How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[kevinkin]

9 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

OK, here's an intellectual game we've not played in a while!  What realistic options do people think Russia could pursue to achieve a better outcome than what it is doing now?  Keep in mind that regime preservation is the ultimate goal, so any strategic shift that puts the regime more at risk is not likely viable.

Putin needs to withdraw from Ukraine or at the very least stop attacking and, in both cases, go over into full nationwide recovery. But he needs to convince the Russian public, military and conservative warmongers that this course of action is in the nation's best interest. That's the hard part since the most important elements in Russian society are not rational. In fact, Putin, who is not completely rational, appears to be somewhat pragmatic. So he needs to trade something for something. While moving to the strategic defensive would minimize Russia's military weakness, Putin would promise a massive asymmetric intelligence offensive overseas. This would play to a historic strength. But be only a temporary gift to the warmongers. Perhaps back away from the world's worst actors and play off a county like India. Find areas in geopolitics where small victories are visible but tangible. He might set Russian down a real path to normalcy and then go and die. The problem I have is finding a way to get Russian out of the same post-Cold War cascade of political and societal debacles. History can repeat itself. A change in direction requires an national epiphany which is nearly impossible to manufacture or plan for.  

Edited January 10, 2023 by kevinkin

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, MikeyD said:

The first thought that came to mind is they should declare victory, claim they achieved whatever the 'political' goals were for the war (just make something up), then pack their bags and go home. That's basically how most stalemated wars eventually end. Sometimes the process takes 8-10 years to reach that point, but that's only for countries with the financial wherewithal to sustain the effort for so long.

Won't work for a bunch of reasons (Kraze pointed to some), but the major one is that Putin was stupid enough to formally annex parts of Ukraine it did not occupy.  He had reasons for doing this at the time, but now it's locked him in because Russians would not accept voluntarily abandoning "Russian" territory.  Though honestly, I don't know how much the average Russian thinks of the 2022 annexes as anything other than theater.  I don't think there's been much call to retake Kherson, for example.

Steve

[Seminole]

8 hours ago, fireship4 said:

Hasn't that boat already sailed?  I get the impression the West is decoupling from China as a manufacturing centre, and that the current order of globalisation is changing.  Perhaps war can be averted, but I wonder if the West will continue with Farostpolitik in either case - some have come to see it as selling rope to their hangman.

At some point we’re in danger of ‘sanctioning’ ourselves.  
 

[Zeleban]

New post from Mashovets

 

In the area of Soledar, the enemy is trying to completely encircle the defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the city by advancing in the direction of Krasnopolevka (from the north) and Krasnaya Gora - Paraskoveevka (from the south).

As of yesterday, the enemy managed to take the T-0513 road (Bakhmut - Seversk) under fire control with their weapons (primarily artillery) at certain points (the villages of Blagodatnoye and Sakko and Vanzetti), which significantly complicates the supply for the APU group leading tough defensive battles with the advancing enemy in Soledar itself.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to hold the central, northwestern and western parts of the city. The enemy did not manage to reach the encirclement of this group either the day before yesterday, or yesterday, or today ...

Moreover, the general situation in the Soledar area does not look as favorable for the enemy as it seems to him. The fact is that along Soledar along this road there is a sufficiently prepared and powerful line of defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the southeastern part of the city, where the Wagner assault detachments have entered, is effectively shot through by means of destruction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

At the same time, towards the northwest, the level of the terrain is gradually rising, so the new advanced positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, both in Soledar itself and to the north and south of it, in fact, occupy a dominant position in relation to the terrain on which the enemy is trying to organize attacking / assault actions...

Even if we assume that the Ukrainian command decides to completely withdraw from the Soledar area, this will in no way bring Russian troops closer to the "desired goal" - a complete blockade of the city of Bakhmut from the north... This is obvious.

 

In addition, it should be borne in mind that the enemy did not manage to achieve anything significant directly in the Seversky direction (and without this, even the tactical significance of occupying the Soledar area for the enemy, to put it mildly, looks very doubtful ...). But "Wagnerites" and Lugandian "mobics" will be killed there ... and a lot.

Moreover, the enemy will not be able to concentrate a significant part of his artillery in this direction for a long time (in other sectors the need for it is no less than now in the Soledar area and near Bakhmut) ... And without it, those who HYPOTHETICALLY will occupy the Soledar area, they will be tritely killed from the dominant positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine east of the city ...

