How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_MonkeyKing]

source: https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1611089317962866691

[kevinkin]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

total UKR combat losses

I wonder if the west loosening its grip on systems like the Bradley is in any way tied to an accurate knowledge of the toll being placed on the UA?  If that is the case, they might want to step up their donations to a level at which Ukraine can train support and field the new equipment. I wouldn't want the Ukrainian cause to come down to watching an hour glass empty like in wizard of oz. May the last grain of sand win. Yuck. 

[Bulletpoint]

1 hour ago, Zeleban said:

The main damage to infrastructure was not caused by cheap drones, but by expensive cruise and ballistic missiles. At the same time, you need to think about what is more expensive than a cruise missile or an anti-aircraft missile that shoots it down

That is clear. But it was a mix of drones and more advanced weapons. I don't think the Russians expected many of the drones to go through.

[Haiduk]

 

About Soledar. From what I read from different sources, situation was approx next. Again there was coincidention, when part of UKR troops came on position after roatation and Russians in this moment launched mass attack. Officers of new arrived units almost didn't organize communications with right and left neighbours and with troops, which remained on positions in northern part of the town. Crisis has started not two days ago, but earlier likely on 4th Jan, when Russians captured Bakhmutske village and next day all SE part of Soledar. Allegedly some officers of new arrived troops just abandoned own soldiers, which caused collapse of control and fleeing from positions.

For example one platoon suddenly has found out that they are completely surrounded by enemy in own position in 5-storey building, because their neighbours just retreated and didn't warn them. They about day sat in full encirclement and only in the night could to sneak to UKR-controlled part of town with support of 46th air-assault without losses. Not all their comrades were so lucky - there was a video  issued by Wagners after mopping-up of the similar 5-storey building, where they showed about 5-7 dead soldiers on the stairs and near entrance door (there was too dark on video, but at least several bodies had yellow tapes)

Lost of Bakhmutske and SE part of town caused pressure on Pidhorodnie village - UKR troops retreated form most part of village - this were elements of 57th mot.inf. brigade. I will not wonder if this "unlucky" brigade caused this collapse since Jan 4th. But I can't confirm this yet on 100 %.

Next gain Russians had on 6th of Jan, when they captured 1st, 2nd, 3rd salt mines complex. And since this day in UKR social media started huge PsyOps attack, alas, picked up by many UKR accounts "we have lost all, Soledar has fallen, Bakhmut next, it betrayal!". 

In the night from 6th on 7th Jan units of 46th air-assault brigade conducted counter attack and likely regained control over salt mine compplex. 

Known selfie of Butusov was made on the territory of 4th salt mine (museum) in 400 m west from occupied salt mine complex, but this video, appeared today, how UKR tankers with support of Border Guards drone shell Russians, shows that probably yesterday clashes took place at the eastern end of salt mines territory and UKR troops very likely mopped-up it.

 

 

Geolocated:

46th air-assault claims they control Soledar (be fair, NW part with townhall) and UKR troops are repelling continous attacks of Russians from three sides. 

Our soldiers note that Russians are attacking with huhe mass of infantry, with small number of armor, but with mass of mortar and arty fire. Before new year UKR destroyed with HIMARS strike large ammo dumps in Brianka and Kadiivaka, which caused defficite of shells, so Russian (mainly Wagner's) arty significantly reduced own activity and Wagners accused General Staff in almost sabotage. This caused next level of tensions between Prigozhyn (FSB) and General Staff, but looks like at last Wagners got new batch of shells and they renewed attacks. Also in this time to attacks on Bakmut direction were involved some VDV and LPR units. 

 

Edited January 8, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Two days of sharp aftercooling on Donbas caused some problems with vehciles. Mud has frozen and deadly stuck tracks. In previous night temperature in Bakhmut fell to -17. But from Thursday the warming will come.  

 

 

 

[Haiduk]

Premium of Darwin for most stupidest death to this orc. Enemy soldier raised up in front of UKR position and began to threaten them with sapper shovel. Maybe he didn't know sniper group of 28th mech.brigade was there. About 4 seconds from the shot to hit.

 

Edited January 8, 2023 by Haiduk

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, JonS said:

At the risk of piling on ...

Russia has done a lot of things. This is one of them. Of the things they have done, this one is amongst the most dangerous and effective. Not necessarily dangerous or effective in an absolute sense, but in a relative sense.

Also, just because you haven't seen an effect, that doesn't mean there hasn't been an effect. Strategic campaigns by their nature tend to be slow burn - thinking about the US sub campaign against Japan in WWII or the RN blockade of Germany in WWI here. Or the USN/RN/RCN campaign against the U-Boasts in WWII. In all three cases there was no identifiable break point where the campaign was clearly "won" or at least "winning", instead there just cumulative corrosion/attrition of the opposing side's ability to sustain/oppose the ongoing campaign, and in the case of the blockades against Germany and Japan the consequent widespread impact on those nation's ability to wage or even sustain the war.

Fast forward to 2022. If Russia is able to sustain widespread interdiction of Ukraine's national grid, then it reasonably follows that there will be a consequent impact on Ukraines ability to sustain or wage the war. Yes, bullets and bombs will probably keep showing up on the Polish border. Yes, most all of the noisy mil kit runs on diesel or petrol, and the deployed stuff that runs on electricity can be powered by portable generators. But that isn't really true of higher, base, or fixed mil infrastructure. And it certainly isn't true of the civilian economy. No sparks means no cooking. It also means no traffic lights, or radio, or - critically - interwebs. Even if that effect is regionally isolated to "only" Kyiv and points east of the Dnipro, that would still seriously impact on Ukraine's ability to wage war at the way it has been, and deny the success that approach has bought them.

And that mostly ignores the impact on an already very battered civilian economy.

 

IF

Russia can sustain their strike campaign

AND

Russia doesn't drop a nut and revert to sprinkling love all over the place rather than concentrating on coherent and achievable goals

AND

the West's AD assistance/gifts prove niggardly and/or ineffective

AND

etc.

THEN,

yeah: the strike campaign could prove dangerous and effective in both an absolute as well as relative sense.

That is a lot of dots to connect and a lot of points of failure.  Having seen Russian behaviour so far I also would not put them in same the strategic campaign camp as the RN or USN - those campaigns had obvious immediate effects that led to longer term outcomes.  One could count the Japanese ships sunk, one could see the resources shortages in Germany by simply counting what did not make it through the blockade.  Strategic campaigns are not an act of faith.

I guess my point is that if one is going to make the link between Russian missile strikes and some larger “dangerous and effective” strategic campaign in a podcast, one has to provide proof of indicators that it is indeed happening.  This is the 21st century, nothing stays hidden or secret for long.  There should have been reports of people dying in dark hospitals, Ukrainian arms industry disruptions etc.  

And then there is a lack of any operational linkages.  While the RN was blockading Germany, the British and French Armies were grinding on the German Army in a series of incredibly expensive operations.  So Russia is hammering at the Ukrainian electric grid and attacking Bakhmut?  While mobilizing a bunch of cannon fodder, and as far as we can tell UA force generation is accelerating?

I may even buy the argument in a relative sense , accept the part back in Feb where the RA had 5 operational axis of invasion the penetrated up to 200kms into Ukraine, and had  12:1 force advantage on the outskirts of Kyiv while the UA was scrambling to defend along a front the size of the US-Canada border.

The current Russia missile campaign is more focused than whatever they were doing before but it is likely too little, too late.  Without military operations on the ground to reinforce whatever pressures they are trying for, it is actually a waste of resources.  Further, I still argue they are shooting at the wrong targets.  From a “let’s make those weak Ukrainian yokels turn on their government by taking away the magic of electricity” the Russian strategy makes sense.  From a “let’s erode their ability to kick us up and down the battlefield” it makes a lot less sense.  An example: hey Ukrainian folks @Haiduk and @Zeleban  how is the Ukrainian rail system doing?  Have the recent strikes cause major disruptions or delays? Have there been any highways or major bridges cut, particularly coming in from the West?  As to AD, have we seen any evidence that the Russian AF is able to achieve a competitive air situation anywhere?  

And finally the real reason that this missile campaign was likely the dumbest thing Russia has done in some time - western escalation.  Ukraine now has Patriots and a laundry list of western equipment coming in that is starting to look like Desert Shield. I do not know what the Russian master plan here is but they do not have three of four years to slowly erode anything.

No, I personally think the latest missile campaign was to show Putin and the Russian people that after suffering two operational defeats last fall that Russia can do something, anything.  It is not “dangerous and effective”, it is desperate.

[Haiduk]

18 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

An example: hey Ukrainian folks @Haiduk and @Zeleban  how is the Ukrainian rail system doing?  Have the recent strikes cause major disruptions or delays?

There were some delays in train shedule, but not significant - 5-6 hours maximum in worst case. If railroad power supply was off that trains got diesel locomotives instead electrical. We have enough extensive ralroad network and it's possible to redirect trains in bypass way if some line will have problems. Though, left bank part of counttry has less of bypassing capabilities

Here is railroad network map on 2014 (you can open it on other page and zoom it). Grey lines - non-electrified, green - electrified with alternating current with 25kV voltage, blue - electrified with direct current with 3kV voltage. Since 2014 some sections were electrified, but I hadn't newer map

 

Edited January 8, 2023 by Haiduk

[Bulletpoint]

42 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Premium of Darwin for most stupidest death to this orc. Enemy soldier raised up in front of UKR position and began to threaten them with sapper shovel. Maybe he didn't know sniper group of 28th mech.brigade was there. About 4 seconds from the shot to hit.

 

I think they missed and he ducked down?

[poesel]

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

I think, Scholz is gradually shifting own position about heavy wepon for Ukraine not because he wants to act in interests of Ukraine, but because he suffers a pressure from USA side

Probably yes

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

(and likely is getting some benefit offers from them)

probably no (except for some warm words)

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

as well as from inner forces in local politicum

yes

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

and large business, which also as for me has 50/50 position - either to support Ukraine with heavy weapon

yes, but that is not a large business

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

or do not spoil the relationship with Russia for future

no - there is not much Russia can offer if you discount gas & oil

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

(+ "guilt memory" for WWII). 

yes

I repeat myself as often as necessary: Scholz is not in favor of delivering weapons, because his party and the voters for his party are not in favor of it. This is pretty simple.
Since he is the chancellor, and he also needs to win elections, Germany will never ever be the first to deliver anything 'heavy'.  He will, however, deliver if EU and NATO partners will. Because it would be bad form not to join ranks. That trumps any hesitation there is.
Finland/Poland/Spain/Netherlands: get a common statement out to deliver x Leo2s and Germany will follow. It is necessary for Scholz to be dragged into this decision. He cannot be seen as active in this matter. He must be reluctant for political reasons.

[dan/california]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

 

About Soledar. From what I read from different sources, situation was approx next. Again there was coincidention, when part of UKR troops came on position after roatation and Russians in this moment launched mass attack. Officers of new arrived units almost didn't organize communications with right and left neighbours and with troops, which remained on positions in northern part of the town. Crisis has started not two days ago, but earlier likely on 4th Jan, when Russians captured Bakhmutske village and next day all SE part of Soledar. Allegedly some officers of new arrived troops just abandoned own soldiers, which caused collapse of control and fleeing from positions.

For example one platoon suddenly has found out that they are completely surrounded by enemy in own position in 5-storey building, because their neighbours just retreated and didn't warn them. They about day sat in full encirclement and only in the night could to sneak to UKR-controlled part of town with support of 46th air-assault without losses. Not all their comrades were so lucky - there was a video  issued by Wagners after mopping-up of the similar 5-storey building, where they showed about 5-7 dead soldiers on the stairs and near entrance door (there was too dark on video, but at least several bodies had yellow tapes)

Lost of Bakhmutske and SE part of town caused pressure on Pidhorodnie village - UKR troops retreated form most part of village - this were elements of 57th mot.inf. brigade. I will not wonder if this "unlucky" brigade caused this collapse since Jan 4th. But I can't confirm this yet on 100 %.

Next gain Russians had on 6th of Jan, when they captured 1st, 2nd, 3rd salt mines complex. And since this day in UKR social media started huge PsyOps attack, alas, picked up by many UKR accounts "we have lost all, Soledar has fallen, Bakhmut next, it betrayal!". 

In the night from 6th on 7th Jan units of 46th air-assault brigade conducted counter attack and likely regained control over salt mine compplex. 

Known selfie of Butusov was made on the territory of 4th salt mine (museum) in 400 m west from occupied salt mine complex, but this video, appeared today, how UKR tankers with support of Border Guards drone shell Russians, shows that probably yesterday clashes took place at the eastern end of salt mines territory and UKR troops very likely mopped-up it.

