believe in the purpose of NATO now than before the war started.
6. Russia wanted to leverage undermining NATO so it could get the Baltics under its thumb.  Instead he got NATO to enlarge by two nations, including strategically important Finland.
7. part of the reason Russia wanted Ukraine was to exploit it economically to benefit his power base in Moscow.  Instead he wrecked much of the Russian economy and cost the oligarchs he didn't murder a lot of money.
8. the influence campaign to disrupt the world order was supposed to be strengthened by attacking Ukraine, instead it was wrecked.
9. Russia's entire economy is based on energy exports.  Those customers are gone and it has not found replacements.  Certainly not lucrative ones like Europe (see recent article on China beating up Russia on pricing).
10. energy has been a primary weapon of choice for Russia.  With the loss of European customer base that's gone now.
11. the arms export market for Russia was an important part of its defense strategy as well as national pride.  Nobody wants to do business with Russia now because it isn't clear that Russia can deliver.  And even if it can, countries have reason to question it's a good investment in their defense capabilities.
12. nowhere on Putin's agenda was becoming dependent upon Iran, North Korea, and most of all China.  And yet, it now is.
13. nowhere on Putin's agenda was spending down 40 years worth of accumulated military power, and yet it has done just that.
14. sanctions prior to 2022 were damaging to Russia's economy and sense of national pride.  Now, it's put them back decades.  Sure, they can still get much of what they need to keep their economy going, but it costs more and is less certain.  People who expected sanctions to crush Russia within 1-2 years were always wrong to think that way.  Sanctions take a long time to work, even longer if the goal is regime change vs. kneecapping the nation's ability to project power.

And lastly, this war was supposed to be an easy win like Crimea.  It was also intended to be the first of many expressions of Russian greatness.  Instead, it's mired in a massively expensive war with absolutely no chance, at all, of paying for itself or achieving any of Russia's national goals.

There's lots more, but the point is that "Russia is done" in terms of what Putin wanted it to be.  It's a wreck and every day it gets worse.

Steve

Now here is something we can fully agree upon.  How on earth anyone believes Russia has “won” is beyond me.  If winning means failing to achieve every strategic objective, stated and unstated.  In fact achieving the exact opposite effect in many ways.  And destroying yourself in the process.  Then I want to lose.  

If the war stops right now, Russia is going to gain something like 6 or 7 percent of additional lands, much of which is blasted and contaminated.  Lands they cannot afford to pull resources out of because that would cost infrastructure and expertise that left in droves.  They will never pull more out of the land they stole from Ukraine than what it costs them to take it. 

Weirdly, Russia probably had a better chance to simply offer Ukraine a mountain of cash for that 6% and it would have been cheaper in the long run.  Or free oil and gas, whatever.  Employing hard military power was the dumbest Russian idea since…well, 1905.

[Harmon Rabb]

President Pavel is a decorated military officer and in my opinion a hero for what he did in the 90s. I'm sure some folks from Czechia and France who read this forum know what I am talking about.

I think his opinion is worth reading.

Quote

The current Western defense deliveries to Ukraine were insufficient to maintain a high-intensity operation, Czech President Petr Pavel said when discussing Kyiv's counteroffensive in an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere Della Sera published on Nov. 27.

Kyiv's partners did not keep their promise to provide enough artillery shells, and the training on F-16 aircraft is not proceeding as fast as it should, Pavel noted.

In turn, Russia ramped up arms production and mobilization efforts and secured 1 million shells from North Korea, he added.

If the West misses its opportunity to support Ukraine, next year could be more favorable to Moscow, Pavel warned.

The president also pointed out that winter hardships, exacerbated by damaged infrastructure and coupled with growing hesitation among Western partners, will likely cause frustration among Ukrainians and may undermine counteroffensive operations.

Pavel believes that the allies still have an opportunity to change the current situation and tip the balance in Ukraine's favor. Russia's defeat is in the West's interests, as Moscow's victory would demonstrate the weakness of democratic powers to other regimes in the world, he stressed.

"We have no choice but to give Ukraine everything it needs to succeed in its mission to restore sovereignty and control of its borders: anything less will be our failure," Pavel, a former NATO Military Committee chair, commented.

Signs of fatigue and hesitation have been becoming visible among Kyiv's allies, linked by some to the limited success of Ukraine's counteroffensive and the breakout of conflict in Gaza.

Political forces skeptical of Ukraine aid have been growing stronger both in the U.S. and the EU, undermining support efforts and causing concern for the future of the pro-Kyiv alliance.

