How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

So what's 'projecting friction' likely to mean at this particular point that could lower the blood price of slogging through the mine belts?

...Russian C4ISR has been 'stressed' at multiple points for over a year now. It could still collapse, sure, but it hasn't yet. Their gunners haven't run out of tubes or ammo, or not systematically. The trains and trucks are still delivering adequate materiel, it seems.

Knocking down enemy quadcopters is hard for squaddies. And the operators are hard to locate.

What's the friction point(s) these days?

All of the above.  If you are asking for there is a magic hat that erases minefields or perhaps some sort of nano-tech that can simply turn all those mines into turnips…well no. Western equipment is not going to solve for this, nor will our wonderful doctrine or training.  We in the west have not done an opposed obstacle belt breaching operation since the Gulf War and we had complete air supremacy in that fight.  The last time we did without air superiority..well WW2?  So we really have no idea if our way would even work right now either.

So we are back to continually hammering RA C4ISR and logistics, artillery and other key capability that is making those obstacles so beastly.  The only other idea I can see is to dismount a lot of infantry and infiltrate but I am sure the UA is trying that.  It goes slow until it goes fast…or not at all.  But at this point there is no other Plan B.  Both sides are far to along to try and talk/buy/bargain.  This whole thing must either break or come to an exhausted end state.  And whichever of those become true then we will have to be prepared to deal with it.

Given the level of just outright destruction the RA has suffered I am surprised they had this much left in the tank to be honest.  After last Fall and a winter of throwing troops away the RA was (and is) in pretty poor shape.  But if the price point for Denial has become too low, then the RA can fight and impose friction with relatively few troops as well.  My money is that the UA has not fully committed.  We have not seen a significant concentrated push by the UA yet that matches their reported troop capacity.  But they have maybe 2 months left to do something, or the entire western support world is going to start asking “are we done?”

[Haiduk]

Russian counter-battery radar Zoopark-M1 was hit by HIMARS as claimed, but as for me it's more similar to Excaliburs. Target was tracked by UKR "Shark" drone, having very cool zoom. Location - Novopetrykivka village, Donetsk oblast. About 15 km SE from Urozhaine. 

 

Edited August 18, 2023 by Haiduk

[Vanir Ausf B]

 

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

At best Russia can construct significant hedgehog defenses.  Anything other than that is beyond their capabilities to do when time, resources, and space are considered.

 

Which is why I continue to assess that Russia is fighting so hard to maintain its current positions because it knows it has nothing behind it capable of stopping a Ukrainian breakthrough.

Steve

There's a lot we don't know, but satellite data suggests that the line of fortifications around Robotyne is the first of three "belts" (broadly speaking) between Ukraine's starting positions and Melitopol, and they are building more all the time.

https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1rRKs40IEbGRsV0Fhky25l5OkPJ_vUvQ

 

 

 

[Haiduk]

The moment of yesterday Ka-52 shooting down and falling (lower video). It's confirmed now, it was shot down by Sweden RBS-70 MANPAD

Russian helicopter fell down between Robotyne and Novoprokopivka villages, so some OSINTers assum UKR troops already can control most part of Robotyne 

 

Edited August 18, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

One of Russian mixed minefield in "extra tall yellow grass" - 1 TM-62 AT-mine and 7 PMN-4 AP-mines on the square about 2 sq.m.

PMN-4 is modern version of old PMN-1. It has 50 g of HE (for comparison PFM-1 "Lepestok" has 40 g)

 

Edited August 18, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

 

Colonel Pavel Chesanov (Rosgvardiya), who was allegedly heavy wounded in this strike

 

[Hapless]

A couple of thoughts re: mines:

Whatever happened to military herbicides?
What's going to happen to all those surface mines in the muddy season or the winter?

[Teufel]

On 8/17/2023 at 5:02 PM, kevinkin said:

Good point. The battlefield is so deadly that it takes a lot of guts to move out of cover. And when the troops are asked to do so they need to have the confidence there is a plan in place to support/cover the move and the right systems to do so. That type support might not be available everywhere all the time. 

Speaking of lacking confidence…

In other events elsewhere we have violation of in Crimea…

…and across the strait in Krasnodar kraj, Russian Federation. One of the most important, if not the most important Russian port in the Black Sea.

Edit: Bonus entry from Ben Hodges.

Sovjet being Sovjet, it maybe reflects all of the above and all at once?

Edited August 18, 2023 by Teufel

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

There's a lot we don't know, but satellite data suggests that the line of fortifications around Robotyne is the first of three "belts" (broadly speaking) between Ukraine's starting positions and Melitopol, and they are building more all the time.

