Exit a HT over the side? Common?

[Destraex1]

Was it more common to exit a half track over the sides or out the back?

Does anybody have any photos in particular of panzer grenadiers jumping over the sides of a half track?

[George MC]

[Destraex1]

Often those training videos are more for the camera than anything else.

But cool vid thx

[George MC]

Yup it's a training video for sure. At this stage in the war SPW attacking forward like that would more likely result in lot's of blazing SPW as they hit the Soviet PAK, More common method of exciting was before making contact with the enemy So guess it was less of an issue - I would imagine given the size of the crew compratment and the number of men inside that the rear door area would possibly be used more for storage.

[Thomm]

Flammgruppe for the Win!

The animation in the end, was that Close Combat on a Zuse computer?

More common method of exciting was before making contact with the enemy.

Good typo, by the way!

Best regards,

Thomm

[Thomm]

Was it more common to exit a half track over the sides or out the back?

I guess they would hit their head when jumping out of the rear of a MOVING half-track, plus potentially being hit by the swinging (heavy?) doors.

I am sure it all depended on the situation: moving/still, direction to enemy, etc.

Best regards,

Thomm

[snake_eye]

Does not mind if it is a German or US HT, jumping over the side with all the gear is not practical. Unless the HT is on the verge of blowing up and or the rear exit is under fire and that you have to get out anyway. In over situation, jumping over might get you a minor injury to a leg and or an ankle, if not worst. Besides the height you are jumping off from is a bit more than 2 meters. You have to clear the edge of the HT upper side, propels yourself outside without having one of your gear attachment caught. That means standing up on the inside bench, grabbing the upper side this one hand (the other has the rifle) and threw yourself outside, with the legs clearing barely the side (same as jumping over a small wooden fence). You can't put one leg on the upper side, raise yourself, have the other one rejoin and then jump. If you do so, that will end in a crash either inside and or outside. Let you imagine the guy trying to get in order his gear which has crashed all around.

For my part I have always preferred the back door of the US HT. I try it once in a motor pool over the side, climbing down in no hurry with no gear and got my jacket caught in an exterior attachment and had to freeze unless I wanted it tear off.

[jbmtintin]

Another example...

[snake_eye]

Another example...

That very well done 251/1 display better than words the way to exit the HT. If you look at the German training movie you will see the Grenadier crashing down or losing their equilibrium once on the ground and they were not under fire !

[Crinius]

Common practice was to dismount over the side (Bordwand). This was drilled during training.

Normaly the Panzergrenadiere dismounted over the side which was not exposed to the enemy, leeward. It was noticed that dismounting was a moment of great vulnerarbility and thats why dismounting over the Bordwand was standard as it was much faster for the whole Gruppe than dismounting through the backdoor. But mounting was also noticed as beeing extremely dangerous. During dismount the MG was required to suppress the enemy. But notice that Panzergrenadiere only fought dismounted when there was no other way e.g. Towns, Woods etc. Panzergrenadiere fought as long as possible mounted and as long as necessary dismounted. Thats the main difference to Allied Mechanized troops which prefered to fight dismounted.

[DLaurier]

Riiigghhhtttt.... I'm gonna jump up into a storm of bullets, then plunge down to the ground over 2 metres below... and I'm gonna do this wearing 30 kilos of gear???????????

I dunno what they taught you at Potsdam, but I'm parking my arse next to the rear door.

When that order to dismount comes, I just pull the handle, let gravity open the doors, and roll out into that nice little safe zone at the back.

[winkelried]

Riiigghhhtttt.... I'm gonna jump up into a storm of bullets, then plunge down to the ground over 2 metres below... and I'm gonna do this wearing 30 kilos of gear???????????

I dunno what they taught you at Potsdam, but I'm parking my arse next to the rear door.

When that order to dismount comes, I just pull the handle, let gravity open the doors, and roll out into that nice little safe zone at the back.

