How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Drone unit Code 9.2 of 3rd mech.battalion of 92nd mech. brigade eliminates Russians with high precise bombing during the fight for position near Khromove

Soldiers of 92nd brigade claen up probably the same trench 

 

I am nearly positive this is the same trench system we saw weeks ago when there was a shootout between Ukrainian and Russian forces.  There was even an after action report posted about it.  This is the one at a crossing with Ukrainians on the right and Russians advancing from the left where the Russians made a tactical mistake got got themselves killed.

 

It is amazing how consistent the lessons of trench warfare are regarding drones:

1. Once a trench attracts the attention of a competent and well equipped bombing unit, it becomes a death trap.  There's very little the defending units can do to protect themselves from bombers and also perform their function of holding ground.  If the defender mans the trench, they can be bombed to death.  If they hide in their dugouts, they can be more selectively targeted by bombers and/or artillery.  At the very least the drones know if all the defenders are hiding and that could facilitate a ground attack to take the trench.
2. Shallow trenches with mounded berms offer drone bombers more opportunities to cause casualties compared to full height slit trenches.  The berm method is quicker and easier to do because you only dig 1/2 as deep and use the excavated soil to achieve a soldier height position.  However, a full height slit trench requires the bomb land directly in the narrow trench.  Strikes on either side of the trench means the effect goes over the heads of the soldiers.  By contrast, a bomb impacting the "friendly" side of a berm directs its effects into the half height trench.  This effectively doubles or quadruples the targeting area for effective bombing.
3. Bunker type dugouts off to the sides of trenches offer very limited protection unless they are below trench level and set back probably 5m from the opening.  Another technique is to have the dugout safety areas off to the sides of the entrance, again sufficiently below ground and/or distant from the opening to ensure no direct fragmentation path to where soldiers are sheltering.
4. Foxhole type dugouts attached to the trench complicate bombing decisions and minimize the casualties per bomb dropped, but if the bomber can easily see who is where and given the opportunity "shoot fish in a barrel".

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

9 hours ago, Yet said:

not the 'evidence', but it also doesnt mean that it isnt true. RU doesnt make these kind of claims in a daily basis. 

the claim they made that UKR speciaal forces tried to take the nuclear power plant also turned out to be more true than some of us here expected.

There were a series of raids supposedly conducted last year that were either fully BS propaganda for Russian consumption or were greatly exagurated (e.g. 2 guys in a boat became 2 companies of Polish mercenaries led by British special forces and backed up by Martians).  However, the most recent large scale raid, as you say, does seem to have happened.  Has anybody heard any follow up on the supposed 600+ man raid that didn't end well for Ukraine?

As for Def Mon's take on the left bank incursions, as usual he makes some excellent observations.  However, I disagree with him about the level of threat even these small establishments create for the Russian defenses.  The primary one is a base of operations for recon/sabotage groups.  If Ukraine decides it is going to make a full scale landing over the river, or even fake one as a distraction, having established "bases" on the left bank give Ukraine a lot of options they otherwise wouldn't have.  Even small numbers of soldiers operating on foot could greatly complicate Russia's response to either real or faked crossing activities.

Russia is no doubt aware of these positions and the risks they pose.  Yet there does not appear to be a concerted effort to get rid of them or, perhaps, even make their lives miserable.  It wouldn't take all that much to make Ukraine's positions untenable, and yet Russia isn't (apparently) doing anything.  Since the knowledge and incentives are clearly there, but the resources to make it happen are not, it is possible to conclude that we are seeing a sign that Russia's obsession with the eastern front (Bakhmut in particular) is ONCE AGAIN having a detrimental impact on their ability to defend its positions elsewhere.

Steve

[danfrodo]

speak of the devil, some allegedly geolocated stuff on the kherson ops.  And some speculation about where UKR should attack based on known RU fortification levels.  But are those trenches all actually manned and supported?  On paper looks tough on the southern front but what kind of army is actually there?  How do they provide artillery support across that whole region and how fast can they shift what they do have to meet any threat?  If they can barely get enough force to inch forward in Bakhmut is it because they have sooooo many men in the south? -- maybe, maybe not.  I bet UKR has a pretty good idea what's down there.