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

Balance of power in artillery is shifting.

also confirmations of huge casualties from the Pentagon for mainly Wagner:

 

[FancyCat]

FT article linked but I'll post the tweets.

 

If China really did not know of the full invasion, or even did know beforehand, the signal of running from Russia is a indication of good news for Ukraine and very bad news for Russia.

[Zeleban]

In the Svatovo direction and in the Kremennaya area, the enemy continued unsuccessful attempts to improve his position at the tactical level over the past 2 days, in particular:

- attacked with two assault groups (up to a platoon each), probably from the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division of the 11th Army Corps, the forward positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the direction of Kuzemovka - Popovsky Forest, Kuzemovka - Stelmahovka.

- as well as by the forces of assault groups from the consolidated units of the "Storm" type of 752 motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division of the 20th CAA (up to a platoon each), with the support of armored vehicles (tanks), made at least two attempts to attack the forward positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine towards the west of Ploshchanka - area southeast of Makiivka.

- in this context, the fact that a tank company and a motorized rifle platoon of the 10th tank regiment of the 6th motorized rifle division of the 3rd AK ( the enemy is clearly strengthening the defense area in Kremennaya, fearing active operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the southwestern direction).

On the direction of Shipilovka - Belogorovka (upper), the enemy brought into battle units of the 206th regiment of the mobilization reserve of the 2nd Army Corps (this is the zone of responsibility of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 2nd Army Corps). Together with units of the 1st battalion of this brigade, the 2nd company of this regiment tried to attack the forward positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the indicated direction - to no avail ...

The enemy command, judging by these stubborn and permanent attempts to eliminate the tactical Belogorovsky ledge of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, fully understands its importance, both for further holding the Kremennaya area and for ensuring the stability of its defense system in the direction of Lysichansk.

However, within a month he did not manage to achieve something "worthy" in this area. Even despite the fact that the units of the 2nd AK operating in this direction are almost regularly reinforced and understaffed with additional forces and means.

[The_Capt]

Just now, The_MonkeyKing said:

Balance of power in artillery is shifting.

also confirmations of huge casualties from the Pentagon for mainly Wagner:

 

It is really interesting how Artillery really has become the determining factor in this war - and now @JonS will come and tell us that is has always been thus - however, from a western perspective it has largely been all about airpower, followed up by those poor lowly guns.  In this war indirect fires of all shapes and sizes have been a key indicator.  We saw RA guns drop off last late summer as a key indication that the UA deep strike campaign was working, and that Russia had lost the offensive initiative.  And now it appears as though RA guns are coming under logistics strain again although exactly why is not clear - my suspicion is deep logistical issues, they are getting into the antiquated stocks of both shell and barrel.

What is telling is that without supporting fires defence or offence becomes untenable. This may seem like a "duh" conclusion but I have to say that I have never seen it as this stark an issue.  No ISR and no Guns = dead, in this war. 

[kevinkin]

5 minutes ago, Seminole said:

At some point we’re in danger of ‘sanctioning’ ourselves.  

Let's not forget China is producing low cost everyday goods using what amounts to slave labor. These goods have a razor thin profit margin. What the map does not show is the influence China might be establishing in the southern hemisphere by dumping goods on them. Even in the US, we buy cheap Chinese goods for everyday purposes while maintaining 2-3 BMWs in the garbage of a 5 bedroom house. It's difficult to fight dumping goods. When southern hemisphere wakes up in the morning surrounded by the latest kitchen gadgets and knock-off this and that it comes down to which system they want to live under. One that will use them, or one that will bend over backward to help them flourish.   

[Kinophile]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

OK, here's an intellectual game we've not played in a while!  What realistic options do people think Russia could pursue to achieve a better outcome than what it is doing now?  Keep in mind that regime preservation is the ultimate goal, so any strategic shift that puts the regime more at risk is not likely viable.

Steve

I'll bite. 

I guess I should work backwards from the final point,  Regime Preservation,  as "Russia" is the regime. 

I'll Also caveat that it's impossible for Russia to win the war in 2023.

