How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

Map time. From Girkin so far nothing. For balance I used UKR MOD morning update + couple of Nats.

  

Day 3 of RU Third phase offensive. Khodakovsky, commander of infamous Vostok "battalion":

Quote

The most terrible dream of a high-ranking boss is to report problems and failures to a boss placed even higher. As a result, only those reports that do not disturb sleep and do not awaken the thought: who is to blame? reach the top through traditional channels. And after this thought, [do not awaken] the desire to punish the guilty...

 

[The_Capt]

10 hours ago, Huba said:

We don't measure "trade", "religion", "politics" with any intricate units of measure

Dollars

Converts (or Believers)

Votes

Just about every human endeavour has fundamental metrics applied to it, be they accurate or not.  We are probably at the “agree to disagree” point on this. But I am grateful for the discussion, it has been helpful and triggered some ideas.

Edited July 30, 2022 by The_Capt

[Beleg85]

In case anybody missed it, here is abrreviated translation of interview with Ukrainian general regarding defeats from early phase of the war. Very interesting takes, inter alia about possible treason in high politcal circles.

https://twitter.com/VolodyaTretyak/status/1553149229664714753

Ths bodes well with last week's cascady of firings of some high-ranking officials from Zhelensky sorroundings. It seems Americans push Ukrainian President for a hard stance on purging those whithout their confidence.

 

Also, another thread from Thomas Theiner about yesterday massacre. Underlaying point: Russia did it.

https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1553346547739410432

 

Edited July 30, 2022 by Beleg85

[Haiduk]

This night strikes:

1. Pervomaysk, Luhansk oblast, occupied since 2014. Ammo dump 

Translation of local TG : There is impact in the town, the fightres of Pervomaysk Emergency service arrived, but dentonation doesn't allow to extinguish the fire.

2. Alchevsk, Luhansk oblast, occupied since 2014. Maybe deployment of troops/vehicles and small ammo dump on the territory of local yacht club.

 Military medic buses came to evacuate wounded

3. Energodar, Zaporizhzhia oblast. Russian vehicles destroyed on the parking near local hotel. Probably loitering munition strike or diversion. Russians claimed "humanitarian cargo for citizens" was destroyed, but this is likely popcorn is detonating on the video %)

4. Bruskine, Kherson oblast, Inhulets bridghead area. General Staff claimed Russian BTG HQ of 34th MRB was hit by artillery.

5. Video of Kherson railway bridge damages

 

Edited July 30, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

here is abrreviated translation of interview with Ukrainian general regarding defeats from early phase of the war.

You should take into account that Kryvonos is not only military, but also political figure in Ukraine, and he has tensions with Zelenskiy's team, so he can be politically biased in own assesmnts. I believe, that in Zelenskiy's office really can be enough maybe not direct Russian agents, but influencers, but the words of Kryvonos about "no reactions on warnings" this is not true. For some reason he didn't say that most troops since 8th of Feb already moved to appointed areas as if for "maneuvers". And of course evacuation of our aviation obviously weren't separate decisions of aviation brigade commanders.

From other military carefuly told in own interviews, we can tell not about "oversliping the war", but about mistake in assesments of probable Russian strike. Our politics as if considred Russians will attack only on Donbas and probably on NE - Kharkiv-Sumy and couldn't maintain invasion from many directions. Why politics so stubbornly though that Russians will attack only on Donbas, it's a real question. Because military really warned that Kyiv and Crimea directions will be active with high probability too. Kryvonos also warned about Hostomel, like a weak point of Kyiv for two weeks before invasion. Though, on 24th Feb some screen forces anyway were deployed north of Kyiv and they delayed Russian offensive, so this is wrong to say "lidership did nothing and ignored all".

Edited July 30, 2022 by Haiduk

[Beleg85]

3 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

You should taking into account that Kryvonos is not only military, but also political figure in Ukraine, and he has tensions with Zelenskiy's team, so he can be politically biased in own assesmnts. I believe, that in Zelenskiy's office really can be enough maybe not direct Russian agents, but influencers, but the words of Kryvonos about "no reactions on warnings" this is not true. For some reason he didn't say that most troops since 8th of Feb already moved to appointed areas as if for "maneuvers". And of course evacuation of our aviation obviously weren't separate decisions of aviation brigade commanders.

