How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

O.o

Quote

A surprising discovery could also ease the administration's choice to send the weapons: The U.S. has found it has more ATACMS in its inventory than originally assessed, the two officials told ABC News.

The serviceability of the rediscovered stockpile is not yet clear, nor which specific type of missiles it contains.

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-send-long-range-atacms-missiles-ukraine-time/story?id=103031722

 

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

But does that blade not cut both ways? West has enormous C4ISR capability and enormous stand-off capability. US Navy can probably delivery hundred cruise missiles anywhere in the world in half hour, and more importantly knows where to deliver them. Lot of that capability was wasted on blowing up shacks with some dudes in middle east, but that doesn't mean it's not there.

I guess the most extreme case might be something like we see in Ukraine right now outside of ground fighting - the war of who can outproduce each other on air defense, missiles and suicide drones, all enabled by C4ISR.

As for SEAD/DEAD I think the really tricky part is that we don't really know how well does the prized stealth of NATO planes work in peer conflict. The planes might be literally invisible and untargetable and make everything very very one-sided, or it might actually not help at all, or anything in between. We don't know.

It does and we can definitely see and hit, but so can China.  Been researching Chinese military and close air support is 70kms stand off.  I am not as to “stealth” never really been tested but for stand off fights it will likely work.

So we are likely talking a change in what air superiority means.  It is actually missile or deep strike superiority.  Our biggest problem in the west is that we are addicted to big steel, all the services.  In raw tonnage we are extremely heavy and concentrated…and expansive.  If we run into an opponent who has gone “everywhere, all at once and cheap” the economics could quickly swing against us.  It is all about cost.  The price of our way of warfare looks to be priced out because we kept on the big steel train.  Like Dreadnoughts our entire military concepts are all about big sharp mass.  Again, I am not worried about an opponent who has been fighting like Russia, I am worried about one who fights like Ukraine.

And none of stand off or missiles solve for small distributed and portable systems that all can kill heavy.  I mean jury is still out but evidence is mounting that the fabric of warfare is shifting. Ukraine would be an anomaly if not for the trend lines extending backward. Our supply lines are extremely vulnerable, minefields kill our stuff just as easily as anyone else’s. I can see an opponent with similar C4ISR and systems grinding us to a halt just like we have seen in this war.  So What?  Well we simply are not built for a high intensity protracted conflict.  We are not set up for a war of Denial/Attrition, we have always assumed that problem away.

So what is the solution?  Go light, go cheap, go smart, go long and go lots.  Shift to a war of Attrition footing within industry and military strategy.  Denial is the new Decisive.  Drop your tools, shed the weight and get ready for a crazy ride.

[danfrodo]

53 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Additive manufacturing on the battlefield was something I brought up years ago and was sort of laughed at.

Having worked very heavily in additive manuf from 2015 to march 2023, I can't imagine why anyone laughed at you.  What a great idea.  We could just 3d print bullets.  Or arty shells.  Or drones.  On site.  totally makes sense.  Or maybe we could 3d print replacement soldiers, on the battlefield.

[paxromana]

10 hours ago, Butschi said:

You know, the other side might just try to do the same. So, what will the US do if the others are not compliant enough to just let them play to their strengths and target the enemy's weaknesses?

It's not like that hasn't happened in a couple of wars in the past...

I read somewhere a long time ago that, for any given conflict, one side's commanders will be close to 100% wrong and a large chunk of the other side's commanders will be wrong as well.

Russia is obviously (hopefully) close to 100% wrong ...

[kevinkin]

3 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

True, this might not be defensive primacy but "the West gave Russians a year to dig in by trickling support for Ukraine" primacy.

The RA was sort of on the run last year and that was the time to go for the jugular. I know I know escalation escalation. Imagine what an integrated air campaign could have done to them as they moved in the open into their current positions. But that cow has left the barn and is irrelevant now. However, if we can learn from the UA regarding squad tactics we can self reflect on our own mistakes. I would donate money for a UA memorial in Washington DC. Not happening, but you all know what I mean. Very few in my nation do. 

