Centurian52

It's annoyingly hard to find exact details on upgrades to the Chieftain, probably because there were lots of them and it was a very gradual process across the entire fleet:
In 1975 all British Army earlier Marks of tanks except Mark 1s were upgraded to Chieftain Mk.5 standard as part of the 1975 "Totem Pole" programme. "Exercise Totem Pole" was carried out in six-to-nine phases depending on the Mark of vehicle being modified (Chieftain Mk.5's already had some of the required changes incorporated at the factory) between 1975 and 1979 and included fitment of the Marconi Improved Fire Control System (IFCS), replacement of the searchlight with the Barr & Stroud Thermal Observation Gunnery System (TOGS), along with modifications for using FSAPDS ammunition. Upon completion of each phase the vehicle received an additional suffix to the designation, e.g., "Chieftain Mk.3/S(Y)2" denoting a Mark 3/S having completed the first three phases of "Totem Pole". including addition of Clansman radios, fitting of TLS, fitment of Muzzle Reference System (MRS) upon replacement of L11A3 barrel with L11A5 barrel, and fitment of 750 hp L60 Mark 8A. These vehicles were re-designated Chieftain Mk's.6 to Mk.8. (Wiki)
The number of potential variants is bewildering, to say the least. Note the modifications for using finned amunition already in the 70s while the ammunition but not purchased until well into the 80s for unknown reasons. 
The big outstanding issue is the laser which was fitted to some Chieftains before 1975 but on the same time it isn't clear if it was part of the Totem Pole package (it seems not). Also note that the Chieftain has some other (unique?) things going for it in the gunnery department during the game's time period, like compensation for bore deformation.
As for protection it's again bewildering, with some sources claming the Chieftain was extremely well protected (presumaby because of the extreme armour slope and low profile for a Western tank) while others even claim it was poor. Unlike with the gunnery there were no significant armour upgrades until Stillbrew in the 80s.
Anyway, Battlefront say they have good British sources so I'm sure this will be cleared up.

How to create a Combat Mission scenario AI Plan
Part 2 – Creating a basic AI Plan: the Set-Up
Introduction
This video series is aimed at those totally and utterly new to creating scenario AI Plans for the Battlefront Combat Mission game series. 
In Part 2 I’ll describe, and show you how, allocate units to AI Groups, select an AI Plan, and deploy units in the AI Plan set-up, and how to create variable set-ups with units in something approaching a tactical formation.
AI Plan Core concepts 
Allocating units to AI groups
Which AI Plan? 
The Set-Up 
Using Map Zones to Create Tactical Formations - vehicles
Checking a Variable Set-up in an AI Plan
Using Map Zones to Create Tactical Formations - infantry
Using Map Zones to Create Tactical Formations – key considerations
Using Facing Zones
 

Not in the near future, no. I was one of the ones specifically suggesting that Korea would be the logical place to go next after Downfall, until Steve stepped in and said it wasn't happening.
As to why, mainly it comes down to priorities. They're a small team that can only do so much at once*. Given infinite time I'm sure they'll eventually get around to covering every single real and hypothetical war in human history. But infinite time hasn't passed yet.
*And I should clarify what I mean by "small". Most people here know that Battlefront is a small company, but I don't think very many appreciate how small. I work for a "small" company with less than 200 employees. Battlefront isn't small like my company is small. I remember Steve saying at one point that Battlefront has about half a dozen employees. Barely more people than you could count on one hand. And somehow this small handful of people has managed to bring us the most realistic tactical wargame of all time. And, while they don't release sales or budget information, I get the distinct impression that they've basically been working with a shoestring budget this whole time. It's hard to overstate just how impressive of an accomplishment Combat Mission really is.

