How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

31 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Worrisome....

Xi'an Bingo has reportedly agreed to manufacture and test 100 ZT-180 prototype drones before delivering them to the Russian Defense Ministry by April 2023. Military experts believe the ZT-180 is capable of carrying a 35- to 50 kilogram warhead.

These things appear to be Shaheed equivalents, buzzbombs launched against a point target. They have yet to prove effective as battlefield weapons.

However mass production of Lancets could be another matter....

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2022/12/01/russian-loitering-munition-racks-up-kills-but-shows-limitations/

Supplying these things in bulk could allow RU to conduct behind the lines interdiction against UKR guns and LOCs that their air force has failed to provide to date.

Especially if they became cheaper per unit than the Manpads and AAA needed to counter them.

And even with huge defect rates, Chinese industry can crank out thousands of such weapons without breaking much of a sweat.

So Western industry is likely already in a race against the mass produced knockoffs all time world champion.

And I don't take much comfort in the threat of Western sanctions to prevent all this. I'd expect a certain amount of secrecy, obfuscation and denial; and then some acrimonious debate in the West, since the effects of sanctions cut both ways due to our continued dependence on Made in China. 

****

Also interesting.

 

Then we need to pull WHATEVER is required out of U.S. war stocks, and get it to Ukraine in time for a spring offensive. By whatever I mean up to and including a couple of hundred of the very latest Abrams with APS, and several hundred ATACMS. And every single bit of support kit to go with it. If only we had started on that nine months ago...

 

And we should send a division of Marines to Taiwan, and go to wartime production of virtually everything. As the Capitan says, sometimes you have to write checks to stay on top.

Edit: That would solve the ambiguity question nicely.

 

Edited February 24, 2023 by dan/california

[danfrodo]

5 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Then we need to pull WHATEVER is required out of U.S. war stocks, and get it to Ukraine in time for a spring offensive. By whatever I mean up to and including a couple of hundred of the very latest Abrams with APS, and several hundred ATACMS. And every single bit of support kit to go with it. If only we had started on that nine months ago...

 

And we should send a division of Marines to Taiwan, and go to wartime production of virtually everything. As the Capitan says, sometimes you have to write checks to stay on top.

Edit: That would solve the ambiguity question nicely.

 

Not that I think everything is about us (mean US version of 'us'), but I wonder if China is looking for some kind of concession from the US in exchange for not helping Putler.  Actually that might be a good play on China's part in the short term, getting something of value for literally doing nothing.  But I think it would poison relations going forward so that when/if China decides it wants to play nice that it will find zero good will or desire to engage.

[Bil Hardenberger]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ok and @Kinophile can jump in on this one too.  So we are muddying up some stuff here, so to clarify:

- The original point on MC vs DC was to point out the cultural constipation of conventional services and how they are nowhere near as innovative or open to disruptive thinking as is often sold.  Over the military generations, military doctrine becomes dogma and counter-thinking in an organization that literally exists to create uniformity in behaviour is not well accepted.  We in the west have built a democratic myth of "empowerment and gumption" but it really does not translate well into actual military reality.  We can debate this but I know what I have lived for the better part of 3.5 decades. 

- The UA is a hybrid mix of Soviet and Western schools, and for them I think this was a major advantage.  It was not because we peppered them with western doctrine and training, it was because they had both worlds to pull from.  If we had an all western force in this thing, with the same restraints/constraints and capabilities as the UA, my hypothesis is that we would have done worse because we would have tried to apply an all-western approach.  I can definitely see in Phase I where this would have gotten us into a lot of trouble.  The UA is already outside of boxes and pulling in so much from the civilian side so quickly also helped in breaking doctrinal group-think and creating whatever this has turned into.  As to which school MC or DC, that the UA employs I do not think we have a clear idea but it is also likely a hybrid - which was how the entire thing was actually designed to work.

