How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

24 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Over at ISW we have some must read key take aways:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2023

For example:

“Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky suggested that Russia freeze the war in Ukraine along the current frontlines, reintroducing a narrative that had been largely dormant since Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion. Khodakovsky stated that Russia will not be able to topple Ukraine militarily in the near term and that Russian forces are unlikely to easily occupy additional Ukrainian cities, echoing comments Prigozhin had made in April 2023.[1] Khodakovsky concluded that Russia will likely have to come to a “truce” and that Russia may enter a phase “of neither peace nor war” with Ukraine.[2] Khodakovsky suggested that Ukraine would be sufficiently weakened in this state of frozen conflict and that Russia would be able to exert more influence over Ukraine in such a situation than it currently can during the ”Special Military Operation.”[3] 

Hard to argue with that strategy. What a nightmare for the Ukrainian people. How can they rebuild under such a scenario? Build a school - Iranian drone destroys the school. Build a housing complex - Iranian drone destroys the complex. Have a baby - Iranian drone destroys the maternity ward. Regardless of where the lines fall, Ukraine will not be whole until it's under NATO's umbrella and anything thrown at them is shot out of the skies. 

And skipping down a few paragraphs are these two important observations:

Quote

Recent Ukrainian advances near small settlements in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast are likely tactically significant because of the structure of Russian defensive lines. Ukrainian Colonel Petro Chernyk stated on August 15 that the three-echeloned Russian defensive line in southern Ukraine is comprised of a first line of minefields stretching several kilometers deep; a second line with artillery, equipment, and personnel concentrations; and a third line of rear positions meant to preserve resources.[10] Recent Ukrainian advances north and northeast of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia may allow Ukrainian forces to begin operating in the areas past the densest minefields.[11] If the areas around the second Russian line of defense are less heavily mined, then they would likely be more conducive to more rapid Ukrainian gains. ISW has no ability to assess the density or depth of Russian minefields, however.

Russian forces have dedicated significant effort, resources, and personnel to hold settlements such as Robotyne and Urozhaine, and recent Ukrainian advances in these areas are therefore likely reflective of a wider degradation of defending Russian forces. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces lack significant operational reserves, and the intense Russian effort to hold these settlements instead of withdrawing their forces means that Ukrainian forces have likely had to thoroughly degrade Russian units before advancing.[12] ISW recently observed Russian forces conduct lateral redeployments of elements of the 7th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division from Kherson Oblast and possibly from the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area to the Robotyne area, further suggesting that recent Ukrainian advances have significantly degraded the Russian forces that have been defending in western Zaporizhia Oblast without rotation since the start of the counteroffensive.[13] The lack of Russian operational reserves means that Russian forces will have to reinforce certain areas of the front at the expense of others, likely weakening Russian defensive lines in aggregate and offering Ukrainian forces opportunities for exploitation.[14] Khodakovsky’s recent complaint that the Russian command failed to send reinforcements to secure exhausted Russian forces defending Urozhaine may indicate that the Russian command is already making difficult choices about what sectors to prioritize as Ukrainian forces advance.[15] Russian forces increasingly appear likely to have to withdraw to secondary prepared defensive positions without significant support in the case of a Ukrainian breakthrough, and the further degradation of Russian forces creates opportunities for any Ukrainian breakthrough to be potentially operationally significant.[16] Khodakovsky’s apparent waning confidence in the Russian defense in southern Ukraine may indicate that he believes that recent advances have made a Ukrainian breakthrough more likely.

The first point reinforces the speculation I've made a couple of times that the reason Russia is defending its first line so hard is because it really doesn't have much after it.  Some hedgehog type positions, but nothing like the extensive minefields that it has out front.  So, once Ukraine is through the first line things are going to get interesting.  Especially because of the second point... Russia is further showing signs of running out of forces to mount effective defensive ops.

A commentator I just listened to pointed out that the downing of the KA-52 by 47th Brigade was very close to the front, perhaps indicating that Russia's loss of grunts and artillery is necessitating taking more risks with its aviation.  A second KA-52 was supposedly downed yesterday as well, that one near Bakhmut.

