How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, zinz said:

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-19-april-2023

I have to agree with Tom Cooper here. The air is the big show stopper for any Ukrainian offensive. 

See also:

https://eurasiantimes.com/russia-adopts-new-offensive-tactics-to-decimate-ukrainian/?amp

I think I would need to see some clear evidence that Russia can actually achieve air superiority, or even parity in order for them to “stop shows”.  My honest recommendation is to stop reading any online “expert” who solely talks about capability.  “Look napalm bomb”, “Look a Russian HARM”.  Arguing solely from a tactical capability perspective is the hallmark of an amateur.

First off the Russian C4ISR system would have to dramatically increase its ability for rapid target queuing and joint integration between air and land power pretty much from tac to strategic. Can anyone point to where this has actually happened?  The Russian air war is still happening in glorious isolation of the land war from what we have seen so far.

Second, we would need some indication that Russian can establish conditions where they are able to create freedom of action to exploit that C4ISR advantage (which they do not have).  We have not.  If Russia could establish even pockets of air superiority they would have done it at Bakhmut or any of the high profile offensives they tried over the winter.

And third, one would need some evidence that Ukrainian Air Denial ability is slipping.  So far we have a leaked report (which may or may not have been doctored) and a few Russian “ARM” strikes.  There has been no degradation of Western ISR support, in fact it has gone the other way.  Ukrainian Air Denial is more than just Radar AD, the MANPAD situation has driven the Russian’s batty.  And more Air Denial systems are coming online - not less.  So this one is dodgy at best.

Finally, we did not see a Russian Air Apocalypse last Fall during the last two Ukrainian offensives?  Have things gotten better for Russia in the interim in the air picture?  About the only positive they have is that as they lost ground and while retreating they were in fact shortening the time and distance to air support.  Beyond that I do not see why or how the Russian Air Force suddenly becomes a wall of steel and precision fires only 5 months after being totally ineffective while the UA took back about 50% of Russian gains had left after the Northern front fell.  I mean seriously, the Russian Air Force is able to stop a major UA offensive now, but they stayed out of Kherson?

I have no doubt the Russian Air Force will be in play but it would need full air supremacy to turn things around at this point.  That is complete C4ISR dominance, watertight SEAD and a demonstrated ability to integrate air and land battles.  And this still would not solve for UA deep precision fires superiority.

Why do people keep coming up with Russian “magic rabbits in hats”? Seriously if Russia had one or two they would have used them by now.  One does not wait until you are teetering on operational collapse to “finally get serious”.    

Edited April 28, 2023 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

10 hours ago, poesel said:

What I think is missing is a discussion in the west on how to treat a post-war Russia (one that has retreated from Ukrainian territory).

We should give Russia a perspective on what to expect when they end this war. Then they can evaluate that against continuing the war and make a proper decision.

Currently, the future looks glum with either war and non-war. But sticking with war and Putin is at least a known factor. Thus there is no real revolt in Russia because there is no alternative.

Well I think a lot of this depends on which Russia is left after the war.  If it is Putin’s Russia, they can expect continued diplomatic and economic isolation while NATO turns the Baltic Sea into its personal swimming pool (except for that weird little Kaliningrad rump thing).  

Russia signed up to being a demonstration of western global order reasserting itself.  That means the “rules” that Putin pooped all over last Sep in his victory speech will be applied very visibly.  So think 1) war reparations - work around to link these to turning the oil back on so we are not talking Versailles. 2) War crimes prosecution - do not even try to wiggle out of that one.  3) Regime change - we are pretty much done doing business with Vlad and Co.   Now a path to re-normalization needs to be on the table but it will come with a penalty box.  Russian Will have to decide to live with that or join North Korea in the “outer club”.  That is a soft Russian landing.  It goes without saying a total Russian military withdrawal is also a requirement - we can solve Crimea and Donbas as a separate issue but it cannot be done under the barrels of Russian tanks.

Now if we have to live with less. Say the Ukrainian offensive fails and this conflict does freeze.  Well then we are back to isolation.  We were pretty close to simply ignoring Crimea and Donbas - way over there and we still need gas. Right up until the point that Russia started bombing things.  Now we care very much about these issues.  No way do things go back to normal until things get addressed.  In fact they are likely to hardwire as “not normal” pretty quickly, in many ways they already are. 

[dan/california]

 

12 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well I think a lot of this depends on which Russia is left after the war.  If it is Putin’s Russia, they can expect continued diplomatic and economic isolation while NATO turns the Baltic Sea into its personal swimming pool (except for that weird little Kaliningrad rump thing).  

Russia signed up to being a demonstration of western global order reasserting itself.  That means the “rules” that Putin pooped all over last Sep in his victory speech will be applied very visibly.  So think 1) war reparations - work around to link these to turning the oil back on so we are not talking Versailles. 2) War crimes prosecution - do not even try to wiggle out of that one.  3) Regime change - we are pretty much done doing business with Vlad and Co.   Now a path to re-normalization needs to be on the table but it will come with a penalty box.  Russian Will have to decide to live with that or join North Korea in the “outer club”.  That is a soft Russian landing.  It goes without saying a total Russian military withdrawal is also a requirement - we can solve Crimea and Donbas as a separate issue but it cannot be done under the barrels of Russian tanks.