Not in the near future, no. I was one of the ones specifically suggesting that Korea would be the logical place to go next after Downfall, until Steve stepped in and said it wasn't happening.
As to why, mainly it comes down to priorities. They're a small team that can only do so much at once*. Given infinite time I'm sure they'll eventually get around to covering every single real and hypothetical war in human history. But infinite time hasn't passed yet.
*And I should clarify what I mean by "small". Most people here know that Battlefront is a small company, but I don't think very many appreciate how small. I work for a "small" company with less than 200 employees. Battlefront isn't small like my company is small. I remember Steve saying at one point that Battlefront has about half a dozen employees. Barely more people than you could count on one hand. And somehow this small handful of people has managed to bring us the most realistic tactical wargame of all time. And, while they don't release sales or budget information, I get the distinct impression that they've basically been working with a shoestring budget this whole time. It's hard to overstate just how impressive of an accomplishment Combat Mission really is.

Yeah hopefully they get it sorted soon-ish.  Joys of having a forum with 20 years worth of content... LOL

I'm not authorized to give any actual bones. But having recently peaked at the bone factory I can say that they're hard at work. I think most of the signs of progress that can actually be presented as something visual (things you can take a screenshot of to show off on a forum) generally come fairly late in the overall process. 

Hmmm, although I 'signed up' for the discord I have not been on it since.  Perhaps I should give it a go and defend the best game ever made.  Fanboi, me 😉?

I'm not authorized to give any actual bones. But having recently peaked at the bone factory I can say that they're hard at work. I think most of the signs of progress that can actually be presented as something visual (things you can take a screenshot of to show off on a forum) generally come fairly late in the overall process. 

Leaving aside the question of the conditions for the applicability of one or another method, let us note that none of them provides for a long walk at full height ("sticking") in front of an enemy trench, and even going in a crowd. 19/
The translation is a little unclear here. Markin laments that no Field Manual (RU or NATO) stipulates that the attack group should stick around at the front of the trench as an unorganized blob. Aside from psychological (fear) and organizational issues (delays), there are practical reasons to do so.
The majority of firefights end when one side decides they've had enough or runs out of ammunition. So, it is possible to outlast the enemy just by sticking around. Second, getting into the trench is dangerous. Your situation awareness suffers and usually trench is already pre-registered. Finally, advancing forward beyond the trench is dangerous as well; rear areas outside of the trenches are mined deliberately to keep assault force inside the pre-registered trench.
As you can see, sticking around is not as bad as you may think (Markin fails to realize it). 
[Skipping not very useful part] 
If trenches are not almost completely covered from above (and there are simply not enough materials, as well as time and effort resources to do so), those in such a trench will be knocked out rather quickly. 44/
It is quite problematic to return to the practice of canopies over trenches, which was practised in the First World War, precisely because of the lack of resources in the broad sense of the word for their construction. 45/
In addition, it was noted as early as the early 20th century that canopies interfered with the use of trenches as a starting point for attacks, limiting their usefulness. Canopies were subsequently abandoned. 46/
Interesting problem. A trench that is only partially covered with overhead cover is not protected from drops. Drone will just drop the gift where the cover ends, blasting soldiers with shrapnel from the side. You can cover the whole trench, but your situation awareness will be poor, and it is impractical to send so much material to the front lines. Also, following artillery fire, debris from the cover tends to clog the trench.
In the main document, he suggests doing what UKR do. You dig up a small branch as an individual firing post. Then, cover the small branch and a portion of the main trench that intersects with it. Even if a drone drops anything into the main trench, the soldier inside the branch is behind the corner and will be unaffected. 
[Skipping not very useful part] 
3) The next important factor is the effectiveness of preparatory artillery fire through fire correction by UAVs, the ability for real-time correction of small arms, grenade launchers and small-calibre mortars at individual defensive positions (firing cells/embrasures) using… 61/
…UAVs, which multiplies the probability of knocking out the most significant firepower of the defenders, as well as the use of UAV ammunition drop systems in preparation for and support of an attack. 62/
As a result of the impact of these factors, the defenders, who are initially few in number due to the thinness of the formations inherent in the current conflict, are knocked out a significant number of soldiers and firepower for a given defensive position. 65/
and few next quotes
I will paraphrase these statements based on the main document description. 
Infantry in forward positions will most likely be significantly reduced owing to dispersion and attrition. Anything (including crew-served weapons) and anybody outside of the shelters will most likely be destroyed/killed by drone-adjusted artillery/drone drops/FPVs by the preparatory fires. As a result, the defender will most likely have to defend the position with substantially fewer soldiers than he would normally expect (literally 3-4 soldiers for a platoon sized strongpoint). In this situation, the majority of standard techniques, such oblique fire or throwing grenades in a volley, won't be effective. Now I'll compile some Markin's recommendations from the article/tweets (I adjusted it for better readability) 
 

