Grimtechnique

2) The entire tank system infantry system is too damn fragile.  Even the tank infantryman itself is pretty fragile.  The thing need only take a few  one sub-munition hits and one can knock out  hurt the engine the heart, or the gun an arm, or the track a leg.  Then all of the support systems from forward repair hospitals to recovery, to logistical support are also heavy, hot and easily spotted.  So now one has to bubble wrap that entire system just to keep the tank infantry in motion - even assuming away all the threats to the tank infantryman itself.  I am pretty sure our gas trucks infantrymen burn die as well as Russian ones.

No it wasn’t and I don’t think you need to.  It is a stupid narrative proposed either by opportunists or fools.  The time for “staring” was between 2014 and 2022 and we failed on that at every turn across the entire political spectrum.  The reasons were pretty simple - you can’t just stare, you have to be ready to back it up, and no one in the US or entire western world was going to do that for Ukraine.  The costs were simply too high on too many levels. This entire post-crisis “tough guy” narrative is a pretty oblivious ploy to try and pin the blame for this war on one side or another.  We all watched Russia doing dirty in the region and basically did nothing…in some cases we made it worse.
”But air power!”  Ok dingus, how much do you think positioning that amount of AirPower in the region would have cost?  Air power is not a magic wand, it is a massive military capability one has to surge, stage and keep at readiness levels, costing billions to do so over the timescales the “staring” would have occurred.  The bill for massive overmatch of the Russian air forces would have been (and frankly still is) very high.  Let alone if we really had to do it, and completely ignore escalation risks. Same people would be quacking about “ridiculous government spending in Ukraine” that is would have taken to actually set up “staring” - unless it was their guy in charge, which is a whole other problem.
 One is not an expert “strategist” because you can regurgitate some spin-lines dreamt up by a political ad agency. You are fool being played because it is so much easier to let someone else do all that hard thinking and make this whole complicated world so simple.  And before anyone weighs on on left or right…both sides do it so let’s just not get into that.  Best thing you can do for yourself is get a library card, read a lot of history and a wide range of political sciences/military affairs.  Do the hard work for yourself.  

I agree in general terms with this analysis although a couple points to make are:
1) In regards to spent fuel pools, yes, they have additional means of cooling, but so did Fukushima until the you know what hit the fan. So postulating what might or might not be operational or usable after some sabotage or battle damage is really being hopeful.
2) Yes, the Fukushima containments were somewhat less robust, but there was also an inner containment which was quite robust. Those failed in varying degrees.
3) The explosions seen at Fukushima were from hydrogen buildup in the containments. All plants have "sparklers" for lack of a better term, that will safely burn off excess H2 (>4% in air is explosive if I remember right, >~95% is not oddly, because not enough O2 for combustion!). Unfortunately the sparklers at Fukushima were of an older design, due to be replaced, and instead of safely burning the H2, they caused the explosions. (Rolls-Royce evaluation at the time). I believe worldwide, new systems have been put in to safely burn. Why is this important? That's where the spent fuel pools were at Fukushima, and the explosion and subsequent fire is what caused aerosol/particulate plumes of fission products, so the result of a mechanical explosion COULD have wider consequences (which the article doesn't mention or explore). Again however, though, the containment here is more robust.
4) Side note - USSR stated that the RBMK reactors did not NEED a containment because their strict operating procedures and extensive training would preclude an accident. The root cause of the accident, regardless of the design, were multiple failures to follow operating procedures, performing an unapproved test, and the complete failure of the operators to understand what was happening in order to take the proper steps. Everything they did made it worse.   We were taught "Believe your indications, because they are all you have. If you have an indication of a problem, acting on that will only put the plant in a more safe condition"  They can complain later about wasting time or money, but my response was always. "I was there. I had the watch. My responsibility. My decision."  They cannot argue with this. Naval Reactors will back that 100%, even if you get grief from your management. THIS is the difference between our power plants and the Russians, more so than the design. As a senior Naval Reactors officer said to us once - "and uncompromising attitude toward safety"   which in our terms meant. "When in doubt, shut it down"
Bit of a ramble on that 4) but bottom line, that article is a reasonable summary, with some added explanation from me, for those who like that sort of thing.

Dave

Well that is what a minefield breaching operation going very wrong looks like.  
Before everyone freaks out the vehicles that kept pushing are supposed to do that.  Backing out is just asking to die and impossible to do in column, he saw the RA prove this over and over again.  If your breaching vehicle takes a hit - and that appears to be the Leo, you keep pushing even if it means taking casualties.  We would do the exact same thing.  I mean what are the options?  Stop, wait for help or talk things over while the enemy kills you inside a minefield?  Back out along the one cleared path…while the enemy kills you in a minefield?  Nope you push.  Difference between the UA and the RA is that the Leo has a mine plow on the front (which is odd, that is the deep end of clearance, they should be sticking with rollers).  The RA was just straight pushing.
What is interesting is again the lack of any real RA artillery.  No big craters or impact marks.  Vehicles look like they took mobility hits (except that one) and the crews bailed and ran.  When we do these ops each Combat Team would do two breaches and accept that one is going to die.  This is the video from the failed one.
We said this from the start - western kit does not come with magic wizard shields that allow them to float above the ground and drive their enemies before them.  They blow up just the same as Russian kit.  We were always going to see this, and we will likely see more.  Russian info sphere is going to push out any and all of these that it can.  So buckle in and put your helmets on.