Now if we have to live with less. Say the Ukrainian offensive fails and this conflict does freeze.  Well then we are back to isolation.  We were pretty close to simply ignoring Crimea and Donbas - way over there and we still need gas. Right up until the point that Russia started bombing things.  Now we care very much about these issues.  No way do things go back to normal until things get addressed.  In fact they are likely to hardwire as “not normal” pretty quickly, in many ways they already are. 

And the Taiwan issue is sitting out there with potential to make everything even more fun, interesting times...

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

Two tidbits from ISW of special note.  The first is that the reshuffling of Russian generals appears to be related to getting replacements ready for the front:

Quote

The three command organs that are reportedly receiving new leadership as part of this reshuffle are noteworthy because they are associated with managing aspects of Russian force generation, troop sustainment, and logistical oversight. The Russian National Defense Control Center is the body responsible for coordinating the actions of the Russian Armed Forces and is essentially the nerve center of the entire Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Alongside the coordination actions of the National Defense and Control Center, the organs responsible for personnel and logistical oversight facilitate critical troops sustainment functions. The Russian General Staff may be scrambling to enact these changes as fear over a Ukrainian counteroffensive mounts in the Russian information space. These changes also suggest that existing commanders in charge of these functions failed to properly facilitate Russia’s winter offensive, which has largely culminated without making substantial gains. However, these changes are unlikely to effectively set conditions for Russian forces to respond to a Ukrainian counteroffensive in a timely manner. These changes may be part of a wider effort to reform and formalize the Russian Armed Forces over the long term.

The second is that Kadyrov is apparently in need of some attention:

Quote

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to have launched a renewed campaign for national attention. Kadyrov publicized that he met with several prominent Russian officials – including Russian National Guard Federal Service Director Viktor Zolotov, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, Presidential Administration Head Anton Vaino, and Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov – on April 26. Kadyrov claimed that he discussed topics including relations between Russian regions and the federal government with Bortnikov and that Bortnikov thanked him personally for the stable situation in Chechnya.[13] Kadyrov also continues to draw heavily on Chechen soldiers’ role in Ukraine to bolster his own image. Kadyrov claimed on April 26 that Chechen Akhmat-1 Special Purposes Mobile Unit (OMON) security officers with extensive combat experience departed to replace their comrades in Ukraine.[14]

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

From time to time ISW produces special reports on Ukraine.  Interestingly, they chose the "long war" as a topic for one released on the 27th of April.  Here is the link:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reframing-us-policy-debate-‘long-war’-ukraine

The short of it is... Russia wants a long war only because a) it lost all chances of a short war and b) it doesn't want to compromise, therefore it has no choice but to thinking longer term.  The US and its allies wish to avoid a long war, but by not resourcing Ukraine to the maximum extent now they are risking elongating he war.  The US and its allies should also be taking definitive steps to set Ukraine up for future offensives (not mentioned, but I'm sure the author is thinking modern airforce and more modern tanks).  While Russia is very much in a compromised state, it is not helpless and the longer the war goes on the more chance Putin has to convince his population it is necessary.

The author also makes specific mention about the need to take back Ukrainian territory from Russian control.  The primary reason is that Russia needs the territory to continue launching its strikes on Ukraine.  The more terrain Ukraine takes back, the more difficult it is for Russia to wage war against it.  What wasn't said is why Russia couldn't just do it from its own territory.  I have some thoughts on that:

Russia having to conduct military strikes against Ukraine from Russian territory creates practical problems because it requires Russia to militarize its border regions to an extent that won't go unnoticed by Russians.  Especially if Ukraine has it's territory back and Russia is still attacking it, guess what Ukraine will do to Russian forces on Russian territory?  Punch back.  This may help Putin convince Russians that they are besieged, but it also begs Russians to ask the question "how did this happen?" and more importantly "who let it happen?".  Neither questions are good for Putin's health.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Pushback against the Pentagon about the delivery timeline for Abrams tanks.  Note that part of the excuse for the delay is that the current capacity to prep the tanks is under stress because of the Polish tank order needing to be filled.  The order was no doubt put into high gear as part of the Polish move of their tanks into Ukraine.

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/27/dems-republicans-tanks-transfers-ukraine-00094212

Steve

[hcrof]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think I would need to see some clear evidence that Russia can actually achieve air superiority, or even parity in order for them to “stop shows”.  My honest recommendation is to stop reading any online “expert” who solely talks about capability.  “Look napalm bomb”, “Look a Russian HARM”.  Arguing solely from a tactical capability perspective is the hallmark of an amateur.

First off the Russian C4ISR system would have to dramatically increase its ability for rapid target queuing and joint integration between air and land power pretty much from tac to strategic. Can anyone point to where this has actually happened?  The Russian air war is still happening in glorious isolation of the land war from what we have seen so far.