I am not saying that Ukraine is on the cusp of a spectacular break through, but it would appear that it is nearing the point of being able to make more substantial territorial gains at (hopefully) lower cost.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

And a couple more ISW tidbits worthy of note:

Quote

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers reportedly detained the lawyer of arrested former FSB officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin on August 17. Russian sources claimed that FSB officers detained Girkin’s lawyer, Alexander Molokhov, in Yalta on suspicion of extortion after he was invited to the city by a developer in an arbitration case and offered money.[38] Russian sources claimed that the FSB officers held Molokhov for 10 hours before releasing him but did not initiate a criminal case.[39]

An imprisoned former Russian Federal Protection Service (FSO) general with alleged knowledge of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s private Black Sea residence died suspiciously on August 16. Gennady Lopyrev, a former lieutenant general in the Russian Federal Protection Service (FSO), who was serving a sentence for bribery in a penal colony in Ryazan Oblast, Russia, died on August 16.[40] The chairman of the Public Monitoring Commission of Ryazan Oblast, Viktor Boborykin, did not provide the cause of Lopyrev’s death, but a Russian insider source claimed that Lopyrev was “unexpectedly” diagnosed with leukemia on August 14 after suddenly complaining of shortness of breath despite normal health indicators.[41] The insider source claimed Lopyrev was “the keeper of secrets” related to the construction of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Black Sea residence in Gelendzhik, often referred to as “Putin’s Palace.”[42]

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Long article in the Washington Post (referenced by ISW) detailing Russia's efforts to produce 6000 Shahed drones by the summer of 2025.  Leaked Russian documents form the bulk of the reporting, which shows that they have a "viable" plan that is "vulnerable" to an array of problems.  One of which being difficulty getting proper staffing for the new production facility.

The article also details quality problems with the drones coming from Iran and some cooperation issues.  Apparently Russia doesn't have the ability to produce the motors and props yet, leading to several hundred airframe assemblies sitting around while that gets sorted.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/08/17/russia-iran-drone-shahed-alabuga/

Steve

[cesmonkey]

 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

5 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Khodakovsky concluded that Russia will likely have to come to a “truce” and that Russia may enter a phase “of neither peace nor war” with Ukraine.[2]

Yeah, because that worked for them so well when they tried this last time in 1917/1918

[LongLeftFlank]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

And skipping down a few paragraphs are these two important observations:

The first point reinforces the speculation I've made a couple of times that the reason Russia is defending its first line so hard is because it really doesn't have much after it.  Some hedgehog type positions, but nothing like the extensive minefields that it has out front....

I am not saying that Ukraine is on the cusp of a spectacular break through, but it would appear that it is nearing the point of being able to make more substantial territorial gains at (hopefully) lower cost.

Steve

But Russia retains an almost unlimited capacity to lay mine belts and obstacles, all the way down to Azov and Perekop if it likes. It wouldn't surprise me if they're doing just that, in the absence of better options.

Manning these belts properly is another question of course, but to what extent does that make these fields less costly and time consuming to clear?

...And the Ivans are showing signs of moving up the tactical drone learning curve, which means fewer defenders can bombard and bleed out the sappers and assault troops while their movement is constrained. There's no way China isn't already supplying these lower tech systems to Russia in bulk.

Ukraine has a breaking point on manpower as well, which it's hiding well but it matters.

[Butschi]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

But Russia retains an almost unlimited capacity to lay mine belts and obstacles, all the way down to Azov and Perekop if it likes. It wouldn't surprise me if they're doing just that, in the absence of better options.

Manning these belts properly is another question of course, but to what extent does that make these fields less costly and time consuming to clear?

...And the Ivans are showing signs of moving up the tactical drone learning curve, which means fewer defenders can bombard and bleed out the sappers and assault troops while their movement is constrained. There's no way China isn't already supplying these lower tech systems to Russia in bulk.

Ukraine has a breaking point on manpower as well, which it's hiding well but it matters.

[akd]

9 hours ago, dan/california said:

With airpower not being a factor, and cluster munitions introduced mid way thru the offensive post war analysis should produce the cleanest data we could ever ask for about their effectiveness. Hopefully that data will end the careers of the people who didn't send it sooner.