1. Putin is not the regime.  He has built a system of government that can now exist without him.  There is a very clear favourite in waiting,  who is building an unassailable military,  political, geographic and economic base within Russia so that when the transition starts he is highly probable to win. Prigozhin will maintain and intensify the system into a truly totalitarian form, national prison complex. I don't know of many other Russian characters who are pre positioned to take over and could also maintain the system. 

2. For the system to be preserved Prigozhin must come out of this war on top. 

3. Prigozhin will stop at nothing the achieve his own success. He will die otherwise, Russian political history being what it is. 

4. The military is not a fan of Prigozhin,  but in a political succession fight I suspect it'll stand by. The MOD is not exactly an inspiring source of leadership, so asking troops to turn on or disarm Wagner forces is unlikely to end well. Gerasimov will stay out,  then support the winner. 

5. The Wagner Group and Priggy is the spine stiffening element oof the Russian War effort. 

6. If the Russian MoD is defeated 2-3.more times in 2023 then it'll just get more men,  change in leadership, and stumble forward again. It is a creature of the system,  while Wagner exists both inside and above the system. 

7. The MoD is turtling for now but will attack. Even so, it's irrelevant,  politically. But If Wagner is truly defeated (a big ask) then real Instability will begin back home. Wagner is the active agent in the political mix.  

So,  what must Wagner do to achieve Prigozhins victory? 

1. Wagner must win at Bakhmut.

2. It must capture the Donbass, or be perceived as doing so,  MoD be damned. 

3. It must become independent of MoD logistics.

4. It must transform to a truly independent mechanized force, a Marine Corps type military entity within the invasion force. 

5. It must be seen as the real fighting force,  so acting as fire brigade to MoD **** ups suits it. Leading a major breakthrough operation is beyond its ability or interest. Grinding through streets, it can manage that. Coordinating a Kharkiv level op is far in its future. 

Functionally,  the only way Russia can improve its situation (militarily AND politically) is to attack (duh). The political priorities are the Donbass, so the MoD will remain fixated on that front. Any other attacks I suspect will be spoilers or distractions. 

To achieve any success it will need 10-1 numbers at the breakpoint.  

The 500k mobilization will happen. They've had a long time to fix things (yes no guarantee in Russia).  Some videos still surface but the intake system appears to have un-ckusterf**ked, to some degree. The first mobilization worked,  helped by the weather for sure,, but still. 

The MoD is currently incapable of taking an independent stance on the course of the war. What Putin wants, it does. Putin wants Donbass,  so hello WW1/3.

To win, the MOD would need to either take on the system itself (deeply unlikely,  see creature more above) or gain a heavyweight ally.  If Suvorokin kicks out Gerasimov,  then with Prigozhins support he could maybe change things. 

Do what would they do? Possibly,  attack Kharkiv. It's at right angles to UKR line,  it's close to Russ logistics andoD knows the ground.

Ukraine would have to defend it,  and the sheer size of the theater would duck in a lot of the UKR troops intended for counter attack. 

Wagner could drive that operation,  giving them a new narrative with more heft. Keep throwing Zeks into the lawnmower while MoD attacks on smaller,  localised but supporting efforts to retake all of Luhansk. 

Ta da,  2023 ends in a Russian victory for that year. 

 

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, fireship4 said:

To get to my general point on the subject - whether or not we are anecdotally prone to a behaviour in one situation or another is beside the point.  Human beings create explanatory knowledge which they can then use to change their behaviour.  We extend our mental machinery with things like pencils and keyboards, hard drives and paper.  We can conjecture things, and hold them to logic, by which they proceed, not by biological rules, but by their own attributes, to imagined consequences.  Whatever biological cages and predispositions we have, it seems to me we are ultimately free to escape them, to the extent that we are able to tie our behaviour to ideas about reality, and those aren't made out of neurons.

Well, I disagree.  Humans are complex and each Human is unique.  There are individuals who can master a dozen languages, there are others who can not communicate at all.  That's biology at work.  Mental illnesses are generally biological in origin, not learned.  Fight or flight is also innately biological, though it can be modified through conditioning.  So on and so forth.  My point?  Some biological cages, as you put it, are not free for us to escape from.  Through personal experience in this world I see Humans as, by and large, being extremely poor at managing short and long term priorities.  Too much and too universal to be chalked up to cultural deficiencies.  Those who are genuinely good at long term thinking likely have a biological advantage, just as most of Humanity's exceptional individuals have.