Second, we would need some indication that Russian can establish conditions where they are able to create freedom of action to exploit that C4ISR advantage (which they do not have).  We have not.  If Russia could establish even pockets of air superiority they would have done it at Bakhmut or any of the high profile offensives they tried over the winter.

And third, one would need some evidence that Ukrainian Air Denial ability is slipping.  So far we have a leaked report (which may or may not have been doctored) and a few Russian “ARM” strikes.  There has been no degradation of Western ISR support, in fact it has gone the other way.  Ukrainian Air Denial is more than just Radar AD, the MANPAD situation has driven the Russian’s batty.  And more Air Denial systems are coming online - not less.  So this one is dodgy at best.

Finally, we did not see a Russian Air Apocalypse last Fall during the last two Ukrainian offensives?  Have things gotten better for Russia in the interim in the air picture?  About the only positive they have is that as they lost ground and while retreating they were in fact shortening the time and distance to air support.  Beyond that I do not see why or how the Russian Air Force suddenly becomes a wall of steel and precision fires only 5 months after being totally ineffective while the UA took back about 50% of Russian gains had left after the Northern front fell.  I mean seriously, the Russian Air Force is able to stop a major UA offensive now, but they stayed out of Kherson?

I have no doubt the Russian Air Force will be in play but it would need full air supremacy to turn things around at this point.  That is complete C4ISR dominance, watertight SEAD and a demonstrated ability to integrate air and land battles.  And this still would not solve for UA deep precision fires superiority.

Why do people keep coming up with Russian “magic rabbits in hats”? Seriously if Russia had one or two they would have used them by now.  One does not wait until you are teetering on operational collapse to “finally get serious”.    

I think there is a little bit of smug misinterpretation of what he actually said there. He was surprised by the napalm because you have to fly low and slow to deploy it. This implies either the Russians are either suicidal (and we haven't seen any massive losses in the VKS) or at least somewhat confident they can fly low and slow over part of the front. 

The other point which I think is worth taking seriously is the fact that the hundreds of russian planes currently preparing for the Ukrainian offensive don't need to be very effective to be a threat. They will introduce a significant amount of friction and constraints into the offensive, just like in Kherson. 

Related: a lot of talk here like the whole operation is going to be easy and the Russians have learned nothing/are terminally incompetent.

1. The Russians may be incompetent at (pointless politically driven) offence, but they are still stubborn on the defence. 

2. The Russian defensive trenches, mines and anti tank ditches are a formidable obstacle

3. The Russian air force will be used to bomb rear areas, ammo dumps, bridges etc. They may be slow to react and inaccurate but a e.g. bridge isn't moving anywhere and they will hit it eventually. That puts constraints on the operation. 

4. Russian EW and drones will be used to add more friction: your arty has to move due to counter battery fire, a Lancet hits an hq vehicle on the move, your attack is blinded by EW etc

5. The Ukrainian formations doing this did not exist this time last year. They have not had a lot of time to train together and are still quite green. 

I am not predicting disaster, in fact I think the offence will be a limited success, but I think we should not write the Russians off just yet.

[Bulletpoint]

15 hours ago, Centurian52 said:

This makes the mistake of assuming that there is a single decisionmaker somewhere who could cut off the supply of all weapons. But there isn't. You would have to get every single western country to agree to not send any more weapons (good luck convincing Poland, for example, to stop sending weapons). No one country, even the United States, has the power to force Kyiv to accept any peace deal that they don't want to accept. 

I'm not in the camp who says the US decides everything and that the EU countries are basically vassals, but I do think the US has a LOT of power to influence the foreign politics of most EU countries. You wouldn't need to stop all Western countries to stop sending weapons, just the majority or even the most important ones.

And politics is rarely black or white. American political pressure could make Kyiv accept some kinds of peace proposals, but not others. I'm thinking of the potential scenario where China agrees with Russia that they will propose a "generous" peace plan that doesn't totally satisfy Ukraine. I think the US opinion on that plan would largely dictate what other Western countries would think about it, and it would put Ukraine in a difficult position where they might just have to accept something less than total victory.

[Butschi]

1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:

I think the US opinion on that plan would largely dictate what other Western countries would think about it, and it would put Ukraine in a difficult position where they might just have to accept something less than total victory.

Maybe "dictate" is too strong here but the net effect would be the same. Some countries would see no point in continuing support without the US, others - probably those who were reluctant to participate to begin with - would see it as an easy way out.

Of course we can't force Ukraine to accept a peace deal - they are a sovereign country after all. But that, of course, works both ways. Ukraine can't force Western countries to support them, either.

[Holien]

Well I wonder if the Russians were involved in blowing up the pipe Line? (Actually I don't at all...)

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1651650991341576200

Danish have photos

Quote

Danish Defence Command confirms it's in possession of 26 photos of  Russian submarine rescue vessel SS-750 at the North Stream 1 blast site on 22 September. Photos taken by  Danish patrol vessel "Nymfen".

