How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[panzermartin]

3 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Even late Tom Clancy's ghostwriters were more moderate in their scenarios.

Reality always beats fantasy any day

[JonS]

On 8/1/2022 at 4:11 AM, Battlefront.com said:

Living creatures with even

Over the last couple of years pre-Covid I had occasion to be driving a lot in different countries, new-to-me cars, and on the "wrong" side of the road.

It. Was. Exhausting.

I realised after a while that the main issue was that I didn't know what could be ignored, so my brain was trying to pay attention to everything, all the time.

Edited August 1, 2022 by JonS

[panzermartin]

There is also a history of chinese involvement in Serbia since the 90s. I still remember the Belgrade chinese embassy that was deliberately bombed by NATO, as Serbs were supposedly hosting there comms. Some months ago the landing of multiple giant Chinese cargo planes with weapons in Belgrade, was a surprising act. If something happens there I suspect it's not only Russia involved. 

[Huba]

More FH70 I guess, but could be much more. It is a bit funny that nobody really puts pressure on Italians to help UA, the way DE or FR is pressured, and their military is almost as big and has a lot of stuff that could be useful.

 

[FancyCat]

More context to the current situation.

 

[Huba]

I'm definitely turning it into an internet truth now:

UA army command south just published on it's Facebook page a info sheet about FH77 Archer:

https://www.facebook.com/528312067340051/posts/2116105355227373/

 

Edited July 31, 2022 by Huba

[Grigb]

New Joke: RU staff meeting - Comrades, we have two topics to discuss. Capture village Pisky and liberate country Kosovo. Because we have little infantry left, and our artillery is bad, we will go straight to the second topic. 

Quote

In the situation with Kosovo, we Russians must help the Serbs. We have a state for this. Let's ask our state to provide Serbia with an expeditionary corps of the Russian army of at least 5,000 people armed with heavy equipment and aircraft, and also give the Iskander tactical missile systems to the Serbian brothers.

The Kosovo Front is at the forefront.
The enemy will not get a single meter of Slavic land.
If I don't defend Serbia,
Tomorrow the troops of the occupiers will be in Moscow.

The song is the Kosovo Front. 1999.

[FancyCat]

So looks somewhat like Ukraine is pulling in Russia into a logistical nightmare in Kherson and Russia is taking the bait, shifting resources to counter a expected Ukrainian offensive. I assume Ukraine will not actually undergo a huge offensive, seek merely to continue pressure on the tail and on the frontline to drain Russian combat power.

Aside from pushing in Kherson, what else can we expect from Ukraine offensively? I know in Kharkov, they may be able to push some more, but the restrictions against fire on the other side of the border, I think makes it a less useful area to attack.

We know in Izlum area that Ukraine is slowly moving to take whatever Russia abandons. But that's not a offensive.

Do you suppose Ukraine will take the time to refit, reinforce other fronts or attempt for offensive actions now? Or simply focus on Kherson and the Zaporozhye front?

 

 

[Beleg85]

In case anybody missed, there is fairly decent overview of last week including analysis by Rochan Cons.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQ9jX7pGEjA

Nothing we wouldn't know anyway, just a nice summ up.

21 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

There is also a history of chinese involvement in Serbia since the 90s. I still remember the Belgrade chinese embassy that was deliberately bombed by NATO, as Serbs were supposedly hosting there comms. Some months ago the landing of multiple giant Chinese cargo planes with weapons in Belgrade, was a surprising act. If something happens there I suspect it's not only Russia involved. 

Yeah, and 9/11 was an inside job.

Russia is courting many countries last months, and Lavrov is probably desparate to ask them to do anything to distract West and allies. Old ethnic problems, postcolonial issues, Tiny Islands disputes, water distribution etc. All these will be played here and there, in Europe, Africa and Asia (+ probably we soon hear about new problems in South America) by RU diplomacy in order to prove that genial idea of his boss that  "Unipolar order is finished" is valid.