We can agree to disagree here, mostly because I don't even remember why we're debating this in the first place.

6 hours ago, fireship4 said:

I shall not appraise your other links, "What can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence": I apply a similar axiom when Google searches are used in place of arguments, placing the burden of disproof on the receiver of wisdom.

Sheesh... well, at least I looked at the content of the links I posted before posting them.  If this were an on topic debate I would have expanded, but whatever.

6 hours ago, fireship4 said:

Government that brooks no alternative and no opposition is not necessarily bad at planning for the future, I disagree with you on that.  They can be more consistent, and with the knowledge that they are secure, plan far into the future.

Sure, and we see this all the time in autocracies which make huge changes that are against the short term interests of its people, but hold out the promise of longer term gains.  Even if those gains are mostly designed for the elites who are running the show.  However, the historical record of the survivability of autocracies long term is pretty scant compared to the list of failures.  So while the ideal form of long term government is some sort of "enlightened dictatorship", history has not produced one yet.

The examples of longer term autocracies, such as North Korea and Cuba, aren't very positive ones.  Long term planning mostly boils down to staying in power for the sake of being in power.  It provides a focus that a more responsible government does not have.

6 hours ago, fireship4 said:

In the case of Russia, 'ruining the economy' is somewhat subjective if you believe all your mates deserve a bunch of money and everyone else can eat a rock, or that might makes right, or that you are the real inheritors of Greek tradition because Catherine the Great captured Crimea...

My point stands.  The very things that could keep Russia's current autocratic system in power for generations of Putins are not there.  Unlike the Soviet Union, which only lasted for 2 generations (not a big accomplishment), the structures in the current regime were designed for short term goals.  In particular getting rich and keeping power.  The clash between short term thinking and long term planning is playing out on the battlefield of Ukraine right now.

6 hours ago, fireship4 said:

The strength of the modern democracies is in good part to do with error-correction, and placing the levers for that in the hands of those they affect.  They are open to ideas which can change them fundamentally, ideas like human rights, property rights, etc. etc.  Their specific incarnations can be better or worse of course, the best of them can be updated without too much trouble...

Which means that despite the benefit autocracies have in establishing and carrying out long term plans, ultimately democracies will outlast them because they are inherently better designed for longevity. 

Steve

[danfrodo]

12 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

What is telling is that without supporting fires defence or offence becomes untenable. This may seem like a "duh" conclusion but I have to say that I have never seen it as this stark an issue.  No ISR and no Guns = dead, in this war. 

Yeah, that's a big part of my belief that UKR can make big gains once the mud ends, either w freeze or in late spring.  I believe that this 600km line has big sections that are manned by very poor quality soldiers that would fold up quickly w/o artillery support.  And I believe UKR will hit those sections hard, unhinging stronger sections of the line as they are bypassed or cut off.

[billbindc]

In any calculation, it should be noted that the Federal Protective Service of Russia controls near Moscow some 50,000 men who are fairly heavily armed, are between Wagner and the logistics that support Wagner and are under the FSB. Unless and until Prigozhin can figure out how to counter them, he's not getting anywhere near power without Patrushev and his cohorts acquiescing. 

[Battlefront.com]

16 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

It is really interesting how Artillery really has become the determining factor in this war - and now @JonS will come and tell us that is has always been thus - however, from a western perspective it has largely been all about airpower, followed up by those poor lowly guns

Ah, and here we run into one of the great conundrums this war presents to us!  How much of the reliance on artillery is due to the failure of Russia's air power and Ukraine's lack of it?  In other words, would we be seeing the same reliance upon artillery by Russia if it had magically started this war with a NATO type air capability?  Would Ukraine have to be relying upon artillery so totally if it had the magic touch from the air?

I think the truth is that air has been overrated and artillery underrated, but that if a nation has a clear superiority in either they will have superiority on the battlefield.  With one major caveat.

Air is well suited for quick, expansive, and dramatic action once air superiority is established.  No artillery system or systems can create or respond to opportunities as efficiently and effectively as air can when used competently.  However, in a protracted war it could be that it's less sustainable at the levels necessary to combat a large ground force.  Especially one that is light infantry based.  It seems to me artillery has more potential for long term sustainable operations.

