How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Beleg85]

6 minutes ago, chrisl said:

So if the UA indeed has a third full division that it's holding back, can/will they take advantage of current Russian disorganization and start a drive towards Melitopol/Mariupol to cut the "land bridge"?  Or do they have to go through the mythical 3rd Army Corps to do that?

Good question; there were reports of fresh military transports from Dnipro several days ago and UA keeps new extra opsec inside. Russian staff must get it as well and they now know what Ukrainians are capable of, but they need to decide where to put their reserves. Zaporizhia front is very long.

[chrisl]

2 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

I think now it's more important for UKR to collapse the Kherson Kessel than to advance more in the east.  Bringing Putin down would be the best thing for UKR, and a second, even more massive disaster is the best chance of achieving this. 

So if it comes down to one or the other, I vote for Kherson.  If they've got resources to secure the newly liberated land and continue eastern offensive and collapse Kherson, that's great, go for it.  But if not they need to consolidate the east and eliminate Kherson as soon as possible. 

I understand that Putin might not fall no matter what, but increasing the probability of that is UKR's best bet.

Kherson as-is is more of a resource sink for Russia than for Ukraine.  Everybody currently enclosed is going to end up dead or as a prisoner, and it's just a matter of them deciding which they'd rather be, and when.  

In the meantime, Russia has to keep using up supply-chain capability trying (or at least pretending) to support the units penned up there.  Once they're gone, all that capability can go back to supplying what's left of their Donbas positions.  So in some ways it's preferable to let Kherson stew a bit longer, running out the resources that are stockpiled there and using up supply capability (and bridging equipment) to keep supplies moving.  So for now, I'd leave them as a logistics problem for Russia rather than turning them into a logistics problem for Ukraine.  But it's also something of a humanitarian and political question, because there are a bunch of civilians in there, too, and it would be preferable to liberate them quickly.

[akd]

Total meltdown (yet still likely carefully managed):

 

Edited September 11, 2022 by akd

[FancyCat]

Part of a longer thread, some of these non-subordinated units have more infantry but no access to Russian MoD artillery and other support. Interesting, they have infantry, but their coordination and command is such that they cannot easily combine them for combined arms maneuvers. I wonder if the effort will be made at this point or not? Sounds like these are partly conscripts, or the more experienced raised separatists units maybe? 

 

 

 

[danfrodo]

21 minutes ago, akd said:

Total meltdown (yet still likely carefully managed):

 

Alice in Wonderland has nothing on this.  It's Bizarro World. 

The guy w tshirt and big nose said we just need to talk to the ukrainians and explain to them that ukraine doesn't really exist, that their language doesn't exist, and that they are really part of russia.  So he thinks if only they had explained this reality then RU wouldn't be in this mess.  WOW. 

Edited September 11, 2022 by danfrodo
added

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Usual Soviet style is "skirmish line" aside IFV ) 

Which seems to change as soon as the first sign of incoming fire is noted

Steve

[sross112]

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

This is a very good point.  I am not sure either to be honest.  Some phenomena will be unique to this war; however, some will be part of larger trends - figuring out which is which will be very difficult.

So lets put Ukraine down and move to a peer fight between say US-led west and a large well funded unnamed Asian country.  Keeping the conversation on hardware - I suspect we will see some of the things we have seen in Ukraine on steroids:

- ISR.  Both sides with a column of ISR capability that goes from space to underwater, and thru cyberspace.  This is backed up by an integrated architecture of human/AI pairing that can keep up with the ISR feeds in real-time.  So what?  Surprise is not a thing until someone's ISR is eroded to the point that they actually have blind spots.

- Unmanned.  Both sides are going to field unmanned systems very broadly.  UAVs are going to be layered from the squad to just below space.  UASs will be capable of ISR, however, they will also be autonomous enough to conduct hunter-killer swarm missions.  Very small UAS armed with precision weapons, or self-loitering munitions - the line between will blur capable of swarming and overcoming C-UAS systems.  We would also very likely see UAS v UAS warfare, something we have not seen in this one at all.  UGS will come online and we will see mixed units of manned and unmanned ground systems.  UGS will be out front, manned systems back.  Like UAS, UGS capable of precision strike and ground based self-loitering munitions will come into play - minefields with legs.

- Massed Precision.  The vast majority of weapons on the battlefield will be "smart".  Designed toward 1-weapon = 1-kill, many able to self-target on the fly. Combined with integrated ISR bubbles, this means that any concentrations within the friendly ISR bubble will be seen and killed, most likely over-the-horizon.  Logistics will remain the most vulnerable part of any military system.

- Deep Strike.  Massed precision with very long ranges.  There will be counter-system development but the physics of some of this deep strike technology will be very challenging to counter in the near-mid term. This, again, combined with ISR will mean that each side can see out to hundreds of kms, and hit single vehicles with a single munition. 

Ok, there is likely more, but lets just take these 4...so what?

Land warfare will evolve - how? Is the question.  Some think it will go the way of naval warfare with a heavy core surrounded by a cloud of ISR and unmanned systems.  A land warfare BG will now engage over the horizon first in an ISR/Unmanned edge war until one sides cloud starts to collapse, then more traditional systems will close in and conduct the finish.  The biggest weakness of this approach is logistics: how does one protect logistics lines that stretch hundreds of kms from being seen and hit? 

The other end of the spectrum is to completely disperse and go as light as possible - all lethal cloud, no steel core.  Gives advantages of much harder to see and hit - ISR is getting powerful but spotting a human is still much harder than a hot large vehicle, same will apply to small dispersed unmanned.  Also has a major advantage of a much smaller logistics tail.  Disadvantage, and question mark, is how will it fair against a cloud-armed heavy core?  If the clouds collide and a non-core force manages to defeat the steel-core cloud, will it have enough power to defeat the steel core, or at that point can Deep Strike precision do the job? 

Upscaling into formations, the most likely answer will be a mix of cores.  Some will be "Light Dispersed" - no core beyond some C2 - thru to "Heavy" having traditional steel in the middle that can still move and hit while bringing protection.  Management of Light - Hybrids - Heavy within a larger formation cloud will be the challenge and the roles of each of these capabilities are up for grabs. In the end we might wind up with an optimized one-size but we will have to go through a series of evolutions first.

To my mind Massed Precision+ Deep Strike+ ISR is a wild card combination. It already looks like it can replace elements of airpower out to around 500km with next gen systems.  There is no viable technological counter to a HIMARs-like system, or very long ranged artillery, except "don't be seen or stand next to (but not too close) to a higher priority target".  The ability to beat counter-systems are just too high when the munition is coming in at Mach 2.5 (e.g. smart submunitions). 

Add to this long range self-loitering/self-targeting swarms of unmanned systems of all types and the battlefield is going to get a lot more lethal, at much longer ranges - to the point that all of our current capability will need a re-think.

Finally, none of this accounts for software warfare - information/cyber, human effects etc. And this war has been mind blowing on how far the needle has moved in those directions. 

So really, the single biggest factor in all of this is ISR. Without it you can have all the PGMs in the world and no targets. So the winner is the one who can deny ISR to his enemy. Age old recon/counter recon except nowadays it has all the layers of an onion and you need to have your own and be able to defeat all the layers of your enemy in order have a viable war machine.

So the next question is who other than the western powers actually has this level of ISR? Does the hypothetical large Asian country actually have this or are they assigned the superpowers that were assigned to Russia before this conflict? It seems to me that if we have a satellite that can read the newspaper dropped on the ground outside the Kremlin in real time we assume that they have a satellite so they have the same ability. Then we find out they are still dropping film cannisters once a week. How much capability have we assigned to these "peer" powers based off of assumptions?

If there is an actual peer environment, then the winning side will be the one that can push the most ISR and supporting PGMs to the lowest levels. PGMs with very short decision cycles are going to be way more effective than waiting on the Pentagon to make the target decision for the squad request. I think we see this in the current conflict and it can be a huge force multiplier. The long range 500km stuff is great for shaping and influencing the overall battlespace but the frontline PGM is going to be the tactical winner. Think of a UGV/HMMWV/whatever vehicle mounting a 6 tubed 200mm rocket with a 10km range that can be digitally connected to the platoon commander's drone and optically targeted onto the hardpoint that is holding up the advance. Or your loitering munition example that can be "grabbed" and targeted by the squad leader to reduce the enemy mg position. 

In the end I just see ISR being the single most important factor out there right now. 

[Beleg85]

It happened. Vovchansk is full of NATO troops.

Next step: LGBT military colonies near Russian border.

[Battlefront.com]

59 minutes ago, Huba said:

In one of the comments somebody posted a link to this magnicifent little thing: https://openrailwaymap.org/ 
So Theiner seems to be right - with routes through Kupyansk and Starobilsk out of the way, the only railway links between Donbas and Russia are located south of Lugansk city and around Rostov. Russian logistics indeed took an extremely heavy blow.

Some people, in particular Russian propagandists, seem to ignore the fact that you can't reroute rail traffic like you can road traffic.  Rail hubs are EXPENSIVE and infrequent.  They exist where they are for very good reasons and there's rarely redundancy that even approaches equivalency.  Lose one of these and you get a big downgrade in efficiency at best, at worst you lose access.  The propagandists that were saying Kupyansk wasn't a big deal to lose likely don't know about any of this.  Or that Russia's forces are heavily dependent on railroads.

Steve

[The_Capt]

And from my homefront we have a clear demonstration of the problem with pundits:

https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/ukraine-shows-military-capabilities-but-russia-can-still-hit-back-hard-military-analyst-1.6064197

I know Walter Dorn, he was a prof when I was back in staff college - his expertise is peacekeeping (look it up).  And now one of our mainstream media channels (one of two really) is pulling him out as a military expert.  He is way outside his lane here but let’s slap him on the front page.

[chrisl]

7 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

It happened. Vovchansk is full of NATO troops.

Next step: LGBT military colonies near Russian border.

Sounds like it was taken by an Improv Everywhere flash mob.

Just wait til they roll out the no pants day.

 

[kraze]

19 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Alice in Wonderland has nothing on this.  It's Bizarro World. 

The guy w tshirt and big nose said we just need to talk to the ukrainians and explain to them that ukraine doesn't really exist, that their language doesn't exist, and that they are really part of russia.  So he thinks if only they had explained this reality then RU wouldn't be in this mess.  WOW. 

It's no surprise. Literally every russian liberal thinks exactly like this. The only difference from the other camp is that they are delusional enough to think that the occupation should've happened peacefully. Somehow.

Edited September 11, 2022 by kraze

[kraze]

16 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

It happened. Vovchansk is full of NATO troops.

Next step: LGBT military colonies near Russian border.

It's true -all NATO is black and English speaking. Especially those fresh guys from Finland.

Edited September 11, 2022 by kraze

[chrisl]

21 minutes ago, sross112 said:

So really, the single biggest factor in all of this is ISR. Without it you can have all the PGMs in the world and no targets. So the winner is the one who can deny ISR to his enemy. Age old recon/counter recon except nowadays it has all the layers of an onion and you need to have your own and be able to defeat all the layers of your enemy in order have a viable war machine.

So the next question is who other than the western powers actually has this level of ISR? Does the hypothetical large Asian country actually have this or are they assigned the superpowers that were assigned to Russia before this conflict? It seems to me that if we have a satellite that can read the newspaper dropped on the ground outside the Kremlin in real time we assume that they have a satellite so they have the same ability. Then we find out they are still dropping film cannisters once a week. How much capability have we assigned to these "peer" powers based off of assumptions?

If there is an actual peer environment, then the winning side will be the one that can push the most ISR and supporting PGMs to the lowest levels. PGMs with very short decision cycles are going to be way more effective than waiting on the Pentagon to make the target decision for the squad request. I think we see this in the current conflict and it can be a huge force multiplier. The long range 500km stuff is great for shaping and influencing the overall battlespace but the frontline PGM is going to be the tactical winner. Think of a UGV/HMMWV/whatever vehicle mounting a 6 tubed 200mm rocket with a 10km range that can be digitally connected to the platoon commander's drone and optically targeted onto the hardpoint that is holding up the advance. Or your loitering munition example that can be "grabbed" and targeted by the squad leader to reduce the enemy mg position. 

In the end I just see ISR being the single most important factor out there right now. 

A certain large asian country likely has comparable EO capability at Mars to what Russia has over Ukraine.

They're not at parity with the west, but can realistically get there.  Successfully landing a functioning rover on Mars on the first time out (along with an orbiter to watch it and relay for it) is no mean feat.

[The_Capt]

3 minutes ago, sross112 said:

So really, the single biggest factor in all of this is ISR. Without it you can have all the PGMs in the world and no targets. So the winner is the one who can deny ISR to his enemy. Age old recon/counter recon except nowadays it has all the layers of an onion and you need to have your own and be able to defeat all the layers of your enemy in order have a viable war machine.

So the next question is who other than the western powers actually has this level of ISR? Does the hypothetical large Asian country actually have this or are they assigned the superpowers that were assigned to Russia before this conflict? It seems to me that if we have a satellite that can read the newspaper dropped on the ground outside the Kremlin in real time we assume that they have a satellite so they have the same ability. Then we find out they are still dropping film cannisters once a week. How much capability have we assigned to these "peer" powers based off of assumptions?

If there is an actual peer environment, then the winning side will be the one that can push the most ISR and supporting PGMs to the lowest levels. PGMs with very short decision cycles are going to be way more effective than waiting on the Pentagon to make the target decision for the squad request. I think we see this in the current conflict and it can be a huge force multiplier. The long range 500km stuff is great for shaping and influencing the overall battlespace but the frontline PGM is going to be the tactical winner. Think of a UGV/HMMWV/whatever vehicle mounting a 6 tubed 200mm rocket with a 10km range that can be digitally connected to the platoon commander's drone and optically targeted onto the hardpoint that is holding up the advance. Or your loitering munition example that can be "grabbed" and targeted by the squad leader to reduce the enemy mg position. 

In the end I just see ISR being the single most important factor out there right now. 

Absolutely agree.  As to China’s ISR capabilities, no idea to be honest, we have been too busy counting carrier groups and fighters.  China has one helluva healthy AI/ML and QC industry so I would not assume we have superiority, at least not today.

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Absolutely agree.  As to China’s ISR capabilities, no idea to be honest, we have been too busy counting carrier groups and fighters.  China has one helluva healthy AI/ML and QC industry so I would not assume we have superiority, at least not today.

Hopefully we won't have to start THE THREAD PART TWO, TAIWAN EDITION anytime soon...

Greatly appreciate all your insights here!

[G.I. Joe]

22 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Hopefully we won't have to start THE THREAD PART TWO, TAIWAN EDITION anytime soon...

Greatly appreciate all your insights here!

Amen to that! Or ever, for that matter...

And likewise...

[sross112]

1 hour ago, chrisl said:

A certain large asian country likely has comparable EO capability at Mars to what Russia has over Ukraine.

They're not at parity with the west, but can realistically get there.  Successfully landing a functioning rover on Mars on the first time out (along with an orbiter to watch it and relay for it) is no mean feat.

But what if their Mars lander is just made up like the US moon landing?

 

Just playing. Go easy.  

So a question for the ISR smart guys and gals. How much of the ISR stuff fed to Ukraine do you think is space based vs aerial platforms? I really have no idea on the capabilities of aerial recon platforms nowadays but I assume they are able to gather a lot more than just still photos. Any thoughts?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, akd said:

Total meltdown (yet still likely carefully managed):

 

This is fascinating.  More tea leaves.

It is funny, because towards the end I was thinking "boy, this would have been a good debate BEFORE the war took place",  Then a few seconds later someone said the same thing  

Steve

[Elmar Bijlsma]

Remember that video of 2 BMP-2s turning onto and going down a road with raised berm, with the front most dismounts getting a beating.

Turns out todays video of the guy clearing the dugout was the same event, from the rearmost of the two BMPs.

Compare:

with:

I thought it looked similar but didn't expect it to actually be the very same event.

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, sross112 said:

So the next question is who other than the western powers actually has this level of ISR?

You mean other than Ukraine?   For sure Ukraine's ISR has been greatly enhanced by NATO, but a fair amount of what it has been doing is totally homegrown.  Commercial drones have provided a ton of information that has informed traditional weapons as well as PGMs.  Remember, if someone has eyes on a target it isn't difficult to get GPS coordinates via Google Earth or other readily available mapping systems.  If you have the coordinates you can feed them to traditional systems and eventually (hopefully) you'll get a hit or, if you have GPS guided PGMs, almost for sure get a hit.  You don't need fancy drones or satellites in geosynchronous orbit to get this sort of ISR. 

The commercialization of ISR capabilities gives many nations options that they wouldn't have had even a few years ago.  Ukraine has purchased loitering strike drones from a country with a military industrial capacity that is decidedly in the middle of the pack.  Ukraine leased satellite time form a private company in order to observe targets in real time.  This is something any "good guy" country could do with Western aligned countries, and it's something a "bad guy" could do in some situations.  Russia bought drones from Iran and could theoretically get info from Chinese satellites for example.

There is also OSINT that is coming into Ukraine all the time from their enemy directly as well as allies within the enemy's camp that send reports in to someone and that then eventually makes it put to Ukraine's command.  In fact, the whole Internet makes having spies in the enemy's camp so much easier to leverage.  No more carrier pigeons and crackly radios saying "This is Nighthawk, repeat this is Nighthawk"

LLF, this one is for you buddy!

All this is true, but is also true that Ukraine has two additional homegrown advantages that another nation might not have.  First, its HUMINT is vast, reliable, and redundant.  The number of eyes they have roaming around in Kherson, Melitopol, etc. are so numerous that there is no way Russia can stop information from being gathered as pretty much anybody there might be reporting.

The other thing Ukraine has is cellphone intercept capabilities.  It's their network that the Russians are using, therefore it can hear everything being said.  Which begs the question why Russia doesn't just shut it down.  And the obvious answer is that Russia's communications are so HORRIBLE that they absolutely need the cell network to function even though they (should) know that Ukraine is listening.

Steve

[chuckdyke]

History repeats LOL

 

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, billbindc said:

I agree with DefMon3 that it's prep for an attempted orderly withdrawal. It doesn't help them much except to increase the density of their lines and the risks attendant to a local breakthrough rise geometrically with every lost kilometer between the front and the river behind it.

The most important thing to know for envisioning the near future is Ukraine's capability to keep up an offensive operation in the north.  Since we don't know that, it's difficult to know whether Ukraine should take up the most defendable positions and hold there OR to keep going.  And by keep going... what does that mean?

Assuming Ukraine's offensive power isn't spent (or close to it):

Operational Art - go on the defensive along the Russian, keep something in reserve, and start moving forces over the Oskil in as many places as possible.  Take back the rest of Kharkiv Oblast and focus on getting within interdiction range of Bilolutsk, Luhansk.  This is a major rail and road supply route into Luhansk and screwing with that makes things difficult for LPR.

Send out feelers to LPR and get an "understanding" of some sort, covert or overt, that establishes a cease fire.  Luhansk must be both very tired and also very afraid.  They see how hard Russia is going to fight for them already, so why not throw them a bone?  Give them certain guarrantees ahead of post-war talks if need be, just get them effectively out of the war.  Doing that will be the worst thing to happen for Russia since they started the war.  It's worth concessions.

If LPR agrees, and it seems to be working, start transferring units south.  If LPR doesn't agree or seem to be doing what it says it will, then either keep advancing until they come to their senses or positions on the Aidar River are taken.

Start Another Offensive - regardless of what is going on with LPR, keep fighting in Kherson, but scale down the offensive in order to free up mobile units to send to Zaporizhia and start pressing southward along the Dnepr.  This will cause great panic all over the Russian front.  Russia will no doubt rush its reserves into play, but my guess is the moves will be piecemeal and poorly supported by combined arms.  I doubt Russia has much in the way of rearward defenses.

 

Now, if Ukraine's offensive power is largely used up, then it's simple... keep Kherson going and put the Kharkiv offensive into park after at least making some attempt at establishing lines on the east side of Oskil and interdicting Bilolutsk.  Clean up anything easy, but don't get too involved.

Steve

[billbindc]

9 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Russia will no doubt rush its reserves into play, but my guess is the moves will be piecemeal and poorly supported by combined arms

What reserves are left at this point? 

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, billbindc said:

What reserves are left at this point? 

That is a very good question   There's still some amount of forces that Russia moved out of the north to reinforce the Zaporizhia and to (probably) set up for more pressure south of Donetsk City.  There are also the 3rd Army Corps units that were definitely seen deploying in and around Melitopol.  Since we haven't seen them show up anywhere else, nor heard reports of them being re-entrained to head back north, I think we should assume they are still there.  I'm sure Ukraine has a very good idea where they are right now even though we don't.

If there aren't any meaningful reserves there, so much the better.  But if there are, I don't think they'll do much of anything other than give Ukraine more bragging rights and Oryx a migraine.

In fact, it should be a goal of Ukraine's go somehow get the 3rd Army Corps into the fight somewhere.  The sooner they start getting chewed up the better.

Steve