 

 

Geolocated:

46th air-assault claims they control Soledar (be fair, NW part with townhall) and UKR troops are repelling continous attacks of Russians from three sides. 

Our soldiers note that Russians are attacking with huhe mass of infantry, with small number of armor, but with mass of mortar and arty fire. Before new year UKR destroyed with HIMARS strike large ammo dumps in Brianka and Kadiivaka, which caused defficite of shells, so Russian (mainly Wagner's) arty significantly reduced own activity and Wagners accused General Staff in almost sabotage. This caused next level of tensions between Prigozhyn (FSB) and General Staff, but looks like at last Wagners got new batch of shells and they renewed attacks. Also in this time to attacks on Bakmut direction were involved some VDV and LPR units. 

 

Clearly rotating units is the single hardest thing for Ukraine to do. I don't think that is out of line from the history of previous conflicts. Obviously, anything that can be done to improve the process should be. Perhaps getting more people through NATO training courses will help.

[Bulletpoint]

12 minutes ago, poesel said:

I repeat myself as often as necessary: Scholz is not in favor of delivering weapons, because his party and the voters for his party are not in favor of it. This is pretty simple.

Why are they not in favour of it?

[dan/california]

Orban is just reading Putin talking points. 

[billbindc]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

That is a lot of dots to connect and a lot of points of failure.  Having seen Russian behaviour so far I also would not put them in same the strategic campaign camp as the RN or USN - those campaigns had obvious immediate effects that led to longer term outcomes.  One could count the Japanese ships sunk, one could see the resources shortages in Germany by simply counting what did not make it through the blockade.  Strategic campaigns are not an act of faith.

I guess my point is that if one is going to make the link between Russian missile strikes and some larger “dangerous and effective” strategic campaign in a podcast, one has to provide proof of indicators that it is indeed happening.  This is the 21st century, nothing stays hidden or secret for long.  There should have been reports of people dying in dark hospitals, Ukrainian arms industry disruptions etc.  

And then there is a lack of any operational linkages.  While the RN was blockading Germany, the British and French Armies were grinding on the German Army in a series of incredibly expensive operations.  So Russia is hammering at the Ukrainian electric grid and attacking Bakhmut?  While mobilizing a bunch of cannon fodder, and as far as we can tell UA force generation is accelerating?

I may even buy the argument in a relative sense , accept the part back in Feb where the RA had 5 operational axis of invasion the penetrated up to 200kms into Ukraine, and had  12:1 force advantage on the outskirts of Kyiv while the UA was scrambling to defend along a front the size of the US-Canada border.

The current Russia missile campaign is more focused than whatever they were doing before but it is likely too little, too late.  Without military operations on the ground to reinforce whatever pressures they are trying for, it is actually a waste of resources.  Further, I still argue they are shooting at the wrong targets.  From a “let’s make those weak Ukrainian yokels turn on their government by taking away the magic of electricity” the Russian strategy makes sense.  From a “let’s erode their ability to kick us up and down the battlefield” it makes a lot less sense.  An example: hey Ukrainian folks @Haiduk and @Zeleban  how is the Ukrainian rail system doing?  Have the recent strikes cause major disruptions or delays? Have there been any highways or major bridges cut, particularly coming in from the West?  As to AD, have we seen any evidence that the Russian AF is able to achieve a competitive air situation anywhere?  

And finally the real reason that this missile campaign was likely the dumbest thing Russia has done in some time - western escalation.  Ukraine now has Patriots and a laundry list of western equipment coming in that is starting to look like Desert Shield. I do not know what the Russian master plan here is but they do not have three of four years to slowly erode anything.

No, I personally think the latest missile campaign was to show Putin and the Russian people that after suffering two operational defeats last fall that Russia can do something, anything.  It is not “dangerous and effective”, it is desperate.

Epitome: there is little evidence after the first several months of the war for any Russian initiative other than reaction to an outwardly imposed condition.

[Zeleban]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

That is a lot of dots to connect and a lot of points of failure.  Having seen Russian behaviour so far I also would not put them in same the strategic campaign camp as the RN or USN - those campaigns had obvious immediate effects that led to longer term outcomes.  One could count the Japanese ships sunk, one could see the resources shortages in Germany by simply counting what did not make it through the blockade.  Strategic campaigns are not an act of faith.

