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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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Russians have a lot of ammunitions in their defensive lines. Ukrainian forces that reached Russian defence today found a bunker with huge numbers of missiles for RPG, 30mm cannon and more. This means Russians will not run out of ammo easily. There is even more ammo in the further lines of defence.

https://wartranslated.com/update-from-ukrainian-military-expert-oleg-zhdanov-29-august/

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1 minute ago, Haiduk said:

Mashovets wrote, Russians before bridges were badly damaged moved during several days about 140 supply trucks of ammunition and fuel to the right bank

Yeah, so they've stockpiled a fair amount there. Although all this stuff is relatively light weapons/ammunition, no idea about heavy artillery ammunition.

Edited by Calamine Waffles
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Mashkovets:

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...For along with the events in the Kherson direction, a number of other events are taking place, and no less important. The situation began to change at an accelerated pace...

So let's start tomorrow, well, or "after the holidays"...

I think we can guess a few:

  • 3 AK movement
  • Izum unknow battles at Brazhivka-Dovhenke line
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2 hours ago, sburke said:

meanwhile Putin's big friend seems to be facing a crisis of their own.  Hopefully Xi doesn't view military adventurism as a way of deflecting attention as well.  That may be one additional benefit of the western response to Russia, unity and action as a deterrence.

China’s dim prospects turn disastrous (msn.com)

Didn't see very much new in that. Doesn't even mention the incipient crop failures due to extreme drought. Straws are just pilin' on that camel... and the whole world is riding on it!

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7 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Mashkovets:

I think we can guess a few:

  • 3 AK movement
  • Izum unknow battles at Brazhivka-Dovhenke line

I'm not sure if Ukraine waited around until 3 Corps began deployment or if that was just a happy coincidence.  Because there's nothing better than to have your enemy deliberately deploy his forces only to withdraw them again haphazardly to deal with a crisis.

The Izyum battles... this has intrigued me.  I've been wondering if Ukraine was deliberately holding back as it seemed there have been opportunities to advance there for some time now.  It would be very smart for Ukraine to time a significant push there to coincide with the Kherson offensive.  At the worst it is a distraction for Russia to deal with, best case is that Ukraine really puts the hurt on the remaining Izyum forces at at time when Russia is already stressed out.

Steve

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4 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Mashkovets:

I think we can guess a few:

  • 3 AK movement
  • Izum unknow battles at Brazhivka-Dovhenke line

Russians also enough active on Chuhuiv direction SE from Kharkiv. They are attacking our line Korobochkybe - Lebyazhe - Bazaliivka. 

North from Kharkiv Russians expanded own control zone, seizing at least northern part of Udy settlement, which lays on northern bank of Udy river. But likely all this near-border settlement is on their control.  

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5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'm not sure if Ukraine waited around until 3 Corps began deployment or if that was just a happy coincidence. 

It would make sense to hang on and wait to see where this much-heralded saviour-formation gets sent before committing to an offensive (even a probe-y one). If it goes somewhere you feel you need to react to, you might have to peel something out of your O-plan, or if it's coming to where you had planned to strike, you'd need to make adjustments or even cancel your operation. But confirmation it's going somewhere that you're pretty sure can hold it off, and will take a very long (in context) time to redeploy to interfere with your actual plans would be a great "green light" once you've got your own confirmations that it's not going to suddenly appear to your front and ruin your day.

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2 hours ago, billbindc said:

I think our only point of disagreement is on what level of stress is going to allow space for change to happen and provide enough incentive for blocs to form relative to the risk they take in doing so. Russian political culture is highly tolerant of badly run regimes and even badly run regimes like this one have pretty powerful coercive levers to pull. I don't think getting stuffed in Kherson will do it, nor will the coming debacle of the 3AC. It will take those events, more battlefield defeats and slow economic suffocation tied to sanctions. And even then...we'll see.