There will be many useful idiots in the West to believe in such crap. Russia sucks at war, but it was always perfectly recognizing and targeting Western inner fears and doubts.

Edited July 31, 2022 by Beleg85

[Huba]

13 minutes ago, Grigb said:

New Joke: RU staff meeting - Comrades, we have two topics to discuss. Capture village Pisky and liberate country Kosovo. Because we have little infantry left, and our artillery is bad, we will go straight to the second topic. 

Kolhoz council meeting: Comrades, we have two topics to discuss: pork production and advances of the world socialism. As we don't have any pigs anymore, let's skip to the second topic...

I believe that  was the original, or something along these lines

[G.I. Joe]

Russia to hold large-scale military drills in Far East from late August

This is a few days old, but I don't recall seeing it mentioned here. Given how hard they're scraping the bottom of the barrel to commit more forces to invading Ukraine, I will be very curious to see what kind of assets Russia can actually manage to commit to an exercise in Asia. I recall some discussion here a long time ago that the actual strength of the last big Vostok exercise had been wildly over-reported in Russian official sources...this should be a whole different level.

Another story also mentioned that Japan has requested that Russia avoid including the Northern Territories / Kuril Islands in the exercises.

[Huba]

54 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Do you suppose Ukraine will take the time to refit, reinforce other fronts or attempt for offensive actions now? Or simply focus on Kherson and the Zaporozhye front?

I watched a lengthy podcast today with Polish Army major talking about this very topic. It's in Polish and youtube translation is  not working unfortunately, but here are some of the more important takes from it:

- UA army is quite chewed at the moment, and it is unlikely they could do a big push with current line units. Kharkiv scenarios, with broad front pushes in RU weak points are most likely. Izium is a good candidate for this at the moment, as are parts of Kherson front. Nothing quick can be expected as of now.

- regarding UA reserve corp. At this point the new units might be achieving operational readiness, but additional month or two of training would be really useful, especially if these units are to operate together at a level higher than brigade. It might be possible to use it for maneouver/ operational breakthrough, it is of course quite risky.

IMO as of now, time is still on UA side, as new units train, western equipment is arriving (including prospects for some "game changing" stuff like NASAMS and ATACMS and perhaps even aircraft - wishful thinking mode on  ). Meanwhile RU is getting weaker due to friction and insufficient reinforcements. If anything dramatic happens in next month or two, it will be due to RU not being able to sustain the pressure on the level it is now and collapsing locally. After that, say late September, there's a chance for something more dramatic. UA will probably be able to utilize the new units, combining them with new technical capabilities, at least to greatly intensify the pressure in line with current modus operandi.

Edited July 31, 2022 by Huba

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, akd said:

This doesn’t really make sense.  A staged failed attack would be sufficient for those purposes.  A successful attack (literally wounding / killing people on the steps of the BSF Central HQ) on Navy Day is deeply humiliating.  Ukraine is going to deny just like they have with the attacks inside Russia proper as they have no need to provide escalation fuel and the act speaks for itself.

True, and this is why I initially hesitated to think of it as a Russian false flag op.  However, the alternative is the first ever deep attack by a Ukrainian strike team since Ukraine doesn't have drones capable of covering that distance from friendly territory.  And if they were going to do that, why wouldn't they wait for clustered military targets after the events started?  Why go through all the risk just to hit a courtyard and lightly wound 5 personnel?  That, to me, doesn't make any sense.

We know Russia has no problem blowing up its own people.  The fact that the drone hit outside and wounded so few is looks to me like the drone operator went out of his way to cause minimal damage/casualties.  That would be more consistent with a Russian false flag event than the product of a Ukrainian strike.

Whatever happened, it does seem like Russia used it as an excuse to cancel the Naval Day events.  In my opinion that's because they didn't have the manpower to pull it off and/or didn't want to risk a Muskova repeat.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, Huba said:

If anything dramatic happens in next month or two, it will be due to RU not being able to sustain the pressure on the level it is now and collapsing locally.

