How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, sburke said:

who knew CMCW might become the game to depict 2023 fighting.  Leo 1 and T62s

Silly rabbit, all roads lead back to CMCW.

[LongLeftFlank]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I found a rather interesting Pro-Russian blog (Substack) from a link off of Ed's Twitter feed by the name of Big Serge:

https://substack.com/profile/102984907-big-serge

The analysis he does is fairly even handed and even insightful for the most part.  He lets is political ideology slip through here and there, but in one section he derides both Macgregor and Kofman as being out of touch with reality; Macgregor because he's insane and Kofman because he's so optimistic about Ukraine and pessimistic about Russia.  My guess is Big Serge thinks we're even more wrong than Kofman

In a way, Big Serge and Kofman are fairly similar in their outlook as both downplay Russia's deficiencies and highlight Ukraine's.  Both believe that Russia can play the long game and win.  Ironic that a critic of Kofman is making almost the same arguments.

The difference, though, is that Big Serge is inherently political and pro-Russian in his beliefs.  He thinks Ukraine is a "failed state" acting as a puppet for NATO and that this whole war is NATO's fault.  Yet the core of his analysis of the fighting isn't all that bad, in fact in some ways it's quite good.

In fact, some of his opinions are pretty much inline with ours here (i.e. Ukraine didn't retake Kherson, rather it obligated Russia to leave).  He even admitted that he called the Kharkiv offensive incorrectly, though he gave himself credit for correctly calling out that Ukraine wouldn't be able to get much further than it did (he cherry picks a little about his mistakes, but still he admits making some).

For those who want an opinion that is pessimistic about Ukraine's military capabilities, yet isn't crazy deluded like Macgregor, I think it's a good read. 

Steve

Yup, I've been quoting the Serge here for some time. As you say, his frameworks are sound, so long as you accept his premises. GIGO....

[LongLeftFlank]

6 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Whatever happened to that “1:1” attrition ratio claim from last week?  Did anyone follow up with details?  And of course was that straight casualties or combat power attrition?  

Nobody really knows of course, except the UA (I doubt the Russians keep an accurate count, or care to).

But looking at the tactical vids, and the daily maps showing small 'bites' (city blocks) I suppose I can believe in a lower ratio, assuming Ivan has forsaken the human wave approach he used to break into and envelop the city.

In the (videoed) fights for the shattered suburban housing east of the river, for example, tactically it looks less like positional attacks on strongpoints (with cleared fields of fire) than squads and fire teams playing  lethal hide-and seek, popping caps and RPGs at each other down fire lanes. Sniping isn't dominant in the videos, but no doubt they're playing a large role. Not everything gets videoed of course.

...But in such cases, with both sides having to move around and take chances, I'd expect a more even casualty rate.

[Battlefront.com]

9 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Nobody really knows of course, except the UA (I doubt the Russians keep an accurate count, or care to).

But looking at the tactical vids, and the daily maps showing small 'bites' (city blocks) I suppose I can believe in a lower ratio, assuming Ivan has forsaken the human wave approach he used to break into and envelop the city.

In the (videoed) fights for the shattered suburban housing east of the river, for example, tactically it looks less like positional attacks on strongpoints (with cleared fields of fire) than squads and fire teams playing  lethal hide-and seek, popping caps and RPGs at each other down fire lanes. Sniping isn't dominant in the videos, but no doubt they're playing a large role. Not everything gets videoed of course.

...But in such cases, with both sides having to move around and take chances, I'd expect a more even casualty rate.

That and all reports indicate that Russia has funneled some of their best remaining units into that area, not untrained conscripts.  I completely reject using the "elite" moniker for them as they've been cut down and hastily regrown several times now.  But relative to the rest of the Russian forces?  Likely decent quality.  On the Ukrainian side it's also uncertain what level of quality they have defending on any given day.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

41 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yup, I've been quoting the Serge here for some time. As you say, his frameworks are sound, so long as you accept his premises. GIGO....