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

I can't imagine why anyone laughed at you.  What a great idea.  We could just 3d print bullets.  Or arty shells.  Or drones.  On site.  totally makes sense.  Or maybe we could 3d print replacement soldiers, on the battlefield.

Well few have 20/20 vision. There are nearsighted, farsighted, and the short sited. Let's leave it at that. 

[kevinkin]

Myers told USA TODAY the Ukrainians use "pin pricks" and news about taking back land to demonstrate progress to the West − but are less transparent about the cost in Ukrainian lives.

"They don’t talk about the counterstrikes by the Russians, who don’t care about gaining or holding ground in the kill zone and are experts at laying traps," he said.

A very short read but I would not discount it because it does not fit the narrative:

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/ukraine/2023/09/07/ukraine-russia-war-live-updates/70783569007/

Basically, security and economic growth matter more than finite borders as long security and growth don't depend on finite borders. I think this might be the US strategy. But using attrition to get there is very painful. So we need to get off our high horse and think strategically and not that there is some artificial goal line to be crossed as if this were Monday night football. 

Edited September 9, 2023 by kevinkin

[The_Capt]

34 minutes ago, paxromana said:

I read somewhere a long time ago that, for any given conflict, one side's commanders will be close to 100% wrong and a large chunk of the other side's commanders will be wrong as well.

Russia is obviously (hopefully) close to 100% wrong ...

Well we already saw that in this war.  Russia was supposed to take Kyiv in a few days and occupy half the country in a couple weeks.  Best case scenarios had Ukraine holding out a little longer and then staging a wicked insurgency that we would be supporting.  That was a lot of western expertise and metrics feeding those estimates.  Mainstream military thinking took months to realize that this war was very different and that they were very wrong.  I personally listened to a retired 3 - star declare last summer that “there was no way Ukraine could achieve a military victory.”  

By any realistic metrics that has already happened.  Unless the RA walks out of a phone booth and manages to retake all the ground the lost since Apr 22, they have completely failed to achieve anything that looks like military strategic success.  They essentially blew themselves up taking on a tiny relative power, humiliated their own military on the global stage, destroyed their ready force and currently hold something like 7 addition percent of Ukraine beyond what they already held, most of it blasted empty fields.  The only thing they can point to as a success is the strategic corridor jointing Crimea to Donbas and it is currently under assault by an opponent that wasn’t supposed to exist right now.

Yes folks it is possible to be “more wrong” and western military thinking before this war proved it.  Why?  Because our basic metrics and assumptions were way off.  Everyone ran to “well no one expected the RA to suck so bad,” Well yes and no. They do suck but it became apparent very quick that mass wasn’t working.  Manoeuvre wasn’t working.  Combined arms as we knew it wasn’t working.  Mechanized wasn’t working.  Air power wasn’t working.  Russia sucks but the UA does not and even they are challenged in these areas right now.

But by all means let’s simply shrug our shoulders and go “well that was interesting, now we were talking about buying more tanks,” after this is all over.

[danfrodo]

15 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well we already saw that in this war.  Russia was supposed to take Kyiv in a few days and occupy half the country in a couple weeks.  Best case scenarios had Ukraine holding out a little longer and then staging a wicked insurgency that we would be supporting.  That was a lot of western expertise and metrics feeding those estimates.  Mainstream military thinking took months to realize that this war was very different and that they were very wrong.  I personally listened to a retired 3 - star declare last summer that “there was no way Ukraine could achieve a military victory.”  

By any realistic metrics that has already happened.  Unless the RA walks out of a phone booth and manages to retake all the ground the lost since Apr 22, they have completely failed to achieve anything that looks like military strategic success.  They essentially blew themselves up taking on a tiny relative power, humiliated their own military on the global stage, destroyed their ready force and currently hold something like 7 addition percent of Ukraine beyond what they already held, most of it blasted empty fields.  The only thing they can point to as a success is the strategic corridor jointing Crimea to Donbas and it is currently under assault by an opponent that wasn’t supposed to exist right now.

