How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[BeondTheGrave]

3 minutes ago, Hapless said:

Why bother trying to grind all the wall to Moldova  when you can play sea-denial?

Depends on how you view the Russian enclave in Moldova. If your goal is to unite all German Russian speaking peoples on your borders, Moldova could be an important goal for Putin. A direct land bridge would set Russia up for a replay of this crisis in the few years in Moldova. Plus it turns Ukraine into a totally landlocked country, strangling it economically (hopefully). 

[Taranis]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I am sure this is a "train the trainer" situation where the crews trained in France on CAESAR will go back to Ukraine and train more.  At least that is the sensible thing to do because it gives Ukraine the ability to field in as many CAESARs that France sends them without having to send crews to/from France.

BTW, I really like the CAESAR system from a logistics standpoint.  It is self propelled (shoot and scoot), but it is wheeled instead of tracked.  Much easier to keep operational vs. tracked.  One of the reasons is you can tap into a wider range of mechanics in civilian clothing to help fix routine problems vs. tracked vehicles.

Thumbs up

Steve

Yes exactly.

It is even developed to meet road traffic standards (like many NATO vehicles now).

To complete my previous position, another major advantage is that a very experienced crew (see an officer commanding the vehicle, it is a sergeant who normally commands such a vehicle) may be able to fire on their own in complete autonomy without the need for a command vehicle because it has its own firing computer that you can initialising yourself (afterwards you have to know how to do it). The vehicle by himself calculate the trajectory etc. It's a very, very rare practice (at least when I was still in the army) but it's quite possible.

The most common was that a command vehicle received the firing orders, sent them directly to our computer by crypted radio wave and you just had to press a button to aim it, load it (semi-automatic loading), add the propellant charge, close the bolt (also semi-automatic) and fire (no shell casing) ! To packup the barrel it's almost the same principle, it was enough to press a button (there are things to be careful or to close but the vehicle does not pack up with the force of the arms or with a crank ). 

The gun also had the capacity to make direct fire (at view) but as I stated before it's not the best thing since it's "fragile" but could be good against bunker and fortified positions.

About the inertial navigation system it is the same that is used on Rafale or nuclear submarine (that's a thing )

[Vacillator]

4 minutes ago, Taranis said:

The most common was that a command vehicle received the firing orders, sent them directly to our computer by crypted radio wave and you just had to press a button to aim it, load it (semi-automatic loading), add the propellant charge, close the bolt (also semi-automatic) and fire (no shell casing) ! To packup the barrel it's almost the same principle, it was enough to press a button (there are things to be careful or to close but the vehicle does not pack up with the force of the arms or with a crank ). 

Loving this sort of insight .

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, Vacillator said:

Loving this sort of insight .

Me too!  Thank you Taranis for the detailed first hand information on this system.  Because it isn't in Black Sea or Shock Force it likely is not as well known to us here as the other stuff.

Steve

[Taranis]

2 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Training the trainers. And the longest lessons are going to be on the maintenance side of things. Meaning mechanics and technicians.

Good points about maintenance like stated previously by Steve, it's really easy. In theory, it's simply a Renault truck with a gun on it.
If you know how to repair a truck, that's enough, if you know how to maintain a cannon, that's good. The most complicated is the navigation system (frankly even with us if there was a problem it was seen directly by the manufacturer (Nexter) and I never had the case) or the hydraulic system (I never had worry either). A well trained commander can easily solve basics hydraulic problem (but you really need to be trained to know it).
Another flaw perhaps is the need to have an ad-blue additive (road traffic standard) against pollution (ecology ) but which is replaceable with water in the event of war (but not ideal for the long term vehicle)

[The_Capt]

ISW weekly is up:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-invasion-update-24

Key Takeaways April 15-21

• Russia and Ukraine are unlikely to resume negotiations in the coming weeks. Both sides await the outcome of Russia’s ongoing offensive in eastern Ukraine. Kyiv likely assesses that its military has the potential to push Russian forces back to their pre-February 24 positions and is unlikely to engage in negotiations until that outcome occurs or becomes significantly less likely.
• The Kremlin is increasingly describing the war in Ukraine as a war with NATO to the domestic Russian audience to explain slower-than-intended operations and mounting casualties.
• The Kremlin likely intends to create one or more proxy states in occupied southern Ukraine to cement its military occupation and set conditions to demand permanent control over these regions.
• Russian and Belarusian officials seek to frame Western sanctions as predominantly harming European economies while playing up the efficacy of their sanction-mitigation efforts.
• The Kremlin is failing to deter NATO expansion and failing to disrupt Ukraine's military alignment with the West.
• The Kremlin remains unlikely to use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine in this phase of the war

 

[TheVulture]

Getting back to the sharp end,  here's a Russian convoy that got whacked near Kherson. Definitely 5 vehicles present,  plus a lonesone turret that doesn't look like it came from any of them.  And possibly one or two more dark stains (can't see very well on this screen) that are probably just scorched ground,  but might be thoroughly trashed vehicles.