I agree.  Months ago when I thought that June/July was going to see some major ground regained by Ukraine I was counting on Russian near-collapse frontwide with local areas of tangible collapse.  What I didn't factor into my thinking was how many different tricks Russia had to get cannon fodder into the frontlines so quickly.  That plus copious amounts of artillery have definitely kept most of the front stable in most places.

That said, Izyum seems to be another Kyiv, but in slow motion.  From what little information we're getting from there it looks like Russia is pulling back because the forces there are at risk of collapse.  Too many casualties from futile ground attacks, too many units stripped away for Severodonetsk and elsewhere.  And now that Russia has advanced westward from the direction of Severodonetsk, there's less need to hold Izyum, especially because they were never able to do much with it for months anyway.

If it were up to me, I'd divert all new Ukrainian units to the western portion of the Zaporizhzhia front.  Small, calculated ground offensives in lots of areas over several weeks could have a significant impact on overall Russian defenses.  Let Kherson stew in its own juices, as the saying goes.

Steve

[Grigb]

Map time. I am making slight changes to improve the map. I will stop making them as soon as I am satisfied. 

[UPDATE] Got small new info for Maryinka and Krasnohorivka( On map it is still Krasnogorivka, will correct) so, here is new map.

Regarding other directions there is still a lack of concrete data regarding offensive moves there. So, no map for them yet.

Edited July 31, 2022 by Grigb
Map update

[Haiduk]

Situation with moving and deployment of Russian troops on south is continuosly changing, so Konstantin Mashovets offered own updated review on tomorrow.

For a while here DONBASIZATION of the battle for Donbas - part 2. Bakhmut area.

After Avdiika most hot place now is Bakmut, where Russian shifted own efforts after failure to breakthrough to Siversk from Lysychansk and to Barvinkove - Sloviansk from Izium.

Here we can see the same "donbasization" - most of Russian troops either moving to second line or moving to south without R&R. Their place seize LDPR units. On Bakmut direction operates former Popasna grouping "East", having three tactical groups

1. Yakovlivka - Soledar direction.  3 BTGs (one of them in second echelone) - 102ns MRR regiment of 150th MRD and 6th Cossack MRR of LPR. Likely have a task to outflank Bakmut from the north, operating from Striapivka. 

2. Bakhmut direction. 5 BTGs (one of them in second echelone). Most dangerous group, which already came close to the city, after capturing Pokrovske village or at least southern part of it. They will try to burst into the city directly, ramming of our defense. For this they have BTG of 26th tank regiment of 47th tank division. Other troops - BTGs of 31st air-assault brigade and 5rd MRB "Oplot" of DPR

Both theese groups have artillery support from two tactical groups (likely battalions) of 147th SP-howitzer regiment of 2nd Guard Motor-rifle division. 

3. Kodema direction. Have a task in cohesion with northern part of Donetsk-Horlivka group to break through from Vershyna to Zaitseve and from partillay captured Semyhirya to Kodema in order to push off UKR troops further to Kurdiumivka and outflank Bakhmut from south. This group mostly consist of PVC BTGs and elements of 5th MRB "Oplot" of DPR, which substitute Russian regulars. 

In villages Striapivka, Volodymyrivka and Trypillia 4 conscripts rifle battalions (RB on the map) are deployed  - they don't participate in attacks yet, but they will be sent into the grinder, when group 2 will enter to Bakhmut

Some update about northern part of Donetsk group, attacking from Dolomitne and Novoluhaske power plant. Yesterday I wrote in has 4-5 BTGs of 40th and 336th naval infantry brigades - already not. Marines are moved to second line and part of them already on the route to south. So, 3rd MRB "Berkut" of DPR and tank battalion "Dizel", probably with PVC.

 

Edited July 31, 2022 by Haiduk

[Beleg85]

@Grigband @Haidukthanks for your great info and maps. We have basically high-quality separate OSINT channel here, only for viewers of this forum. I already recommended this forum to several friends interested in development of the war. Your insights are invaluable.