Part 1 
Let me comment on it as I have read and analyzed Markin Tactics work. Please keep in mind that what I am writing below is not Markin words. This is my subjective impression/analysis based on better description from the main document.
1) in the immediate vicinity of the attacked trenches, soldiers of the attacking side move almost at full height at a slow (!) pace, often freezing (!) in place to fire 3-7 meters from the enemy trench. 
The vast majority of the assault occur across broken ground covered in various plants, obstacles, and debris. Most of the time firefights are short, small-scale ambushes that can only be survived by paying close attention to your surroundings. 
Standing provides you better situational awareness Slowly going forward permits you to spot the threats in advance If you see something (noise, slight movement, or due to a cue from the drone operator), you shoot at the precise suspected area to confuse enemy soldier, encourage him to retreat, or compel him to expose himself by firing back Artillery is not a concern because the majority of assault are intended to take place during short periods when defender's artillery support is unavailable. Supporting fire from heavy infantry weapons or other units, as well as everything else you take for granted while practicing textbook defense, is also not an issue. Because the majority of firefights occur in so-called gray zones. There are no traditional defenses there because anything larger and slower than infantryman with personal weapon is rather quickly destroyed by drone-adjusted artillery or FPVs. Only small groups of AK/PKM/RPG-armed troops can survive there, spending the majority of their time in makeshift dugouts and underground shelters.
I exaggerate slightly since situations on the frontline vary based on local conditions and overall unit competency. But I hope you got the point.
When stopping their movement, they do not always move to the "lying down" position in the immediate vicinity of the enemy trenches, often taking the "kneeling" or "kneeling" position or remaining in the "standing" position, barely ducking down;
Lying down causes you to become almost entirely blind. The best you can do it to kneel and go down only when facing a specific threat.
the assault almost always proceeds along the trench, and not frontally;
most assaults aim to flank the trenches. You penetrate between trenches and then easily roll them from the sides.
3) the approach to the attacked trench is carried out "in single file", that is, practically in a column, one at a time, without deploying in a chain (wedge), and often such a "column" in front of the enemy trench gathers into a small crowd,
Assaults usually take place along the best path with the most cover and concealment. There are usually just a handful of these (if not just one). Moving in a wedge or a line formation causes the majority of your soldiers to move in the open with very little cover or concealment.
…when the leading soldiers of the column stop, and those walking behind continue to move forward until they catch up with the soldiers who stopped in front. 8/
There is an additional advantage to the so-called "column". You make contact with the smallest possible unit - with just a few guys at the head of the column. Walking in a line result in the entire squad making contact at once, which is a good way to lose the entire squad. BTW Line or Chain formation is RU textbook assault formation mandated by the Field manual.
Now, the so-called "column" is not the column formation you imagine. Buddy teams remain far apart till the last possible moment. It might be a few (5-20) minutes walk between teams. If a buddy team might get hit by FPVs and lost completly - majority of the column survives. AFAIK, this is actually the main method of infantry movement in drone dominated areas (that's how you go to and from your own front-line positions). 
…does not take cover at the moment of dismounting; not to mention the fact that soldiers often sit on top of the armoured vehicle during the approach), and the dismounted soldiers then approach the attacked trench in a "crowd", without moving to the lower level. 
APC/IFV assaults often occur after defenders' positions have been thoroughly demolished by artillery and tanks. Very little opposition is expected. RU APC/IFVs are cramped death traps. You are better off outside. Conscripted infantry of both sides... well... often demonstrate certain lack of assault skills. All this indicates that the density and effectiveness of the defenders' fire in front of the forward edge of the defence is extremely low, otherwise the above actions would be simply impossible. 11/
Yes (see above)
I will ignore the next few statements becasue they are typical RU military pseudointellectual ignorant blah-blah. I have to admit though that because Markin is not a military guy (AFAIK, he is a civil servant), it is of the higher quality compared to official RU military writings.
 