The “civilian truck” incident (aftermath seen in thread previously I believe) and the discussion of different wounds makes me think a lot of this commentary is about M30A1 specifically, not the newly introduced legacy DPICM.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

But Russia retains an almost unlimited capacity to lay mine belts and obstacles, all the way down to Azov and Perekop if it likes. It wouldn't surprise me if they're doing just that, in the absence of better options.

Manning these belts properly is another question of course, but to what extent does that make these fields less costly and time consuming to clear?

...And the Ivans are showing signs of moving up the tactical drone learning curve, which means fewer defenders can bombard and bleed out the sappers and assault troops while their movement is constrained. There's no way China isn't already supplying these lower tech systems to Russia in bulk.

Ukraine has a breaking point on manpower as well, which it's hiding well but it matters.

Ukrainian manpower has been at “a breaking point” for about 18 months now.  Do we have any actual evidence of the state of Ukraine force generation, or are we seeing doom and gloom?

The obstacle dynamic is interesting.  Minefields are supposed to be useless unless “covered”.  What appears to have changed is what it takes to “cover” a given obstacle.  It used to be dug in troop organizations, now it is UAS and ATGMs linked to artillery.  So the bill for effective coverage has gone down significantly.

This is all starting to add up to the blindingly obvious - this is not a shift to Defence Primacy, it is a shift to Denial Primacy.  We have been seeing denial in the air and on land (now projected onto the sea).  Denial effectively raises the cost of action to a level that is unsustainable.  One does not “hold ground” one simply makes the cost per foot too high.  We appear to be entering into an age of denial.  Closely linked to corrosive warfare concepts as Denial essentially is very expensive friction, the question remains whether or not the UA can overcome and project its own level of friction back onto the RA at a rate higher than the RA can sustain.

It has been a summer of slow grinding and not many signs of success but remember the metrics are not territory as much as they are systemic erosion.  Which side is eroding faster?  I do not know if the UA can reach a tipping point that leads to major advances.  We have until about Nov and then the whole thing will peeter out, if last Fall is an indication.  If the UA cannot achieve a major breakout by then, well there will have to be some difficult conversations I expect.

[Battlefront.com]

51 minutes ago, akd said:

The “civilian truck” incident (aftermath seen in thread previously I believe) and the discussion of different wounds makes me think a lot of this commentary is about M30A1 specifically, not the newly introduced legacy DPICM.

Yup.  And those have been in Ukraine's hands since the beginning, or nearly so, of HIMARS use.  Maybe we're seeing more examples of it now because the US has provided more of the M30A1?

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The obstacle dynamic is interesting.  Minefields are supposed to be useless unless “covered”.  What appears to have changed is what it takes to “cover” a given obstacle.  It used to be dug in troop organizations, now it is UAS and ATGMs linked to artillery.  So the bill for effective coverage has gone down significantly.

This is all starting to add up to the blindingly obvious - this is not a shift to Defence Primacy, it is a shift to Denial Primacy.  We have been seeing denial in the air and on land (now projected onto the sea).  Denial effectively raises the cost of action to a level that is unsustainable.  One does not “hold ground” one simply makes the cost per foot too high.  We appear to be entering into an age of denial.  Closely linked to corrosive warfare concepts as Denial essentially is very expensive friction, the question remains whether or not the UA can overcome and project its own level of friction back onto the RA at a rate higher than the RA can sustain.

It has been a summer of slow grinding and not many signs of success but remember the metrics are not territory as much as they are systemic erosion.  Which side is eroding faster?  

So what's 'projecting friction' likely to mean at this particular point that could lower the blood price of slogging through the mine belts?

...Russian C4ISR has been 'stressed' at multiple points for over a year now. It could still collapse, sure, but it hasn't yet. Their gunners haven't run out of tubes or ammo, or not systematically. The trains and trucks are still delivering adequate materiel, it seems.

Knocking down enemy quadcopters is hard for squaddies. And the operators are hard to locate.

What's the friction point(s) these days?

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

So what's 'projecting friction' likely to mean at this particular point that could lower the blood price of slogging through the mine belts?