Ya know, I thought I remembered you quoting him here and there.  He doesn't post on the war very often, which is a shame because I'd find it interesting to read how he tracks things as they happen instead of after.  His early comments on the Kharkiv counter offensive didn't date themselves very well.  Which is why he was selective about his mea culpa in the follow up entry.  Note the importance he placed on Izyum (and why Ukraine wouldn't take it) in the first one and barely mentioned it in the second one (downplaying its loss).

This comment at the top of his follow up entry really does say it all:

Quote

On the 9th and 10th, Ukraine achieved its first concrete success of the war by retaking all the Russian-held territory in Kharkov Oblast west of the Oskil river, including the western bank of Kupyansk and the transit node of Izyum.

"First concrete success"?  Slaughtering Russia's best units in northern Ukraine and obligating Russia to retreat from roughly 25% of the territory it seized and pretty much arrested all Russian advances just 1 month into the war Russia expected to win within days doesn't count as a success?  Yesh.

Anyway, I'll stop nit picking the guy.  Total agreement his stuff is worth reading.  Please post links to new entries if you spot 'em first.

Steve

 

[LongLeftFlank]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

That and all reports indicate that Russia has funneled some of their best remaining units into that area, not untrained conscripts.  I completely reject using the "elite" moniker for them as they've been cut down and hastily regrown several times now.  But relative to the rest of the Russian forces?  Likely decent quality.  On the Ukrainian side it's also uncertain what level of quality they have defending on any given day.

Steve

Agreed, again, video doesn't tell the entire story but while the heavy mortar section looked well trained and kitted out, the guys were in their 40s and 50s.  The infantry section contesting that crossroads with the shattered M113 were clearly TDDs.

Much respect to these guys, but this doesn't scream 'cream of the new UA army' to me.

[dan/california]

 

[dan/california]

The French intelligence and forecasting apparatus has not exactly shined in this war. This is one hundred percent the other way from where they have been though, if I understand their previous positions. Alternatively, Macron has concluded he can't get a deal to let Putin off the hook by pretending Russia is strong, so now he is trying to exaggerate Russian weakness for the same purpose.

Edited March 12, 2023 by dan/california

[LongLeftFlank]

9 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Kiev's decision to continue defending the city, an objective that is primarily political, as it is intended to force an outcome similar to that of Mariupol, in which Ukrainian troops confronted the Russian offensive in Azovstal, in this case, the AZOM plant.

But it is also a strategic objective, and that is to gain time, not only to strengthen the next line of defence but also to allow new units to arrive at the front, many of them from the reserve and territorial defence groups.

NOTE:  Russian troll Geroman is claiming Wagner are in the outskirts of Orikhovo-Vasilivka, in the NW corner of the above map. We shall see, but if true and if not ejected, it may be time to go....

3.  Curious though, when the DC beltway mainstream is more pessimistic than the other team and their fellow travelers....

 

WRT Ukrainian force generation (and I am not in fact as pessimistic on this as it may sometimes appear), one thing that disturbs me is that: 

(a) if we accept UKR wants to hold Fortress Bakhmut for symbolic as well as sound military reasons; and

(b) has bolstered its defences with some of the core units it is husbanding and building;

(c) BUT they are losing the hills and hamlets that flank the city and shield its LOCs

...then where are the large scale counterattacks to eject the Russians before they consolidate these gains? The attempts we've seen to date have been small beer.

[JonS]

IF we accept that Ukr has an ISR stack that reaches from space all the way down to individual blades of grass

AND we accept that Ukr has the physical capability to conduct counter attacks when and where it wants to

THEN presumably Ukr hasn't yet seen anything that warrants a counterattack. Ie, although the situation looks bad to outside observers, it isnt actually bad when comparing known friendly and enemy capabilities and options. And intentions.

Economy of effort is a principle of war for good reason.

Edited March 13, 2023 by JonS

[dan/california]

3 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

WRT Ukrainian force generation (and I am not in fact as pessimistic on this as it may sometimes appear), one thing that disturbs me is that: 

(a) if we accept UKR wants to hold Fortress Bakhmut for symbolic as well as sound military reasons; and

(b) has bolstered its defences with some of the core units it is husbanding and building;

(c) BUT they are losing the hills and hamlets that flank the city and shield its LOCs

...then where are the large scale counterattacks to eject the Russians before they consolidate these gains? The attempts we've seen to date have been small beer.