Author says going for Donetsk would be big surprise and might pay off, but I would never enter the city.  The only thing I'd do in that area is try to cut the rail line SW of the city.  That might be worth it. 

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/4/23/2165137/-Ukraine-Update-So-many-counterattack-options-but-here-s-one-that-could-break-Russia

 

[dan/california]

23 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

There were a series of raids supposedly conducted last year that were either fully BS propaganda for Russian consumption or were greatly exagurated (e.g. 2 guys in a boat became 2 companies of Polish mercenaries led by British special forces and backed up by Martians).  However, the most recent large scale raid, as you say, does seem to have happened.  Has anybody heard any follow up on the supposed 600+ man raid that didn't end well for Ukraine?

As for Def Mon's take on the left bank incursions, as usual he makes some excellent observations.  However, I disagree with him about the level of threat even these small establishments create for the Russian defenses.  The primary one is a base of operations for recon/sabotage groups.  If Ukraine decides it is going to make a full scale landing over the river, or even fake one as a distraction, having established "bases" on the left bank give Ukraine a lot of options they otherwise wouldn't have.  Even small numbers of soldiers operating on foot could greatly complicate Russia's response to either real or faked crossing activities.

Russia is no doubt aware of these positions and the risks they pose.  Yet there does not appear to be a concerted effort to get rid of them or, perhaps, even make their lives miserable.  It wouldn't take all that much to make Ukraine's positions untenable, and yet Russia isn't (apparently) doing anything.  Since the knowledge and incentives are clearly there, but the resources to make it happen are not, it is possible to conclude that we are seeing a sign that Russia's obsession with the eastern front (Bakhmut in particular) is ONCE AGAIN having a detrimental impact on their ability to defend its positions elsewhere.

Steve

I think crossing the river in force is probably just too hard. But if the Ukrainians are considerably stronger than I think, there are good paved roads from Kherson and Nova Kakhovka Straight to the choke points at the top of Crimea. If the Ukrainians could even credibly threaten along this axis, while also attacking towards Melitopol from the North, it could unhinge the entire western third of the land bridge . Of course if Ukraine strong enough to do this, then they are probably going to smash the Russians almost regardless of the plan.

Edited April 23, 2023 by dan/california

[billbindc]

8 hours ago, kluge said:

Ah, I didn't mean to imply that it was false. It's clear that UKR has some degree of control over that particular part of the left bank.

What I'm surmising is that the density of UKR forces is too low to present an economical target for a full fledged response, but still high enough to unnerve the Russians in that area.

This. The point is to elicit a military reaction and force adjustment. It has already provoke nervous discussion on the Russian side.

[Haiduk]

 

Russians increase number of bomb strikes and try to conduct such sorties already not only by single jet or pairs, but with flights. Four Su-35 dropped five UPAB-500 bombs (ER-JDAM analog) on village near Kherson. 

On the video probably aftermath of this or recent strike - the bomb hit the ground near private yard, damaging buildings. It's unknown what a reason to bomb a village without troops, but this can be just training of mass usage of avaiation for repelling of Ukrianian offensive. 

 

According to Kostianntyn Mashovets, Russians in own preparatins to UKR offensive made main bet on mass of aviation and artillery

Troops Grouping "East", which appointed to meet UKR offensive on southern direction from Orikhove to Vuhledar is regrouping now in two echelons battle order. Grouping in about 87300 of personnel has 392 tanks, 1238 of light armor, 763 artillery pieces over 100 mm, 216 MLRS and 12 ballistic missiles launchers.  