 

 

[Combatintman]

1 hour ago, Vacillator said:

A sort of related question - we see lots of UA drone footage from steady positions.  Are these drones not being targeted by the RA somehow, or is it that we're just seeing the ones that weren't?

The sensor rotates on many UAV platforms, particularly military-spec ones so the airframe can move while the camera stays slaved to the target.  That said UAVs aren't cutting around at Mach 2, looping the loop and jinking but don't think that a steady picture from the sensor means that the thing isn't moving.

[Battlefront.com]

43 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I agree that the first two are obvious and not much of a change, that third one of “deny Ukraine the Black Sea” is just plain nuts.  That is an over 200km advance that once again they have to take. And then hold while being attacked from both sides.  I mean maybe the RA staff sold it as a good idea but they cannot believe it.

This is why I think it's deliberately in there to do nothing more than be withdrawn as a "concession" at the negotiating table.  Putin usually has a couple of these going into negotiations.  "OK, you compromise on this real thing that really hurts your side, we'll offer you something completely ridiculous in exchange.  That's fair in our minds!"

43 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The Russia “stated aims” in this war have shifted and turned on a dime.  I am not sure I believe this signal as anything more than posturing.  I still think this is all smoke at this point, at least until the RA demonstrates some real gains that it can take and hold.  One operationally decisive outcome in the RA’s favour would be a start.  Right now they appear to be fumbling around like a teenager on prom night striving for paradise by the dashboard lights.

Light bulb just went off about this.  See next post.

43 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

As follow up: if Russia had started with this plan maybe we could be talking business but they spent that high ready force in the last two months. 

They did try, but it would have only worked under the original presumption of no opposition.  As soon as it became clear that wasn't the case, and Mykolaiv proved too tough to tackle, that part of the plan was put back on the shelf.

Steve

[CHEqTRO]

13 minutes ago, Hapless said:

Especially if they're denying Ukraine the Black Sea right now anyway. Why bother trying to grind all the wall to Moldova  when you can play sea-denial?

Mine up the ports, station some subs, supplement with anti-ship missiles and aircraft from Crimea... job's a good'un (with the caveat that the Black Sea Fleet should be able to pull that off). Hence, they could drop the goal of a land corridor to Moldova in negotiations and still retain important long term effects.

What's interesting about this batch of Russian aims is that they pretty much reflect the situation as it is right now, with the notable exception of the Donbass. So, the idea that this is endgame (or at least ceasefire) posturing or a sign of the Russians recognising their limited means seems pretty on the ball to me.

Well, that is now that they are in wartime. In an hypotethical negotiated peace the Russians will have to eventually allow free movement for the merchants, otherwise they would be enacting a blockade, so an act of war. If those territories are controlled by Rusia when the dust settles then Ukraine would lose a long term economic asset, which they hope would bring (rather force) Ukraine closer to Russia (or atleast cripple it for when Round 2 cames along), without having to mantain such blockade. Also, it will allow them to start meddling into Moldava.

Nevertheless, I still think that the plan is to take Ukraine in its entirety eventually, and from there keep on putting pressure into eastern europe (remember all those ultimatums against NATO back in January). This declarations are most likely just meant as internal propaganda, as Odessa is considered by Russians as theirs, and supposedly one of the main cities that had to be liberated. Like I said early, wether they go now against Ukraine or they decide to bite the bullet and wait for another time will most likely be known as Russia mobilizes this May or doesnt. I would be surprised if they intend to keep the war going for longer, but they atleast dont partially mobilize.

[Huba]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Establish land Bridge to Transnistria and cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea - this has not been a publicly stated goal, but obviously it has long been on Russia's want list and they did actively attempt to make it happen.  Unlike the other two, this is total fantasy at this point.

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I agree that the first two are obvious and not much of a change, that third one of “deny Ukraine the Black Sea” is just plain nuts.  That is an over 200km advance that once again they have to take. And then hold while being attacked from both sides.  I mean maybe the RA staff sold it as a good idea but they cannot believe it.

35 minutes ago, Hapless said:

Especially if they're denying Ukraine the Black Sea right now anyway. Why bother trying to grind all the wall to Moldova  when you can play sea-denial?