From other military carefuly told in own interviews, we can tell not about "oversliping the war", but about mistake in assesments of probable Russian strike. Our politics as if considred Russians will attack only on Donbas and probably on NE - Kharkiv-Sumy and couldn't maintain invasion from many directions. Why politics so stubbornly though that Russians will attack only on Donbas, it's a real question. Because military really warned that Kyiv and Crimea directions will be active with high probability too. Kryvonos also warned about Hostomel, like a weak point of Kyiv for two weeks before invasion. Though, on 24th Feb some screen forces anyway were deployed north of Kyiv and they delayed Russian offensive, so this is wrong to say "lidership did nothing and ignored all".

Yup, thanks for clarification. He indeed had a bias. And it is still a mystery how Russians, who concentrated massive forces at Crimea, simply drove into Southern Ukraine, taking large and smaller cities like Kherson, Berdyansk, Tokmak etc.

However, the "cleaning up" of certain people in UA leadership is clearly undergoing. Now Demchenko is out, before him Venediktova and Bakanov. Yermak position seem to be very weak as well. Some of those people were very close to Zelensky, so I guess there is a strong pressure from the West to "make his backyard in order".

[Haiduk]

3 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Yermak position seem to be very weak as well.

Alas, not. He is real "ruler" when Zelenskyi is only "reign". Yermak appoints own people on key duties and this is concerning situatin. Though, on other hand Zaluzhnyi and Reznikov were appointed by Zelenskyi also from Yermak offer. I think he is not so "pro-Russian agent", but "pro-System agent" in worse meaning of this word (corruption, "own people" on fund sterams, mutual responsibility between politics, larege business and law protection structures etc). But in current terms his skills in protecting the System can ne useful. What we will have in the future - this is a question. 
 

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, Grigb said:

Map time. From Girkin so far nothing. For balance I used UKR MOD morning update + couple of Nats.

  

Thanks for putting these in graphical form!  I'm saving them right alongside of my ISW reports.  That's quite an honor

Steve

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Thanks for putting these in graphical form!  I'm saving them right alongside of my ISW reports.  That's quite an honor

Steve

I tried to make an update for Kherson front, but it looks like almost everybody got quiet about it. Girkin did not post any updates since yesterday noon. And all other RU Nats are quiet.  UKR General Staff also seems quiet. I believe there is heavy fighting that does not favor RU. But we have to be patient.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Why politics so stubbornly though that Russians will attack only on Donbas, it's a real question.

Yes, I am very interested in what intel the West provided and how that impacted Ukrainian thinking.  It seems that right up until the invasion that some in Ukraine's government doubted the intel.  Certainly many in the West also doubted it (France fired its head of intel because he vehemently said the US was wrong).  However, I don't understand why Ukraine's own intel wasn't able to confirm what the US was telling it.  Or if it did, why it was not acted upon with more thoroughness and speed.  This could be where some incompetence and divided loyalties made an impact.

I have been suspicious since the very beginning of the war that Russia took extra steps to hide its Crimean invasion force.  I do not have much evidence of this, the strongest being the vehicle markings.  Many of the vehicles with Zs, Vs, and Os, were applied were stencils.  The marks on the initial Crimean invasion vehicles were a straight, sloped line that were obviously done extremely quickly and by hand.  Lots of paint drips, for example.

My guess is that tactical markings, which might be noticed by foreign intel services, were deliberately kept off of all Crimean vehicles until the day or two before the invasion started.  This way intel services would say "ah!  We see suspicious markings up here, but not down there.  So let's focus attention up here".

It is all speculation, of course.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Thanks for all the updates, Haiduk!

2 hours ago, Haiduk said:

5. Video of Kherson railway bridge damages

I am no structural engineer, but I think it's pretty clear that the bridge can not be repaired to take rail traffic again.  At least not within a time that matters.  It can still be used for foot traffic, of course, however that's not what Russia needs to keep fighting on the western side of the river.