But looks like even this enough number artillery probably can play not a main role in comparison with aviation groupment, which Russian continiue to gather for operation on southern direction:

Nearest airfields in Crimea (Russians also, if possible disperse aviation among airfields)

Gvardeyskoye: 10 Su-24M, 12 Su-25

Belbek: 6 Su-35, 6 Su-34, 1 Su-30, 28 Su-27

Dzankoy: 4 Su-25, 4 Ka-52, 8 Mi-28, 2 Mi-24/35, 23 Mi-8

Saky: 9 Su-24M, 6 Su-30, 5 Su-27, 4 MiG-29K

Kirovske: 6 MiG-29, 3 Mi-28, 3 Mi-24/35, 2 Mi-8

Kacha: 1 Mi-8

Strilkove (Kherson oblast): 5 Ka-52, 3 Mi-24/35, 3 Mi-8

Total 97 combat jets (12 UPAB cariers Su-34/35) and 57 helicopters (i.e. 28 attack)

 

AIrfields in south of Russia and occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast:

Berdiansk (occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast): 6 Ka-52, 5 Mi-8

Primorsko-Akhtarsk (Krasnodar region): 6 Su-34, 12 Su-25

Krymsk (Krasnodar region): 15 Su-30, 35 Su-27

Kushchevskaya (Krasnodar region): 7 Su-35

Yeysk (Krasnodar region): 4 Su-34, 6 Su-25, 2 Su-30

Korenevsk (Krasnodar region): 1 Ka-52, 2 Mi-28, 3 Mi-8, 5 Mi-26

Rostov-on-Don: 2 Ka-52, 17 Mi-8, 5 Mi-26

Taganrog (Rostov oblast): 9 Su-25, 3 Mi-28, 5 Mi-24/35, 6 Mi-8

Zernograd (Rostov oblast): 6 Ka-52, 7 Mi-28, 1 Mi-24/35, 26 Mi-8, 13 Mi-26

Toatal: 96 combat jets (17 UPAB carriers), 113 helicopters (i.e 33 attack)

 

Russian recon and ELINT aircraft actively monitoring southern direction by 2 A-50 AWACS, using as aerial communication center and ELINT four Il-22 and 2 EW aircraft Il-22PP. Operative-tactical recon/SIGINT/ELINT conducts with 6 Su-24MR and 2 Su-34 with UCR recon pods 

 

Edited April 23, 2023 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

16 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

 

Russians increase number of bomb strikes and try to conduct such sorties already not only by single jet or pairs, but with flights. Four Su-35 dropped five UPAB-500 bombs (ER-JDAM analog) on village near Kherson. 

On the video probably aftermath of this or recent strike - the bomb hit the ground near private yard, damaging buildings. It's unknown what a reason to bomb a village without troops, but this can be just training of mass usage of avaiation for repelling of Ukrianian offensive. 

 

According to Kostianntyn Mashovets, Russians in own preparatins to UKR offensive made main bet on mass of aviation and artillery

Troops Grouping "East", which appointed to meet UKR offensive on southern direction from Orikhove to Vuhledar is regrouping now in two echeloned battle order. Grouping in about 87300 of personnel has 392 tanks, 1238 of light armor, 763 artillery pieces over 100 mm, 216 MLRS and 12 ballistic missiles launchers.  

But looks like even this enough number artillery probably can play not a main role in comparison with aviation groupment, which Russian continiue to gather for operation on southern direction:

Nearest airfields in Crimea (Russians also, if possible disperse aviation among airfields)

Gvardeyskoye: 10 Su-24M, 12 Su-25

Belbek: 6 Su-35, 6 Su-34, 1 Su-30, 28 Su-27

Dzankoy: 4 Su-25, 4 Ka-52, 8 Mi-28, 2 Mi-24/35, 23 Mi-8

Saky: 9 Su-24M, 6 Su-30, 5 Su-27, 4 MiG-29K

Kirovske: 6 MiG-29, 3 Mi-28, 3 Mi-24/35, 2 Mi-8

Kacha: 1 Mi-8

Strilkove (Kherson oblast): 5 Ka-52, 3 Mi-24/35, 3 Mi-8

Total 97 comabt jets (12 UPAB cariers Su-34/35) and 57 helicopters (i.e. 28 attack)

 

AIrfields in south of Russia and occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast:

Berdiansk (occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast): 6 Ka-52, 5 Mi-8

Primorsko-Akhtarsk (Krasnodar region): 6 Su-34, 12 Su-25

Krymsk (Krasnodar region): 15 Su-30, 35 Su-27

Kushchevskaya (Krasnodar region): 7 Su-35

Yeysk (Krasnodar region): 4 Su-34, 6 Su-25, 2 Su-30

Korenevsk (Krasnodar region): 1 Ka-52, 2 Mi-28, 3 Mi-8, 5 Mi-26

Rostov-on-Don: 2 Ka-52, 17 Mi-8, 5 Mi-26

Taganrog (Rostov oblast): 9 Su-25, 3 Mi-28, 5 Mi-24/35, 6 Mi-8

Zernograd (Rostov oblast): 6 Ka-52, 7 Mi-28, 1 Mi-24/35, 26 Mi-8, 13 Mi-26

Toatal: 96 combat jets (17 UPAB carriers), 113 helicopters (i.e 33 attack)

 

Russian recon and ELINT aircraft actively monitoring southern direction by 2 A-50 AWACS, using as aerial communication center and ELINT four Il-22 and 2 EW aircraft Il-22PP. Operative-tactical recon/SIGINT/ELINT conducts with 6 Su-24MR and 2 Su-34 with UCR recon pods 

 

I count 16 airfields, my back of the envelope says Ukraine Needs 160 ATACMS or cruise missiles soonest. And hey i just got started on this weeks letter to my Congressman.

[Vet 0369]

On 4/20/2023 at 12:35 PM, Beleg85 said:

For me personally (and professionally-happened to write some articles on how massed combat was viewed through Eastern Roman military manuals back in academia times) the human averse to killing is fascinating topic. It is not directed by higher ethics (this layer exist, but let's face it- it's easily breacheable) but by more primitive, apish impulses- chiefly, danger of direct reciprocity. We are very, very social animals when in crowds, even at mirroring behaviour of persons we want to immediatelly kill. Take for examples these stories from Crimean or Civil War when soldiers armed to their teeth in lethal muskets suddenly started to pick stones or even snowballs (!) and within seconds deadly serious battle could turn into throwing contest. Something very similar we are witnessing now in "club war" on India/China border. Quite amazing that in XXI cent. both sides prefer to behave like Stone Era warriors, even developing their own creative tactics, marking champions from both sides (there was an article year ago about one Sikh soldier who get "touched" most enemies with his club) or agreeing on "safe spaces" where wounded can crawl.

It's deadly, lethaly serious, but also so silly in the same time. Homo sapiens are strange creatures.

There are many theories as to why this type of behavior exists. The human psychology at this point in time is probably well beyond what we (Scientists, Anthropologists,Psychologists, etc) are capable of understanding at this point in time. The switch from “war game” to “war” can be almost instantaneous. There are many documented examples of men, and women, involved in an organized and planned military war game has suddenly devolved into an actual battle with entrenching tools, bayonets, combat knives, rocks, helmets, etc. I saw it in a NATO operation in Norway when Norwegian Infantry asked us if we had bayonets. We said no, and asked why they wanted to know. They told us that an SAS unit (aggressors) they had attacked the previous night, had fixed bayonets and stuck a couple of their unit.

When I was in a militia Minuteman group re-enacting pre and eventual colonial battles in the U.S. Bicentennial in 1974 and 1975, ram rods were required to be wired into the ram rod slot of all muskets and pistols because of the frequency of the ram rods flying down range at “the enemy, and no one was allowed to carry a bayonet or knife. There is something about our psyche that puts those turns of events on a hair-trigger.

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Once a trench attracts the attention of a competent and well equipped bombing unit, it becomes a death trap.  There's very little the defending units can do to protect themselves from bombers and also perform their function of holding ground.

Wagners became to use experimental "trench EW" systems like "Strizh" jammer and universal asset "Repeinik", which is 3 in 1  - GSR, drone detector and drone jammer. This staff was developed from civilian purpuse devices for money of Prigozyn company. Russan MoD is also interested in this, so now manufacturers try to deploy production of this equipment in series. Of course, these devices can't be deployed immediately during assaults, but Wagners actively use it in own close rear and often close to important assault directions to detect and jam UKR drones. This equipment shows own enough effectiveness, so UKR side now tries to spot them and this is one of priprity targets. Theer were several videos, of strikes on this devices. Though, this equipment can supress only civilian frequencies 800 MHz/2.4 GHz/5 GHz, using by Chinees commercial drones. Against special Ukrainian developments like Furia, Shark, Leleka it usuless. I have no info about FPV drones.  

Edited April 23, 2023 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Wagners became to use experimental "trench EW" systems like "Strizh" jammer and universal asset "Repeinik", which is 3 in 1  - GSR, drone detector and drone jammer. This staff was developed from civilian purpuse devices for money of Prigozyn company. Russan MoD is also interested in this, so now manufacturers try to deploy production of this equipment in series. Of course, this devices can't be deployed immediately during assaults, but Wagners actively use it in own close rear and often close to important assault directions to detect and jam UKR drones. Though, this equipment can supress only civilian frequencies 800 MHz/2.4 GHz/5 GHz, using by Chinees commercial drones. Against special Ukrainian developments like Furia, Shark, Leleka it usuless. I have no info about FPV drones.  

Interesting.  Well, jamming a signal is pretty straight forward if you know the frequencies you want to jam.  It's not surprising that Prig was able to commission the production of the devices.  It will be interesting to see if they can mass produce them.  Because a few of them won't make any difference.

I did mean to caveat my previous post with the assumption that the trench in question is not covered by effective counter measures, in particular EW. 

Steve

[Vet 0369]

On 4/20/2023 at 6:05 PM, womble said:

Doesn't he have the Kerch Bridge in the wrong slot in that OOB? Is it worth leaving up as a rat-escape-route, vs dropping it to deny rail and road supply?

Sun T. said to always leave your enemy an escape route because an enemy without one will always fight like a cornered animal. (Paraphrased.)

[danfrodo]

4 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

Sun T. said to always leave your enemy an escape route because an enemy without one will always fight like a cornered animal. (Paraphrased.)

Boats.  I am sure UKR will be happy to pledge not to attack any boat leaving Crimea.

[The_Capt]

12 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Boats.  I am sure UKR will be happy to pledge not to attack any boat leaving Crimea.

How about just following the LOAC and letting people surrender without beheading/shooting/sledgehammering or whatever messed up thing the RA/Wagner did this week?

[Haiduk]

Combat debute of Gazprom PMC, named "Potok" ("Stream") failed. As told one of Russian milbloggers, "Potok" was actually either former BARS battalion or BARS-type formation with all problems of their supply. "Potok" was attached to "Redut" PMC (under personal Shoigu control) and moved to Bakhmut to cover flank of Wagners. But because of lack of supply and ammunition they couldn't stand against UKR counter-attack and abandoned positions. 

Situation inside Bakhmut, meanwhile, became worse. Russians since 21st of April conducted heavy mass assault of northern part of city with almost endless artillery support - they could push UKR defenders to several quarters south. Now line of defense is alnog Kraynia str., but Wagmers in some places alredy have infiltrations further and has fire control along this street. Now main fights are around city hospital.

In the center Russians seized meat processing factory and have minor advance along Chaikovskoho str.  

Southern part of city - minor advance of the enemy from east.

One of main forces of Bakhmut defense now (inside the city) is 127th TD brigade of Kharkiv oblast as well as rifle battalion(s) of 93rd mech.brigade 

Edited April 23, 2023 by Haiduk

[Vet 0369]

On 4/21/2023 at 5:04 AM, Butschi said:

Luckily I can't speak from any personal experience but I think there is also a difference between killing in the heat of battle or shortly thereafter (like executing enemy soldiers who try to surrender) and deliberately killing in cold blood.