 

Edited April 28, 2023 by Holien

[Bulletpoint]

32 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Maybe "dictate" is too strong here but the net effect would be the same. Some countries would see no point in continuing support without the US, others - probably those who were reluctant to participate to begin with - would see it as an easy way out.

Of course we can't force Ukraine to accept a peace deal - they are a sovereign country after all. But that, of course, works both ways. Ukraine can't force Western countries to support them, either.

Yes, it's proably a bit too strong wording. "Very strongly affect" might be better.

But I think it's a philosophical question about what it actually means to be a sovereign country these days.

Denmark is officially a completely sovereign nation, and we recently refused to sell Greenland to the USA. But the USA could just grab Greenland if they wanted, and we know that. We also know that Russia could - and likely would - take over Greenland if we were not "very good friends" with the USA. So do we really have a choice in this?

Same with Ukraine. A proud sovereign nation with its own flag and national anthem etc., but it only remains sovereign thanks to the goodwill and support of the West, which is completely dominated economically and militarily by the US.

Edited April 28, 2023 by Bulletpoint

[Kinophile]

If there's one thing I'm absolutely dying to see by August, it's true division-level panic in the Russian invasion force. 

 

[Holien]

3 hours ago, hcrof said:

lot of talk here like the whole operation is going to be easy

Hmmm I have failed to see that.

I think Steve has given a pretty good summary of where the Russian military is based upon the visible evidence.

He has also given a range of possible outcomes as we can't be certain. Ukraine could mess up, I hope not but we are dealing with humans and anything is possible...

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, hcrof said:

I think there is a little bit of smug misinterpretation of what he actually said there. He was surprised by the napalm because you have to fly low and slow to deploy it. This implies either the Russians are either suicidal (and we haven't seen any massive losses in the VKS) or at least somewhat confident they can fly low and slow over part of the front. 

The other point which I think is worth taking seriously is the fact that the hundreds of russian planes currently preparing for the Ukrainian offensive don't need to be very effective to be a threat. They will introduce a significant amount of friction and constraints into the offensive, just like in Kherson. 

Related: a lot of talk here like the whole operation is going to be easy and the Russians have learned nothing/are terminally incompetent.

1. The Russians may be incompetent at (pointless politically driven) offence, but they are still stubborn on the defence. 

2. The Russian defensive trenches, mines and anti tank ditches are a formidable obstacle

3. The Russian air force will be used to bomb rear areas, ammo dumps, bridges etc. They may be slow to react and inaccurate but a e.g. bridge isn't moving anywhere and they will hit it eventually. That puts constraints on the operation. 

4. Russian EW and drones will be used to add more friction: your arty has to move due to counter battery fire, a Lancet hits an hq vehicle on the move, your attack is blinded by EW etc

5. The Ukrainian formations doing this did not exist this time last year. They have not had a lot of time to train together and are still quite green. 

I am not predicting disaster, in fact I think the offence will be a limited success, but I think we should not write the Russians off just yet.

Well I can’t speak to “smug” - perhaps you meant “informed”, but we have been seeing these sorts of reports since this war began.  Some come from a place of honest fear that Russian superiority will assert itself, others from hope that it will (e.g. Macgregor).

As to the “hundreds of Russian aircraft”, well the other factor is the Russian willingness to lose them.  Unlike mobs of poorly trained men, Russia has a limited amount of effective fix wing aircraft and a big @ss sky that it needs to control, largest sovereign airspace in the world.  So I expect, much like this entire war to date, the Russia’s willingness to throw its remaining AirPower away in a denied airspace is pretty damn low.

As to your points:

- not sure where you are getting “easy” from, nothing easy about any of this.  What it won’t be is “impossible” which is what both the OP and articles seem to suggest.  Seems like many fear/hope for the opening of the Somme.

- We really need to get over WW2 and the Russian defence myths.  In this war Russia has failed on defence pretty consistently.  We had no siege of Kherson, or Kharkiv.  Instead we have seen three operational level collapses.  The biggest issue with the “bloody Russian defence” is that they are not defending Russian soil, this is a discretionary invasion war in another country.  I am sure some units will dig in but a lot of others - now mauled by whatever this crazy winter assault was - are likely going to buckle early and fast.  We should see a new line being drawn somewhere but I suspect it will be a scramble back to the Crimea bottleneck and an Eastern line N-S.

- I am a military engineer by trade and frankly have no idea how obstacles will work in this environment.  Given the effects of corrosive warfare that we have seen so far, I am not even sure these will work as viable investments.  The Russians are clearly thinking “force multipliers” but there are basic calculus’s in the wind right now.

- If Russia had the ability to conduct deep operational battle (e.g. static bridges, rail etc) via AirPower, then why has it waited until now to use it?  It bled itself white over the winter trying to grab something/anything and we did not see a single coherent operational level air campaign. So now while it is being assaulted it is suddenly going to figure that out? I am sure we will see some weak disjointed attempts but if Russia could do this - do it freakin now before those reported 9 fresh UA Bdes form up on the start line.