- MC vs DC schools of thought.  Ok, this is a whole other thing.  Mission Command is a essentially (and I will just use my own descriptions, feel free to go look up others) is essentially empowered command.  It arms subordinates with context and intent, "why we are doing this and here is what we are looking for".  This, plus allowing them to exercise initiative to exploit opportunity - the alignment of circumstance, context and capability, theoretically provides a force with higher potential for tempo advantage.  The thinking goes that empowered tactical commanders can see opportunity well before formation level and as such if they exploit it without waiting to be told the entire force can OODA faster than an opponent.  This is a cornerstone of Manoeuvre Warfare which is really a strategy of Annihilation through Dislocation.  We seriously bought off on all this and drank the Kool Aid on it about 40 years ago, to the point it became so dogmatic that it left little room for counter thought.

DC is one of mission control being held at higher levels.  Subordinates are empowered to do a task (The terms are actually derived from the Germans largely because Depuy and Starry really were hot for German warfare - Auftragstaktik and Befehlstaktik, The first meaning "mission tactics" the second "detailed orders tactics").  They then wait for further direction before exploiting opportunity.  They can still execute initiative in execution of the task but not the overall mission. 

So was born the Great American Military Myth (and frankly almost every western nation jumped onboard).  We were a democratized military built on "good ol 'merican innovation and initiative."  Further this All-Yankee Doodle (sorry but we really got beat over the head on this one back in the day) approach is very economic as it yields quick nearly bloodless wars.  The Persian Gulf became the poster child for this type of warfare, but more than few put up their hands and asked if it wasn't a false-positive.  The Gulf War was highly attritional and mostly driven by air supremacy - the land battle of mission command and manoeuvre warfare was basically executed against an already beaten foe, and one crushed by far more Detailed Command approaches of the Air Force. (This brings up the other problem with the Kool Aid, it really does not work for either the Navy or Air Force - and does not work enough for SOF, kinda).  

The truth is far more complicated.  The largest problem with Mission Command is that while it is great in theory it runs into serious problems in full execution because of all those pesky enablers.  Tactical commanders can run all over the place all empowered but there is only so much ISR, artillery, engineers and logistics to go around.  So what really happens is far more control in practice.  The Main Effort gets a lot more empowerment but if you are on a side gig, well you might very well get held back because the boss simply does not have the stuff to support you if you go all manouvrey.  Detail Command it far to restrictive and you get into micromanagement, so in reality neither systems works in extremes.

The future.  Well the problem was seen coming way back during the RMA days.  "What happens when a higher level commander knows more than a tactical one?"  I suspect if the UA has created a sort of ad hoc JADC2 system then this has already happened.  If a higher formation commander knows more than the tactical level, then DC starts to make a lot more sense.  And then what does Manoeuvre Warfare turn into? Well a form of Corrosive Warfare is one option apparently.  There is a lot of sense to this, we already do it with unmanned systems, which are going to expand in use not contract.  Detail Command that controls the battlespace like a production line and not a jazz band is not totally out of the question.  

So at one end we have "lets go all DC because higher can see all".  While at the other end we have "remove higher command entirely."  This is hyper-Mission Command, or self-synchronization.  Here tactical units are loaded up and basically command themselves with their peers - this gets a lot of traction in SOF circles. They then share enablers in a hand-off system where "higher" is really coordination and not command and control.  Here we get into military effects clouds and inverted command systems.  This also makes some sense but many are shy as to human nature.  How are enablers going to be shared?  This is always a friction point, and higher commanders are the referees.  What happens if we get rid of them.  Some have suggested AI does the job as it can calculate requirements far faster than a human can, or a human AI pairing because human can do context.

So in the end there is no "answer".  We should continue to try both, and maybe have a C2 system that can swing wildly from one to the other based on good ol human art of war.  But service cultures and equities already get in the way.  This is way tanks got resisted, the machine gun and even unmanned systems.  We make idols of our history and sometimes it gets in the way of evolution.  Experimentation and paying attention to wars like these are absolutely critical as we can start to get some idea of where things are going and then plan to adapt at a better rate than an opponent.      

Warren, as an old school maneuverist and die-hard Boyd School mission command advocate this was a very interesting write up. Probably my favorite post of yours in the entire thread. You have actually given me some things to think about, rare for you.   

The future of the tactical and operational battlefield is an exciting thing. We are lucky to have something like Combat Mission to enable experimentation.

Bil

[LongLeftFlank]

22 minutes ago, Sojourner said:

That's fallacious reasoning, the cost of MANPADs and AAA should be weighed against the cost of what the drone is targeting, .