Keeping in mind the zillion things we don't know, one of two things is happening. The first is that Ukraine is content to lose Bakmuht, albeit as slowly as possible. The second is that there is a certain place they want Russians to reach before the really counter attack. There were reports today of the Russians pushing again at Avidika and Vulhedar as well. My opinion, worth what you paid, is that Ukraine is willing to give very small amounts of ground to keep the Russians attacking in horrible conditions. There really is no easier way to eliminate them. For all that we have seen announcements about reserves being committed, we haven't really seen much. 

It is possible there is a real counter attack waiting in the wings, But Bakmuht would be a difficult place to exploit even a large scale early success. I think Ukraine wants to use its best troops in better weather, somewhere with more upside. I mean it would be brilliant to smash a full up combined arms east attack from Bakmuht, and then split Luhansk and Donestk, turn south and cut Donestk City off from Russia. If Ukraine was strong enough to do that though, I think the war would be over already.

[LongLeftFlank]

5 minutes ago, JonS said:

IF we accept that Ukr has an ISR stack that reaches from space down to grass blades

AND we accept that Ukr has the physical capability to conduct counter attacks when and where it wants to

THEN presumably Ukr hasn't yet seen anything that warrants a counterattack. Ie, although the situation looks bad to outside observers, it isnt actually bad when comparing downside and enemy capabilities and options.

Economy of force is a principle of war for good reason.

That explanation actually makes more sense than any other, thanks, although a certain leap of faith is required, even for some plugged in think tank folks in DC.

Clearly, as @Haiduk has noted lately, staying the course is hard for the Ukrainians on the ground as well, especially the frontline guys.

 

...This all also highlights, yet again, the dangers of letting (perceived) body count or 'red zones' on a map drive decisions. War is hell.

[The_Capt]

Just now, LongLeftFlank said:

WRT Ukrainian force generation (and I am not in fact as pessimistic on this as it may sometimes appear), one thing that disturbs me is that: 

(a) if we accept UKR wants to hold Fortress Bakhmut for symbolic as well as sound military reasons; and

(b) has bolstered its defences with some of the core units it is husbanding and building;

(c) BUT they are losing the hills and hamlets that flank the city and shield its LOCs

...then where are the large scale counterattacks to eject the Russians before they consolidate these gains? The attempts we've seen to date have been small beer.

I mentioned this before but casualty ratios are only one metric (and frankly a squishy one).  The question is one of combat power attrition.  So in Feb we saw tallies of RA logistics, C2, engineering etc. This is stuff Russia cannot get back easily, while the UA is being pushed this stuff from the West.  I expect the combat power attrition is still acceptable to the UA, hence why they hold onto Bakhmut.

As to counter-attacks, why waste the effort in Bakhmut, which is now a grinding wasteland and the RA main effort.  The counter attacks should be operational offensives to the east or west.  I mean this is why I don't really buy the political symbolism argument,  the UA is not counter-attacking at Bakhmut because it is simply not worth it, bleeding the RA is.  They are marshalling offensive combat power in the backfield, why waste it on Bakhmut?  Frankly it is what the RA should have been doing as they now have lost time to prepare defensives with all those troops they got killed at Bakhmut (time is an attritional metric as well).

[JonS]

5 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

hard for the Ukrainians on the ground as well, especially the frontline guys

Yup. It was ever thus.

No matter how fancy the manoeuvre, or how complete the encirclement, or how decisive the advantage, at some point some poor bastard has to frontaly assault someone in a pit who really doesn't want to die and is probably prepared to do something about it.

[The_Capt]

Just now, JonS said:

Yup. It was ever thus.

No matter how fancy the manoeuvre, or how complete the encirclement, or how decisive the advantage, at some point some poor bastard has to frontaly assault someone in a pit who really doesn't want to die and is probably prepared to do something about it.

Well there was that pretty long stretch of standing in a line with pokey stuff and stabbing each other but the overarching principle is sound.

[Beleg85]

17 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 Frankly it is what the RA should have been doing as they now have lost time to prepare defensives with all those troops they got killed at Bakhmut (time is an attritional metric as well).