Therefore, this war is probably teaching us that if you don't have the capability to arrest or defeat the enemy within a very short span of time, with or without air power, you'd better have a lot of artillery lined up with a lot of shells if you want to win.

Steve

[kraze]

49 minutes ago, Seminole said:

At some point we’re in danger of ‘sanctioning’ ourselves.  

Isn't russia a very good lesson of what happens when you rely on your enemy too much for important things?

Sure in the case above it's just a genocidal gas station that produces nothing else but gas and death, but China is certainly a lot more and when it decides to go to war and pull the plug on your goods - you may not get to "sanction yourself" in time.

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, fireship4 said:

It is a forte that we possess alone in the known universe.

To get to my general point on the subject - whether or not we are anecdotally prone to a behaviour in one situation or another is beside the point.  Human beings create explanatory knowledge which they can then use to change their behaviour.  We extend our mental machinery with things like pencils and keyboards, hard drives and paper.  We can conjecture things, and hold them to logic, by which they proceed, not by biological rules, but by their own attributes, to imagined consequences.  Whatever biological cages and predispositions we have, it seems to me we are ultimately free to escape them, to the extent that we are able to tie our behaviour to ideas about reality, and those aren't made out of neurons.

I shall not appraise your other links, "What can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence": I apply a similar axiom when Google searches are used in place of arguments, placing the burden of disproof on the receiver of wisdom.

If I may weigh in?  This is a really fun discussion.

Well to your first point, I am not sure we are the only species that possesses the ability to do long-term planning.  I would say we are the only species that can do adaptable long term planning.  For most animals the long term planning and strategies are hardwired into them at birth (migratory cycles, reproductive patterns...cicadas anyone?).  Humans seem to posses a unique ability to dynamically plan based on feedback from the environment.

I think that the main issue on either side of your positions - and major weakness in both arguments to frank - is that neither of you has defined longer term.  If we are talking a one year horizon then Steve is wrong and there is an entire Agrarian Age of evidence stacked up against him.   There would be no human civilization if we could not plan out a year of agricultural operations.  5 years, much trickier but I suspect that the evidence points to the idea that we are not only able to plan/strategize that far but do so regularly particularly when we invented much larger enterprises where endstate objectives took longer than a year to accomplish - e.g. pyramids and roads. We broke long term strategies into smaller one year strategies - meta-strategizing effectively, but it still counts.

Beyond 5 years, well yes we can do it, and in many cases do it very well.  But herein lies the second problem with the debate, you are muddling individual with collective; in human affairs scale matters.  For example, at a small scale individual level, one does not develop a strategy to send one's kids to college during the high school graduation ceremony.  My wife and I started strategizing on the children's post-public school educations when they were infants.  And given the College Savings Plan industry, I am sure we are not an isolated case.

Now try and get a 20 year strategy for national education and one is tilting at windmills.  I don't think one could do it at the municipal level let alone higher scales. 

So What? Well I am not sure of the whole "biologicamal 20 Hz versus 55 Hz thing", but looking at the world around us it appears that we can do longer term planning, at a micro social scale.  My mortgage says we are pretty good at it.  So no matter how our brains are designed, there is overwhelming evidence we can do small social scale - long term, to a point.  Even at a micro-scale planning out past say two or three generations (I am farmer, so my son can be an engineer, so his son can be an artist).  Get past that into the century window and I think we pretty much stop caring enough to actually put the effort into the issue.   We enter into the land of faith at that point, or as my dear departed Grandmother used to say - "stop worrying, it will all work out somehow."  To which, as I slide into my golden years, I would add to my own children/grandchildren - "Stop worrying, it will all work out somehow. And if it does not, you will be long dead and wont care anyway."

Collectively we have demonstrated an ability to conduct long term collective strategization (a word I did not just totally make up), however, we have not demonstrated a lot of talent or inclination.  For example, China does have an infamous rumored 100 year strategy ( https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order/), but to be honest I am not sure how much of this is us projecting our own strategic weaknesses and painting China as some sort of superhuman collective, and/or how much is reality.  There are persistent myths that totalitarian states do strategy better, but history is really a mixed bag on this.  We had sustainable great empires in the past where some sort of longer term strategy was likely at play, but they all fell apart, usually to lack of strategic foresight.  Or when micro-social strategies diverged too far from wherever the macro-social strategies were going. 