OK, great, no reason at all to worry then. What else do you have to contribute, beyond a drive by one-liner?

Edited February 24, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[The_Capt]

32 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Worrisome....

Xi'an Bingo has reportedly agreed to manufacture and test 100 ZT-180 prototype drones before delivering them to the Russian Defense Ministry by April 2023. Military experts believe the ZT-180 is capable of carrying a 35- to 50 kilogram warhead.

These things appear to be Shaheed equivalents, buzzbombs launched against a point target. They have yet to prove effective as battlefield weapons.

However mass production of Lancets could be another matter....

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2022/12/01/russian-loitering-munition-racks-up-kills-but-shows-limitations/

Supplying these things in bulk could allow RU to conduct behind the lines interdiction against UKR guns and LOCs that their air force has failed to provide to date.

Especially if they became cheaper per unit than the Manpads and AAA needed to counter them.

And even with huge defect rates, Chinese industry can crank out thousands of such weapons without breaking much of a sweat.

So Western industry is likely already in a race against the mass produced knockoffs all time world champion.

And I don't take much comfort in the threat of Western sanctions to prevent all this. I'd expect a certain amount of secrecy, obfuscation and denial; and then some acrimonious debate in the West, since the effects of sanctions cut both ways due to our continued dependence on Made in China. 

****

Also interesting.

 

Oh my this is interesting.  So, if true (big if, first I have heard of lethal aid from China) this would be an escalation.  Odd that China would show its hand so quickly on this one.  Going to have to think about the political implications here.

As to military implications, well not insignificant but also not game changing, yet. Unless China gives Russia an ISR architecture to plug into these munitions are going to have limited deep strike application.  We know China is building a large C4ISR enterprise but it is likely no where near the US capability, and is all pointed in other priority locations.  This kinda looks more symbolic than anything, or perhaps testing western resolve.

Well folks this may be a whole new ballgame if China doubles down though and really starts to backstop Russia, a global proxy war.  This is odd because the west holds the escalation stick right now.  This could trigger a large escalation from the US, the kind of stuff people have been asking for because the US is not kidding around about China. I mean Russia has been a warm up round if this becomes a contest between China and the US. I am surprised as China is simply not ready, too soon by a half.

So people have wrung a lot of hands over this war but we have always said that “until strategic conditions change”.  Well China jumping into this thing would constitute such a condition change. Of course I would worry a lot less about the ‘24 US election if China gets in deep on all this, even the most isolationist candidate is not going to be able to ignore this shot across the bow.

[danfrodo]

5 minutes ago, Bil Hardenberger said:

You have actually given me some things to think about, rare for you

This was complement, yes?  no? 

[The_Capt]

5 minutes ago, Bil Hardenberger said:

Warren, as an old school maneuverist and die-hard Boyd School mission command advocate this was a very interesting write up. Probably my favorite post of yours in the entire thread. You have actually given me some things to think about, rare for you.   

The future of the tactical and operational battlefield is an exciting thing. We are lucky to have something like Combat Mission to enable experimentation.

Bil

You can think about it on the way up the next mountain…after the CMCW: BAOR AAR preview battle. 

Edited February 24, 2023 by The_Capt

[Kinophile]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ok and @Kinophile can jump in on this one too.  So we are muddying up some stuff here, so to clarify:

- The original point on MC vs DC was to point out the cultural constipation of conventional services and how they are nowhere near as innovative or open to disruptive thinking as is often sold.  Over the military generations, military doctrine becomes dogma and counter-thinking in an organization that literally exists to create uniformity in behaviour is not well accepted.  We in the west have built a democratic myth of "empowerment and gumption" but it really does not translate well into actual military reality.  We can debate this but I know what I have lived for the better part of 3.5 decades. 

- The UA is a hybrid mix of Soviet and Western schools, and for them I think this was a major advantage.  It was not because we peppered them with western doctrine and training, it was because they had both worlds to pull from.  If we had an all western force in this thing, with the same restraints/constraints and capabilities as the UA, my hypothesis is that we would have done worse because we would have tried to apply an all-western approach.  I can definitely see in Phase I where this would have gotten us into a lot of trouble.  The UA is already outside of boxes and pulling in so much from the civilian side so quickly also helped in breaking doctrinal group-think and creating whatever this has turned into.  As to which school MC or DC, that the UA employs I do not think we have a clear idea but it is also likely a hybrid - which was how the entire thing was actually designed to work.