Yes folks it is possible to be “more wrong” and western military thinking before this war proved it.  Why?  Because our basic metrics and assumptions were way off.  Everyone ran to “well no one expected the RA to suck so bad,” Well yes and no. They do suck but it became apparent very quick that mass wasn’t working.  Manoeuvre wasn’t working.  Combined arms as we knew it wasn’t working.  Mechanized wasn’t working.  Air power wasn’t working.  Russia sucks but the UA does not and even they are challenged in these areas right now.

But by all means let’s simply shrug our shoulders and go “well that was interesting, now we were talking about buying more tanks,” after this is all over.

The weird part of this is that UKR is basically facing WW1 France, w trench lines in depth stretching for the entire front.  Plus mines. There is no flanking, there is no maneuver until one breaks through.  But is that what NATO militaries were built for?  Where was NATO expected to face this kind of challenge?  So I am not sure NATO got things 'wrong'.  They were just planning on very different challenges than this.  Combined arms and maneuver would probably work really well if RU was trying to advance and NATO was told to stop them.  

I actually was hoping UKR would flank the northern end of the line through RU territory (for just a short ways) and cut off Starobilsk.  That would've been fun.

[Harmon Rabb]

3 hours ago, FancyCat said:

O.o

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-send-long-range-atacms-missiles-ukraine-time/story?id=103031722

 

About goddamn time.

[FancyCat]

Thread on ATACMS.

Quote

1/ Assuming ABC News reporting is accurate re ATACMS, a very wise move by the administration. Here’s a short thread as to why:

2/ It eliminates the last big item on Ukraine’s 16 month-long shopping list — a liar HUR provided me in Ukraine in April 2022. This is literally everything the last of what wanted since the early days of the war. (Cluster bombs were even on the list.)

3/ It also calls Russia’s bluff about retaliation, now rendered especially ridiculous in light of successive Ukrainian strikes against strategic Russia targets (including a nuclear bomber) well within Russian territory, all of which led not to World War III.

4/ It puts Russian logistics in Ukraine at greater risk, and further allows Kyiv to target mobile Russian AD: the ATACMS is a particularly useful munition against time-sensitive targets. (An S-300 crew can displace in 15-30 mins; too quick for Storm Shadow or SCALP but not ATACMS.)

5/ Finally, creates much-needed redundancy for Ukraine’s deep-strike capability. The 7th Tactical Aviation Brigade is based at Starokostiantyniv Air Base, in Khmelnytskyi Oblast; this is the brigade that operates the Su-24M boomers that fire Storm Shadows.

6/ Russia has hit the base before. Should it take out some or all the bombers on the tarmac, Ukraine will lose its valuable CM launch platforms. The U.S. cannot send more Su-24M; it can, however, send more HIMARS or M270s, which fire ATACMS. /END.

 

[kevinkin]

A society can have military victories, but those do not necessarily stop the eventual downfall of the society and result in a strategic long lasting victory. It's as simple as the old "cost - benefit ratio" or "live to fight another day". The US is just throwing money at the problem. I see no long tern strategy out of DC.

We don't have any skin in the game. We do provide intel to the UA. That only goes so far. US systems must have killed and wounded over 10,000 Russians. Result: no escalation; more UA losses. We are treating this of like sort arming Afghanistan. However,  that proxy war was one of power protection in the minds of Russia. Ukraine is a war of survival in their warped and molded mines. Holding fertile soil and access to the Mediterranean is far more important to them than access to the Persian Gulf ever was. America, with all our age old internal problems is being tested. And we are punting the ball again. 

[kevinkin]

17 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

That would've been fun.

Not sure I would describe it that way, but your point overall is well taken. Like I said previously, the US does not want to fight a war where we have to break through fortified positions. They would be neutralized by airpower and no longer be fortifications. It might take weeks, but that's how it would go. Russia is a cancer that can be cured via firepower (chemotherapy) or surgery (maneuver warfare). Either way can solve the issue. But sometimes either of those approaches can kill the patient. It's a difficult call. I think the UA is best positioned to use economy of force and kill Russians. Sorry to say that might mean going over the strategic defensive while operationally looking offensive. They might have already decided that. This not a negative view. But maybe a winning view.   