In his earlier statement on Nov. 9, Pavel said that battlefield developments do not indicate Ukraine can gain the upper hand militarily.

He added that time favors Russia and urged the West to commit to long-standing support to prevent Moscow from securing any kind of victory.

Source: Czech president: Western military support for Ukraine insufficient for high-intensity operation (The Kyiv Independent)

[Battlefront.com]

14 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Now here is something we can fully agree upon.  How on earth anyone believes Russia has “won” is beyond me.  If winning means failing to achieve every strategic objective, stated and unstated.  In fact achieving the exact opposite effect in many ways.  And destroying yourself in the process.  Then I want to lose.  

If the war stops right now, Russia is going to gain something like 6 or 7 percent of additional lands, much of which is blasted and contaminated.  Lands they cannot afford to pull resources out of because that would cost infrastructure and expertise that left in droves.  They will never pull more out of the land they stole from Ukraine than what it costs them to take it. 

Weirdly, Russia probably had a better chance to simply offer Ukraine a mountain of cash for that 6% and it would have been cheaper in the long run.  Or free oil and gas, whatever.  Employing hard military power was the dumbest Russian idea since…well, 1905.

Keep in mind the % of ground seized compared to Russia's prewar land area.  I think we're talking about a fraction of a faction of a percentage.  If this tiny amount of land held some incredible money making resource, important population center, port, etc. then maybe it could be seen as a gem in a pile of dung.  But the only significant city they have now, Mariupol, is flattened and depopulated.  No prize there.  Plus, it really is only useful for maintaining the otherwise non-important lands they currently occupy.  It's not like it opened up a trade route to any place else.

Now, if Russia had taken Kyiv and little else, that would have been quite different.  It might not be all that useful to Russia, but it sure as heck would be a major loss for Ukraine.  But they couldn't even do that.

Oh, and one of the things I didn't throw into my quickly constructed list is the ramifications that come along with the massive and long term damage to trade relations.  Russia built much of its pre-war economic strength on the backs of Western companies' expertise and investments.  For the most part they are gone and won't be coming back until Russia has somehow made amends for all of its evils.  Russia lacked the ability to be successful on its own when it wasn't operating under sanctions and a massive PR black eye.  At best they might be able to meet some of the basic needs and wants of their own people, but it will be more like the Soviet Union than Russia of the 2000s.

 

Steve

[danfrodo]

Good lord that is really funny.  I vaguely remember that one.

[chris talpas]

Not to digress too much but continuing the 80’s commercial with a Soviet theme

 

[kimbosbread]

On the other hand, we have to remember that Russia and China have perhaps different winning conditions than we do,.

Perhaps Russia is content to trade relations with the west for a land bridge to Crimea and becoming a vassal of China.

Perhaps China (really, Winnie the Flu) is willing to risk economic ruin and starvation in return for Taiwan.

I assume a dictator has much more asymmetric victory conditions than a democracy, if we would phrase it that way.

[kimbosbread]

Any thoughts on Ukraine opening up an alternate front, ie Transnistrya? Surely they have the manpower to do that (or borrow it, as it would be much easier to hide super special friend casualties). It would make Russia look bad, and close down a giant security hole they currently have.

[Battlefront.com]

21 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

On the other hand, we have to remember that Russia and China have perhaps different winning conditions than we do,.

Perhaps Russia is content to trade relations with the west for a land bridge to Crimea and becoming a vassal of China.

Perhaps China (really, Winnie the Flu) is willing to risk economic ruin and starvation in return for Taiwan.

I assume a dictator has much more asymmetric victory conditions than a democracy, if we would phrase it that way.

Sure, the old asymmetric concept of victory is appropriate to examine.  Someone who sells sex for a hit of heroin might consider debasing themselves and getting VD or beat up is worth the end result.  Me?  I certainly don't.

Another example is perceived worth of an object.  I wouldn't pay $10,000 for a rare stamp, but two stamp collectors might get into a bidding war starting at $10,000.  The winner at $18,000 might feel he got a great deal, and by stamp collector standards maybe he did, but if it cost him his marriage and his house because the price wasn't affordable, well then I'd say that there's grounds to question if it really was such a great deal even if he would rather have that stamp and live in a seedy motel alone and ridiculed by everybody he once new.

Objective measurements of success/failure can not be chucked out the window completely simply because someone's perception of reality requires that it is.

Based on everything I know about the Soviet and Russian mentality, I am pretty sure that if Vlad had been given access to a time machine in January 2022, went forward 2-3 years, saw what the state of things was, then went back... my money is on him not attacking in February 2022.  At least not a full scale invasion.

Steve