I think it's pretty clear that Russian forces in Kherson are effectively cut off and will remain that way until the conflict is resolved.  Ferries can supply only a fraction of what the forces need.  Pontoon bridges could, in theory, substitute, but in reality they are unlikely to remain in service very long due to Ukraine's artillery.

Good news

Steve

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, Haiduk said:

This night strikes:

1. Pervomaysk, Luhansk oblast, occupied since 2014. Ammo dump 

Translation of local TG : There is impact in the town, the fightres of Pervomaysk Emergency service arrived, but dentonation doesn't allow to extinguish the fire.

2. Alchevsk, Luhansk oblast, occupied since 2014. Maybe deployment of troops/vehicles and small ammo dump on the territory of local yacht club.

 Military medic buses came to evacuate wounded

3. Energodar, Zaporizhzhia oblast. Russian vehicles destroyed on the parking near local hotel. Probably loitering munition strike or diversion. Russians claimed "humanitarian cargo for citizens" was destroyed, but this is likely popcorn is detonating on the video %)

4. Bruskine, Kherson oblast, Inhulets bridghead area. General Staff claimed Russian BTG HQ of 34th MRB was hit by artillery.

5. Video of Kherson railway bridge damages

 

I wonder if you could do a thermite warhead for GMLRS that would just melt a three to five foot hole through a bridge. I doubt the project would ever get traction because the U.S. uses other things to drop bridges. 

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, poesel said:

Short answer: if _you_ can assess the outcome of a war, a program can or will eventually do it, too (if someone deems it worthy to spend the money and with war, they will).
Why: it is all just processing of information. No magic in the human brain (unfortunately).
The 'when' I don't know, but I guess not more than a few decades.

The enormity of the task will present its own challenges to practical application.  AI right now struggles to handle even relatively straight forward physics problems.  Like self driving cars, for example.  Even with the billions put into it by companies that have massive financial incentives to get it right, it's only now sorta becoming practical under more-or-less ideal circumstances.

The irony is that self driving AI is probably safer than the average Human driver.  Doesn't fall asleep, can't get intoxicated, isn't distracted by texting, etc.  Yet it's being forcefully pushed back against because it isn't "perfect".  Our species has a really, really tough time with risk assessment and risk management strategies

7 hours ago, poesel said:

You are mixing up statistics with single events. You cannot draw conclusions from a general probability to what is going to happen to a specific element.
If your hard disk has an MTBF of 5 years, it does not mean that exactly that hard drive in your PC will die after 5 years. It could also mean that _none_ of that batch of hard disks die at the 5 years mark.

Ah, but that is what people will expect of some sort of future über number crunching system that costs billions of Dollars and decades to develop.  The expectation will be that it won't get it wrong for any specific war or battle within it. Just like people expect driving AIs to never kill its occupants or others by its decision making.

Humans absolutely suck at evaluating and accepting probability for what it is.  The same person that is unwilling to accept a 0.05% chance their AI controlled car might kill them is the same person that buys 100 lottery tickets and is convinced the 1 in 305,000,000 chance of winning the lottery jackpot is realistically within their grasp. 

However, I do concede the point that given enough time, resources, and smarts there could be an AI capable of reasonably predicting the outcome of a particular military engagement or general conflict.  I just don't think it is practical.  Mostly because the more likely event is there will be a conflict so bad that the resources necessary for such an AI will no longer be available.

Steve

[panzermartin]

On the Kherson and the Dniepr bridges, I can't really find much information about the structure of russian forces in the pocket. I wonder if their standard armor leaning BTG never changes.

If I was RU commander I would rely mostly on well equipped infantry units instead of Armor and heavy arty that cant be repositioned or withdraw easily. I would also station most artillery units covering Kherson on the eastern shore. But thats only me and not some overconfident and inflexible RU commander  

[dan/california]

19 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

On the Kherson and the Dniepr bridges, I can't really find much information about the structure of russian forces in the pocket. I wonder if their standard armor leaning BTG never changes.