- Russian EW and UAS will add friction to the attack.  But they need to to more than that.  They need to disrupt and dislocate.  This means Russia need to be able to employ a defensive form of corrosive warfare (the ability to project enough precision attrition and friction on an opponent to create wide systemic failure in their military operational machine).  We have not seen this.  Russia has been relying almost entirely on old school front edge combat attrition, trading 3 men for 1 theirs type stuff.  

- Ukrainian formations are green?  What kind of shape do you suppose the RA units are in?  They are 1) pretty banged up and replacements likely rushed into place and 2) have not had a free and donated western force generation stream to pull on.  The UA has experience in conducting operational level offensives, the staffs and HQs that pulled that off are anything but green.  All of it rested on an increasingly more integrated western supported ISR and targeting enterprise.  In the competition of “who is in rougher shape before the spring/summer offensive of ‘23”. I gotta go with Russia.

I am not predicting a rout of the RA back to its borders (but if it goes well enough that is not off the table), but this thing has the hallmarks of another Russian operational collapse in the making - highly eroded operational systems, significant C4ISR asymmetry, and still no sign they can establish favourable strategic or operational pre-conditions in any domain.  If they do manage to hold the UA back effectively, then something fundamental will have changed and we damned well will need to understand what that is because it might mean that this war is done pretty much where they stand now and we are out of military solutions.  But I am not there yet, quite the opposite, I am wondering how successful the UA will be and whether not it will be enough to keep the west engaged in this.  As we saw at Kherson - which many western pundits ping to with disappointment- the bar of western expectations is sometimes unreasonably high, largely because we have no modern experience in wars like this one.

Regardless, I guess we will see soon.

[The_Capt]

14 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

First off, what happened to Tom Cooper's grasp of the English language?  It's been a while since I've read anything of his as I found his prognostications to off the mark, so I almost thought this particular post was a spoof

While I certainly don't view Russia's air power to be completely ineffective, I do not think it has what it takes to use it decisively in any way.  A whole year's worth of evidence to support that position.  Given their difficulty fielding precision weapons that worked well, and now they have hardly any of those left, it doesn't seem to me that they have anything that will change the equation on the ground.

Hopefully Ukraine's deep strike plan includes more damage to Russia's bomber capacity.  Hitting them has certainly worked in the past.

Steve

You know the more I think about this the angrier I get.  This is an egregious double standard against Ukraine coming from the “experts”.

The course of this war for Russia - 

I will invade and crush you…fail

Ok, now I will create 20 sieges and crush you…fail.

Ok, getting serious now.  I will WW1 blast you in the South - we really only wanted that anyway, create cauldrons and crush you…fail.

Ok, ok, you asked for this, I will create multiple Stalingrads on defence and you will die trying to take your country back…fail.

Alright you have really ticked me off now, prepare for human waves and a winter offensive…fail.

That is it!  I am all out of patience and now you are in for it.  Prepare to die on the Putin Line!  (And western pundits are buying into it)

Meanwhile “Ukraine is barely hanging on and maybe we should rethink about support because they have not driven the RA into the sea yet.”  I mean c’mon, with friends like these…

[billbindc]

59 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well I can’t speak to “smug” - perhaps you meant “informed”, but we have been seeing these sorts of reports since this war began.  Some come from a place of honest fear that Russian superiority will assert itself, others from hope that it will (e.g. Macgregor).

As to the “hundreds of Russian aircraft”, well the other factor is the Russian willingness to lose them.  Unlike mobs of poorly trained men, Russia has a limited amount of effective fix wing aircraft and a big @ss sky that it needs to control, largest sovereign airspace in the world.  So I expect, much like this entire war to date, the Russia’s willingness to throw its remaining AirPower away in a denied airspace is pretty damn low.

As to your points:

- not sure where you are getting “easy” from, nothing easy about any of this.  What it won’t be is “impossible” which is what both the OP and articles seem to suggest.  Seems like many fear/hope for the opening of the Somme.

- We really need to get over WW2 and the Russian defence myths.  In this war Russia has failed on defence pretty consistently.  We had no siege of Kherson, or Kharkiv.  Instead we have seen three operational level collapses.  The biggest issue with the “bloody Russian defence” is that they are not defending Russian soil, this is a discretionary invasion war in another country.  I am sure some units will dig in but a lot of others - now mauled by whatever this crazy winter assault was - are likely going to buckle early and fast.  We should see a new line being drawn somewhere but I suspect it will be a scramble back to the Crimea bottleneck and an Eastern line N-S.

- I am a military engineer by trade and frankly have no idea how obstacles will work in this environment.  Given the effects of corrosive warfare that we have seen so far, I am not even sure these will work as viable investments.  The Russians are clearly thinking “force multipliers” but there are basic calculus’s in the wind right now.