Democracy is a weird one.  She is like a girl we dated in college but got away and now we are trying it again in middle age.  We are older, wiser and saggier so maybe this time it will stick...jury is still out.  As to whether democracies can strategize - well obviously they can, and in some cases do it well.  However, it tends to be (nod to Mintzberg) emergent and messy.  We also tend to not write it down.  We write a lot of stuff but the real strategies we dare not say lest they evaporate before our eyes.  

I suspect that collective strategy is much harder because it is built on what Harari called "imagined community" and these are held together by abstract ideas and concepts.  So pinning those down into hard metrics we can all agree upon get much harder.  There is plenty of evidence that we suck at collective longer term planning, history is a collection of human failures in that regard.

Finally, I am not sure those are "biological cages" more anchors.  We can pull away from them but they do tend to weigh us down.  In many ways you are both right or wrong depending on a "certain point of view". 

[Battlefront.com]

30 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

1. Putin is not the regime.

Ooooo... I disagree strongly with this.  Putin is absolutely the regime.  For someone to take over for Putin it will have to either co-opt the entire system from within (e.g. a coup of elites already in power) or to crush it from outside (Prigozhin).  There is no realistic scenario I can think of where an outsider, like Prigozhin, can simply remove Putin and gain possession of the existing state apparatus intact.  Of course if Prigozhin cuts enough deals with the insiders, perhaps.  But Putin has built a system that is not all that amenable to such deal making.  And that is by design

This one factor pretty much undermines everything you laid out that follows.

Steve

[FancyCat]

I can't recall a visit by a senior figure from the West to Kharkiv, Odessa, Kiev yes but not Kharkiv I believe?

 

[The_Capt]

Just now, Battlefront.com said:

Ah, and here we run into one of the great conundrums this war presents to us!  How much of the reliance on artillery is due to the failure of Russia's air power and Ukraine's lack of it?  In other words, would we be seeing the same reliance upon artillery by Russia if it had magically started this war with a NATO type air capability?  Would Ukraine have to be relying upon artillery so totally if it had the magic touch from the air?

I think the truth is that air has been overrated and artillery underrated, but that if a nation has a clear superiority in either they will have superiority on the battlefield.  With one major caveat.

Air is well suited for quick, expansive, and dramatic action once air superiority is established.  No artillery system or systems can create or respond to opportunities as efficiently and effectively as air can when used competently.  However, in a protracted war it could be that it's less sustainable at the levels necessary to combat a large ground force.  Especially one that is light infantry based.  It seems to me artillery has more potential for long term sustainable operations.

Therefore, this war is probably teaching us that if you don't have the capability to arrest or defeat the enemy within a very short span of time, with or without air power, you'd better have a lot of artillery lined up with a lot of shells if you want to win.

Steve

What has happened to airpower in this war is by far more impactful than what happened to armour (i.e. the bloody tank).  I have not heard one coherent explanation or assessment of why neither side has been able to achieve air superiority.  I have seen a lot of ideas and anecdotes being tossed around, along with theories but a full blown case study is lacking.

Is this some sort of Ukraine-Russia specific thing or is airpower as we know it in trouble? Unmanned tactical airpower is having a massive surge in that vacuum as a result.  This appears to be a collision of air denials - both sides are effective in denying traditional airspaces leading to a stalemate.  This is particularly concerning as Canada shells out $19B for F35s. Did we just spend all that money to intercept Russian bombers made in the 60s because we wont be able to use them elsewhere?

Perhaps it only confirms what every army officer already knows - depend on what you control.  In this case, tac UAS and the guns. 

[danfrodo]

35 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ooooo... I disagree strongly with this.  Putin is absolutely the regime.  For someone to take over for Putin it will have to either co-opt the entire system from within (e.g. a coup of elites already in power) or to crush it from outside (Prigozhin).  There is no realistic scenario I can think of where an outsider, like Prigozhin, can simply remove Putin and gain possession of the existing state apparatus intact.  Of course if Prigozhin cuts enough deals with the insiders, perhaps.  But Putin has built a system that is not all that amenable to such deal making.  And that is by design

This one factor pretty much undermines everything you laid out that follows.