Mine up the ports, station some subs, supplement with anti-ship missiles and aircraft from Crimea... job's a good'un (with the caveat that the Black Sea Fleet should be able to pull that off). Hence, they could drop the goal of a land corridor to Moldova in negotiations and still retain important long term effects.

What's interesting about this batch of Russian aims is that they pretty much reflect the situation as it is right now, with the notable exception of the Donbass. So, the idea that this is endgame (or at least ceasefire) posturing or a sign of the Russians recognising their limited means seems pretty on the ball to me.

I'd argue that the cutting Ukraine from the Black Sea is already achieved to a large degree (in an economic sense, not the Transnistria landbridge of course), as Russians controlling Nova Kakhovka  gives them full control of the riverine trade, crucial for the grain exports. Closing the lock there "for maintenance" is an economic weapon on par with closing the valves on gas pipeline.

 

 

Edited April 22, 2022 by Huba

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

Getting back to the sharp end,  here's a Russian convoy that got whacked near Kherson. Definitely 5 vehicles present,  plus a lonesone turret that doesn't look like it came from any of them.  And possibly one or two more dark stains (can't see very well on this screen) that are probably just scorched ground,  but might be thoroughly trashed vehicles.

 

 

If the Russians can't even protect a convoy on a road that parallels a rail line in what looks pan flat farm field they just need to quit and go home.

[Taranis]

1 hour ago, akd said:

Said to be 64th (now Guards) MRB (they of Bucha infamy) losses inflicted by UKR 93rd MRB:

https://www.facebook.com/2376998539017818/posts/5188284504555860/?d=n

Did not realize this unit had T-80BVs.

At the start of the invasion, it was stated that the brigade had at least 2 companies of T-80BV and BVM (sorry I can't find the source. Maybe the Order of Battle channel on youtube? )

[Desertor]

Say hi to your mom!

https://twitter.com/lapatina_/status/1517392040409145344?s=20&t=iHeNOLUDM8jTDXhyXeLuew

[Taranis]

29 minutes ago, Vacillator said:

Loving this sort of insight .

Thanks ! Glad you guys find this interesting. 

This is really the strong point of our community, everyone can bring their knowledge and experience and you really get a result of a professional level. Look at all the predictions and analyzes that have been made since the start of the war. Congratulations to everybody !

[The_Capt]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Light bulb just went off about this.  See next post.

In order for this to be anything more than posturing the Russians will need to demonstrate a few things:

- Putin's centers of gravity - Stability of his regime, Russian militaries ability to sustain itself over time and the Russian economies ability to support those first two - would have to be secure.  Everything happening so far has eroded these CoGs and taken the Russian strategic options spaces with them.

- The RA in the field would have to demonstrate actual gains.  I am talking about taking operational objectives and hold them in something that resembles a campaign design that lead to achieving these strategic military ends.  And to do that they would need to re-tool their entire military enterprise, and appointing a single commander (who also has no experience at this level) is not enough.  

- That Russia is somehow influencing Ukrainian CoGs - Unified will to resist, sustain western support and the ability to continue to deny the Russian military it operational and strategic objectives.  The Russian have really failed to do any of this and in some places have actually reinforced them.

My sense is that no matter what the Russians say, this is a race to nibble off enough of the Donbas, keep a land bridge to Crimea to call it a win, establish a puppet government and go home.  I am pretty sure there is no long game in the Russian thinking right now, such as "how do we possibly re-normalize after this?" or "how do we keep our economy functioning in 5 years and not be a Chinese gas station", pretty sure those are problems for next month.   

All war is negotiation, with the opponent, stakeholders, your own people and with the future.  Ukraine's strategy has been crystal clear here, even as it evolves.  Russia's strategy so far is makes no sense, and all seems to hinge on just how big a lie one nation can hold on to.

[Battlefront.com]

Thanks to something The_Capt said, I think I just got an insight into what is going on in Moscow regarding ending this war. 

The original war aims consisted of a list of things Putin wanted.  A military plan (Plan A) was developed that, theoretically, could deliver the full list without violating certain constraints (time and full mobilization).  The most important element of this plan was the assumption that Ukraine would be compelled to surrender.

Plan A failed.

About 2 weeks in Russia realized the original plan was never going to work, but it was unwilling to give up on Putin's wish list.  Therefore, they switched to Plan B -> a terror campaign to convince Ukraine to surrender.  The most important element of this plan was the assumption that Ukraine would be compelled to surrender.

Plan B failed.

A couple more weeks into the war Russia realized that collapse was nearing.  They had to come up with something else fast.