I think we've come to this point before ;)  It really comes down to how much "free board" (room for failure) Putin has going into something like Kherson or 3AC slaughter.  I'm thinking he had lost much of it even before the war started, now with things going as poorly (in all ways) as they are, he has almost nothing left.  You think there's more room for failure, therefore he can absorb a couple of pretty bad setbacks.  Only one thing is for sure... neither of us are doing more than guessing, therefore either of us could be correct.

What I think is working against your assumptions is pretty much anybody that matters sees the errors Putin is making as being structurally fatal to the Russian state.  This is no longer about Putin mishandling this or that crisis, but mishandling the survival of the state itself.

To fall back on the WW2 analogy, Russia today is in a similar state to Germany in summer of 1944.  Definitely not doing well, but still quite powerful.  The opposition was organized but not energized.  Then July came around and twin disasters of Normandy and Bagration hit.  They saw where it was headed and they calculated Germany would be destroyed if someone didn't do something.  They acted and found a lot of support.  Even some of the SD and SS apparatus was willing to go along, at least partially, with the coup plot because they shared a similar outlook and also thought the coup plotters might succeed.  They weren't wrong to think that, either, as the coup did come quite close to achieving critical mass.  If Hitler had died or been mortally wounded I'm sure they would have succeeded.

Back to the present... I think a lot of Russians who matter have figured out that there's no hope already.  A major defeat or two will probably convince them they have to act now or it will be too late.  I think Kherson might be enough, but it could very well be a systemic military collapse has to happen first.

Steve

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writing almost from the bed so not map for now. RU claim:

  • UKR are making fresh push toward Davydiv Brid
  • RU forces in Olhino and Visokopyla (North East part) are blocked by UKR fire [possibly they are partially surrounded - it is my opinion, not RU]
  • RU expect fresh push to Olhino and Blagodatne [to west from Snihirevka]. I believe there is confusion, and it is Blahodativka [to west from Inhulets bridgehead]
Edited by Grigb
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21 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'm not sure if Ukraine waited around until 3 Corps began deployment or if that was just a happy coincidence.  Because there's nothing better than to have your enemy deliberately deploy his forces only to withdraw them again haphazardly to deal with a crisis.

I’m imagining this “3 AK” passing through multiple commands, each command stealing a part to plug a hole.

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2 hours ago, sburke said:

meanwhile Putin's big friend seems to be facing a crisis of their own.  Hopefully Xi doesn't view military adventurism as a way of deflecting attention as well.  That may be one additional benefit of the western response to Russia, unity and action as a deterrence.

China’s dim prospects turn disastrous (msn.com)

This is fairly off topic for this thread, but since this post got a couple likes...

From my perspective there is quite a bit of wishful thinking in certain circles in the west about Xi's weakness, but they don't really seem to be based on much evidence.

To be sure, it's difficult to read what the situation is inside party circles since everything happens behind closed doors, but there doesn't really seem to be any kind of organized resistance happening amongst the elite set that could perhaps influence what happens at the next national congress. On the contrary, all official messaging is firmly behind Xi. Even some of the more nationalist voices of dissent have recently been harmonized, without much fanfare (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3189923/nationalistic-blogger-sima-nan-banned-chinese-social-media). Although there has been some degree of protest around mortgage payments, it needs to be put in context of how many people still either support Xi or at least don't feel particularly compelled to mount a formal resistance. China is a big country and even a few tens of thousands of people making a fuss doesn't mean much.

Speaking personally, several of my acquaintances have reached out for support in finding a way to emigrate, but that's a very select group who anyway was open to pursuing opportunities overseas, and who simply find themselves frustrated by the ongoing COVID restrictions. They're part of a small group who have the perspective to see that their family's personal economic hardship might be alleviated somewhat if they found work outside. None of them expect or seek major change at home. Many Chinese - I think a vast majority - still accept that the current situation is just some "bitter they need to eat" (吃苦) due to the pandemic and supposed American bullying. This is the party line, and it's not really being widely challenged, as far as I can see.