I had heard that inept Soviet-style leadership was a problem ever since large numbers of old Soviet-trained officers were mobilized into the Ukrainian Army in 2022. I take it from you post that it's still a serious problem, but has there at least been some progress towards solving it?
Obviously inept Soviet-style leadership is a problem for the Russians too, but if it's possible to widen Ukraine's advantage in competent leadership over the Russians then that would obviously be desirable. Theoretically Ukraine, being a democracy, should be better equipped to resolve problems with incompetent leadership than the Russians. The primary mechanism for that of course is that incompetent leadership is more likely to cause a widespread scandal in a democracy, and scandals are more likely to result in meaningful action in a democracy. So if the leadership issue is causing a widespread scandal, then perhaps that's a good sign?

I had heard that inept Soviet-style leadership was a problem ever since large numbers of old Soviet-trained officers were mobilized into the Ukrainian Army in 2022. I take it from you post that it's still a serious problem, but has there at least been some progress towards solving it?
Obviously inept Soviet-style leadership is a problem for the Russians too, but if it's possible to widen Ukraine's advantage in competent leadership over the Russians then that would obviously be desirable. Theoretically Ukraine, being a democracy, should be better equipped to resolve problems with incompetent leadership than the Russians. The primary mechanism for that of course is that incompetent leadership is more likely to cause a widespread scandal in a democracy, and scandals are more likely to result in meaningful action in a democracy. So if the leadership issue is causing a widespread scandal, then perhaps that's a good sign?