...Russian C4ISR has been 'stressed' at multiple points for over a year now. It could still collapse, sure, but it hasn't yet. Their gunners haven't run out of tubes or ammo, or not systematically. The trains and trucks are still delivering adequate materiel, it seems.

Knocking down enemy quadcopters is hard for squaddies. And the operators are hard to locate.

What's the friction point(s) these days?

Aside from Ukraine obtaining new capabilities, like clearing the skies or mass long range precision strikes, I don't think there is much that can be done that isn't already being done.

The problem Ukraine faces is that modern Russia isn't as different from ancient Russia as we had all hoped.  Meaning, it is still able to draw upon vast resources supplied to it by a largely compliant and politically inactive population capable of producing what is needed to keep a very costly war going well beyond the "normal" breaking point.

In short, Russians are willing and able to keep this up long, long, long after any sensible people would have put a stop to it.

What we had all HOPED would be the case is that enough of the Russian population would object to being used in this manner.  As we have long discussed here, it turns out "when the going gets tough, the tough stay and the rest leave".  The people we were all counting on putting a stop to this either left Russia or are actively participating (with or without regrets).

The thing is, even with all of this going for Putin there are limits.  The biggest one appears to still be his inability to mobilize as many men as the job calls for.  Another is the inability to truly shift gears and fight this war significantly better than it has (whatever minor improvements it has made have been exceeded by Ukraine's improvements, so still a net negative).

So all Ukraine can do is to keep hammering away at Russian capabilities and, while doing so, learning ways to do so at a lower cost to its own.  Fortunately, Ukraine continues to show that it can do this.  It might not be enough, but I see no reason to doubt it (yet).

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

32 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

It has been a summer of slow grinding and not many signs of success but remember the metrics are not territory as much as they are systemic erosion.  Which side is eroding faster?  I do not know if the UA can reach a tipping point that leads to major advances.  We have until about Nov and then the whole thing will peeter out, if last Fall is an indication.  If the UA cannot achieve a major breakout by then, well there will have to be some difficult conversations I expect.

Yup.

Before this counter offensive started there was plenty of discussion, here and elsewhere, about what it might look like, where it might be, and what the goals would be.  So far everything is "within parameters of expectations" for anybody that took an honest and informed look at the variables before this offensive started.  While a sudden collapse of Russian defenses was desirable, it should never have been expected as inevitable or (at a minimum) to occur quickly and/or easily. 

For me it is disappointing that collapse hasn't happened already and that the cost to Ukraine for pushing Russia closer to it is so high.  I had hoped a combination of factors would have caused at least a couple of significant breakdowns already. However, everyday we are seeing hard evidence (not wishful thinking) that Ukraine is still making progress towards that goal.  We are also not seeing any evidence that Ukraine is unable to continue with this counter offensive. 

With all this in mind, we aren't at the critical point of making a determination about the success/failure of this counter offensive.  People who think we have, even those in uniform, are wrong.  They might turn out to be correct, but it needs to be remembered that these are the same people that thought Putin's plan of crushing Ukraine in 3 days was going to work.  Track record between now and then has not been much better.

I think Ukraine has until the end of September to achieve a major breakthrough if it is going to get to, and isolate, Melitopol.  Anything later than that and there simply isn't enough good campaign time left to make assured advances.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

But Russia retains an almost unlimited capacity to lay mine belts and obstacles, all the way down to Azov and Perekop if it likes. It wouldn't surprise me if they're doing just that, in the absence of better options.

I would be   Russia had nearly a full year to prepare its defenses that Ukraine is now slogging through.  Russia doesn't have that sort of time on its side.  It also was able to focus all efforts on a single, well established line.  It didn't have to lay out defenses for multiple contingencies, which it would have to do now in order to have the same effect as the defenses up front.  The area is hundreds of thousand of square KMs!  It is simply impossible to cover all of that at all, not to mention as densely as the minefields Ukraine is fighting through now.

Then there is the question of manpower to lay all those mines... where is it?  The existing minefields were laid by the soldiers manning the positions, but we see no evidence that there is such a resource sitting in the rear.  We also have no idea how far down into their reserve of mines they drew to make the existing belts feasible.