True and not incompatible with what I've been arguing.

Trenches and dugouts are all over the place, for sure.  They are also digging more of them, true as well.  It's pretty easy for a rear area digger to pound out KMs of shallow trenches, so it's not surprising at all.  However, they need minefields.  Deep, thick minefields which took Russia many months to establish in the current frontline area.  Furthermore, all of these defenses need them in a continuous, unbroken line.  I do not see that being feasible.  They also need artillery, ISR, and grunts to provide effective defenses of these positions.  Things they seem to be running out of.

As I've been saying since the start of this counter offensive, the Soviet doctrine calls for defending the first line only until it hits a point of diminishing return, then pulling back to the second line to mount the main defense.  The third line is a backup.

It seems that Russia has instead done a "forward defense" and put most of their eggs in the 1st line basket, leaving little in the next line.  There's been some good, solid evidence of this being the case, though it could be anecdotal and not fully representative of the broad reality across the second line.  However, some of the evidence came from Tokmak area, which is relatively close to the front and is a major goal for Ukraine to take.  One should think that if an obvious key piece of terrain is poorly defended, then the rest is probably worse.

Steve

[Twisk]

I mentioned this pages ago but the Ukrainian offensive reaching Tokmak alone I think would be significantly damaging to the Russian hold on the land bridge. It further limits Russian movement across the land bridge to roadways (mainly the M14 through Melitopol), forces them to use trucks, and effectively denies their ability to do so without risking interdiction by long range Ukrainian fires. It also puts Melitopol under fire which is likely  a major hub for freight.

So with Tokmak under control any Russians the west of Melitopol would need to run a gauntlet to reach the east and vice versa. It damages Russian interior lines.


https://imgur.com/a/Z0jm73g

[danfrodo]

17 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

True and not incompatible with what I've been arguing.

Trenches and dugouts are all over the place, for sure.  They are also digging more of them, true as well.  It's pretty easy for a rear area digger to pound out KMs of shallow trenches, so it's not surprising at all.  However, they need minefields.  Deep, thick minefields which took Russia many months to establish in the current frontline area.  Furthermore, all of these defenses need them in a continuous, unbroken line.  I do not see that being feasible.  They also need artillery, ISR, and grunts to provide effective defenses of these positions.  Things they seem to be running out of.

As I've been saying since the start of this counter offensive, the Soviet doctrine calls for defending the first line only until it hits a point of diminishing return, then pulling back to the second line to mount the main defense.  The third line is a backup.

It seems that Russia has instead done a "forward defense" and put most of their eggs in the 1st line basket, leaving little in the next line.  There's been some good, solid evidence of this being the case, though it could be anecdotal and not fully representative of the broad reality across the second line.  However, some of the evidence came from Tokmak area, which is relatively close to the front and is a major goal for Ukraine to take.  One should think that if an obvious key piece of terrain is poorly defended, then the rest is probably worse.

Steve

I am getting a little tired of people calling every damn RU ditch a 'defense line'.  Many of these trenches are completely in the open.  They are also often perpendicular to the axis of advance, which would be normal.  But what we see from UKR side is that the problem is clearing the trenchworks built parallel to axis of advance in tree lines.  I am not worried one damn bit about these perpendicular ditches dug out in the open.  

[kimbosbread]

7 minutes ago, Twisk said:

I mentioned this pages ago but the Ukrainian offensive reaching Tokmak alone I think would be significantly damaging to the Russian hold on the land bridge. It further limits Russian movement across the land bridge to roadways (mainly the M14 through Melitopol), forces them to use trucks, and effectively denies their ability to do so without risking interdiction by long range Ukrainian fires. It also puts Melitopol under fire which is likely  a major hub for freight.

So with Tokmak under control any Russians the west of Melitopol would need to run a gauntlet to reach the east and vice versa. It damages Russian interior lines.

Absolutely. It’s not as big as retaking Melitpol, but it’s enough to cause enormous problems for Russian logistics, as well as making positions in Polohy, Vasylivka and many other places along the current front untenable.

Tokmak literally presents a strategic fork in the road for Ukraine: Besiege or drive past Melitopol, or drive to Berdynask. Both options for Russia are unpleasant. Presumably those bastards are furiously laying mines all the way to the coast in anticipation.