[MikeyD]

About 'concerted air campaigns' and such, lets remember S300 AA missiles still exist and are the primary reason why neither side overflies the other's territory. Russia's air defenses five months ago weren't quite as attritted and depleted as they are now. The Ukraine air force attempting a 'bum's rush' against Russian positions in the spring would have likely halved their air arm in a matter of days.

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, kimbosbread said:

I’m very curious about your perspective on this. Why do you think the unmanned ground assets will be a such a big deal? Smaller logistics footprint? Harder to detect?

I'll chime in from my perspective.

UGVs can perform pretty much any role that any current ground vehicle can perform, though admittedly much larger ones are needed to exactly mimic the role of SPGs and MBTs (i.e. large caliber, relatively cheap rounds fired rapidly and in quantity).  This is an important thing to keep in mind when examining the relative benefits of UGVs over conventional ground vehicles:

1. production - cheaper, quicker, and easier to design, produce, and stockpile
2. logistics - cheaper, easier, and more flexible to keep running in peacetime and sustain in the field during wartime
3. deployment - cheaper, quicker, and easier to deploy en mas anywhere in the world in very short order
4. adaptability - cheaper, quicker, and easier to produce UGVs that can perform a variety of roles depending on nearly instant swapping out of components based on mission requirements.  This isn't really in the cards just yet (everything is too exploratory to be standardized), but it is where things are headed
5. survivability - theoretically harder to spot and hit, therefore more likely to survive in combat
6. longevity - cheaper, quicker, and easier to replace worn parts, upgrade to better parts, integrate advancements, etc.
7. reduced personnel - everything about UGVs requires fewer trained personnel at a time when militaries are failing to meet recruiting targets and physical fitness requirements
8. new capabilities - everything above, when combined, is going to open up strategic, operational, and tactical possibilities that are currently impossible to do with legacy systems. Don't believe me?  Look at UAVs in this war right now and where they are headed.  Individual soldier MEDEVAC, precision delivered tailored just-in-time resupply, AI demining, etc. are all entirely new capabilities emerging out of Ukraine.  It's only going to get more sci-fi as time goes on.

And that is just off the top of my head   The takeaway here is that there is nothing a legacy system can do that a UGV can't do cheaper, better, and more flexibly once UGVs mature.

If you don't know what I'm talking about, picture a C-17 moving a single Abrams tank with nothing to support it.  No fuel, no ammo, no logistics tail, no nothing.  Now picture how many UGVs and their associated range of capabilities can fit onto a single C-17.  We're talking about sending a company or two's worth of firepower with one trip WITH logistics instead of a single MBT.  What sort of impact does that have on military options?  More than 2 or 3, that's for sure

Steve

 

[chuckdyke]

So, warfare in the future is very much playing a computer game. Operator in some secure control room directing operations with drones and UGVs.

[kevinkin]

I was not talking about the the Ukraine air force:

https://www.barrons.com/news/russian-air-superiority-stopping-counteroffensive-zelensky-42a53972

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Friday that Russian air superiority was "stopping" Kyiv's counteroffensive, complaining of the slow rate of both Western arms deliveries and sanctions on Russia.

Ukrainian officials have expressed frustration at criticism that Ukraine's counteroffensive has been too slow.

"If we are not in the sky and Russia is, they stop us from the sky. They stop our counteroffensive," Zelensky said, calling for more "powerful and long-range" weapons.

There was not time to equip and train Ukraine for the air warfare needed. That's why a no-fly zone should not be have been out of question early or now; nor would it precipitate escalation. We would be defending the skies over a nation we have given billions to and have killed thousands of Russian anyway. If Russia wants to escalate - Where's The Beef? 
Figuring out Russian is impossible and trying to define their line in the sand as well. Free nations can't let this ambiguity in the way while watching a nation like Ukraine evaporate. 

BTW the S400 and 300 are not at all feared within the USAF. Sort of like a annoying bug on a summer night. Could they get lucky - sure. But never in a tactically meaningful way. This comes from a family member in USAF intel. This is because the operators are idiots and the mechanics are broken down.

Ukrainians are dying because of our fear of escalation which why I brought up the subject of "speak softly; and carry a big stick" i.e. diplomacy and staring down the enemy. There are reasons we don't that are beyond the scope of this thread. 