At best Russia can construct significant hedgehog defenses.  Anything other than that is beyond their capabilities to do when time, resources, and space are considered.

Which is why I continue to assess that Russia is fighting so hard to maintain its current positions because it knows it has nothing behind it capable of stopping a Ukrainian breakthrough.

Steve

[danfrodo]

Right now none of us know which possibility will play out.  UKR might break through and find a very weak RU backfield.  UKR might be forced to grind for every meter -- and not get anywhere.  We just don't know.  There's lots of indicators that RU is getting weaker & weaker.  And minefields covered by drone/arty, as TheCapt said, are difficult.  But RU's artillery is being continually degraded. 

Maybe UKR is running out of soldiers.  Maybe not.  RU right now for sure is weakening.

[kevinkin]

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Ukraine-war/U.S.-approves-sending-F-16s-to-Ukraine-from-Denmark-Netherlands

Interesting to find where they will be based and supported and what weapons they will be allowed to use.

War Zone: The Danes currently have around 43 F-16AM/BMs in service, batches of which could head to Ukraine as they are retired in the next two years. The training is expected to physically take place in Denmark and Romania. Despite previous hopes that the first group of Ukrainian pilots would start to train on the F-16 as early as this month, this is now not expected to happen until January 2024, according to a report last week from The Washington Post. This, in turn, would mean that those aviators would not graduate from the training course until sometime next summer. Future classes of F-16 trainees would likely be pushed back, as well. Though the U.S. government's position does seem to have significantly changed in recent months, U.S. authorities, including President Joe Biden, have argued repeatedly in the past that getting F-16s should not be a priority for Ukraine's armed forces.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-intelligence-says-ukraine-will-fail-to-meet-offensive-s-key-goal/ar-AA1fpY4L

The path to Melitopol is an extremely challenging one, and even recapturing closer cities such as Tokmak will be difficult, said Rob Lee, a military analyst with the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

“Russia has three main defensive lines there and then fortified cities after that,” he said. “It’s not just a question about whether Ukraine can breach one or two of them, but can they breach all three and have enough forces available after taking attrition to achieve something more significant like taking Tokmak or something beyond that.”

Well on a positive note, they have been wrong before. 

The grim assessment is based on Russia’s brutal proficiency in defending occupied territory through a phalanx of minefields and trenches, and is likely to prompt finger pointing inside Kyiv and Western capitals about why a counteroffensive that saw tens of billions of dollars of Western weapons and military equipment fell short of its goals.

But finger pointing is certain. 

Edited August 18, 2023 by kevinkin

[sburke]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

For me it is disappointing that collapse hasn't happened already and that the cost to Ukraine for pushing Russia closer to it is so high.  I had hoped a combination of factors would have caused at least a couple of significant breakdowns already. However, everyday we are seeing hard evidence (not wishful thinking) that Ukraine is still making progress towards that goal.  We are also not seeing any evidence that Ukraine is unable to continue with this counter offensive. 

Steve

It is also important to keep in mind that the frontlines are only one place this war is being fought.  There are many dimensions to this conflict and in the others, Russia may be losing faster than the physical frontline in Ukraine.  Financial, diplomatic etc.  The Russian economy is tanking and the manipulation Russia has done to delay that has run out of steam.  Meanwhile Russian industry for the war is sucking the wind out of whatever was left in the civilian side.  Russian air transport is increasingly becoming a game of roulette - sure you can fly but we might not have brakes when we land... fasten that seatbelt!  On the diplomatic side Russia is pretty much isolated to the most despised nations on the planet with China likely weighing the value of this friendship every day.  The Russian military export business is pretty much gone. Not only has their weaponry shown to be deficient, but they are also having difficulty buying it back due to the lack of foreign currency and the effect of sanctions.

All this has got to be having an affect internally.  We may not have visibility but there is no way this is not causing stress within Russian power circles.

[kevinkin]

Some numbers out today (NYT reposted):

https://dnyuz.com/2023/08/18/troop-deaths-and-injuries-in-ukraine-war-near-500000-u-s-officials-say/

Probably better than a wild guess, but who knows.