[Battlefront.com]

Well, good thing this guy isn't likely to be President.  Because according to him, giving Russia everything it wants is the best way to secure a "win" for the United States:

I'm posting this simply to remind us of how important it is for Ukraine to take back significant terrain this year.  Because US support for Ukraine is only assured until the 2024 elections.  After that it all depends (oddly enough) on Democrats holding power in the White House because the most likely Republican presidential possibilities are not supportive of Ukraine.  Even if the Democrats retake the House and hold the Senate, losing the Presidency is likely fatal to Ukraine's ability to fight a high intensity war against Russia.  Some NATO countries will continue to support Ukraine with all they can, but let's face it... some will welcome a change in US policy towards appeasement.

Steve

[danfrodo]

7 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Absolutely. It’s not as big as retaking Melitpol, but it’s enough to cause enormous problems for Russian logistics, as well as making positions in Polohy, Vasylivka and many other places along the current front untenable.

Tokmak literally presents a strategic fork in the road for Ukraine: Besiege or drive past Melitopol, or drive to Berdynask. Both options for Russia are unpleasant. Presumably those bastards are furiously laying mines all the way to the coast in anticipation.

I think one cannot simply lay mines all over ones own territory, which must be crossed by all sorts of people & vehicles.  It would mean no logistics or commerce at all.  It would mean their own people stepping on mines all over the place.  I think RU is mining new frontal areas, which change as UKR advances, but they can't pre-mine their own backfield to that extent, not until that backfield becomes front line.  Maybe someone can correct me but that's what I'm thinking.

[danfrodo]

Just now, Battlefront.com said:

Well, good thing this guy isn't likely to be President.  Because according to him, giving Russia everything it wants is the best way to secure a "win" for the United States:

I'm posting this simply to remind us of how important it is for Ukraine to take back significant terrain this year.  Because US support for Ukraine is only assured until the 2024 elections.  After that it all depends (oddly enough) on Democrats holding power in the White House because the most likely Republican presidential possibilities are not supportive of Ukraine.  Even if the Democrats retake the House and hold the Senate, losing the Presidency is likely fatal to Ukraine's ability to fight a high intensity war against Russia.  Some NATO countries will continue to support Ukraine with all they can, but let's face it... some will welcome a change in US policy towards appeasement.

Steve

I would bet a whole lot of money that a lobbying group that is backdoor funded by russia is backing this guy, and a lot of other folks like him.  No one outside RU can come up with this level of b--s--t without being paid to do it.

[Battlefront.com]

Rare instance of Def Mon's post attracting criticism for flawed analysis.  He argues that the NYT report of ESTIMATED Ukrainian casualties verifies that he's been right about how high they are for Ukraine.  Yet the counts are not verified and appear to be not counting Wagner and DLPR casualties which, of course, are massive.  It also is ridiculous for him to look at 1.5 year totals and conclude that casualties for Bakhmut must fall within the same ratio.  That's just really bad analysis. 

But he redeems himself with these videos showing a precision attack on a DPR position using, probably, JDAM.  These videos show the aftermath and not just the boom part, which is unusual:

Steve

 

[Battlefront.com]

Various footage of damage done by Ukrainian drone strike on Moscow last night:

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Footage from 2 days ago of Ukrainian forces entering the outskirts of Robotyne.  Footage shows dismounted infantry firing small arms and LATW.  Geolocated reference as well:

Steve

[danfrodo]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Footage from 2 days ago of Ukrainian forces entering the outskirts of Robotyne.  Footage shows dismounted infantry firing small arms and LATW.  Geolocated reference as well:

Steve

Mine or just thrown track, I wonder?

And drones hitting Moscow.  Joy joy joy.  One way to stop this might be for the russian army to just go home, but that would be crazy, right?  That land Putin is still holding in UKR is definitely worth ~250k casualties, a wrecked economy, war crimes indictments, and getting your capital city attacked night after night.  Totally worth it.

[Battlefront.com]

21 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Mine or just thrown track, I wonder?

The two road wheels sitting out there in the field indicates a mine or some real area bozo forgetting to tighten the lugnuts

Steve

[poesel]

5 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Russian counter-battery radar Zoopark-M1 was hit by HIMARS as claimed, but as for me it's more similar to Excaliburs. Target was tracked by UKR "Shark" drone, having very cool zoom. Location - Novopetrykivka village, Donetsk oblast. About 15 km SE from Urozhaine. 

 

Maybe a bit late to ask, but why do you bold some parts of location names, like the 'o' & 'i' in Novopetrykivka? Thanks.

 

[kevinkin]

28 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Furthermore, all of these defenses need them in a continuous, unbroken line

Mine fields can be use in area denial to funnel the attacker into kill zones. There is not a need for continuous line. In fact, that is predictable and loses the element of surprise. Of course the RA are idiots and that is beyond there comprehension. But they must have read this open source document but still employ continuous minefields and disregard the learning. That's actually good for the UA. RA Dopes. I guess. 