- If Russia had the ability to conduct deep operational battle (e.g. static bridges, rail etc) via AirPower, then why has it waited until now to use it?  It bled itself white over the winter trying to grab something/anything and we did not see a single coherent operational level air campaign. So now while it is being assaulted it is suddenly going to figure that out? I am sure we will see some weak disjointed attempts but if Russia could do this - do it freakin now before those reported 9 fresh UA Bdes form up on the start line.

- Russian EW and UAS will add friction to the attack.  But they need to to more than that.  They need to disrupt and dislocate.  This means Russia need to be able to employ a defensive form of corrosive warfare (the ability to project enough precision attrition and friction on an opponent to create wide systemic failure in their military operational machine).  We have not seen this.  Russia has been relying almost entirely on old school front edge combat attrition, trading 3 men for 1 theirs type stuff.  

- Ukrainian formations are green?  What kind of shape do you suppose the RA units are in?  They are 1) pretty banged up and replacements likely rushed into place and 2) have not had a free and donated western force generation stream to pull on.  The UA has experience in conducting operational level offensives, the staffs and HQs that pulled that off are anything but green.  All of it rested on an increasingly more integrated western supported ISR and targeting enterprise.  In the competition of “who is in rougher shape before the spring/summer offensive of ‘23”. I gotta go with Russia.

I am not predicting a rout of the RA back to its borders (but if it goes well enough that is not off the table), but this thing has the hallmarks of another Russian operational collapse in the making - highly eroded operational systems, significant C4ISR asymmetry, and still no sign they can establish favourable strategic or operational pre-conditions in any domain.  If they do manage to hold the UA back effectively, then something fundamental will have changed and we damned well will need to understand what that is because it might mean that this war is done pretty much where they stand now and we are out of military solutions.  But I am not there yet, quite the opposite, I am wondering how successful the UA will be and whether not it will be enough to keep the west engaged in this.  As we saw at Kherson - which many western pundits ping to with disappointment- the bar of western expectations is sometimes unreasonably high, largely because we have no modern experience in wars like this one.

Regardless, I guess we will see soon.

It's also a ridiculous assumption to assume that the Russia Airforce is a shiny deus ex machina ready to be pulled out of the box to win the war. Yes it has a lot of planes. What it lacks is doctrine, pilots, attitude and upkeep. We've been to this rodeo before with the Russians and we know how it's highly likely to turn out. 

https://www.businessinsider.com/fighting-in-ukraine-reveals-russian-air-force-fragility-think-tank-2022-12?r=US&IR=T

 

 

Edited April 28, 2023 by billbindc

[billbindc]

Kofman and Evans is a pretty decent rundown of where we are on the offensive. Kofman is fairly optimistic and both are critical of the pre-game jitters from the USG and the overall theory of success. 

https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/the-calm-before-the-storm-waiting-for-ukraines-offensive/?__s=4983vxa1cr7umn9uarm1

Caveat: it would shed more light on the complexities involved if there was less emphasis on supposed American political considerations (supporting Ukraine is popular...this is a bad point) and the more rigorous interpretation that arbitraging Chinese intervention is a far likelier influence.

Edited April 28, 2023 by billbindc

[hcrof]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Well I can’t speak to “smug” - perhaps you meant “informed”, but we have been seeing these sorts of reports since this war began.  Some come from a place of honest fear that Russian superiority will assert itself, others from hope that it will (e.g. Macgregor).

As to the “hundreds of Russian aircraft”, well the other factor is the Russian willingness to lose them.  Unlike mobs of poorly trained men, Russia has a limited amount of effective fix wing aircraft and a big @ss sky that it needs to control, largest sovereign airspace in the world.  So I expect, much like this entire war to date, the Russia’s willingness to throw its remaining AirPower away in a denied airspace is pretty damn low.

As to your points:

- not sure where you are getting “easy” from, nothing easy about any of this.  What it won’t be is “impossible” which is what both the OP and articles seem to suggest.  Seems like many fear/hope for the opening of the Somme.

- We really need to get over WW2 and the Russian defence myths.  In this war Russia has failed on defence pretty consistently.  We had no siege of Kherson, or Kharkiv.  Instead we have seen three operational level collapses.  The biggest issue with the “bloody Russian defence” is that they are not defending Russian soil, this is a discretionary invasion war in another country.  I am sure some units will dig in but a lot of others - now mauled by whatever this crazy winter assault was - are likely going to buckle early and fast.  We should see a new line being drawn somewhere but I suspect it will be a scramble back to the Crimea bottleneck and an Eastern line N-S.

- I am a military engineer by trade and frankly have no idea how obstacles will work in this environment.  Given the effects of corrosive warfare that we have seen so far, I am not even sure these will work as viable investments.  The Russians are clearly thinking “force multipliers” but there are basic calculus’s in the wind right now.

- If Russia had the ability to conduct deep operational battle (e.g. static bridges, rail etc) via AirPower, then why has it waited until now to use it?  It bled itself white over the winter trying to grab something/anything and we did not see a single coherent operational level air campaign. So now while it is being assaulted it is suddenly going to figure that out? I am sure we will see some weak disjointed attempts but if Russia could do this - do it freakin now before those reported 9 fresh UA Bdes form up on the start line.