The numbers also point to a lack of rapid medical care on the frontline. Wounded soldiers are increasingly hard to evacuate given how much artillery and gunfire bookend each engagement. Unlike the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where American forces strictly adhered to evacuating casualties within an hour to a well-stocked medical facility, there is no such capability in Ukraine.

Instead, injured troops are often thrown into any vehicle available or leave the front on foot. In some cases, the wounded and dead are left on the battlefield, because medics are unable to reach them. Hospitals and aid stations are often overwhelmed.

And across Ukraine, in big cities and rural villages, almost everyone knows a family that has lost someone in the fighting. Dry flowers from funerals litter quiet roads, and graveyards are filling up in every corner of the country.

While Mr. Putin appears somewhat reluctant to initiate a widespread mobilization, he has raised the upper age limit for men eligible to be conscripted into the army. And should Russia decide to mobilize more people, its larger population could quickly overwhelm Ukrainian reserves of manpower.

Can't tell how much of the above quote is opinion or fact. Perhaps somewhere in between. 

[kimbosbread]

If Ukraine manages to reach Tokmak (which seems likely to me) and pressure south of Urozhaine, how long until Russia abandons Polohy? I was under the impression that this settlement was one of their HQs and strong points for most of the war so far.

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, kevinkin said:

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Ukraine-war/U.S.-approves-sending-F-16s-to-Ukraine-from-Denmark-Netherlands

Interesting to find where they will be based and supported and what weapons they will be allowed to use.

War Zone: The Danes currently have around 43 F-16AM/BMs in service, batches of which could head to Ukraine as they are retired in the next two years. The training is expected to physically take place in Denmark and Romania. Despite previous hopes that the first group of Ukrainian pilots would start to train on the F-16 as early as this month, this is now not expected to happen until January 2024, according to a report last week from The Washington Post. This, in turn, would mean that those aviators would not graduate from the training course until sometime next summer. Future classes of F-16 trainees would likely be pushed back, as well. Though the U.S. government's position does seem to have significantly changed in recent months, U.S. authorities, including President Joe Biden, have argued repeatedly in the past that getting F-16s should not be a priority for Ukraine's armed forces.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-intelligence-says-ukraine-will-fail-to-meet-offensive-s-key-goal/ar-AA1fpY4L

The path to Melitopol is an extremely challenging one, and even recapturing closer cities such as Tokmak will be difficult, said Rob Lee, a military analyst with the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

“Russia has three main defensive lines there and then fortified cities after that,” he said. “It’s not just a question about whether Ukraine can breach one or two of them, but can they breach all three and have enough forces available after taking attrition to achieve something more significant like taking Tokmak or something beyond that.”

Well on a positive note, they have been wrong before. 

The grim assessment is based on Russia’s brutal proficiency in defending occupied territory through a phalanx of minefields and trenches, and is likely to prompt finger pointing inside Kyiv and Western capitals about why a counteroffensive that saw tens of billions of dollars of Western weapons and military equipment fell short of its goals.

But finger pointing is certain. 

 

1 hour ago, kevinkin said:

Some numbers out today (NYT reposted):

https://dnyuz.com/2023/08/18/troop-deaths-and-injuries-in-ukraine-war-near-500000-u-s-officials-say/

Probably better than a wild guess, but who knows.

The numbers also point to a lack of rapid medical care on the frontline. Wounded soldiers are increasingly hard to evacuate given how much artillery and gunfire bookend each engagement. Unlike the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where American forces strictly adhered to evacuating casualties within an hour to a well-stocked medical facility, there is no such capability in Ukraine.

Instead, injured troops are often thrown into any vehicle available or leave the front on foot. In some cases, the wounded and dead are left on the battlefield, because medics are unable to reach them. Hospitals and aid stations are often overwhelmed.

And across Ukraine, in big cities and rural villages, almost everyone knows a family that has lost someone in the fighting. Dry flowers from funerals litter quiet roads, and graveyards are filling up in every corner of the country.

While Mr. Putin appears somewhat reluctant to initiate a widespread mobilization, he has raised the upper age limit for men eligible to be conscripted into the army. And should Russia decide to mobilize more people, its larger population could quickly overwhelm Ukrainian reserves of manpower.