@chuckdyke seriously your behaviour is wild. Accusing others of holding putin sentiments for stating what is well regarded as historical orthodoxy in regards to the russian will to keep on fighting despite horrendous losses i think actually should garner some warning from the admins here.
You are poisoning the well imo and should probably take some time to chill out before posting again.

So if I disagree with your above post,  pointing out the obvious mistakes with links,  I'll be a Putin shill? 

@chuckdyke seriously your behaviour is wild. Accusing others of holding putin sentiments for stating what is well regarded as historical orthodoxy in regards to the russian will to keep on fighting despite horrendous losses i think actually should garner some warning from the admins here.
You are poisoning the well imo and should probably take some time to chill out before posting again.

@chuckdyke seriously your behaviour is wild. Accusing others of holding putin sentiments for stating what is well regarded as historical orthodoxy in regards to the russian will to keep on fighting despite horrendous losses i think actually should garner some warning from the admins here.
You are poisoning the well imo and should probably take some time to chill out before posting again.

@chuckdyke seriously your behaviour is wild. Accusing others of holding putin sentiments for stating what is well regarded as historical orthodoxy in regards to the russian will to keep on fighting despite horrendous losses i think actually should garner some warning from the admins here.
You are poisoning the well imo and should probably take some time to chill out before posting again.

@chuckdyke seriously your behaviour is wild. Accusing others of holding putin sentiments for stating what is well regarded as historical orthodoxy in regards to the russian will to keep on fighting despite horrendous losses i think actually should garner some warning from the admins here.
You are poisoning the well imo and should probably take some time to chill out before posting again.

@chuckdyke seriously your behaviour is wild. Accusing others of holding putin sentiments for stating what is well regarded as historical orthodoxy in regards to the russian will to keep on fighting despite horrendous losses i think actually should garner some warning from the admins here.
You are poisoning the well imo and should probably take some time to chill out before posting again.

@chuckdyke seriously your behaviour is wild. Accusing others of holding putin sentiments for stating what is well regarded as historical orthodoxy in regards to the russian will to keep on fighting despite horrendous losses i think actually should garner some warning from the admins here.
You are poisoning the well imo and should probably take some time to chill out before posting again.

@chuckdyke seriously your behaviour is wild. Accusing others of holding putin sentiments for stating what is well regarded as historical orthodoxy in regards to the russian will to keep on fighting despite horrendous losses i think actually should garner some warning from the admins here.
You are poisoning the well imo and should probably take some time to chill out before posting again.

@chuckdyke seriously your behaviour is wild. Accusing others of holding putin sentiments for stating what is well regarded as historical orthodoxy in regards to the russian will to keep on fighting despite horrendous losses i think actually should garner some warning from the admins here.
You are poisoning the well imo and should probably take some time to chill out before posting again.

@chuckdyke seriously your behaviour is wild. Accusing others of holding putin sentiments for stating what is well regarded as historical orthodoxy in regards to the russian will to keep on fighting despite horrendous losses i think actually should garner some warning from the admins here.
You are poisoning the well imo and should probably take some time to chill out before posting again.

So, my quick 2p on the Polish Missile Incident while we wait for more facts to come out:

On the one hand, it seems likely that it was an accident, or at least unintentional (which is not quite the same thing). Missiles can do funny things in flight- I don't think it's unreasonable to think that a Russian cruise missile got lost somehow, that a Ukrainian air defence missile missed it's target and keep going west, or that a Russian missile was damaged by a Ukrainian one and went off course.

We've got some spectacular footage of a missile in Luhansk deciding to do a 180 and return itself to sender- it's not a stretch to think that one might be damaged or off by a small error when fired and end up miles off target.

On the other hand... it seems like there's a lot of potential deniability to this and thus uncertainty. The fact that missiles malfunction and get lost, the fact that Russia and Ukraine both use similar weapons, the fact that the missile hit a random location in Poland rather than a specific target... this is all leads to a pretty murky picture (at least, right now).

Does that deniability and murkiness make it more likely that it's actually some kind of Russian signalling attempt? The timing is interesting- NATO leaders are split between Europe and Bali because of the G19 (those in Indonesia, including Biden having to be roused at stupid o'clock over there to be briefed) and the Russians have just suffered a significant set-back at Kherson.