If I was RU commander I would rely mostly on well equipped infantry units instead of Armor and heavy arty that cant be repositioned or withdraw easily. I would also station most artillery units covering Kherson on the eastern shore. But thats only me and not some overconfident and inflexible RU commander  

This sort sums up the conundrum of the Russian position in Kherson. The Russians can't hold any ground outside of artillery coverage, But if they pull their guns back to the East/South side Then Ukrainian guns will very shortly be in range of the river crossings with 155, and the minute Ukrainians can range the river with regular 155 rounds as opposed to the expensive rocket assisted ones, and GMLRS The Russians go from a bad supply situation, to NO supply situation. No supplies means they get to just leave. So they have to try and hold well on the OTHER side of the river or just leave.

[Battlefront.com]

19 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

On the Kherson and the Dniepr bridges, I can't really find much information about the structure of russian forces in the pocket. I wonder if their standard armor leaning BTG never changes.

It's a bit dated (July 5), but Schlottman puts the BTG count stood at about 10.  Armor includes T-90s and BMP-3s, Marines, Airborne, and Spetsnaz units.  This was prior to the flood of reinforcements into the area, so there's likely quite a bit more there.

19 minutes ago, panzermartin said:

If I was RU commander I would rely mostly on well equipped infantry units instead of Armor and heavy arty that cant be repositioned or withdraw easily. I would also station most artillery units covering Kherson on the eastern shore. But thats only me and not some overconfident and inflexible RU commander  

The dilemma for Russia is that if it withdrew its armor heavy artillery, it would effectively end any hope of keeping the western bank positions.  Why?  Because thus far Ukraine has shown itself more than capable of taking back terrain from Russian infantry units.  Especially in this case where Ukraine's forces are backed by armor and heavy artillery.

What this means is, realistically, Russia had to choose between defending Kherson with everything it had or retreating to the eastern side.  Anything other than full defense or full retreat would not have worked.

Steve

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

The enormity of the task will present its own challenges to practical application.  AI right now struggles to handle even relatively straight forward physics problems.  Like self driving cars, for example.  Even with the billions put into it by companies that have massive financial incentives to get it right, it's only now sorta becoming practical under more-or-less ideal circumstances.

The irony is that self driving AI is probably safer than the average Human driver.  Doesn't fall asleep, can't get intoxicated, isn't distracted by texting, etc.  Yet it's being forcefully pushed back against because it isn't "perfect".  Our species has a really, really tough time with risk assessment and risk management strategies

Ah, but that is what people will expect of some sort of future über number crunching system that costs billions of Dollars and decades to develop.  The expectation will be that it won't get it wrong for any specific war or battle within it. Just like people expect driving AIs to never kill its occupants or others by its decision making.

Humans absolutely suck at evaluating and accepting probability for what it is.  The same person that is unwilling to accept a 0.05% chance their AI controlled car might kill them is the same person that buys 100 lottery tickets and is convinced the 1 in 305,000,000 chance of winning the lottery jackpot is realistically within their grasp. 

However, I do concede the point that given enough time, resources, and smarts there could be an AI capable of reasonably predicting the outcome of a particular military engagement or general conflict.  I just don't think it is practical.  Mostly because the more likely event is there will be a conflict so bad that the resources necessary for such an AI will no longer be available.

Steve

My favorite line for humans not properly assessing risk is "obese, sedentary, diabetic, non-seatbelt wearing middle-aged smoker very concerned about health effects of vaccines"

(edit: not to get all holier than thou, as I am drinking my 2nd diet coke of the day and god knows that can't be good for me)

Edited July 30, 2022 by danfrodo
added

[Battlefront.com]

Good article in Foreign Policy Magazine about the transformation of the FSB back to KGB and now to NKVD:

Quote

During his first 15 years in power, Putin relied on the FSB but tried to distance it somewhat from the KGB. He wanted the FSB to be his rapid-response team, rushing to him with solutions to his political problems, inside and outside Russia. But after the FSB repeatedly let him down—failing to warn him of color revolutions, Moscow protests, and finally, the Maidan revolution in Kyiv in 2014—Putin changed the rules. Instead of having the FSB serve as a rapid-response force, he revised its mandate to something much closer to that of the KGB. He made it an instrument for providing political stability through the intimidation of the Russian people, including elites. But the recent moves suggest that Putin is once again shifting course. Instead of the KGB of the 1970s and 1980s, the FSB increasingly resembles Stalin’s secret services, the NKVD, which aimed to a much greater degree at total control of the Russian population.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putins-new-police-state?campaign_id=249&emc=edit_ruwb_20220729&instance_id=68020&nl=russia-ukraine-war-briefing&regi_id=77867169&segment_id=99982&te=1&user_id=06eb42ecc9056dd32ea63af0c30707b6&utm_medium=social

Steve

[danfrodo]

26 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

It's a bit dated (July 5), but Schlottman puts the BTG count stood at about 10.  Armor includes T-90s and BMP-3s, Marines, Airborne, and Spetsnaz units.  This was prior to the flood of reinforcements into the area, so there's likely quite a bit more there.

The dilemma for Russia is that if it withdrew its armor heavy artillery, it would effectively end any hope of keeping the western bank positions.  Why?  Because thus far Ukraine has shown itself more than capable of taking back terrain from Russian infantry units.  Especially in this case where Ukraine's forces are backed by armor and heavy artillery.

What this means is, realistically, Russia had to choose between defending Kherson with everything it had or retreating to the eastern side.  Anything other than full defense or full retreat would not have worked.

Steve

But how can it really defend that area?  I think they can't do it by conventional means, so I suppose the first thing RU will do is to starve the civilians, knowing how Putin operates.  Bascially they've got many thousands of civilians as hostages.  That's my worry, and also why I think UKR was trying to entice RU to leave.  Maybe mass murder is Putin's plan. 

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

However, I don't understand why Ukraine's own intel wasn't able to confirm what the US was telling it.

It is hard to say. It is obviously Zelenskiy's team after Russian "dress rehersal" in 2021 understand that war is close, and as consequense of this became Zaluzhnyi appointment instead Khomchak, which openly "pacificated" and "optimized" UKR army, openly told that UKR will never win in the war with Russia, entered money awarding for "truce executing" in JFO and had a conflict with Minister of defense Taran, which failed State Defence Ordering program in 2020-21. I more than belive that in 2020 Zelenskyi and Yermak could have some secret preliminary agreements with Russia how to finish the war (his strange visit to Oman has born many conspiracy), so in this time Ukraine was making several tactical concessions to Moscov, which summoned angry in society (like "Wagnergate"). But contray to expectations of Zelenskiy's office, Russia kept tough position and didn't want make any concessions from own side. So, I think exactly in 2021 during big Russin "maneuvers" Zelenskiy and Yermak understood, that any peace agreements with Russia will be impossible, so "hawks" were assigned, and active dipomacy work has begun for westren AT-systems receiveing and future support.  

There is other problem - there are more than rumors that direct access to Zelenskyi is possible only via President's Office (Yermak). So, Information, which president receives, initially interpreted by President Office. Former chief of SBU Bakanov, for example, using personal friendship with Zeklenskiy, could bypass Yermak and this caused hidden conflict between him and Yermak for influence on president. So, main reason of Bakanov dismissal is result of Yermak's victory, than real fails of service. Zelenskiy maybe understand the war is close, but he is not politic, and completely relies on own "grey cardinal". In 2019 he apperared as naive pacifist whith words "I already have finished the war in my mind" or "I never will give order to solve Donbas question in military way", "I have to look in Putin's eyes and I believe we can make a deal". I can't judge is Yermak is Russian influencer or not, but he is obviously was a source of scepticism of prsident about NATO, EU and US warnings. Some people in President's Office had a duties diring Yanukovich times and by their support (and of course by "yes" of Yermak) influent lawer Andrey Portnov, strong opponent of western course of Ukriane and bright enemy of Maidan returned to Ukraine. So, I think not so "pro-Russian", but "pro-System, anti-Maidan" wing of President's team was forning mistrust of Zelenskiy to western organizations, by mesages about "western interfering in Ukraine" (relating to corruption) and "external control over Ukraine". So, Zelenskyi to the last wanted to believe that he can avoid the war and all warnings is a games of the West, which wanted to use Ukriane in own geopolitical goals. But, I think this opinion at least partially has a right for life. There is no friends between states, there is only matching of interests.  

