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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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new post of Mashovets...

 

I now become exclusively a night correspondent ...

 

For more or less long periods of time, electricity is supplied exclusively at night. Therefore, I can collect and process, and even more so write, only at this time. Please understand and forgive...

Moreover, the amount of writing also has to be forcedly reduced due to the desire to be in time for the next power outage. Today also - briefly about the important ... about Russian "leaps" on the territory of Belarus.

The basis of the joint Russian-Belarusian grouping of troops on the territory of Belarus will obviously be the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (MSD) of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the Western Military District of the Russian Armed Forces (1st Guards TA WMD).

To date, the command of the enemy troops is completing the concentration and deployment of the main forces of this formation in certain areas of Belarus. Its total number deployed there should be about 12,500 military personnel, at the moment 8,950 Russian military personnel from this division have already been deployed in Belarus, in particular:

- 15th MRR, 136th separate reconnaissance battalion, 211th separate engineering and construction battalion, 47th separate communications battalion, 1063rd separate material support battalion, 1117th air defense regiment, (6540 military personnel in the area of the training ground " Obuz - Lesnovsky")

- 1st tank regiment, (1050 servicemen in the area of the Lepelsky training ground)

-1st MRR, (740 troops in the area of the Losvido training ground)

- 147th self-propelled artillery regiment, 1174th separate anti-tank artillery battalion, (620 personnel in the area of the Osipovichsky training ground)

 

It is planned that within the next 2 weeks the command of the enemy troops will also deploy an artillery component of the division on the territory of Belarus.

To date, together with the personnel of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division of the 1st Guards TA on the territory of Belarus is deployed up to:

- 52 tanks

- 28 armored fighting vehicles (mainly of the type of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers)

– 18 artillery systems

- 11 MLRS

- 8 mobile anti-tank systems (on transport platforms or specialized armored chassis).

However, these are by no means final figures ...

At the moment, the following amount of weapons and military equipment removed from long-term storage bases and reserve points for ensuring mobilization deployment is already “on the way” to the deployment areas of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division:

 

– 86 tanks

- more than 180 AFVs

- up to 150 units of automotive and special equipment.

In addition, it should be borne in mind that today at several points for the collection and repair of weapons and military equipment on the territory of the Belgorod Region, there are still at least 245 units of military equipment and weapons of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division damaged and knocked out in past battles, which are now very active and intense repaired and restored by the enemy. Their appearance on the territory of Belarus is a matter of the near future...

 

 

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3 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Actually, that seems like a reason for the Germans and other West Europeans to develop a defence industry not dependent on US conventional arsenal, rather than exploring the options of cozying up to a bloody dictator waging a war of aggression. Even more so now, as by this moment in time, the Russians have repeatedly presented the war in the Ukraine as a war with the West. The "diplomatic option" without getting the RUS at least back to the 24.02.2022 borders would be for many intents and purposes a surrender on terms, not only of the UKR, but also of Germany.

I'm not talking about cozying up to Putin. I'm talking about keeping the relationship with China intact to survive economicaly.  In case Trump returns Europe will find itself between the devil and the deep blue sea.

Edited by Aragorn2002
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5 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

In Severodonetsk it was mostly UKR  territorials. With different levels of training, which may encourage Russians to try the same with chmobiks. The obvious difference is motivation, but so far chmobiks when put in contact with the enemy did not surrender en masse, but tried to fight. They did badly, but made the Ukrainians expend time, materiel and men.  On the other hand, if UKR do not storm Cherson and do not blast it to oblivion with artillery, the would have to starve the garrison out the old way, even discounting the odd ferry sneaking across Dnieper (in Severodonetsk all bridges were down at some point, yet materiel was coming through on boats).

So in each scenario except for Russsians running away without significant fight, garrisoning Cherson with low quality troops as sacrificial rearguard is better than cleanly leaving the entire Cherson bridgehead, which is in turn better, then trying to stay in the bridgehead indefinitely. Which is why I think the RUS will take that options (that, plus the rumblings about fortifying Cherson & some preparatory sad tales about the new Panfilovtsy emerging in the Kherson bridgehead in RUS military blogs)

It might be better, but that doesn't mean it is very good. The Dnipro is an order of magnitude, maybe two orders of magnitude, bigger river than the Seversky Donets, and most of the banks where you can land anything bigger than a canoe are not heavily vegetated. If the Russians are down to Kherson city they will be cut off completely. About five days of watching some sort of PGM obliterate everything that moves, and the chmobiks will quit, if their officers object, well that is what hand grenades are for.

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In general, the bulk of the current personnel of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division are Russian military personnel mobilized in the framework of Putin's so-called "partial mobilization."

Therefore, according to the plans of the Russian command, in order to increase the level of combat capability of units and subunits of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division, it is planned to conduct a monthly cycle of intensive combat training of “partially mobilized” at the training grounds of Belarus (its completion is mainly planned in the period from the 26th to the 30th November this year).