All that said, I do believe that the recent attacks on the status quo vis-a-vis Taiwan are an attempt to reinforce the narrative that the US and other democratic nations are conspiring against the Chinese people, which is a good distraction from troubles at home. But the fact it didn't go any further than it did seems to me an indicator that the party doesn't want to do anything too radical ahead of the congress. I do think Xi will be confirmed for another 5 years, and I do think his Thought will be codified as the way forward for the party. Certainly his next term will be challenging, and things might get even more heated across the strait, but I don't foresee a total collapse - or unnecessary adventurism - in the near future (~12 months). It seems to me the party wants to keep things relatively stable ahead of the congress, given the challenges of climate change, COVID and increasing international criticism of their policies. Domestic stability is always number one priority.

I quite liked this piece which touched a bit on how "reading the tea leaves" of party inner workings can sometimes get a bit paranoid: https://merics.org/en/opinion/does-beidaihe-meeting-actually-take-place-and-why-does-matter

As usual, the Sinocism blog (https://sinocism.com/) is an indispensible resource for people interested in China, although it is currently on summer break. I also posted Perun's recent interesting piece on China over on the other thread (https://community.battlefront.com/topic/140295-china-vs-taiwan-please), which might be a better place to continue discussion.

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23 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Russians also enough active on Chuhuiv direction SE from Kharkiv. They are attacking our line Korobochkybe - Lebyazhe - Bazaliivka. 

North from Kharkiv Russians expanded own control zone, seizing at least northern part of Udy settlement, which lays on northern bank of Udy river. But likely all this near-border settlement is on their control.  

Thank you!

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3 hours ago, billbindc said:

I think our only point of disagreement is on what level of stress is going to allow space for change to happen and provide enough incentive for blocs to form relative to the risk they take in doing so. Russian political culture is highly tolerant of badly run regimes and even badly run regimes like this one have pretty powerful coercive levers to pull. I don't think getting stuffed in Kherson will do it, nor will the coming debacle of the 3AC. It will take those events, more battlefield defeats and slow economic suffocation tied to sanctions. And even then...we'll see.

Yup, my view is the same. Not enough discontent within regime for now to easily find contenders. And even if somebody will dare- he, his family and possibly friends may find themselves at the bottom of the Volga river. We didn't even see most brutal face of Putin's regime yet.

If we compare it to trying to break into huge warehouse, it took giant work to just to loosen the lock a little. We still must force the heavy door first. And then we may expect large space full of very unexpected packages. Till we find something that is interesting for us, a lot of time may pass.

Sorry for sticking to those criminal analogies.😎

44 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

To fall back on the WW2 analogy, Russia today is in a similar state to Germany in summer of 1944.  Definitely not doing well, but still quite powerful.  The opposition was organized but not energized.  Then July came around and twin disasters of Normandy and Bagration hit.  They saw where it was headed and they calculated Germany would be destroyed if someone didn't do something.  They acted and found a lot of support.  Even some of the SD and SS apparatus was willing to go along, at least partially, with the coup plot because they shared a similar outlook and also thought the coup plotters might succeed.  They weren't wrong to think that, either, as the coup did come quite close to achieving critical mass.  If Hitler had died or been mortally wounded I'm sure they would have succeeded.

Back to the present... I think a lot of Russians who matter have figured out that there's no hope already.  A major defeat or two will probably convince them they have to act now or it will be too late.  I think Kherson might be enough, but it could very well be a systemic military collapse has to happen first.

Russia now did not received even 1% that punishment as Germany in 1944, including massive airstrikes and fatigue of whole population. There was also feel of existenstial treat not only to regime, but physically to the nation. Since modern Russians don't care about war in general, we are very far from that point, if we use historical analogies. We are still moving within regime bubble + narrow sections of society (nats and few liberals) who care.

That is one crucial point why it is hard to believe in sudden collapse or change of power now- population is indiffrent and apolytical. And probably still view Putin as stabilizing factor much more than not. Potential successors would need to explain a lot to them.

About new Kherson events, note that Russians immediatelly started strikes on Mikolaiv in daylight.

Edited by Beleg85
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