- Russian EW and UAS will add friction to the attack.  But they need to to more than that.  They need to disrupt and dislocate.  This means Russia need to be able to employ a defensive form of corrosive warfare (the ability to project enough precision attrition and friction on an opponent to create wide systemic failure in their military operational machine).  We have not seen this.  Russia has been relying almost entirely on old school front edge combat attrition, trading 3 men for 1 theirs type stuff.  

- Ukrainian formations are green?  What kind of shape do you suppose the RA units are in?  They are 1) pretty banged up and replacements likely rushed into place and 2) have not had a free and donated western force generation stream to pull on.  The UA has experience in conducting operational level offensives, the staffs and HQs that pulled that off are anything but green.  All of it rested on an increasingly more integrated western supported ISR and targeting enterprise.  In the competition of “who is in rougher shape before the spring/summer offensive of ‘23”. I gotta go with Russia.

I am not predicting a rout of the RA back to its borders (but if it goes well enough that is not off the table), but this thing has the hallmarks of another Russian operational collapse in the making - highly eroded operational systems, significant C4ISR asymmetry, and still no sign they can establish favourable strategic or operational pre-conditions in any domain.  If they do manage to hold the UA back effectively, then something fundamental will have changed and we damned well will need to understand what that is because it might mean that this war is done pretty much where they stand now and we are out of military solutions.  But I am not there yet, quite the opposite, I am wondering how successful the UA will be and whether not it will be enough to keep the west engaged in this.  As we saw at Kherson - which many western pundits ping to with disappointment- the bar of western expectations is sometimes unreasonably high, largely because we have no modern experience in wars like this one.

Regardless, I guess we will see soon.

I think we are generally in agreement, it's just that there is so much effort to debunk the naysayers here that sometimes it feels like it has gone too far in the other direction. 

To clarify some of my points:

The Russians are definitely being stubborn in this war, there are quite a few stories of blocking detachments, medieval punishments etc for troops who retreat and we have seen stories of Russians killing themselves before being captured. Even when they retreated in Kherson and Kiev they did so in reasonably good order. Kharkiv was different but I think it will always be an outlier. 

Obstacles: any breaching operation is always going to be difficult and risky. I am not sure the Ukrainians have such an overwhelming advantage in corrosive warfare to offset that.

In Kherson we saw russian airpower being used against temporary bridges (I remember a few videos of vehicles moving past a lot of destruction at various choke points). Also, yes the Russians are holding back now, but will they do so again if they feel it is all or nothing?

Russian EW is now disrupting starlink and is continuing to adapt. Russian drone warfare is still behind the Ukrainians but they are only 6 months or so behind from what I can see so it is still being felt. 

I am not denying that the Russians are in a bad shape, but they will try to project enough friction to make the Ukrainian operation collapse under its own weight (and green troops just add more friction). They hope that mobiks in trenches combined with a more assertive Russian air force is enough to do that. Let us hope they are wrong. 

[Letter from Prague]

I can imagine Russians holding back now. Looking at just the battlefield it makes no sense but looking at the political battlefield it does: if Ukrainian offensive fails without achieving much, that probably means the end of Western support and push to freeze to conflict. And the double standard that TheCapt mentioned is disgusting and infuriating for sure, but it does exist - in heads of politicians, voters and others.

[womble]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

It's also a ridiculous assumption to assume that the Russia Airforce is a shiny deus ex machina ready to be pulled out of the box to win the war.

It's not going to win the war, because it can't get inside the UKR AD umbrella to do any harm, except with standoff "Precision" (LOL) munitions.

I can only remember one time the UKR have gotten an armoured strike together (somewhere in the north/Donetsk, maybe around the time Russia was floundering around failing to cross a river... I have no idea how to spend only a reasonable amount of time going back to find it), and it fell apart, largely, according to the preponderance of accounts, due to Russian TACAir. I know my recollection isn't perfect, but within its parameters, there's a 1:1 relationship between UKR armoured push and RUSAir stopping it.

Air couldn't be a factor in stopping the Kharkhiv push, because that was basically a cloud of midges expanding, and way too diffuse for Russian CSIR and precision combined to be able to exercise any decisive effect.

In Kherson, hasn't it been said that RUS CAS was a large factor in making the UKR advance as slow and painful as it turned out to be? There, it was also a situation that the Russians knew was going down eventually, given the supply problems and obvious UKR motivation to retake it, and the geometry of the geography probably also helped keep UKR activity at least partially under their established AD umbrella.

It has seemed to me, from the accounts promulgated here, that most times UKR stray from under their established AD perimeter, they do suffer from RUS CAS. It's also seemed to me that the UKR command have learned their lesson, and severely restricted the depth of any counterattacks over the winter (whether through choice or necessity). This means we don't know whether they have solved the problem of leaving their own "safe zone". They have Gepard now, and hopefully a lot more Stinger, Starstreak and the rest, because they're not going to be contesting air superiority on the wing.