Edited July 30, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, panzermartin said:

On the Kherson and the Dniepr bridges, I can't really find much information about the structure of russian forces in the pocket. I wonder if their standard armor leaning BTG never changes.

If I was RU commander I would rely mostly on well equipped infantry units instead of Armor and heavy arty that cant be repositioned or withdraw easily. I would also station most artillery units covering Kherson on the eastern shore. But thats only me and not some overconfident and inflexible RU commander  

I posted about Kherson about week ago. In short - main forces there 7th air assault division (mountain) - at least 5-6 BTGs, then 205th MRB almost in full composition, BTG of 34th MRB (mountain), 11th air-assault brigade (at least 2 BTGs), 126th coastal defense MRB (also 2 BTGs), 127th recon brigade, about 1-1.5 BTGs ot 42nd MRD, moved from Zaporizhzhia, elements of 98th VDV division, moved from Donbas, at least four battalions of LDPR conscripts. Other lesser units, artllery, AD. In last days Russia moved many troops to Kherson and I will write about this. Up to 12-15 BTGs total, not counting LDPR conscripts

Edited July 30, 2022 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

17 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

I posted about Kherson about week ago. In short - main forces there 7th air assault division (mountain) - at least 5-6 BTGs, then 205th MRB almost in full composition, BTG of 34th MRB (mountain), 11th air-assault brigade (at least 2 BTGs), 126th coastal defense MRB (also 2 BTGs), 127th recon brigade, about 1-1.5 BTGs ot 42nd MRD, moved from Zaporizhzhia, elements of 98th VDV division, moved from Donbas, at least four battalions of LDPR conscripts. Other lesser units, artllery, AD. In last days Russia moved many troops to Kherson and I will write about this. Up to 12-15 BTGs total, not counting LDPR conscripts

Any clue what that works out too in actual manpower? The definition of a battlegroup has gotten sort of flexible lately. Also any indication of the number of guns and AFVs? I am just trying to get an approximate idea of how much tonnage has to cross the Dnipro every day to keep those forces functional. I realize that this may not be available from public sources.

[akd]

9 hours ago, Taranis said:

"Photojournalist Evgeniy Maloletka flees from a field inflamed by a Russian army bombardment, in the Kharkiv region, July 29, 2022. MSTYSLAV CHERNOV / AP"

These two photogs were the last independent journalists in Mariupol, escaping narrowly in mid-March.

[Haiduk]

10 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Any clue what that works out too in actual manpower? The definition of a battlegroup has gotten sort of flexible lately. Also any indication of the number of guns and AFVs? I am just trying to get an approximate idea of how much tonnage has to cross the Dnipro every day to keep those forces functional. I realize that this may not be available from public sources.

About 12 000, before some developments, about which I will write tomorrow 

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Any clue what that works out too in actual manpower? The definition of a battlegroup has gotten sort of flexible lately. Also any indication of the number of guns and AFVs? I am just trying to get an approximate idea of how much tonnage has to cross the Dnipro every day to keep those forces functional. I realize that this may not be available from public sources.

I use the following rules of thumb for Russian BTGs...

Fresh from rear = 600-800
Committed, offensively capable = 500
Committed, supporting role or defense only = 300
Committed, burnt out = 150

If we assume 15 Russian BTGs that are committed and not worn out, that puts the Russian manpower at roughly 8500.  Add in maybe 1200 for LDPR and we've got just shy of 10,000 combat with several thousand support (including artillery).  This number seems to be about right for the amount of terrain and typical troop density of this war.

NOTE - just saw Haiduk's post.  So we're estimating roughly the same amount based on his BTG count.

Steve