Can't tell how much of the above quote is opinion or fact. Perhaps somewhere in between. 

The peace faction in the U.S. government has obviously decided to make a coordinated push at Zelensky's expense. Note this comes at the same moment as Sarkozy's unfortunate attempt to rant himself back into relevance. Ukraine just needs to keep calm and carry on. 

There is also an outside chance that this a coordinated info op with the Ukrainians, that has been done at least once, although the goal of this one is unclear to me if that is what it is.

[sburke]

Russia's Novorossiysk port cargo terminal on fire – video (yahoo.com)

[sburke]

The Kremlin's top brass are trying to pass the buck over the ruble's collapse. This rare public infighting shows just how precarious Russia's wartime economy is. (yahoo.com)

This infighting and finger-pointing among the Kremlin's top brass highlights the conundrum Putin's administration is facing amid the long-drawn war in Ukraine.

"There is a tug-of-war taking place in Russia right now between President Putin's military ambitions on the one hand and the policy objectives of the central bank and finance ministry on the other," Liam Peach, an economist at research firm Capital Economics, said in an August 15 note, per RadioFreeEurope.

After all, the ruble's plunged has caused pain for some in Russia — with a news ticker in Surgut, a Siberian oil town, openly calling Putin "a dickhead and a thief," Max Seddon, the FT's Moscow bureau chief, tweeted Monday.

"100 rubles to the dollar – you've lost your ****ing mind," read the news ticker in Surgut, per Seddon's translation. The news agency running the ticker said the device was hacked.

For context on the interest rates, Russia's central bank made an emergency rate hike to 20% in late February 2022 following the country's invasion of Ukraine which triggered wild gyrations in the markets.

But the institution had been lowering interest rates steadily until September 2022 to support its sanctions-hit economy. The rate held steady at 7.5% until last month when it was upped to 8.5%.

[sburke]

Russian Army Heads Find a New Way to Screw Their Dead Troops (yahoo.com)

Russian military commissars in Crimea have reportedly come up with a new scam to get rich using the bodies of dead soldiers—by extorting the grieving family members.

That’s according to the human rights group Crimea SOS, which reported Thursday that military commissars have been lying to family members of soldiers killed in Ukraine about the whereabouts of their remains. While the bodies are already stored at a morgue in Simferopol, the group says, military officials tell families they have to pay an extra fee to have the remains retrieved from the battlefield.

“They offer a fee of about 100,000-150,000 rubles for carrier services. The ‘commissars’ explain this scheme [by citing] the inconvenient location of the body and its transportation, otherwise it will be a long wait for the body,” Crimea SOS said.

There have been at least three such instances of the scam so far, they said. Last month, the group warned of university students on the occupied peninsula being blackmailed into joining the Russian military, with staffers telling them they wouldn’t pass their exams otherwise.

Earlier this week, a Russian soldier who spoke to the New York Times revealed that officers handed down orders to not collect the bodies of soldiers killed in action—because then the government would have to pay their families compensation. Instead, troops were reportedly told to classify the dead as missing in action.

Myriad reports have also emerged during the war of families getting stiffed on promised payments, bodies being left to rot in mass graves, and corpses arriving home already “half-decomposed” because officials transported them only in “small batches” to hide the staggering death toll.

[kevinkin]

10 minutes ago, dan/california said:

although the goal of this one is unclear to me if that is what it is.

I just see it as data from the NYT. They have been supportive. 

 

11 minutes ago, dan/california said:

And should Russia decide to mobilize more people, its larger population could quickly overwhelm Ukrainian reserves of manpower.

This could cut both ways: give Ukraine more assistance now or be prepared to do so at a future time. Putin is not ready to back down. And given the nature of the combat numbers matter at least to some degree. That's why they are an important discussion point even if we don't know the complete picture. Pretty sure the US has intel attached to the UA and knows a lot more than what we get from open sources. 

[kevinkin]

Another pin prick or a measured way to strike symbolic targets?:

https://news.yahoo.com/what-is-happening-with-ukraine-war-as-moscow-hit-by-powerful-explosion-141029407.html?fr=yhssrp_catchall

I side with a measured strike/testing for larger ones maybe soon.