This casualties vs. lost combat power is interesting issue here. It works both ways- the crucial question is if casualties are indeed draining overall Russian combat capabilities as well and dimnishing their power to a point when this battle even having a sense, ofc. within broader Ukrainian startegy. Trading human for human, without serious dimnishing of capabilities of enemy (or simply below a level, in which attacker can constantly replace them) does not seem terribly good deal either for UA or RU; if that would be the case, it would just pointless slaughter. It does not seem that Muscovites lost great deal of their armour/mech. in that particular battle, for example (as opposed to South), as these were primarly infantry fights. Losses in artillery where noticeable, but were they replaceable for Russian side? A lot of unknowns in this case.

[sross112]

21 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I mentioned this before but casualty ratios are only one metric (and frankly a squishy one).  The question is one of combat power attrition.  So in Feb we saw tallies of RA logistics, C2, engineering etc. This is stuff Russia cannot get back easily, while the UA is being pushed this stuff from the West.  I expect the combat power attrition is still acceptable to the UA, hence why they hold onto Bakhmut.

I stopped into Oryx for the first time in a long time the other day. The majority of what we see is the front line stuff being whacked, but there is a pile of support assets in there. You see a picture here and a video there but it has really piled up in the last year. I'd suspect that the numbers on there are just a slice of the damage done by the deep strikes over the last few months. Even though it is just a slice that is confirmed the numbers are really staggering when you think about it:

233 Command Posts and Communications vehicles

287 Engineering vehicles and equipment

24 Radars

28 Jammers and Deception units (EW)

And for @LongLeftFlank since we all know how much he likes dead trucks;

2330 Trucks.

Again, this is just the known and confirmable slice. That is a lot of high end fancy stuff that can't roll off of production lines easily or be sourced somewhere else. Stack sanctions on top of that and these things are just gone from their inventory for the foreseeable future. 

[sburke]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

WRT Ukrainian force generation (and I am not in fact as pessimistic on this as it may sometimes appear), one thing that disturbs me is that: 

(a) if we accept UKR wants to hold Fortress Bakhmut for symbolic as well as sound military reasons; and

(b) has bolstered its defences with some of the core units it is husbanding and building;

(c) BUT they are losing the hills and hamlets that flank the city and shield its LOCs

...then where are the large scale counterattacks to eject the Russians before they consolidate these gains? The attempts we've seen to date have been small beer.

somehow, I think that meme of kids saying, "are we there yet?" originated from your parents.  

[NamEndedAllen]

ISW has quite a long and intense analysis of the tense situation of Prigozhin, the Russian military, and Putin. 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023

[The_Capt]

54 minutes ago, sross112 said:

I stopped into Oryx for the first time in a long time the other day. The majority of what we see is the front line stuff being whacked, but there is a pile of support assets in there. You see a picture here and a video there but it has really piled up in the last year. I'd suspect that the numbers on there are just a slice of the damage done by the deep strikes over the last few months. Even though it is just a slice that is confirmed the numbers are really staggering when you think about it:

233 Command Posts and Communications vehicles

287 Engineering vehicles and equipment

24 Radars

28 Jammers and Deception units (EW)

And for @LongLeftFlank since we all know how much he likes dead trucks;

2330 Trucks.

Again, this is just the known and confirmable slice. That is a lot of high end fancy stuff that can't roll off of production lines easily or be sourced somewhere else. Stack sanctions on top of that and these things are just gone from their inventory for the foreseeable future. 

Add to this arty assets.  The other thing Oryx does not show is the wear out attrition.  There have been reports of RA guns wearing out, but basically nothing in combat has a long shelf life without maint and refit.  Just simply driving tracked vehicles causes all sorts of issues over time (worn parts, gun sights get knocked out of whack, comms burn out).

The UA does not even need to kill this stuff, just keep it in operations without proper maint and it will simply die on its own.  Given the state of the RA, I have serious doubts that they have been able to sustain upkeep let alone refits.

As to backfill production, well once again it is what is missing - does anyone think that if Russia was rolling stuff off lines at a great of knots that they would not be flashing that to the world?  "Look at our mighty war machine!"  We have not seen it because it is not happening.