- MC vs DC schools of thought.  Ok, this is a whole other thing.  Mission Command is a essentially (and I will just use my own descriptions, feel free to go look up others) is essentially empowered command.  It arms subordinates with context and intent, "why we are doing this and here is what we are looking for".  This, plus allowing them to exercise initiative to exploit opportunity - the alignment of circumstance, context and capability, theoretically provides a force with higher potential for tempo advantage.  The thinking goes that empowered tactical commanders can see opportunity well before formation level and as such if they exploit it without waiting to be told the entire force can OODA faster than an opponent.  This is a cornerstone of Manoeuvre Warfare which is really a strategy of Annihilation through Dislocation.  We seriously bought off on all this and drank the Kool Aid on it about 40 years ago, to the point it became so dogmatic that it left little room for counter thought.

DC is one of mission control being held at higher levels.  Subordinates are empowered to do a task (The terms are actually derived from the Germans largely because Depuy and Starry really were hot for German warfare - Auftragstaktik and Befehlstaktik, The first meaning "mission tactics" the second "detailed orders tactics").  They then wait for further direction before exploiting opportunity.  They can still execute initiative in execution of the task but not the overall mission. 

So was born the Great American Military Myth (and frankly almost every western nation jumped onboard).  We were a democratized military built on "good ol 'merican innovation and initiative."  Further this All-Yankee Doodle (sorry but we really got beat over the head on this one back in the day) approach is very economic as it yields quick nearly bloodless wars.  The Persian Gulf became the poster child for this type of warfare, but more than few put up their hands and asked if it wasn't a false-positive.  The Gulf War was highly attritional and mostly driven by air supremacy - the land battle of mission command and manoeuvre warfare was basically executed against an already beaten foe, and one crushed by far more Detailed Command approaches of the Air Force. (This brings up the other problem with the Kool Aid, it really does not work for either the Navy or Air Force - and does not work enough for SOF, kinda).  

The truth is far more complicated.  The largest problem with Mission Command is that while it is great in theory it runs into serious problems in full execution because of all those pesky enablers.  Tactical commanders can run all over the place all empowered but there is only so much ISR, artillery, engineers and logistics to go around.  So what really happens is far more control in practice.  The Main Effort gets a lot more empowerment but if you are on a side gig, well you might very well get held back because the boss simply does not have the stuff to support you if you go all manouvrey.  Detail Command it far to restrictive and you get into micromanagement, so in reality neither systems works in extremes.

The future.  Well the problem was seen coming way back during the RMA days.  "What happens when a higher level commander knows more than a tactical one?"  I suspect if the UA has created a sort of ad hoc JADC2 system then this has already happened.  If a higher formation commander knows more than the tactical level, then DC starts to make a lot more sense.  And then what does Manoeuvre Warfare turn into? Well a form of Corrosive Warfare is one option apparently.  There is a lot of sense to this, we already do it with unmanned systems, which are going to expand in use not contract.  Detail Command that controls the battlespace like a production line and not a jazz band is not totally out of the question.  

So at one end we have "lets go all DC because higher can see all".  While at the other end we have "remove higher command entirely."  This is hyper-Mission Command, or self-synchronization.  Here tactical units are loaded up and basically command themselves with their peers - this gets a lot of traction in SOF circles. They then share enablers in a hand-off system where "higher" is really coordination and not command and control.  Here we get into military effects clouds and inverted command systems.  This also makes some sense but many are shy as to human nature.  How are enablers going to be shared?  This is always a friction point, and higher commanders are the referees.  What happens if we get rid of them.  Some have suggested AI does the job as it can calculate requirements far faster than a human can, or a human AI pairing because human can do context.

So in the end there is no "answer".  We should continue to try both, and maybe have a C2 system that can swing wildly from one to the other based on good ol human art of war.  But service cultures and equities already get in the way.  This is way tanks got resisted, the machine gun and even unmanned systems.  We make idols of our history and sometimes it gets in the way of evolution.  Experimentation and paying attention to wars like these are absolutely critical as we can start to get some idea of where things are going and then plan to adapt at a better rate than an opponent.      

