How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Ultradave]

Spent the day at our 82d Airborne Association Chapter "Rumble" (Annual picnic) . Guest speaker was Marty Schweitzer, from the McCrystal Group, former ADC of the 82d, among (many) various other things. He provided a few thoughts on Russia's invasion of Ukraine. He's had apparently a bit of contact with the Russian Army over the years.

His evaluation: 

1. "They are terrible. Really terrible"   (meaning their competence).

2. They have a lot of artillery, always have, and they use it.

3. Their maneuver elements are "absolutely awful" at tactical maneuver ops.

4. If they ever get to where they are going they can't fight well

  -- because --

5. They have nothing resembling western army' professional NCO corps. Their NCOs are NCOs in rank/name only, have almost no authority, are discouraged from exhibiting initiative, and even if they could, are not given the whole picture of the op - objective, assets. In his opinion this more than anything else cripples them. And the UA has quickly learned that by taking out as many officers and HQ units as possible, everything grinds to aa halt.

None of this is any revelation, but another analysis by someone with experience that confirms a lot of what has been seen and said here.

He discussed aa a few other things, but the rest were not really relevant to this discussion. Except maybe one. He spent time on the Joint Chief's staff. He said that when there is a crisis somewhere, the president (any president) has two questions. a) where are the carriers right now?, and b) how soon can the 82d get there if they have to? 

Other than that, it was a day of good camaraderie with a bunch of former paratroopers of all ages and really good food, on a spectacular afternoon.

Dave

[Battlefront.com]

More evidence that Russia is scraping the bottom of the equipment barrel to outfit its forces.  Here's a bunch of pictures of captured vehicles in the Izyum area.  I don't know what units they are from, but these vehicles are obviously VERY old and likely stored outside for a long period of time.  One of them, maybe two, show a much older paint color dating back decades IIRC.

Steve

[CAZmaj]

Mark Galeotti
How will Putin respond to his latest defeat?
11 September 2022, 9:20am

Russia is retreating at speed along the Kharkiv front, leaving behind burnt-out tanks and, even more tellingly, undamaged ones, too. There are television images of locals welcoming Ukrainian forces and accounts from eyewitnesses on the spot – but none of that has made it into Russian state media. As the Kremlin struggles to find some way of spinning the unspinnable, this will affect not just its public credibility but also elite unity.

The Russian defence ministry is talking about a 'regrouping' of its units. State TV is extolling the 'exploits' of its gallant soldiers. Government newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta, recounting an alleged victory, trips itself up by placing the action deep into formerly Russian-held territory. The tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda’s war correspondent – sorry, ‘special military operation’ correspondent – files gung-ho tales from the front describing not a rout, but an orderly retreat under assault by 'foreign mercenaries' and 'Nato-trained troops.'

The official media is either trying to ignore the collapse of the Russian lines or looking for some ways of excusing or sugar-coating it, but either way the effect is incoherent and unconvincing. In the process, this is demonstrating the key problem of a state-controlled propaganda machine: it all depends on a line coming from above.

Instead, the Kremlin seems to be in disarray at best, crisis at worst. Caught by surprise, unsure how to respond, it is not giving the media a steer, and in a system like this, no one dares show initiative lest they get it wrong. This is, after all, the same Soviet-style defensive thinking that is bedevilling the military, and it’s proving every bit as counter-productive.

The Kremlin has two immediate problems. The first is how to manufacture any kind of positive narrative without resorting to the most egregious of lies. This was the same dilemma it encountered in both Chechen wars and during the Soviet war in Afghanistan: how to lie enough, but not too much.

There is, after all, a strange kind of moral balancing act that obtains in totalitarian regimes. It is not so much that most Russians necessarily believe the official line – though many do – so much as that they are unwilling to put the effort into disbelieving it. It’s too dangerous, both morally and ethically.

Back in the late 1980s, I remember one parent of a Soviet Afghan war veteran telling me 'I didn't want to believe what people were saying about the war, because if I did, then I would either have to act or be a part of it.'

Likewise, today, many Russians would rather leave the box closed and not know whether Schrödinger’s cat is dead or alive. However, the greater the gap between propaganda and reality, the harder it is to avoid the truth.

The Kremlin’s second challenge is how to manage the elite, those who have most to lose but also the best knowledge of what is going on.

A sign of the times is that Ramzan Kadyrov, warlord of Chechnya, has taken to social media openly to complain that 'it’s a hell of a situation' and warning that 'if today or tomorrow there are no changes in the strategy for conducting the special military operation, I will have to go to the leadership of the Ministry of Defence and the country to explain the situation to them.'