Edited September 9, 2023 by kevinkin

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

So, warfare in the future is very much playing a computer game. Operator in some secure control room directing operations with drones and UGVs.

It's already in large part happening in Ukraine already.  However, it will be an extremely long time before soldiers are replaced.  They are just too damned capable to replace entirely.  What can happen is replacing certain types of soldier, such as drivers and gunners for vehicles and heavy weapons platforms. 

And as I said above, the nature of UGVs means there's less need for all kinds of support personnel.  Think of vehicle recovery.  How many personnel does it take to transport a single M88 into theater?  How many to keep it ready for use?  How many to effectively use it in the field?  And how many soldiers are involved doing the same with tracked vehicle transporters?  By contrast, a single pickup truck with a trailer crewed by two soldiers can deploy an entire platoon's worth of UGVs and recover any number of damaged/immobilized vehicles with the same exactly steup (plus a recovery UGV).

Anybody that doesn't see the writing on the wall is either living in denial, operating out of ignorance, or is currently employed by General Dynamics Land Systems or similar

Steve

[The_Capt]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'll chime in from my perspective.

UGVs can perform pretty much any role that any current ground vehicle can perform, though admittedly much larger ones are needed to exactly mimic the role of SPGs and MBTs (i.e. large caliber, relatively cheap rounds fired rapidly and in quantity).  This is an important thing to keep in mind when examining the relative benefits of UGVs over conventional ground vehicles:

1. production - cheaper, quicker, and easier to design, produce, and stockpile
2. logistics - cheaper, easier, and more flexible to keep running in peacetime and sustain in the field during wartime
3. deployment - cheaper, quicker, and easier to deploy en mas anywhere in the world in very short order
4. adaptability - cheaper, quicker, and easier to produce UGVs that can perform a variety of roles depending on nearly instant swapping out of components based on mission requirements.  This isn't really in the cards just yet (everything is too exploratory to be standardized), but it is where things are headed
5. survivability - theoretically harder to spot and hit, therefore more likely to survive in combat
6. longevity - cheaper, quicker, and easier to replace worn parts, upgrade to better parts, integrate advancements, etc.
7. reduced personnel - everything about UGVs requires fewer trained personnel at a time when militaries are failing to meet recruiting targets and physical fitness requirements
8. new capabilities - everything above, when combined, is going to open up strategic, operational, and tactical possibilities that are currently impossible to do with legacy systems. Don't believe me?  Look at UAVs in this war right now and where they are headed.  Individual soldier MEDEVAC, precision delivered tailored just-in-time resupply, AI demining, etc. are all entirely new capabilities emerging out of Ukraine.  It's only going to get more sci-fi as time goes on.

And that is just off the top of my head   The takeaway here is that there is nothing a legacy system can do that a UGV can't do cheaper, better, and more flexibly once UGVs mature.

If you don't know what I'm talking about, picture a C-17 moving a single Abrams tank with nothing to support it.  No fuel, no ammo, no logistics tail, no nothing.  Now picture how many UGVs and their associated range of capabilities can fit onto a single C-17.  We're talking about sending a company or two's worth of firepower with one trip WITH logistics instead of a single MBT.  What sort of impact does that have on military options?  More than 2 or 3, that's for sure

Steve

 

So this.  I would also add that they will get smaller and evolve sub-species of loitering munitions.  Right now we mount ISR or guns on them (mortars are going to happen).  We saw a small unmanned water craft hit enemy ships and that was on a big ol flat ocean. UGV loitering munitions can be very small and hide out in the bushes.  When they swarm large vehicle formations all sorts of hell will happen.  And then someone is going to figure out how to build one of these systems that can dig itself in and go silent/hibernate until it needs to wake up and attack.  

Combine this with the systems Steve highlights above, plus some sexy air droppable single shot indirect fire systems that fire freakin self-loitering UAS and we have…wait for it…Denial.  A lot of freakin Denial.  Massive potential for friction that make the Russian minefield belts look quaint - and for giggles, good old fashion landmines are not going anywhere.  And that, is just the stuff we can come up with.  Hand these little monsters to a bunch of teenagers and see what really happens. Toss in more UAS over all this and we basically have an unmanned cloud.  Anyone who tries to “manoeuvre” the old fashion way into that, even with traditional air superiority - because as I have said we do not know what air superiority in the UAS altitude bands (0-2000 feet) even looks like - and they are going to start looking a lot like the RA mess.