Thank you, that was an excellent clarification and discussion. 

[danfrodo]

5 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

OK, great, no reason at all to worry then. What else do you have to contribute, beyond a drive by one-liner?

W all due respect, LLFlank, I think he was just making a valid point.  I need a $100k AA missile to knock out your $50k attack missile, but your attack missile will cause $2M in damage if it hits.  That's still a win -- isn't that what he's saying?  I didn't see anything snarky in it.

[Kinophile]

12 minutes ago, Bil Hardenberger said:

. You have actually given me some things to think about, rare for you. 

Komrad Bil,  master of the backhanded compliment. 

[LongLeftFlank]

5 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Of course I would worry a lot less about the ‘24 US election if China gets in deep on all this, even the most isolationist candidate is not going to be able to ignore this shot across the bow.

Yeah, the only meaningful goad to industrial policy in the US of A has always been a military threat.

So forget Bill Gates buying up farmland, look for Blackstone or someone seeing a buy opportunity in blighted (and in some cases, lightly dioxin coated ) US industrial zones with the potential and 'bones' (rusted rail tracks, retirees not too far gone to teach trades, etc.) to be revivified as defence plants.  All subsidised by moar debt.

Money printer go brrrrrrrrrrrr.....

[LongLeftFlank]

8 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

W all due respect, LLFlank, I think he was just making a valid point.  I need a $100k AA missile to knock out your $50k attack missile, but your attack missile will cause $2M in damage if it hits.  That's still a win -- isn't that what he's saying?  I didn't see anything snarky in it.

Sure, except for the smug 'fallacious reasoning' ad hom.

If he'd stuck around long enough to elaborate or provide some supporting facts, I might have let that slide.

[danfrodo]

3 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Sure, except for the smug 'fallacious reasoning' ad hom.

If he'd stuck around long enough to elaborate or provide some supporting facts, I might have let that slide.

I think Sojourner perhaps was just being succinct.  He's not usually very verbose.  Maybe he was being snarky, I just didn't see it that way. 
So there's a new YT video by Task & Purpose guy talking about new US bases in Phillipines.  Do you think there's US buildup in your neck of the woods?

[sburke]

The escalatory answer to China is in Taiwan and other pieces of the Pacific.  in the end China doesn't really care about Russia. They are just a source of raw materials.

Make it clear that if China takes this step then the US will see no alternative to start beefing up Taiwan's defenses.  Maybe even help the Philippines and Vietnam establish some bases in the pacific. 

*ninja'd by @danfrodo

Edited February 24, 2023 by sburke

[The_Capt]

10 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yeah, the only meaningful goad to industrial policy in the US of A has always been a military threat.

So forget Bill Gates buying up farmland, look for Blackstone or someone seeing a buy opportunity in blighted (and in some cases, lightly dioxin coated ) US industrial zones with the potential and 'bones' (rusted rail tracks, retirees not too far gone to teach trades, etc.) to be revivified as defence plants.  All subsidised by moar debt.

Money printer go brrrrrrrrrrrr.....

Aww chin up little fella, we are still within the richest block the world has ever seen.  We just needed a wake up call, and this might just do it.

[LongLeftFlank]

7 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

So there's a new YT video by Task & Purpose guy talking about new US bases in Phillipines.  Do you think there's US buildup in your neck of the woods?

Yes, very much so. I know which side I'm on personally (like you ), so not about to elaborate. Look at a map.

Edited February 24, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Kinophile]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- The UA is a hybrid mix of Soviet and Western schools, and for them I think this was a major advantage.  It was not because we peppered them with western doctrine and training, it was because they had both worlds to pull from.  If we had an all western force in this thing, with the same restraints/constraints and capabilities as the UA, my hypothesis is that we would have done worse because we would have tried to apply an all-western approach. 

There are significant caveats to this, no? Does not Ukraine fight (and fought) the way it does out of sheer necessity, not just pre-war doctrine?