I don't think the PG carried 30kgs into battle. Probably just the personal weapon or the LMG 34/42 (which weighted 10 kgs).

Although I have my own reasons to be sceptical. The 11. Panzerdivision had almost its full complement of SPW when it arrived at Mesimieux on 1. September 44 after 2 weeks of intense fighting it seems. Can't imagine how they would have had such low losses when they had driven into battle on the SPW - they lost 50% of their Panthers, 20% of their Pz IV, 1/3 of their Marders and 50% of their Hummels (!). But if there is a field manual or so I would be immediately convinced.

[winkelried]

aah. in the same timeframe the division lost 1'668 men. most of them PGs it seems (the division had 4 truck borne PG batallions and 1 armored PG batallion). And a recon batallion with a 250 and at least one 251 borne company.

[Wicky]

http://www.ww2incolor.com/german/_14_+Panzergrenadiers+and+their+SdKfz-251+half-track.html

[MikeyD]

Lets remember the US M2A1 HT in the game doesn't have a rear door so its either over the side or awkwardly file out through the front cab doors. M2s did have a projecting step at the back so the plunge wasn't necessarily all the way to the ground. Any HT, the drop to the ground wouldn't be as far as dropping off a Panther or Sherman hulltop, for example. I suspect in normal circumstances soldiers would exit 'normally', but if the armor's holed and the fuel tank is spraying gas into the interior you're going over the side!

[snake_eye]

German reports about the use of the Sd Kfz /251/1 Ausf D have clearly shown that the SPW had difficulties following tanks, specially the Panthers in the battles fought against the Russians on muddy and or snow grounds.

Besides the SPW did not offered the degree of protection that was thought to be sufficient to protect its load of Panzer Grenadiers. That’s why the Heereswaffenamt asked, starting in October 1943 a study for a fully tracked replacement. MAN, Auto-Union, CKD and BMM were approached. The objective was to start production for late 1944

The first project shown by Auto-Union gets a pre order.Man is asked to deliver its project. That one looks like a small Panther and becomes known as the Kätzchen (kitten).

All projects were made using the PZ 38 frame.

The diesel engine was located at the rear and was to give a 600 kilometers range. The forward slope armor was 50mm thick and 30 mm on the sides.

The projects, however were retarded and the Kätzchen prototypes were last seen in Tchekoslovakia in May 1945. One example seems to have been seized by the US forces.

Here after, are the not so well know pictures of the CKD 2nd design and drawings of the CKD and MAN project. The MAN “Kätzchen” had overlapping wheels like the Panther tank.

Exit was done by the rear door located on the left.

[Crinius]

Theres a nice article about IFV´s here

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-1.html

[RockinHarry]

I´d say unboarding procedure mostly was dictated by tactical situation. If speed and exploitation of a fortunate tactical situation was essential (the YT training video shows such) then unboarding over side walls would have had benefits. Guess that happened more oftenly in the 1941-43 period, when germans had yet opportunities to attack with halfway sufficiently equipped and experienced Panzergrenadier units. This would be mostly short range objectives, seizure of lightly to non defended key terrain, like bridges, heights and such. Or as demonstrated in the YT training video, the break in to an enemy position where defenders are already heavily supressed and lack means of effective AT weapons. In 1944-45 there were surely less opportunities for germans to apply aggressive Panzergrenadier tactics in the face of well equipped allied troops. Also with germans having lost most to all of their experienced Panzergrenadier infantry in the preceding war years, lack of Schutzenpanzers, fuel ect. it´s more likely that germans used their remaining assets more carefully generally. Also depended upon individual leader aggressiveness and tactical skill.

So I´d say unboarding via rear door was the more common procedure under 1944-45 battle conditions for germans, unless experienced, aggressive leaders and troops were involved and short range battle situations demand speed and quick exploitation.

[winkelried]

In 1944-45 there were surely less opportunities for germans to apply aggressive Panzergrenadier tactics in the face of well equipped allied troops. Also with germans having lost most to all of their experienced Panzergrenadier infantry in the preceding war years, lack of Schutzenpanzers, fuel ect. it´s more likely that germans used their remaining assets more carefully generally.