In connection with the deployment of a fairly powerful enemy grouping on the territory of Belarus, it should also be noted that in the area of the Luninets airfield (about 50 km to the border of Ukraine), the Russian military construction unit (numbering about 340 troops), at a high pace, is building PB (basing point), that is, a banal military base.

The Russian “construction battalion” is building administrative, park and technical and storage zones there, as well as a residential town with all the infrastructure (they are supposed to live with their families). The readiness and commissioning of these facilities is planned for the end of November. And at the same time - the planned arrival of the first batch of "Lukashenko's close friends" with an approximate number of under 1000 "carcasses" ...

There is another rather significant nuance directly related to the deployment of forces of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division of the 1st Guards. TA on the territory of Belarus. Here's the thing - before the transfer "under the wing" of Lukashenka, units of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division constituted a fairly significant part of the operational-tactical reserve of the GV enemy "West" ...

After the captured Russian “chmobiks”, which were mainly “understaffed” by the units of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division, which were rather cracked near Balakleya and in the Kharkov direction, were loaded into passenger cars and taken to Belarus, this reserve was reduced to 5 BTGr. Which, in turn, objectively, let’s say… has narrowed the operational capabilities of the Russian troops in the northern part of the Lugansk region and in the Kharkiv direction as a whole.

And in conclusion, some interesting figures and assessments about the so-called Russian mobilization ... or rather, about the parody of it that the Russian terrible “mobilization system” demonstrated.

- the Russian command was forced to announce the “cessation of mobilization measures”, obviously this is directly related to the fact that it simply cannot carry out both mobilization and autumn conscription at the same time. Although earlier Russian propaganda actively dispersed the thesis that, unlike Ukraine (where the conscription was simply canceled due to the war ...), Russia seems to be capable of simultaneously both slaughtering young people in the “primary recruits” and continuing to catch deep-seated Russians “partially graved” with bad alcohol. It turned out that the Russian generals somehow did not realize that the “value of conscription” (in the declared 120 thousand people) during the war, and even more so mobilization, looks quite controversial, or at least debatable ...

 

- As of November 1, according to more or less balanced estimates, the Russian command, despite almost "titanic efforts", managed to "conscript" and "process" no more than 238 thousand people (who forgot, let me remind you ... 300 thousand were notified). This is only 79.3% of what was planned. Of these, only 43% have begun "training and equipping" to some extent.

 

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3 hours ago, sburke said:

not sure why anyone thinks the UA will have to fight block by block for Kherson.  The Russians try to make it a fortified city with no supplies coming across that river once UA artillery closes in?  Who is gonna hold it, the cannon fodder?

Militarly it has not much sense, but politically and from propaganda standpoint from Kremlin perspective things are not so clear cut. Kherson is now "Russian" city, and very likely candidate for Hero City in case something goes south for Kremlin  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hero_City_(Soviet_Union)  . We know Putin has tendency to think in images of glorious past and has no practical understanding of military strategy, so when put on the horns of dilemma (keep slowly decaying bridgehead or retreat without serious fight) he may be inclined to dwell into this narrative of heroic besieged fortress beyond the river. Which would give him additional boost among population; he may be slowly start to realise his only choice to get something from this war is massive mobilization of whole society like WWII kind. "Motherland in Danger" and similar crazy stuff. He won't do this without serious engagement of large sections of society.

Of course Ukrainians are still very far from city itself, and Russian problems with logistics are not able to force them to retreat on itself. Putin is determined and still has many cards in the sleeve, unfortunatelly.

Edited by Beleg85
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3 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

And on that note every single new drone killing widget the Pentagon is testing ought to be in Ukraine getting tested for real, and incidentally winning this war.

And whatever the boffins decide actually works had better be purchased in quantity. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has proven, again, that countries will start wars that make no sense, and keep fighting them long after they have obviously lost. In the hopes of some sort of miracle I suppose. But the oh my god they just used six weeks of ammo, per doctrine, in eight days shock really shouldn't be shocking anymore.

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17 minutes ago, dan/california said:

every single new drone killing widget the Pentagon is testing ought to be in Ukraine getting tested for real, and incidentally winning this war.

Actually testing under combat is not part of the early stages of R&D where collection of controlled data is key. The Lockheed's of the world are better off conducting extensive field tests unless the product is very far along. It might do more harm than good to test every widget that comes out the the butt of some 20 something wiz bang engineer.  

Edited by kevinkin
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2 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Actually testing under combat is not part of the early stages of R&D where collection of controlled data is key. The Lockheed's of the world are better off conducting extensive field tests unless the product is very far along. It might do more harm than good to test every widget that comes out the the butt of some 20 something wiz bang engineer.  

Allow me to cheerfully add "late stage"...

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1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Big if true...

Sound incredible, but on other hand...it's Russian military. This woman does not say number of KIA, but there were reportedly other videos.

https://verstka.media/pod-makeevkoy-pogibli-sotni-mobilizovannyh/   here article, it seems they were brought to the front, lacked tools to dig in and were shelled intensively by UA artillery. Worth to read it, especially in light of discussions about quality of mobiks.