One cannot take his posturing at face value, as he has a track record of empty rhetorical threats and flourishes. (Just as Russian troops have become exasperated that the Chechen forces seem more interested in posting videos of themselves on TikTok than fighting.)

However, when Kadyrov is admitting that things are going badly, and trying to distance himself from the conduct of the invasion, it is a sign of deeper, tectonic pressures. The technocrats have long been unhappy with the war, but unable to do anything about it. As hawks and opportunists also begin to be willing publicly to signal their dismay, it signals a growing isolation of the president.

Putin is not seriously under threat, at least not yet. But if he feels he may be, then that arguably takes us into even more dangerous territory. It may be that he will find ways to reframe the narrative and try and make peace while calling it a victory. But it may also be that he feels he has no alternative but to find some way of escalating, lest defeat abroad lead to defenestration at home.

WRITTEN BY
Mark Galeotti
Professor Mark Galeotti is the author of 24 books about Russia. The latest is ‘A Short History of Russia’ (2021).

[Battlefront.com]

This is a video interview with Girkin speaking about the current state of affairs almost as if he's reading from this forum   Well, except the end where he blames the Russian MoD for everything, which is a gross oversimplification to say the least.

 

Seems to have been shot within the last couple of days as he references the HIMARS attack on the Kherson proxy leadership.

Steve

[Artkin]

1 hour ago, Ultradave said:

5. They have nothing resembling western army' professional NCO corps. Their NCOs are NCOs in rank/name only, have almost no authority, are discouraged from exhibiting initiative, and even if they could, are not given the whole picture of the op - objective, assets.

Chapter one of The Russian Way Of War really bangs this over your head, the officers are too far and few. The Serdyukov reforms attempted to allieviate the stress on the officer corps if I'm not mistaken.

Edited September 18, 2022 by Artkin

[Battlefront.com]

Yes, this might be propaganda... but the sentiment is completely real.  THIS is what real liberation looks like:

As opposed to the Russian concept of liberation:

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Another sign of Russia's weakening strength in the Near Abroad, here's a Tweet from Armenia's Speaker of the National Assembly:

Think about this.  The highest level US political delegation to set foot in Armenia since 1991 comes as the Russian brokered ceasefire with Azerbaijan is in trouble.  This is a huge slap in Russia's face.  Turkey's a bit also

Politics is all about messaging, and the message here is quite clear to both Russia and to Turkey.  And that is the United States is no longer going to sit on the sidelines in the region.  Armenia would do well to ditch Russia as a patron and cozy up to the US.  Long term it offers more opportunities than staying it could possibly have staying with Russia.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

This is a bit provocative.  Phrasing implies that the West is happily supplying weapons to Ukraine to hurt Russia.  Sure, it's true, but I didn't think they were supposed to say it out loud like that.  I don't disapprove, just a little surprised.

 

[Battlefront.com]

Heh... Euromaidan just posted this Tweet:

"Russian Lend-Lease to Ukraine"... that's the first time I've seen it and it's hilarious!

Steve

[Artkin]

71 captured tanks is a lot. They probably rake the electronics on the turret with machine guns since they know it'll be theirs anyway 

[Livdoc44]

Geez. Heck of a juxtaposition, Steve. Legit got chills.

[dan/california]

48 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is a bit provocative.  Phrasing implies that the West is happily supplying weapons to Ukraine to hurt Russia.  Sure, it's true, but I didn't think they were supposed to say it out loud like that.  I don't disapprove, just a little surprised.

 

The revelation of another batch mass graves that are even worse than the awful expectations is grinding away some of the diplomatic niceties. Not ENOUGH of them, or several hundred Abrams, Bradleys, and ATACAMS would be lining up as we speak to shove the Russians into the Sea of Azov, free Mariupol, and reveal the REAL extent of Russias crimes. But it is progress none the less.

[CAZmaj]

14 hours ago, akd said:

This is a really, really dumb sentence.  Korea? Cuban Missile Crisis? Vietnam? Israel during several wars? Etc. All raised the prospect of warfare were nuclear weapons were an option, but rejected for a various reasons, some of the same that will likely lead to rejection of use during the current war.

The differences now:

- no more Politburo

- Putin has billions $ to pay for loyalty and protection

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, CAZmaj said:

The differences now:

- no more Politburo

- Putin has billions $ to pay for loyalty and protection

Except going nuclear makes the money worthless, and the more senior people n the Ministry of Defense know it. The best way I have heard it put is that almost the entire Russian elite is currently trying not to deicide. Credit to The Capn for the terminology. Going nuclear makes all those people push their fortunes and their families lives into pot, It is the mother of all decisions. The Russian hand for achieving anything besides state failure, or the end of the world is about a pair of fours. The end of the world includes state failure, just to be clear. The calculus about the risk of trying to do something about Putin instead gets very different, very quickly.