I guess my point is that if one is going to make the link between Russian missile strikes and some larger “dangerous and effective” strategic campaign in a podcast, one has to provide proof of indicators that it is indeed happening.  This is the 21st century, nothing stays hidden or secret for long.  There should have been reports of people dying in dark hospitals, Ukrainian arms industry disruptions etc.  

And then there is a lack of any operational linkages.  While the RN was blockading Germany, the British and French Armies were grinding on the German Army in a series of incredibly expensive operations.  So Russia is hammering at the Ukrainian electric grid and attacking Bakhmut?  While mobilizing a bunch of cannon fodder, and as far as we can tell UA force generation is accelerating?

I may even buy the argument in a relative sense , accept the part back in Feb where the RA had 5 operational axis of invasion the penetrated up to 200kms into Ukraine, and had  12:1 force advantage on the outskirts of Kyiv while the UA was scrambling to defend along a front the size of the US-Canada border.

The current Russia missile campaign is more focused than whatever they were doing before but it is likely too little, too late.  Without military operations on the ground to reinforce whatever pressures they are trying for, it is actually a waste of resources.  Further, I still argue they are shooting at the wrong targets.  From a “let’s make those weak Ukrainian yokels turn on their government by taking away the magic of electricity” the Russian strategy makes sense.  From a “let’s erode their ability to kick us up and down the battlefield” it makes a lot less sense.  An example: hey Ukrainian folks @Haiduk and @Zeleban  how is the Ukrainian rail system doing?  Have the recent strikes cause major disruptions or delays? Have there been any highways or major bridges cut, particularly coming in from the West?  As to AD, have we seen any evidence that the Russian AF is able to achieve a competitive air situation anywhere?  

And finally the real reason that this missile campaign was likely the dumbest thing Russia has done in some time - western escalation.  Ukraine now has Patriots and a laundry list of western equipment coming in that is starting to look like Desert Shield. I do not know what the Russian master plan here is but they do not have three of four years to slowly erode anything.

No, I personally think the latest missile campaign was to show Putin and the Russian people that after suffering two operational defeats last fall that Russia can do something, anything.  It is not “dangerous and effective”, it is desperate.

Train delays are typical of spring missile attacks on railway infrastructure. In November, after the start of the autumn missile strikes, my relatives used the railway and did not experience any problems. Trains ran without delay. After spring, our railway workers adapted to the situation

[The_MonkeyKing]

28 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Orban is just reading Putin talking points. 

[Zeleban]

2 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

I think they missed and he ducked down?

He did it too fast. All his muscles instantly relaxed. This usually happens when the nervous system fails (hit in the head or spine)

[danfrodo]

38 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Orban is just reading Putin talking points. 

I am betting Putin has put millions of $ into an account somewhere for this hunk of filth.  Maybe also has some compromising information on him.  One thing Putler is good at is bribing and/or extorting people.

[The_MonkeyKing]

Wether is telling that any winter offensives(if any) will start within weeks:

 

and history:

[The_MonkeyKing]

an interesting graph of proportional RUS tank losses by type:

source: https://twitter.com/MMaenpaa1/status/1612116950527746048?s=20&t=H-9j5Px7Zev4CtM00ehUwA

I was under impression RUS already lost most of its top end equipment. Indeed seems they are still holding significant portion of their best stuff in reserve.

[Grossman]

6 hours ago, kevinkin said:

I wonder if the west loosening its grip on systems like the Bradley is in any way tied to an accurate knowledge of the toll being placed on the UA?  If that is the case, they might want to step up their donations to a level at which Ukraine can train support and field the new equipment. I wouldn't want the Ukrainian cause to come down to watching an hour glass empty like in wizard of oz. May the last grain of sand win. Yuck. 

It's pretty clear to me, with Putin maxing up on a general mobilisation, he's not giving up. The West cannot afford to let Putin win, hence we'll see more and more involvement from the West. The next thing is longer range artillery, tanks, then aircraft. After, if necessary then it will be western crewed aircraft, and the full gambit of NATO war techn. Finally, it will be men, boots on the ground. The West cannot allow Putin to win. That realisation has seeped through western leadership. 