I am not so sure about the lack of SPW - in 1943 4'300 Sd Kfz 251s were built and in 1944 7'800 (although I have no data on the losses) this would have been enough to equip something between 50 and 75 panzer divisions in 1944.

Deployment, fuel and quality of the troops I agree. Especially after Bagration and Cobra.

[YankeeDog]

I am not so sure about the lack of SPW - in 1943 4'300 Sd Kfz 251s were built and in 1944 7'800 (although I have no data on the losses) this would have been enough to equip something between 50 and 75 panzer divisions in 1944.

Deployment, fuel and quality of the troops I agree. Especially after Bagration and Cobra.

Can't speak for the entire German army in 1944, but the figures for the number of SPWs in the OOBs of the divisions actually deployed to Normandy are available. I don't have them in front of me ATM, but if I am recalling them correctly, generally speaking the PDs in Normandy didn't have anywhere near their full, theoretical TOE allotment of SPWs, and this only got worse once the divisions had been in theater for a week or two and wear and tear, losses to allied air interdiction, etc. began to take their toll.

[winkelried]

Can't speak for the entire German army in 1944, but the figures for the number of SPWs in the OOBs of the divisions actually deployed to Normandy are available. I don't have them in front of me ATM, but if I am recalling them correctly, generally speaking the PDs in Normandy didn't have anywhere near their full, theoretical TOE allotment of SPWs, and this only got worse once the divisions had been in theater for a week or two and wear and tear, losses to allied air interdiction, etc. began to take their toll.

checking a few:

2. PD, 21. PD and PzLehr each had two armored PG Bn at full strength (incl approx 500 SPW for each division),

116. PD had 163 SPW (which is a bit low),

1.SS PD had 260 SPW on 1 July,

2. SS PD had 0 in May and 249 SPW in July,

9. SS PD was seriousely understrength (ca 65%) as was 10. SS PD (ca 70%) (but with reasonable levels of SPWs it seems). Losses for July were 10-12 SPW for each division.

12 SS PD had 333 SPWs

17. SS PGD had 0 SPWs

It seems to me that the losses of SPWs were at least parallel to the overall losses the divisions took if not smaller.

Where all divisions had shortages was with cross-country wheeled vehicles and vehicles in general.

Maybe you have better data.

[winkelried]

on the losses

21.PD lost 12 SPW in I/PG Rgt 125 in July going from 97 to 85 and another 13 in I/PG Rgt 192 going from 67 to 54 (after loosing 27 in June).

Panzer Lehr lost 82 SPW in June which is 20% of its effective compared to 25% of the the Panthers lost. End of July the division still had 445 SPWs.

[RockinHarry]

I am not so sure about the lack of SPW - in 1943 4'300 Sd Kfz 251s were built and in 1944 7'800 (although I have no data on the losses) this would have been enough to equip something between 50 and 75 panzer divisions in 1944.

Deployment, fuel and quality of the troops I agree. Especially after Bagration and Cobra.

Highest available number of around 10.000 surprisingly was in september 1944, but the same source said only 20% of needed were in the frontline units. Sure, losses were always high and there were possibly 30-40% in maintanance and depots, as was with other german armor usually.

[RockinHarry]

on the losses

21.PD lost 12 SPW in I/PG Rgt 125 in July going from 97 to 85 and another 13 in I/PG Rgt 192 going from 67 to 54 (after loosing 27 in June).

Panzer Lehr lost 82 SPW in June which is 20% of its effective compared to 25% of the the Panthers lost. End of July the division still had 445 SPWs.

That indicates that most were held back, since these can´t be used effectively in normandy hedgerow combat. Panzer Lehr already lost many of the APCs on the march to the frontlines due to heavy air attacks.

[Destraex1]

hmmm. Horses for courses then.