It seems that Russia fought in its original style in many ways due to its large pre-war vehicle park. Howebver a year of destruction has eroded that park and Russia does not seem capable of overmatching the current Rate Of Attrition, so is forced into tactical adjustments. Very soon (if not already in motion) they will be force to change their operational formatting. In fact, I suspect this is actually underway with the effective abandonment of the BTG model and the readjustment of force back into the classic (and larger) more resilient formations.

An all-western force by its own internal definition, would not operate under the same pressures, fail-points and stressors as the ZSU did at the start, no? A modern, integrated and fully implemented NATO style force (if that's what we're implying here) could not have struggled vis a vis this Russian invasion. If the ZSU, for all its faults, weaknesses (and even outright treason in its ranks) was able to both hold and throw back multiple Russian axis then surely a NATO force would have tripled that effect? The sheer quantity of quality equipment and matching doctrine, training from trench level to 40,000 ft up top would have done enormous damage extremely quickly. The Ukes are kicking some serious *** with just dribbles of our gear, They're using the stuff in the way it was intended, designed and doctrined for and slaughtering Russians with it every day- but you think an all-western approach might have struggled? 

I do fully agree, institutional blind spots abound in Western militaries, indeed all militaries because they are institutions. It's inevitable and inherent in the nature of the beast.

But there are blind spots and just plain blind.

 

 

Edited February 24, 2023 by Kinophile

[dan/california]

46 minutes ago, Bil Hardenberger said:

Warren, as an old school maneuverist and die-hard Boyd School mission command advocate this was a very interesting write up. Probably my favorite post of yours in the entire thread. You have actually given me some things to think about, rare for you.   

The future of the tactical and operational battlefield is an exciting thing. We are lucky to have something like Combat Mission to enable experimentation.

Bil

To really bexplore the DC/MC thing we need five a side co-op. four players commanding various elements, and an overall commander.

[cesmonkey]

 

China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis

China's 12 point peace plan includes:

• Cease Fire
• Removal of unilateral  sanctions
• Avoiding nuclear escalation
• "Abandoning the Cold War mentality."

[LongLeftFlank]

22 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Aww chin up little fella, we are still within the richest block the world has ever seen.  We just needed a wake up call, and this might just do it.

L'histoire est que le modèle de pantoufles de soie descendant les escaliers pour le tonnerre de bottes cloutées escalade de bas en haut.

(But wealth helps, yes)

[kevinkin]

18 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

So there's a new YT video by Task & Purpose guy talking about new US bases in Phillipines.  Do you think there's US buildup in your neck of the woods?

This follows the trend in distributed operations. This started as a theory many years ago but has gained so much traction
that now that potential island bases are being map out and the US is gaining formal permission to use them. 

https://www.marines.mil/Force-Design-2030/

Interesting that the HIMARS is a central part of the mobile fires piece including anti-ship with RORO using C-130s or landing craft. Here is an article that's close to home:

 https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/11/black-sea-drill-again-validates-himars-as-an-anti-ship-weapon-system/

There is so much written now on this operational concept that it's easy to find. There is software out that can sim all this and it's damn cool to set up. Especially with STOL F-35s hunting and relaying intel to the big boys carrying the AGM-158C LRASM. Still the ability of a modern warship to defend it self to these swarms is impressive. All in all, very expensive too. 

 

[dan/california]

Kinophile, I think you misunderstood The_Capt's point. He is talking about a U.S./NATO offensive against a Ukraine equivalent opponent supported by China. To whit can a NATO style offensive work against top tier ATGMS, and an air defense system we couldn't just shatter.

[sburke]

13 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

 

China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis

China's 12 point peace plan includes:

• Cease Fire
• Removal of unilateral  sanctions
• Avoiding nuclear escalation
• "Abandoning the Cold War mentality."

This is the stickler

Quote

1. Respecting the sovereignty of all countries. Universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community. All parties should jointly uphold the basic norms governing international relations and defend international fairness and justice. Equal and uniform application of international law should be promoted, while double standards must be rejected.

So in order to even begin the process outlined in these positions, Russia has to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity.  That would mean defeat for Russia.  Maybe Xi can discuss that with Putin when they meet.

[cesmonkey]

There were some good speeches at the UN General Assembly on Thursday:

Speech by Federal Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock at the United Nations General Assembly on “Principles underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine”

[dan/california]

I swear to God he reads the thread...