Edited by Beleg85
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13 hours ago, JonS said:

That's kind of always been true though. Consider the trend of what is "high" density from the crimean war, wwi, wwii, gw1, and gw2. The trend is inexorably down as lethality and range both go up. Even during wwi there was a noticeable thining out of the lines, over quite short periods sometimes, such as during the passchendale campaign. Having a solid line of muskets to repel the tommies as they stagger across no man's land is all well and good, but it doesnt count for much when those musketeers all get smooshed by the supporting artillery.

I think the big thing shorter lines will give RU is not higher density (unless you include getting their densities back up to something sane, rather than just a section every km or two  a'la Kharkiv), but the ability to designate and constitute effective reserves. The reduced tactical options for the Ukrainians is a nice bonus, as is having solid flanks anchored by the pre-2014 border.

Absolutely, so the trend line of this war is consistent as ISR, lethality and range has once again taken a leap forward.  The issue with reserve advantage (also in response to @Battlefront.com Steve) is that those reserves are also highly visible and hittable than before, so I am not sure the battlefield management advantage will carry over as it has in the past - reserves are very vulnerable interdiction in this environment and being on shorter higher density lines actually will likely make them more vulnerable, right along with logistics lines. ISR, deep precision strike and dispersed infantry really still dominate this battlefield as far as I can tell and creating narrower higher density battle spaces is likely not a good idea - unless you are the RA still trying to fight the last war.

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9 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Surely they cannot be less advantageous than in Kherson. Yet Russians did manage to supply critical materiel and even rotate troops by ferries and the Kahovka dam bridge hastily filled in with rubble and earth to the extent necessary to hold on for what, four months?

And the defended area is not going to be so small, to prevent dispersing of units and cause Russians to mass excessively. They basically have the square  Vasylivka -Volnovakha - Mariupol- Melitopol at their disposal, which is a lot of real property. So yes, getting additional troops from Kherson and Berislav areas to strengthen the Zaporizhe direction will be beneficial to the RUS.

I am still not sure there is a mass advantage at Kherson to be honest.  As you note it is Severodonetsk in reverse except that the higher density force is being slowly eroded by the lower density force - recall at Severodonetsk the Russian had something like a 900 gun concentration in a very small area to make incremental gains.  At Kherson we have a much less density UA essentially making incremental gains at much lower cost, and one far more sustainable.

The cutting of supply lines clearly worked as the Russians, again with a much larger conventional force (at least on paper, recall the trainloads of armour) has not been able to muster anything that looks like a counter attack, they are basically holding on by fingernails.  What I have found surprising is the fact that the RA has had enough left in the tank to last this long - that is not good news.

Higher density on the middle portion of the line towards Zaporizhya may very well end up mirroring the slow gasps of the RA at Kherson - they likely will not collapse like Kharkiv, at least not right away but they will be on the losing end of an attritional battle.  Attrition on a redundant military system is a classic tipping point scenario where things go slow, and then suddenly very fast.  Russia is gambling that they can stay left of the tipping point of a cascade collapse until some miracle occurs; however, cramming more resources into a smaller area and creating a target rich environment that increases the efficiency of your opponents strengths is bad strategy.  I would be far more concerned if the RA was dispersing and setting up for an unconventional fight aiming to erode in depth the UA as they try to advance.  But to do that they would need all of the enablers that they did not bring to this war.

If the RA did try to disperse as they are - to use all that real estate, they will simply die isolated from each other as their C4ISR architecture is nowhere near able to effectively support the coordination required to wage a modern hybrid warfare defence, let alone support it.  An Army built for conventional mass in a war where that mass is a liability = self constructed dilemma - use the mass as designed and die slow or try to fight hybrid and die fast.  But Russia does not care, this is all a massive delaying strategy hoping the UA runs out of support - which is also incredibly bad strategy when one is also committing very visible warcrimes on a daily basis effectively shoring up your opponents support.

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3 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Sound incredible, but on other hand...it's Russian military. This woman does not say number of KIA, but there were reportedly other videos.

https://verstka.media/pod-makeevkoy-pogibli-sotni-mobilizovannyh/   here article, it seems they were brought to the front, lacked tools to dig in and were shelled intensively by UA artillery. Worth to read it, especially in light of discussions about quality of mobiks.

Hmm…the military unit (в\ч 2079) referenced doesn’t seem to match with anything but an infectious disease hospital in Voronezh.  I guess they could have been sent there for screening and then directly to the front? Seems a bit odd.

Edited by akd
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4 hours ago, kevinkin said:

No worries Steve, left and right depends on the map projection you are looking at. A cool map of all of Europe and Eurasia has France and the UK at the top. Another way to look at the geography e.g. mountains, rivers and choke points etc.. 

I think the downstream orientation is an excellent one to use.  It's better than having it be arbitrarily assigned based on general direction (the Dnepr is mostly running east to west in the Kherson city stretch!).

Steve

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