If I were China, I would be investing like mad into this space.  In fact any enemies/competitors of the west are likely going to go heavily into this?  Why?  Because you don’t need a trillion dollar military industrial complex to do this - entry costs are much lower. And the opportunity to level the playing field against the US and West is the golden ring everyone who does not like us (and there is a long list) has been reaching for for decades.  The technology is advancing very fast, the costs are dropping and there is a massive incentive to do it.

[kevinkin]

9 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

If you don't know what I'm talking about, picture a C-17 moving a single Abrams tank with nothing to support it.  No fuel, no ammo, no logistics tail, no nothing.  Now picture how many UGVs and their associated range of capabilities can fit onto a single C-17.  We're talking about sending a company or two's worth of firepower with one trip WITH logistics instead of a single MBT.  What sort of impact does that have on military options?  More than 2 or 3, that's for sure

That's a well thought out analogy. But I have to add, the US and societies in general have failed to predict what type of firepower systems will be needed in next critical war. There is a reason why Switzerland  is such a calm and beautiful nation. They know what they need to exactly stay that way. Same thing, in a way, for Singapore - authoritative nation. The US is guarded by two huge oceans and the US Navy holds supreme. The Marines let go their tanks - great forward thinking. Why would not the US start a entire department related to UAVs or similar drone boats? The reason is the DOD is ossified. We all know the benefits of low cost systems, but try to explain that to bean counters at Boeing or in Georgetown. There is no desire to change American's way of war. Whatever the US learns from this war it will be at least 5 years behind.  

[chuckdyke]

The trains in the Australian mining industry are also replaced by robotics. The only reason they may still have drivers is because in case of an emergency one incident justifies a year's salary. The same may apply in the military.

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

The trains in the Australian mining industry are also replaced by robotics. The only reason they may still have drivers is because in case of an emergency one incident justifies a year's salary. The same may apply in the military.

This is similar to the history of automation of all sorts.  Mechanization allows for the reduction, but not elimination, of Humans SOMEWHERE in the operations.  Even if a specific part of the operation is no longer supervised directly by a Human, there's probably someone still on the payroll to perform at least some oversight.  Granted, AI and robotics are definitely making it feasible to further reduce Human oversight.  But yes, at the end of the day, things break or go wrong and it's going to be a long time before such tasks can be performed without Humans in the loop.

Steve

[kevinkin]

How are they replacing the jobs being eliminated? I am not sure a concentration in income generation is heathy e.g. into IT. Or Ai. There are too many people in the world that need something to do other than reproduce. 

Just saw Steve's post above. I think we are on the same page. 

Edited September 9, 2023 by kevinkin

[chuckdyke]

3 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Just saw Steve's post above. I think we are on the same page. 

Typical example is the start button of motorcycles. The Brits invented it and sold the patent to the Japanese as British bikers were traditionalists and preferred kick starters. Like they say it is now history, I loved my Yamaha with the electric starter granted Triumphs were nice bikes too. 

[kevinkin]

https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/07/western-sanctions-russia-ukraine-war/

Again, it's hard to agree or disagree with this article because emotions are raw and the ground situation is primarily unknown.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/07/western-sanctions-russia-ukraine-war/

But it does success the US is lazy with war effort in support of Ukraine. Same old same old. 

Three patterns can be discerned across the entire parallel import supply chain—a term that the Kremlin’s official communication team uses to describe what are in effect decriminalized smuggling schemes used to bypass Western sanctions. First, using intermediaries that haven’t been put under sanctions; second, restructuring existing companies to conceal entities; and third, purchasing components and moving final assembly to Russia instead of buying finished sanctioned goods. On top of that, Russia disguises customs data, sets up illegal networks and one-day shell companies, and orchestrates fake transit operations.

Sounds like something out of the Family playbook. Where is leadership in disrupting this enterprise?