[JonS]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

That is a lot of dots to connect and a lot of points of failure.  Having seen Russian behaviour so far I also would not put them in same the strategic campaign camp as the RN or USN - those campaigns had obvious immediate effects that led to longer term outcomes.  One could count the Japanese ships sunk, one could see the resources shortages in Germany by simply counting what did not make it through the blockade.  Strategic campaigns are not an act of faith.

I guess my point is that if one is going to make the link between Russian missile strikes and some larger “dangerous and effective” strategic campaign in a podcast, one has to provide proof of indicators that it is indeed happening.  This is the 21st century, nothing stays hidden or secret for long.  There should have been reports of people dying in dark hospitals, Ukrainian arms industry disruptions etc.  

And then there is a lack of any operational linkages.  While the RN was blockading Germany, the British and French Armies were grinding on the German Army in a series of incredibly expensive operations.  So Russia is hammering at the Ukrainian electric grid and attacking Bakhmut?  While mobilizing a bunch of cannon fodder, and as far as we can tell UA force generation is accelerating?

I may even buy the argument in a relative sense , accept the part back in Feb where the RA had 5 operational axis of invasion the penetrated up to 200kms into Ukraine, and had  12:1 force advantage on the outskirts of Kyiv while the UA was scrambling to defend along a front the size of the US-Canada border.

The current Russia missile campaign is more focused than whatever they were doing before but it is likely too little, too late.  Without military operations on the ground to reinforce whatever pressures they are trying for, it is actually a waste of resources.  Further, I still argue they are shooting at the wrong targets.  From a “let’s make those weak Ukrainian yokels turn on their government by taking away the magic of electricity” the Russian strategy makes sense.  From a “let’s erode their ability to kick us up and down the battlefield” it makes a lot less sense.  An example: hey Ukrainian folks @Haiduk and @Zeleban  how is the Ukrainian rail system doing?  Have the recent strikes cause major disruptions or delays? Have there been any highways or major bridges cut, particularly coming in from the West?  As to AD, have we seen any evidence that the Russian AF is able to achieve a competitive air situation anywhere?  

And finally the real reason that this missile campaign was likely the dumbest thing Russia has done in some time - western escalation.  Ukraine now has Patriots and a laundry list of western equipment coming in that is starting to look like Desert Shield. I do not know what the Russian master plan here is but they do not have three of four years to slowly erode anything.

No, I personally think the latest missile campaign was to show Putin and the Russian people that after suffering two operational defeats last fall that Russia can do something, anything.  It is not “dangerous and effective”, it is desperate.

Re. initial multi prong assault in Feb: sure, and that's because "ONE of the most" is not the same as "THE most". Lets consider some other things the Russians have done - is the strike campaign more effective and dangerous than the Russian defence of Kherson? What about the attack/siege of Mariupol? Bakhmut? Mobilisation? Their ISR campaign? Sprinkling missiles all over Ukraine in ones and twos? The Snake Island campaign? Using the Moscow in the Black Sea?

I agree it's a lot of dots to connect. That's why I included the IF ... AND ... AND ... AND ... THEN piece. But, isn't that true of all complex undertakings. Do I think the Russians will be able to deliver with this campaign? Well, my Binford Predicto2000(tm) puts it at 37.51% so probably not. But that's not a 'no'.

[Zeleban]

43 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Wether is telling that any winter offensives(if any) will start within weeks:

 

and history:

I am sure we will not see the offensive of the Ukrainian troops until the offensive impulse of the Russians is stopped. Defense requires effort. Therefore, the transfer of reinforcements to the zone of a possible offensive will be difficult

[The_MonkeyKing]

9 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

I am sure we will not see the offensive of the Ukrainian troops until the offensive impulse of the Russians is stopped. Defense requires effort. Therefore, the transfer of reinforcements to the zone of a possible offensive will be difficult

idk, UKR is forming new units on the scale of couple of divisions and already showed in the fall that they can conduct two simultaneous strategic level offensive operations. And meaniwhile RUS never stopped banging its head in Dombass.

[Zeleban]

1 minute ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

idk, UKR is forming new units on the scale of couple of divisions and already showed in the fall that they can conduct two simultaneous strategic level offensive operations. And meaniwhile RUS never stopped banging its head in Dombass.

Now the Russians have concentrated significant forces in the east of Ukraine. More than summer or autumn