On the defense, RUS don't have to attain air superiority to deploy their CAS platforms, since they have competent AD complexes to deter UKR interceptors. I guess it depends how deeply the two umbrellas overlap...

They'll probably have enough information about where to strike, since it'll be their forces that are stood in front of the UKR advance; if the "C2" part can handle the volume and properly direct their assets... that's a big hurdle, for sure, but the Russians don't have to get it right many times to give the UKR attack a bloody nose and pause, and they have a lot of air frames to throw around; reluctance to lose them might start to erode once the UKR advance starts and nothing else is stopping it...

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

It's also a ridiculous assumption to assume that the Russia Airforce is a shiny deus ex machina ready to be pulled out of the box to win the war. Yes it has a lot of planes. What it lacks is doctrine, pilots, attitude and upkeep. We've been to this rodeo before with the Russians and we know how it's highly likely to turn out. 

https://www.businessinsider.com/fighting-in-ukraine-reveals-russian-air-force-fragility-think-tank-2022-12?r=US&IR=T

 

 

18 minutes ago, womble said:

It's not going to win the war, because it can't get inside the UKR AD umbrella to do any harm, except with standoff "Precision" (LOL) munitions.

I can only remember one time the UKR have gotten an armoured strike together (somewhere in the north/Donetsk, maybe around the time Russia was floundering around failing to cross a river... I have no idea how to spend only a reasonable amount of time going back to find it), and it fell apart, largely, according to the preponderance of accounts, due to Russian TACAir. I know my recollection isn't perfect, but within its parameters, there's a 1:1 relationship between UKR armoured push and RUSAir stopping it.

Air couldn't be a factor in stopping the Kharkhiv push, because that was basically a cloud of midges expanding, and way too diffuse for Russian CSIR and precision combined to be able to exercise any decisive effect.

In Kherson, hasn't it been said that RUS CAS was a large factor in making the UKR advance as slow and painful as it turned out to be? There, it was also a situation that the Russians knew was going down eventually, given the supply problems and obvious UKR motivation to retake it, and the geometry of the geography probably also helped keep UKR activity at least partially under their established AD umbrella.

It has seemed to me, from the accounts promulgated here, that most times UKR stray from under their established AD perimeter, they do suffer from RUS CAS. It's also seemed to me that the UKR command have learned their lesson, and severely restricted the depth of any counterattacks over the winter (whether through choice or necessity). This means we don't know whether they have solved the problem of leaving their own "safe zone". They have Gepard now, and hopefully a lot more Stinger, Starstreak and the rest, because they're not going to be contesting air superiority on the wing.

On the defense, RUS don't have to attain air superiority to deploy their CAS platforms, since they have competent AD complexes to deter UKR interceptors. I guess it depends how deeply the two umbrellas overlap...

They'll probably have enough information about where to strike, since it'll be their forces that are stood in front of the UKR advance; if the "C2" part can handle the volume and properly direct their assets... that's a big hurdle, for sure, but the Russians don't have to get it right many times to give the UKR attack a bloody nose and pause, and they have a lot of air frames to throw around; reluctance to lose them might start to erode once the UKR advance starts and nothing else is stopping it...

A hundred ATACMS directed at the Crimean airfields would mean a LOT less concern about the Russian Air Force. Not doing that is on us. 

[Battlefront.com]

Here's an odd one.  Three armed and uniformed soldiers are hit with VOG-15 bombs, apparently prior to when the video starts.  They are repeatedly hit, with 2 looking to be probable 200s very soon.  But look off to the right.  There is what appears to be a dead man in civilian clothing.  I'm guessing he was hit in the first wave of attacks not shown.  I wonder what that is all about.

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/1313im5/three_enemy_invaders_get_vogged/

Steve

[dan/california]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Here's an odd one.  Three armed and uniformed soldiers are hit with VOG-15 bombs, apparently prior to when the video starts.  They are repeatedly hit, with 2 looking to be probable 200s very soon.  But look off to the right.  There is what appears to be a dead man in civilian clothing.  I'm guessing he was hit in the first wave of attacks not shown.  I wonder what that is all about.

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/1313im5/three_enemy_invaders_get_vogged/

Steve

The Russians are desperate enough to be stripping gear off of the dead?  Or they are forcing civilians/POWs to clear mines/booby traps at gunpoint?

[womble]

17 minutes ago, dan/california said:

A hundred ATACMS directed at the Crimean airfields would mean a LOT less concern about the Russian Air Force. Not doing that is on us. 

For sure. Or maybe the UKR Hrim program already has that sorted. Or maybe the success of RUS CAS I remember being reported was an outlier. Needs to be more than a hope, though, or the poor tankers and infantry might end up regretting it.

[hcrof]

interesting thread as to why the Russians are behind the Ukrainians with regard to small drone use. Their focus on larger drones may even be correct in the long run but they are suffering for it right now, which is probably more important!