[paxromana]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Except going nuclear makes the money worthless, and the more senior people n the Ministry of Defense know it. The best way I have heard it put is that almost the entire Russian elite is currently trying not to deicide. Credit to The Capn for the terminology. Going nuclear makes all those people push their fortunes and their families lives into pot, It is the mother of all decisions. The Russian hand for achieving anything besides state failure, or the end of the world is about a pair of fours. The end of the world includes state failure, just to be clear. The calculus about the risk of trying to do something about Putin instead gets very different, very quickly.

I'd hazard a guess that even his most trusted personal bodyguards simply couldn't be relied on if they got wind of Putin wanting to go nuclear ... they, personally, might get a spot in the Mt Yamantau Bunker, but would their friends and family?

Edited September 18, 2022 by paxromana

[Vic4]

On 9/16/2022 at 3:04 PM, Ultradave said:

Oh, yeah, well aware of that. My body tells me every day because I'm stubborn and continue to run even at the age of almost 66. (The Army made me run and surprise! I found out I was good at it and like it) I do have friends with more recent first hand experience though. We started getting Blackhawks about a year after I arrived at the 82d Airborne. Man, what a ride after thumping around and jumping (falling really) in Hueys.  It was like trading in your VW Beetle for a BMW 7 series. Not that there is anything wrong with a Beetle but what a difference.

All this time later and the sounds of a Blackhawk, a C-130 and a Huey (don't hear many but very occasionally) are instantly recognizable and make you look at the sky. We have a couple of USCG C-130s that fly over south to north going to somewhere, or returning. I know them when they are barely audible - so used to the sounds.

Dave

The posts of your experience and knowledge are invaluable. Vet of the 82nd, Phd nuclear physicist, kicked cancer to the curb —- you set a high bar few achieve. Much respect $

[Letter from Prague]

52 minutes ago, paxromana said:

I'd haard a guess that even his most trusted personal bodyguards simply couldn't be relied on if they got wind of Putin wanting to go nuclear ... they, personally, might get a spot in the Mt Yamantau Bunker, but would their friends and family?

Yeah, would they rather live in Putinless Russia where they lose some of their privileges, or in a nuclear wasteland? Seems like easy thing to answer.

[Taranis]

↑"A Ukrainian tank heading towards Izium, fully liberated from Russian occupation since 9/11. In the Kharkiv oblast, September 17, 2022 SAMUEL GRATACAP FOR “LE MONDE"

*PRP-3

↑"Ukrainian territorial defense fighters in Izium, September 17, 2022. SAMUEL GRATACAP FOR “LE MONDE"

 

↑"A car marked with the "Z" symbolizing the Russian army. It was destroyed during the liberation of Izium by Ukrainian forces. In the distance, a grain silo that was hit earlier in the day by a Russian bombardment. In Izioum, Ukraine, September 17, 2022. SAMUEL GRATACAP FOR “LE MONDE"

 

↑"For forty-eight hours, the bodies have been carefully exhumed and listed by the Ukrainian national police and forensic doctors. Izioum, Ukraine September 17, 2022. SAMUEL GRATACAP FOR “LE MONDE"

[FancyCat]

Long thread on Kharkiv, nothing not gone over by others on this thread but hey, it's nice to see emerging agreement. Gonna quote some interesting stuff. One, as Grigb has gone over, the Russian forces in Ukraine are divided into LPR and DPR, the National Guard (Chechen and non Chechen Rosgvardiya), the army, and Wagner. Wagner can get support, it's seen separatists, army, Rosgvardiya support it's units, even has airplanes but is pretty small, 4-5k, answers only to Putin thanks to Prigozhin.

Wagner is therefore uncontrollable. Same applies for the rest of the factions, who jealously guard their power.

Wagner can recruit from anywhere, Putin's Chef is untouchable, but the rest of Russian bureaucracy remains, and the SMO means no one wants to join willingly, Russia is just dead on manpower. Mobilization will probably do nothing, cause Russians can smell the stink of the SMO and this defeat in Kharkiv will cement their decision to stay far away and Putin's control over Russia is nowhere near absolute.

As seen in the quote below, there were many saying Izyum contained a powerful set of units, the basis for the cauldron or trap for Ukraine to be lured into depended on the Izyum grouping to be a pincer. We know now they were as stripped as anything else in the area.

I strongly believe that the rot in the Russian military is so high that the General Staff can no longer have accurate data on their own units, neither men, supplies, capability, it's all equally suggestible to be false as true.

How is Russia supposed to defend any new defensive line when their officers are more afraid to say everything is going wrong than smoothly? When it's more important to lie about the capability of their unit than to ensure they can win the next battle?

One would hope that maybe this would be a proper wake up call but...I doubt it.

Quote

To summarise: The Russian army in Ukraine is not a single mechanism, but several factions with their own commanders, control system and structure. Some have heavy weaponry. Others do not. Some have only transport, while others are bumming around campfires without socks.

On paper, however, everything is fine. This is how Russian officials' traditional corruption works. It is quite possible that the Russian command thought that fully equipped units were stationed in Izyum and Balakliia and therefore there was nothing to be afraid of.

 

 

[Haiduk]

Ahah, English cover on the song "Arta" ) Of course, the text completely different and not so eager tempo, but the sense in almost the same )

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Taranis said:

↑"A Ukrainian tank heading towards Izium, fully liberated from Russian occupation since 9/11. In the Kharkiv oblast, September 17, 2022 SAMUEL GRATACAP FOR “LE MONDE"

*PRP-3

This looks to be a vehicle captured in Izyum area.  In my link to other older captured vehicles above you can see others with the same tactical markings.  Also, there are no Ukrainian marks on it (clearly it is in Ukrainian possession).

The PRP-3 is a rare vehicle.  I had to look it up   To me this looks like another example of Russia scraping the bottom of the barrel to outfit (probably) 1st Guards Tank Army units that were decimated in earlier fighting around Kharkiv.  My guess is the specialized equipment in this variant (radar and coms) are either removed or non-functional.  Knowing the Russians, I'd guess they didn't bother removing it!

Steve

[Haiduk]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I don't know what units they are from, but these vehicles are obviously VERY old and likely stored outside for a long period of time.

On the photos markings on vehicles "oak leaves" - 4th GTD, 2 in square - 2nd GMRD. Also not on theese photos, but there are too many of tanks of 26th tank regiment of 47th GTD.

Some other trophies - at least 3 BTR-80 and SNAR-10 artillery radar (soldier mistakingly called it MTLB)

On other hand, I read a post of our soldier, that there is problem exists with proper distributig of captured vehciles. There is no any centralized service, which should gather this staff and distribute it in units, which has the same equipment. So, for example, captured BMD, which would be more appropriate in 25th airborne brigade, used instead in mech.infantry or captured T-80 tanks are used together with T-72 and T-64, or BTR-82A in one company with BMP. So now our units might to have complete zoo in own TO&E. Thought, I suppose this soldier can see only his "trench part of true" - I think, after the unit is went to rotation, the representatives of Central Armored Service try to make their vehicle park more appropriate to their TO&E.    

[paxromana]

23 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Thought, I suppose this soldier can see only his "trench part of true" - I think, after the unit is went to rotation, the representatives of Central Armored Service try to make their vehicle park more appropriate to their TO&E.    

In the later part of WW2 at least one US Army Infantry Division on the Western Front fielded a Battalion of (captured) Panzer IV Tanks in support of operations ands the use, by the Allies, of captured German smallatrms, Mortars, Heavy Weapons and Artillery was not inconsiderable ... all subject to the availability of spares and suitable ammunition, of course.

It's not just Ukrainian soldiers who want to make their lives easier (and longer) by boosting their firepower.

Edited September 18, 2022 by paxromana

[Huba]

First video of UA in Bilohorivka ( the one on Donets I presume, but you can never be sure with these...). 

Edit: RU Military Informant confirms it's near the quarry in THIS Bilohorivka. 

Edited September 18, 2022 by Huba

[Billy Ringo]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is a video interview with Girkin speaking about the current state of affairs almost as if he's reading from this forum   Well, except the end where he blames the Russian MoD for everything, which is a gross oversimplification to say the least.

 

Seems to have been shot within the last couple of days as he references the HIMARS attack on the Kherson proxy leadership.

Steve

Continued disparaging of the Russian military---point blank and direct.  He doesn't offer any suggestions, just blame and negativity.  IMO--he's not positioning himself for any particular position of authority, but speaking on behalf of someone else or group lining up the Russian military as the scapegoats.  Also interesting that he can speak so bluntly without falling out of a high window. 

I've noticed the flag behind him and have seen it elsewhere, who does it represent and is it just a random coincidence that it has resemblance to the Confederate flag from the US Civil War?