They certainly blew the Nordstream pipeline after the Kharkiv Offensive took off in what was almost certainly a signalling attempt... that obviously did not warn NATO off, so are the Russians taking a step up the escalation ladder? Just drop a missile somewhere on the Polish border at random- enough to pass off as a malfunction, or ideally a Ukrainian error- but also enough to say "Look guys, we can hit the cross-border supply routes. You've been warned."

Signalling? Coincidences? Or the unfortunate but natural result of firing a hundred cruise missiles at Ukraine? Of course, it stands to reason that it could be both, with the risk of missile malfunction generating this kind of incident accepted as an opportunity to send a signal.

But, too early to know yet. We'll see.

You could try to be optimistic and happy about what @danfrodo and @Billy Ringo said above and stop trying to drag the topic back down into hateful US politics.   Give it a try.    

Hey thought i'd jump on this point, its because the human mind is very good at ignoring stuff that isnt important to it, an ai will constantly have the streams of data and as you say become overloaded.
This all comes into the pattern recognition capability of the human mind and its capabality to on the fly 'zone out' things experience tells it is unimportant.
Just my two cents, been lurking for quite a while and thought theres something I think I have insight into. Appreciate all the analysis and info you guys are collating.

It's important to distinguish US Cavalry from that of other nations. Where the typical roles of Cavalry are screening, reconnaissance and exploitation, US Cavalry have a fourth role, that of economy of force missions (i.e., using them as a more conventional force, when the need arises). That's almost unique to the US, so it's not a "normal" capability in broader terms.

Some of the typical Cavalry roles are indeed above CM scale, and will therefore play a role in scenario design. Many of the missions in CMCW use Cavalry units, because they're likely to be first to the fight in a Fulda Gap scenario.

Nevertheless, *all* of the cavalry roles are also important on the scale of a CM battlefield, and that would be true regardless of equipment or time period.

To understand reconnaissance units in general, it's important to understand what they're for. Most reconnaissance units are equipped with fast vehicles and good optics - whether that's just a jeep, a pair of binoculars and a radio, the large open windows of the BRDM giving excellent vision whilst under cover of armour, or sophisticated suites of thermal optics and satellite communications.

Any armament they have is often secondary, but it's typically designed to deal with the threats they are likely to encounter - that of other reconnaissance units.

The British Scimitar is a great example of a reconnaissance vehicle. A company-sized force might have a pair of them in the Cold War, and this pair would roam ahead of the formation, possibly dismounting to spot when appropriate.

The job of this pair would be to screen - get advanced warning of the incoming enemy, and to do so in positions which do not give away their position to the enemy. They would do this by screening forward of the friendly positions, using their speed to get well forward.

Then, the first enemy they would be likely to see in this context would be a Soviet recon platoon - perhaps three BMPs. In this situation, the 30mm Rarden is in it's element, and two Scimitars fighting from successive hull down positions are a serious overmatch for three BMPs. 

So consider this scenario from the perspective of the Soviet player. They've sent forward their recon platoon, with the hope of finding the enemy position. Instead, a pair of Scimitars has engaged them from a position entirely unrelated to their defensive lines, and further has destroyed their recon platoon without giving anything more away.

That means that the only option for the Soviet player would be to turn their CRP from a force that's creating the conditions for the main body to operate - perhaps seizing key terrain or starting to shape the battlefield with artillery - and instead has been relegated to a probing force, slowing inching their way forwards without the information that the recon platoon should have provided.

This tiny screening asset has just had an outsized impact on the way this entire battle will unfold.

The "how" of Recon is better described by Bil than me (https://battledrill.blogspot.com/2014/01/reconnaissance.html), but there are two fundamentally different approaches to how you employ intelligence to shape your course of action. One is that you're relying on recon assets to form the plan - the entire early portion of the battle will be led by those assets, and you're intending to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy before you make decisions. This is the safer, more flexible option, but it's also very slow. It also represents the typical approach that a NATO force might employ in most situations. The latter method is that you lean heavily on your terrain and enemy analysis, and use recon elements in a much simpler role - to firm up that picture. Typically these would roam ahead of your force as per the Soviet example above, with the much simpler goal of working out where the enemy are. This is a lot more dangerous, but it's significantly faster, and it's therefore the approach that the Soviet armies should be using in CMCW.

Neither is "recon by death", although both obviously involve accepting some risk. Sometimes knowing where the enemy aren't is more important than knowing where the enemy are, and making sure that a route or a terrain feature is clear from enemy can be equally or more important than actually seeing them.

In what possible context did you think this was about Quick Battle points?

All points-buy systems are bad, and CM's is no different - typically they're a least-worst option for design. If you're going to shift the goalposts to discussing the formations in QB efficiency terms then sure, only a minority of possible units and formations and unit are actually going to be worth taking, this is why they're bad. 
Quick battle points have no influence or meaning on the CM model, campaigns, scenarios or any PBEM which are outside of the context of Quick Battles. That might be the only thing that matters to you, but it's a minority of what CM actually is.

The servers are back up if anyone is waiting.