Plan C was to concentrate on taking the rest of the Donbas and ending the war after.  The plan took the overextended forces in the north and brought back to execute the attack on the Donbas, the result of which is all DLPR territory and the destruction of a large chunk of Ukrainian forces.  We're seeing that play out now.  The most important element of this plan is the assumption that at the end of this offensive Ukraine will be compelled to surrender.

Plan C will also fail. 

In short... Russia's Plan C seems to be based on the same process as Plan A and Plan B were.  Think of what you want, come up with a theoretical way to achieve it, and don't allow reality to convince you it's not possible.

Steve

 

[JonS]

42 minutes ago, Hapless said:

Mine up the ports, station some subs, supplement with anti-ship missiles and aircraft from Crimea... job's a good'un

That's all well and good this month, and next, but as soon as peace breaks out that approach is untenable. If your war goal is to turn UKR into a landlocked country it has to survive the peace, which means colouring the coast from Kherson to Odessa red.

[Taranis]

28 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Me too!  Thank you Taranis for the detailed first hand information on this system.  Because it isn't in Black Sea or Shock Force it likely is not as well known to us here as the other stuff.

Steve

You're welcome. It really is one of those high-tech weapons that are easier to explain when someone has used it or worked with it than to find in a huge pile of data found on the internet.

[Vacillator]

2 minutes ago, Taranis said:

You're welcome. It really is one of those high-tech weapons that are easier to explain when someone has used it or worked with it than to find in a huge pile of data found on the internet.

I'm not sure Steve hands out likes, so I've done so.

[The_Capt]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Think of what you want, come up with a theoretical way to achieve it, and don't allow reality to convince you it's not possible.

I think there were some interim steps in there but that pretty much captures it.  I guess it comes down to "want vs reality" and this is all Putin negotiating with Putin while thousands die...yep, checks out based on historical references.

There is a breaking point for the Russians here, the question is "where is it?"

[dan/california]

You know there is an entire game in this modern artillery/drone/counter/counter /counter thing somewhere. Combat Mission, The Big Guns.

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, JonS said:

That's all well and good this month, and next, but as soon as peace breaks out that approach is untenable. If your war goal is to turn UKR into a landlocked country it has to survive the peace, which means colouring the coast from Kherson to Odessa red.

It will untenable to keep Ukrainian grain off the world market, period. Indeed getting Ukraines crop in this year is one the strongest reasons for NATO to get in now, today. The secondary casualties from hunger in the third world are going to surpass the casualties from the fighting.

[sross112]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Rare Russian equipment - BMP-1AM "Basurmanin" in Kupyansk, Kharkiv oblast

BMP-1AM is BMP-1P with weapon module from BTR-82A. Such vehicles since 2021 were brought to service for units of Eastern military district, where remained enough BMP-1. Probably this BMP-1AM belongs to one of 10 BTGs of 5th CAA, which were moved to Ulraine from Far East three weeks ago.

Has anyone been keeping up with RA reinforcements? I've heard batches of 10, 3 and 4 for a total of 17 BTG's since their Kyiv operation crashed but not sure if that is it.

[Taranis]

59 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

Was looking on Wikipedia, I was curios as to whether any model of T-80 had equipped a Thermal sight. As we learned in threads posted to the CMCW subforum, the Soviets never fielded real thermal sights. So none of the 1980s standard -80s have one. According to Wiki the -80BVM has the same suite of sights as the -90A? Not sure, it was unclear. But, more interestingly, this pushed me to check the -90 page just for a refresher on what the -90 was rolling:

And then:

If you wondering, Thales Optronique is a French company. The Wiki article (and who knows how accurate it is) suggests later that the Catherine FC incorporates a number of western made components, probably including chips. Now apparently Russia tested and green lit a domestic version (one wonders how different from the Catherine) called the IRBIS-K. This was done between 2016 and 2018, probably in response to western arms sanctions. BUT! one wonders what the yearly production rate on those domestic models are and how big of a priority its been to replace the French sights with Russian made, vs. just putting domestic production on new tanks. I would guess, just my own assumption here, that the reserve & non-elite units would still be running the French designed equipment. 

This has interesting implications for all those reserve tanks, even if someone didn't steal the thermal imager or cannibalize its parts after 2014, it ought to be very difficult to refurbish any of this equipment without fresh supplies of French components. More interestingly, to me, was that this deal would have went forward in the first place. It dovetails well with what some were posting this morning about the Iskander and US sourced components. What would have been the state of the Russian Army had the west not placed profits above security interests and refused to collaborate with Russia on arms designs.... 

About the thermal sight :