 

@Haidukhow would you read the last appeal of Zelensky to evacuate Donbas population? There are some voices (serious ones, not usual scaremongers) that it may signalled they expect to have some problems with holding current defensive lines there. I know there was explanation about UA inability to provide them with water and electricity, but how valid it is in your judgment?

Edited July 31, 2022 by Beleg85

[Haiduk]

10 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

how would you read the last appeal of Zelensky to evacuate Donbas population?

I think this is second. Not so electricity and water - this can be delivered by volunteers (food and generators), but abscent of heating in buildings, especially in the cities and towns will be heavy problem. Nobody will repair heating systems now. Even if we will liberate this territories, also nobidy will repair this in winter. Though many locals don't want to leave. In villages they have own homesteads, cows, chickens, they can use the stove with wood. And many of locals are indifferent to question "whose flag is over". They wait only one - stop on shooting. 

Edited July 31, 2022 by Haiduk

[Grigb]

25 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Most dangerous group, which already came close to the city, after capturing Pokrovske village or at least southern part of it. 

 It seems Pokrovske is contested. Today's 6 PM report from UKR GS says: Under the cover of aviation, it tried to improve the tactical position in the areas of Vershyna, Soledar, Yakovlivka, and Pokrovske. Our soldiers thwarted these plans with accurate fire. After unsuccessful assaults, the occupiers retreated. Also, I do not see any RU reports of capture. 

So, most likely they tried to capture, then suppressed it with arty and bypassed it.   

[Grigb]

RU Nats translation of Vucic speech 

Quote

Summary of Alexander Vucic's speech on national television (as presented by our bird in Belgrade):

• We completed the meeting at the General Staff, before that General Moisilovich spoke with the commander of the KFOR and conversation was apropriate [not rude]
• The KFOR commander should come to Kosovska Mitrovica and talk to the leader of the Kosovo Serbs Rakic
• I hope that the arguments of (third parties) will work on the Albanian “irresponsible” side
• I hope tomorrow it will be possible to achieve compromise solutions through dialogue, which will lead to a situation more conducive to the preservation of peace
• I thank the Serbs in the North of Kosovo for their restraint and, at the same time, courage
• I thank the representatives of the American Embassy (!), Borell (!!), and Carl Bildt (my God, what is this for? — BP) [BP - TG channel that posted it] 

 

Edited July 31, 2022 by Grigb

[Battlefront.com]

Yeah, so as expected.  Serbia-Kosovo trouble is just the normal sort of thing we see from time to time.  Which is, underlying tensions going one step further.  Nothing more than that.

As expected, it's not connected to Ukraine or even Russia, though no doubt Russian agents/idiots were active.  But that's also normal.

Steve

[asurob]

12 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yeah, so as expected.  Serbia-Kosovo trouble is just the normal sort of thing we see from time to time.  Which is, underlying tensions going one step further.  Nothing more than that.

As expected, it's not connected to Ukraine or even Russia, though no doubt Russian agents/idiots were active.  But that's also normal.

Steve

Can a quiet observer get a ballpark estimate as to what you think could happen should that trouble go hot?  I know Kosovo has a very small army, but I imagine with NATO troops and air on the ground there and given the fact that Serbia's neighbors aren't big fans that could be the start of a domino that inflames the region...yet again.

[DesertFox]

 

 

[Calamine Waffles]

Serbians want to FAFO it seems. For their sake they better hope they've gotten better at hiding their weapons than 25 years ago.

[Huba]

19 minutes ago, asurob said:

Can a quiet observer get a ballpark estimate as to what you think could happen should that trouble go hot?  I know Kosovo has a very small army, but I imagine with NATO troops and air on the ground there and given the fact that Serbia's neighbors aren't big fans that could be the start of a domino that inflames the region...yet again.

I think that tweet answers Your question pretty well: