How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

18 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

How far do they need to go before the corridor is effectively cut. My layman perspective is to wonder if getting to the H-30 highway (runs SE from Tokmak to Berdiansk) is enough - that would the railway connection and one of the two major roads that run across the land bridge here (assuming the railway is still meaningfully operational E-W here), and leave only the coastal highway, which would be within  roughly 30km of the front line. Within arty range, but I've no idea how effective artillery would be at that distance at impacting supply routes along the coast.

Best guess given what we have seen.

So based on road infrastructure break through to Tokmak and one has expanding operational options.  The greatest Russian military weakness of this war is manoeuvre.  They really suck at it.  They can drive but rapid manoeuvre to effect is not their strong point.  Their artillery and ISR are not set up for it and their C2 is badly built for it.  I would also bet money that their logistics can't support, especially with stuff constantly blowing up in the backfield.  The Russians are good at static warfare.  Digging in and sending wave after wave to die.  Or digging in like a tick and making life difficult.  IF the UA can break through then they can effectively cut that corridor as long as they force the RA into reactive situation that will require rapid manoeuvre. In the area we are talking about that is Tokmak.  Vasylivka is a good secondary because it also greatly expands operational options.

Take Tokmak and Melitopol is 40 kms away, they could sweep that area with ISR and artillery.  This would effectively force the RA MSR along the M14, plus any back country roads...that is a narrow branch to sit on, and the other guy is on the truck with a hand saw.  Could they keep up tempo? Going to have to or the RA will just dig in like a big red blob and they will have to do this all over again next spring.  They do not need to take Melitopol.  In fact that would play to Russia's strength of digging in.  Cut it off and Kherson the place.  Keep expanding the option spaces and get M14 within gun range and this thing is over as far as the strategic land bridge is concerned.

[Twisk]

 

Edited August 24, 2023 by Twisk

[Battlefront.com]

23 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Next question - what is the RA ability to plug a hole right now.  My bet is not so good.

Worse than not so good, by the sounds of it.  Since the start of this counter offensive it's been noted operational reserves were limited and few units have moved in from outside of the theater.  Since the counter offensive started the operational reserves have been committed as reinforcements instead of rotations.  As far as I can tell, there is consensus (including from Russian sources) that the units at the front have not been rotated in any meaningful way in three months.  And yet, still no reports of new units being moved into the theater.

What we have seen reports of is what ISW terms "lateral reinforcements", which is pulling a unit out of an active combat zone and committing it to combat elsewhere.  The result is some sector of front gets weaker in order to favor defending another sector.  Even worse, the units being moved are likely beat up and exhausted, so it's questionable how much good the moves are doing.

17 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

How far do they need to go before the corridor is effectively cut. My layman perspective is to wonder if getting to the H-30 highway (runs SE from Tokmak to Berdiansk) is enough - that would the railway connection and one of the two major roads that run across the land bridge here (assuming the railway is still meaningfully operational E-W here), and leave only the coastal highway, which would be within  roughly 30km of the front line. Within arty range, but I've no idea how effective artillery would be at that distance at impacting supply routes along the coast.

If Ukraine makes Melitopol unusable then that will go a long way to making the land bridge kinda pointless, but not really "effectively cut".  It is amazing how difficult it is to interdict via bombs and artillery.  I'd call it "highly constrained" as Russia can still move reinforcements and logistics in from Crimea, Rostov, and Berdyansk to compensate for problems with cross shipping by rail and road.

If Ukraine physically holds any portion of highways E-105 or M-14 (rail parallels each) and then it's show over for the land bridge.

Ahead of that, though, is Tokmak.  For the immediate fighting taking that is more important than Melitopol.  Why?  Because supplies flow into it from Melitopol to the south and from there east and wast just behind the frontline.  Taking out Tokmak makes much of the southern frontline reachable only by very, very, very long truck routes.

Steve

 

[Battlefront.com]

OpEd in The Telegraph predicting that things are going to get really messy for Putin.  Oligarchs will become more assertive, Wagner thugs will cause mayhem, and kompromat about Putin (supposedly held by Prig) will create waves of some sort.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/08/24/putin-prigozhin-surovikin-wagner-oligarchs/

Steve

[Offshoot]

8 hours ago, billbindc said:

Galeotti with the right take: 

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/prigozhins-death-has-exposed-putins-weakness/

Further, any group now going after Putin will know/believe there is no room for compromise, so they will not be turning back at the outskirts of Moscow.

[Tux]

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Russia needs to negotiate with its own defeat, no one is going to be able to do it for them in this war.  We are not in a war where force of arms will get Russia to accept anything.  Force of the Russian people is another thing but as we can all see, we are not there yet.

Unless I’ve got totally the wrong end of the stick this has been the case since circa March 2022.  In theory, then, are there understood to be ways in which Ukraine/“we” can help hurry Russia along with this negotiation?  I guess that simply maintaining military, economic and diplomatic pressure ensures that the conditions required remain.  Is the rest just a case of propaganda, diplomatic back channels and maybe the odd unconventional security op?

[MSBoxer]

 

 

Edited August 24, 2023 by MSBoxer

[danfrodo]

 

4 minutes ago, MSBoxer said:

 

 

Wagner volunteered to be defanged and chained to a tree.  Now they think they can threaten to bite someone?  Or am I reading this wrong?

Thanks for the updates on the progress at the front in the actual war going on.  Looks like RU resistance is decreasing and we're not seeing new reserve units at the pressure points.  Good signs, hopefully we'll keep getting hopeful news.  

Also interesting posts about Bakhmut being considered waste of time by US military.  I've kinda been on this side of it also, but maybe it drew in enough RU reserves to make it payoff.

[Tux]

21 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

OpEd in The Telegraph predicting that things are going to get really messy for Putin.  Oligarchs will become more assertive, Wagner thugs will cause mayhem, and kompromat about Putin (supposedly held by Prig) will create waves of some sort.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/08/24/putin-prigozhin-surovikin-wagner-oligarchs/

Steve

So… what exactly do we think Putin’s rationale for killing Progozhin now was, again?

Surely this can’t be as simple as ‘he had it coming’:  If the above downsides to killing him were always acceptable Putin could have executed him immediately after the uprising as a far more effective way of emphasising his own power and ruthlessness.  If the downsides weren’t acceptable back then then what has changed to make the killing sensible now?  And if Prigozhin was protected by powerful puppet masters then killing him doesn’t achieve anything vis-a-vis said masters and you still get the downsides.

Something still doesn’t add up about this whole business.

[TheVulture]

While I'd like to believe that the Wagner mercenaries are going to start some trouble to avenge Prig and co., there's a very big tendency to see what we want to see. As soon as Prigozhin was killed, anyone who wants to see some Wagner reaction will start looking at every bit of news available, and interpret it in the light of their hopes.

Or fears - it works both ways. For example, during the first 6-9 months of the war when there was concern that the Belarusian army might become actively involved, any movement of troops within Belarus was flagged up as as possible indication that things were about to kick off.  While Lukashenko might have been making something of a performance in that direction, a lot of very normal stuff was interpreted as having a significance that it just didn't bear.

[MSBoxer]

4 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

As soon as Prigozhin was killed, anyone who wants to see some Wagner reaction will start looking at every bit of news available, and interpret it in the light of their hopes.

While I would love to see this, I just don't think anything will come of it.  For the most part these guys are mercenaries not "true believers" and unless someone steps up to arm and pay them, I doubt much will come of this.

[Tux]

3 minutes ago, Tux said:

So… what exactly do we think Putin’s rationale for killing Progozhin now was, again?

Surely this can’t be as simple as ‘he had it coming’:  If the above downsides to killing him were always acceptable Putin could have executed him immediately after the uprising as a far more effective way of emphasising his own power and ruthlessness.  If the downsides weren’t acceptable back then then what has changed to make the killing sensible now?  And if Prigozhin was protected by powerful puppet masters then killing him doesn’t achieve anything vis-a-vis said masters and you still get the downsides.

Something still doesn’t add up about this whole business.

Ok, so to answer my own question, perhaps Putin has now (very recently) managed to consolidate his power in some meaningful way which has afforded him the security he needs to be able to wipe out Prigozhin/Utkin and comfortably deal with the blowback (I suppose we’ll see how that works out).  
Have we noticed any statements, movements or signals in the last week or so which might indicate that Putin has secured the support of a hitherto neutral/opposing party within Russia or, I suppose, elsewhere?

[danfrodo]

4 minutes ago, MSBoxer said:

While I would love to see this, I just don't think anything will come of it.  For the most part these guys are mercenaries not "true believers" and unless someone steps up to arm and pay them, I doubt much will come of this.

exactly, just pay them if you think they are a threat, it aint rocket science

[dan/california]

 

33 minutes ago, MSBoxer said:

 

 

Wagner is certainly much weaker than it was. But it is also true that Putin just broke a bargain, spectacularly, with a group that has a very well founded reputation for killing people for a tiny fraction of that level of disrespect, or no reason at all. Two bullets each for Putin and Lukashenko remain one the best bargains in human history.

Edited August 24, 2023 by dan/california

[dan/california]

Fingers crossed!

 

[danfrodo]

19 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Fingers crossed!

 

northern side of this town looks to be ~3km south of robotyne's south side.  This is a much higher pace of advance than previously seen in this offensive.  Very very interesting.

[Twisk]

Are we sure that Putin ordered the killing?

Wagner is in a weaker position but it creates a situation where the top level Wagner people may become fearful for their lives and feel forced to take action. If you are a layer under Prighozin do you feel safe? What if you are 2 people down the chain of Wagner? Why would someone who has a stake in Wagner feel safe?

[danfrodo]

2 minutes ago, Twisk said:

Are we sure that Putin ordered the killing?

it walks like a duck and talks like a duck.  yeah, could be a tiny little guy in a duck suit but .....   No one knows or will ever know probably.  

The tankies are all saying it's CIA / NATO killed this great russian hero.  Mind boggling insanity.

[Fenris]

Interesting, looks like UKR has a new wonder weapon

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, Twisk said:

Are we sure that Putin ordered the killing?

As sure as anything Kremlin related, yes.  Putin has a very, very long track record of having people murdered for far less than what Prig did to him.  Prig should have known that he was not untouchable and acted accordingly.  But people don't get to his level of power without being over confident and self centered.  Ironically those traits don't do well at keeping power when there's someone else more powerful, more over confident, and more self centered.  Er, like Putin.

Steve

[Fenris]

I'm not a fan of Erdogan but this is nice to see

 

[Fenris]

More comedy

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, Fenris said:

More comedy

Stil waiting for that moment when Ukraine manages to "hack" that particular channel and land a largw scale airstrike in the Russian's front line.

 

[paxromana]

7 hours ago, Sojourner said:

They sure do, and they rewrite them every few years.

Maybe they should implement the Ceaucescu solution ... I believe that Romanian History books were Loose Leaf Binders for easier replacement of pages that 'needed' to be ...

[paxromana]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Crimea is even worse, that one has bloody insurgency written all over it. Unless we are talking about ethnically cleansing the area and then we can say "so long" to western support.

I presume that, in both cases, it would not be 'ethnic cleansing' to expel all foreign (i.e. non-local aka Russian citizen) incomers who have arrived since 2014 and re-import all the expelled or fled Ukrainian citizens (including the Crimean Tartars)?

I cannot see Western authorities seeing that as 'ethnic cleansing' ... 

How much of a difference would that make?

Edited August 25, 2023 by paxromana