In the Book of Exodus of the Bible, it recounts how Joshua orders killing every living being, even animals, except the “witch” who helped breach the defenses, and then required anyone who had blood on themselves, their clothing, or their weapons, to perform a “ritual cleansing” for five days before returning to the Hebrew camp. 
 

Do you think that even that long ago they knew it wasn’t a good thing to take allow warriors who had just butchered an entire city population to rejoin society right away. And to anyone who wants to invoke “ethnic cleansing,” if I’m not mistaken, the Hebrews were in fact also a  Canaanite tribe.

[billbindc]

16 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

How about just following the LOAC and letting people surrender without beheading/shooting/sledgehammering or whatever messed up thing the RA/Wagner did this week?

Also, in what scenario is it a good idea to simplify Russian water and supply logistics in Crimea. It's not Ukraine's job to make Russian decisions *less* complicated. 

[womble]

41 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

Sun T. said to always leave your enemy an escape route because an enemy without one will always fight like a cornered animal. (Paraphrased.)

True in a battle. Less so in a siege where you're relying on the enemy element's isolation to defeat them, rather than your own force of arms.

[Haiduk]

How looks from the back strange "heavy BMP", spotted several days ago in Bakhmut. This is usual transporter, made from likely damaged T-64BV with removed turret. Probably it uses for ammunition supply and evacuation of wounded 

 

Edited April 23, 2023 by Haiduk

[Vanir Ausf B]

How many purchase points is this worth in a Quick Battle?

WAPO article on the situation in Bakhmut. Seems to echo @Haiduks comments above.

 

[Battlefront.com]

3 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

How looks from the back strange "heavy BMP", spotted several days ago in Bakhmut. This is usual transporter, made from likely damaged T-64BV with removed turret. 

 

Good to finally see what the rear looks like.  Until now I've only seen pictures from the front or side.  So, it is nothing more than steel plate for sides and some overhead plates where the turret used to be.  I wonder how thick it is?

Steve

[Haiduk]

8 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

 

 

It's imagination that UKR "elite forces" involved on flanks (3rd and 5th assault brigades. 92nd mech. - at least one battalion, somewhere unit of 77th air-assault brigade was spotted), but inside the city just light infantry mostly (TD, border guards, Chechen battlion, rifle battalion of 93rd mech, some SOF etc) with some armor support of 93rd brigade. 

Edited April 23, 2023 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/04/23/russias-economy-can-withstand-a-long-war-but-not-a-more-intense-one

Throwing the kitchen sink at Ukraine therefore looks out of the question. “Considering Russia’s existing capabilities and limitations, it will likely opt for a slower-paced attritional campaign in Ukraine,” asserts the csis report. Mr Putin has succeeded in insulating the Russian economy from the worst effects of war and sanctions–but in a way that makes the war hard to win. 

 

[dan/california]

Good stuff!

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Troops Grouping "East", which appointed to meet UKR offensive on southern direction from Orikhove to Vuhledar is regrouping now in two echelons battle order. Grouping in about 87300 of personnel has 392 tanks, 1238 of light armor, 763 artillery pieces over 100 mm, 216 MLRS and 12 ballistic missiles launchers.  

Let's do the math.  This is roughly 125km of frontage, which means the following per KM:

• 700 men
• 3 tanks
• 10 APC/IFV
• 6 artillery over 100mm
• 1.7 MLRS

Excluding support personnel and presuming everything is at the front it basically means that per KM of front there's roughly:

• 1x Rifle Company (dismounted)
• 1x Rifle Company (APC/IFV)
• 1x Tank Platoon
• 1x Artillery Battery

This is not a bad sized force for a 1km section of frontage, especially given the rough terrain.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

28 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

It's imagination that UKR "elite forces" involved on flanks (3rd and 5th assault brigades. 92nd mech. - at least one battalion, somewhere unit of 77th air-assault brigade was spotted), but inside the city just light infantry mostly (TD, border guards, Chechen battlion, rifle battalion of 93rd mech, some SOF etc) with some armor support of 93rd brigade. 

And yet Russia makes tiny progress despite investing almost everything they have.  It makes the defense of Bakhmut even more amazing.

Steve