[FancyCat]

Isn't it still muddy?

[danfrodo]

4 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Agreed, again, video doesn't tell the entire story but while the heavy mortar section looked well trained and kitted out, the guys were in their 40s and 50s.  The infantry section contesting that crossroads with the shattered M113 were clearly TDDs.

Much respect to these guys, but this doesn't scream 'cream of the new UA army' to me.

Indeed, if the 'cream' is not here, where is it, indeed?  I suspect we can sum up UKR Bakhmut strategy w "don't interrupt your opponent when he's making a mistake".

RU is losing huge to gain nothing.  IMO this is because they have quite lost any sort of intelligent strategic/operational thinking.  Putin needs some success, Prig promises it, they fight for it and now everyone is watching, now Putin really really wants it, generals claim they are pre-empting UKR spring offensive, Putin doubles down again, etc.  I don't know this, of course, but so much of what we see looks like some zombie that just knows to bite what's in front of it, no real brain behind it.  Like Stalin in 1941 "attack here!  now attack here!  no wait, attack here!!", grinding up forces that, if consolidated and used properly, could've really hampered the germans.

[Battlefront.com]

Good discussion.  Here's my take on it.

For months Ukraine was able to hold Bakhmut with a limited number of specific regular units while strategic reserves were able to concentrate on getting ready to deal a (hopefully) strategic blow.  We thought it might come up in the winter, but either they weren't ready or Russia's attempts at an offensive made it unwise to counter attack.  Unfortunately, the Zerk assaults had an impact and the Bakmut front began to wear too thin. 

To deal with the intense pressure Ukraine rushed some usual units back into place (namely the 93rd), but it wasn't enough to keep the front from creeping westward.  At that point they had to decide to withdraw or to reinforce with some portion of the forces they were hoping to save for Spring/Summer.  They decided to reinforce, however they put in the absolute minimum to hold.  This way they didn't upset the Spring/Summer plans, though the downside was large scale counter attacks weren't possible.

This is not just about ground forces, it is also about air and artillery.  Whatever counter offensive is planned for Spring/Summer, it will require a lot of 'splody stuff to get through Russia's entrenched infantry.  They have to build up stockpiles for this otherwise they might not have enough to support the breakthrough.  This means they've had to be stingy with artillery rounds and air support for Bakhmut's defenders.

Up until recently the Russians have been losing immense amounts of combat power at Bakhmut.  Even the Zerks counted because now they aren't available for something else later on.  It is also looking like Russia used up a big portion of its immediate artillery capacity because, unlike Ukraine, it was going all out for extended periods of time.  Up until recently the loss ratio and degradation of Russia's forces were all highly favorable to Ukraine and worth the investment.

No that the Spring is staring to come into reality, Ukraine is still holding onto Bakhmut.  Why?  Because it isn't ready to launch its offensive.  Why would it want to provide relief to Russia at such a critical time?  Central Donbas is very unlikely to be the focus of Ukraine's counter offensive, so why encourage Russia to take all the forces concentrated there and proactively redeploy them to where Ukraine intends to attack?

The way I see it is even if the loss ratio is getting to be 1:1 there is still a reason for Ukraine to keep fighting here.  It distracts Russian attention from other things, it weakens Russia's ability to shift forces, and it reduces the amount of combat power it can use later on.  As long as Ukraine can keep its investments in Bakhmut at a level it can afford in order to have a better position for Spring/Summer, it's a good idea to keep fighting there.  If it isn't, then they should pull back and defend further to the west.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Just saw that the American volunteer, James Vasquez, was serving under Da Vinci at the time of his death.  Looking at his Twitter feed you can see when they got moved down to Bakhmut on March 1st.

 

[Battlefront.com]

I don't recall this getting posted here a few days ago.  ChrisO long thread about massive losses from one of the partial mobilization units out of Volgograd.  Things did not go well for them...

Quote

1/ Dozens of mobilised Russians from Volgograd are reported to have died after being sent to fight in Ukraine without being given any ammunition. Their deaths are said to have been covered up subsequently, but independent Russian journalists have reported on their story.

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1634677247448686592

Steve