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/5-102/Ch5.htm

Maybe outdated, maybe not. 

34 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

One should think that if an obvious key piece of terrain is poorly defended, then the rest is probably worse.

Defending an obvious key piece of terrain is, well, obvious. And some operational thinking would use that terrain as a ruse and not commit to defending it at all cost. Especially given the overall nature and size of the terrain being fought over. Don't forget the RA is fighting on Ukrainian territory already turned in a moonscape. 

There is the idea that the RA is actually learning faster than the west and the UA in relative terms starting in Feb. 2022. Especially when they are fighting a defensive war currently with more trigger power and not yet 100% mobilized. 

Just being contrary to foster discussion. Just being contrary does not mean I support the RA. It means I want the result as to to be in Ukraine's favor. No staff in any part of any organization should be filled exclusively with yes men. 

[JonS]

2 hours ago, danfrodo said:

I am getting a little tired of people calling every damn RU ditch a 'defense line'.  Many of these trenches are completely in the open.  They are also often perpendicular to the axis of advance, which would be normal.  But what we see from UKR side is that the problem is clearing the trenchworks built parallel to axis of advance in tree lines.  I am not worried one damn bit about these perpendicular ditches dug out in the open.  

Amusing.

Last year people in this thread were saying exactly the same thing "lol, silly Russians. The Ukrainians will blow past that in a day." And yet, 11 months later, here we are.

I assume that even the Russians are professional enough to recognise that ditches across open paddocks aren't the only element of a defence line they are going to need. The funny thing about ditches under tree cover is that they're not very photogenic.

The tricky aspect of photographic analysis is interpreting what you can't see from the things you can. The Luftwaffe radar installation at Bruneval, for instance, was first identified because of long grass of all things. The Germans had ringed the site with barbed wire because they were worried about a ground attack or raid, or randos wandered up and having a butchers. The problem with barbed wire is that it's really hard to mow the grass in and around it, so over the course of six months or so a distinctive ring of tall grass sprouted up in the middle of an otherwise nondescript paddock in front of the manor house. "Now why would that happen" the British photo interpreters asked themselves, and working from there - and combining their suspicions with other intelligence threads - realised that they'd found a Würzburg , which led to Op BITING.

IIRC, a similar process was used to delimit the boundaries a number of the minefields in Normandy before D-Day.

Interpreting what you can't see based on what you can is also one of the reasons so much effort is put into studying enemy doctrine.

Quote

Hmm. C Company reported that three BTRs passed through their crossroads 30 mins ago. BTRs are only used in the recon elements of a motor rifle battalion. Typically the first echelon will be following the recce platoon by about 2 hours, and will consist of a motor rifle company and a platoon of armour.

"Shelldrake, this is India 9er. I'm expecting a mounted company with a tank platoon to pass through the intersection at GR123456 in about 90 minutes. C Company are observing the intersection, but don't have any heavy weapons with them, and they don't have a FOO - can you set something up for them?"

"On it boss."

So, putting all that together, and relating it to 2023: we can see ditches. Great, in themselves they're no great shakes. But based on doctrine and experience over the last 6-12 months, what else should the Ukrainians expect on and around these new positions.

Ditches which are in the middle of open paddocks and perpendicular to the expected axis of advance are probably pretty dumb. The only thing dumber than that would be to assume that ditches in the middle of open paddocks perpendicular to the expected axis of advance are the only things the Russians are building.

Edited August 19, 2023 by JonS

[Offshoot]

18 minutes ago, poesel said:

Maybe a bit late to ask, but why do you bold some parts of location names, like the 'o' & 'i' in Novopetrykivka? Thanks.

 

I have always assumed it is to show where the stress is in the name to aid with pronunciation. In Russian, and I assume Ukrainian, unstressed vowels often change their sound; for example, Novo would sound more like Nova when spoken.

Edited August 18, 2023 by Offshoot

[kevinkin]

2 minutes ago, JonS said:

And yet, 6 months later, here we are.

And the US led NATO is prepared to give Ukraine just enough rope to hang themselves. Does anyone think Ukraine will meet it's lofty symbolic land objectives in an armchair generals war during the US political season? POTUS has to make the case otherwise. But that not happening.

Maybe POTUS should just say we are prepared to turn Russian into "North Korea" and Ukraine into "South Korea" for as long as it takes. We will not fire until fired upon. Regime change in Russia is not a strategy when their population are zombies. Any other solution requires WW3. Something the US public can't fight without some form of cognitive leadership. Patience plays into the RA hands given the current correlation of firepower. 

The CIA might know better. But I would not put my money of their assessment.