Steve

I am more in line with this kind of thinking.  Putin IS the gov't.  Like other dictators, he rules by division -- keeping all the other power brokers in competition w each other, like hitler did.  Each one always trying to undermine the others to get a little more power and no trust between them.  There is no succession plan.  If Putin chose a successor, that person would necessarily need to have access to the levers of power in the event of Putin's demise.  Which means the successor would have everything to gain by killing Putin and is therefore a constant threat to Putin himself.  Dictators stay in power by making sure no one has the immediate ability to control all the powers needed to take complete control of the gov't.
 

The death of Putin would lead to a struggle for power.  The only way it doesn't go to serious violence is if enough power brokers decide to back one player, which could happen, though not without a number of balcony falls.  

[Beleg85]

It happens recently mentioned strike at Lantrativka schol killed Russian civilian contractors gathered to construct trenches, not soldiers:

 

Edited January 10, 2023 by Beleg85

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Balance of power in artillery is shifting.

also confirmations of huge casualties from the Pentagon for mainly Wagner:

 

If Russia doesn't have a big crime spree soon it will run out of wagnerites.

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ooooo... I disagree strongly with this.  Putin is absolutely the regime.  For someone to take over for Putin it will have to either co-opt the entire system from within (e.g. a coup of elites already in power) or to crush it from outside (Prigozhin).  There is no realistic scenario I can think of where an outsider, like Prigozhin, can simply remove Putin and gain possession of the existing state apparatus intact.  Of course if Prigozhin cuts enough deals with the insiders, perhaps.  But Putin has built a system that is not all that amenable to such deal making.  And that is by design

This one factor pretty much undermines everything you laid out that follows.

Steve

There *is* a system...it's a personalist autocracy imbued with the methods and values of the siloviki. That system is an oligarchy of strong men who are managed by Putin, the primus inter pares but *not* an absolute ruler in a mobilized state a la Stalin or Hitler. Mass action is almost entirely absent. Should Putin fall, his policies are up for grabs but the form of the state itself is quite unlikely to change unless an actual revolutionary agent such as Prigozhin can alter its composition. On this we agree...I don't believe that's a realistic scenario. 

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ooooo... I disagree strongly with this.  Putin is absolutely the regime.  For someone to take over for Putin it will have to either co-opt the entire system from within (e.g. a coup of elites already in power) or to crush it from outside (Prigozhin).  There is no realistic scenario I can think of where an outsider, like Prigozhin, can simply remove Putin and gain possession of the existing state apparatus intact.  Of course if Prigozhin cuts enough deals with the insiders, perhaps.  But Putin has built a system that is not all that amenable to such deal making.  And that is by design

This one factor pretty much undermines everything you laid out that follows.

Stevea

Maybe to clarify:

Putin created a system that allows his Regime to exist in the form he wants.

Once Priggy Boi takes over it'll be his preferences and priorities projected onto that system,  which he will morph and modify to his taste, creating the Prigozhin Regime. 

Quote

There is no realistic scenario I can think of where an outsider, like Prigozhin, can simply remove Putin and gain possession of the existing state apparatus intact. 

Surely you don't think Wagner and his domestic base/relationship building is about battlefield success and economic enrichment? There is absolutely a realistic scenario -  Prigozhin uses Wagner to ensure his seizure. Putin has held only one thing back from him, public legalization of PMCs. 

And now we see the Patriot PMC coming into play, with others. The Russian elite aren't originalists,  but they watch each other like hawks. 

Prig has no "formal" position but he us not an outsider,  he is part if the system, the extreme edge of it, but he's got a big bloodied boot firmly in the existing power structures.

Wagner aldo gives him a nice big seat at the power table. No one else apart from Putin has his level of public support. There doesn't even need to be a coup,  just Putin anoints Prig for the next election and steps back to retirement. 

Edited January 10, 2023 by Kinophile

[Kinophile]

20 minutes ago, billbindc said:

 Should Putin fall, his policies are up for grabs but the form of the state itself is quite unlikely to change unless an actual revolutionary agent such as Prigozhin can alter its composition. On this we agree...I don't believe that's a realistic scenario. 

It doesn't need to change, for Prigozhin to take over,  though. He can smooth his way with a LOT of funds available, plus who wants to pick a fight with the "only"  force actually  "winning"? Prigster is firmly within the Russian Zeitgeist. 

Wagner is just his gun held idly in the hand to make a message clear. 

The only real opposition could be FSB, and they have no one visible right now.

Edited January 10, 2023 by Kinophile