You reminded me of this meme @FancyCat

This is very dangerous, but looks like after dismissal of Sodol, some threshold level is already passed. Either all will continue like previous two years and we have all chances to lost this war, or public resonance will force authorities to do something with high command staff. The problem of incompetence and "Zhukov style" command doesn't appear after Zaluzhnyi resignation. Just in 2022 we had success, courage and many motivated soldiers, so about such things tried not to talk. But Bakhmut campaign and unsuccessfull offensive, creating of dozens new brigades with mobilized retired stupid soviet-style commanders, who don't understand modern warfare and don't want to study themselves - all this caused first break between "old army elite" and "men of war", supported by society activists. Fail of mobilization in 2023 and successful Russian PsyOps campaign in many cases were because of criminal and incompetent orders of high command, who sent to grinder without any logic and operative necessity thousands of lives. 
"Old style" commanders could hold the front and even achieve some successes, sending company by company to hold or retake a tree-plant, which already 10 rimes passed from the hand to hand. Some cynically openly told "I'm not care how much them will lost, the order must be accomplished, we will get reinforcement anyway". But in one not good moment the spring of reinforcements sharply dried out. And turned out, these commanders without sending hundreds of private Mykolas to the death again and again, just incapable to wage the war, they are not capable organize communication between own units, they are not capable to organize fire support etc. And the problem has arised in all highness.
This is not a first scandal. 59th motorized infantry brigade was one of capable units from 5x brigades, established in ATO times. During full-scale it was headed by talented officer Sukharevskyi, which personally paritcipated in development of brigade UAV systems and tactic of thier usage, so 59th had one of the most effective UAV forces. But recently Sukharevskyi was appointed as a chief of new established Unmanned Systems Command and his place in brigade seized colonel Shevchuk. Soldiers told he is typical Soviet idiot, he was responsible for stupid command, which cost many lives in some other brigade, but by typical Ukrainian tradition he was removed from that brigade... with promotion and appointing of commander of 59th. Shevshuk in short time disrupted all what created Sukharevskyi, except about what told "Ptashka", medical service of volunteer battalion "Da Vinchi Wolves", who became a part of brigade now had a sharp conflict with chief of brigade medical service. Chief of this service just sit own own place and doesn't want to improve nothing. She even rejects to allow to transfuse the blood to wounded in brigade stabilization point, despite this already allowed by Medical Command directive - and of course after "uprising of combat medics", which during long several month "war" forced Medical Command to recognize this method increasing chanses to save lives.
I can recall scandal, but more silent with 14th mech. brigade. Brigade successfully repelled Russian assault on Kupiansk direction, but their commander had a dare to report to HQ about real situation in brigade and situation around. But top-brass doesn't like a true. Commander was removed and on his place was appointed next "soviet style officer", who already never sent reports, which could make top-brass sad. But level of losses in brigade rised significantly.
And today's appeal of 24th mech brigade to President with demanding to remain colonel Holishevskyi as brigade commander. Soldiers say this is very cool talented commander, which rised combat capabilities of brigade and has respect to soldiers. But.... He also sens "uncomfortable" reports. And top-brass, readinh them getting angry "What? Why?! Retake this area immediately! Will we lost many soldiers?! Don't give a damn! Execute!" Holishevskyi reportedly rejected to execute idiotic orders from HQ generals, which completely don't know real situation and real conditions of troops. So, General Staff is preparing to remove ot from command and to appoint him to military university. Of course, somebody with new experience have to teach future officers, but this looks like usual revenge. 
Other recent episode - conflict between 226th TD battalion and commander of 41st mech. brigade colonel Romashko. Soldiers say he is a cum of Syrskyi. The said Romashko consider soldiers even own soldiers as a cattle, so you can imaging his treatment to attached units. 41st came on place of 24th brigade, which was moved to Chasiv Yar. Comamnder didn't master with defense of own sector and enemy advanced in New-York settlement southern from Toretsk. He ordered 226th battalion (strictly saying a large company of this battalion) to counter-attack the enemy, cut off his logistics and restore positions. But he didn't give any fire support. 226th TD battalion is from Kyiv 241st TD brigade - this is very well trained unit with motivated soldiers, from which many ATO veterans. But TD units are just light infantry. Without support battalion suffered heavy losses, their commander tried to explain Romashko they can't accomplish this task, because he completely didn't understand real situation and this task can accomplish only StarTroopers, but Romashko has started to make threats with criminal cases, so battalion again was sent to impossible mission and again lost many soldiers without any sense. Scandal with Romashko and with on of his HQ officers, who ordered by obscene words to evacuation car driver, who carried wounded soldiers to turn back and "throw down them back to position" was huge. Two days ago some messages appeared that Romashko is dismissed, but this is not confirmed yet.
Other incident from twitter talks of soldiers - one guy told thier battalion commander, who substituted previous commander - "old alcohoilic and scum" in short time rised combat capabilities of battalion and their unit successfully fought several months. But commander gity under Operative Command committee investigation because... their battlion had too low level of losses. Much less than "calculated". By opinion of these staff rats "if you havn't many losses your unit don't fight properly, so you evade from task accomplishing". The same incident I know as far as from ATO times. Nothing changed. 
Now a petition to president is registered to introduce responsibility for high officers for criminal or incompetent orders, which inflicted high level of losses of personnel or equipment. If soldier lost own rifle he will pass seven circles of the hell, but if commander of fighter regiment lost several jets on airfield because he did nothing to protect airfield (of chief of logistic, who ordered the military train to stay several hours on the station close to frontline) - they will have no responsibility. In better case they will resigned from own duty and moved to other duty, often with promotion. 
The situiation now went so far, that society must force authorities to make reforms in high command. Because small Soviet army never defeat large Soviet army 

Heck, I even scored a frontal kill on a StuG like that with HE a while back.
Played the US Downfall campaign. My Pershing started the game with all its AP ammunition greyed out (not sure why; bug reported), so when it spotted a StuG, it started pummeling it with HE until switching to HVAP when it got a direct targeting order on it. But before it had actually reloaded and started shooting at it again, the StuG seemed to have already been beaten into submission by getting HE-smacked (the engine could be heard to stop after the third or so HE hit).

What is interesting is that even since CM1, the common wisdom in CM1 and CM2 was that targeting AFV's with arty (unless it was a modern precision munition) was ineffective and a waste of ammo.  
Either the engine has been changed to make arty more effective vs AFV's, or...  perhaps designers don't usually give the player sufficient arty to make it a viable tactic.  In the "Comet vs PzV" scenario the Brits get two batteries with (IIRC) over 800 rounds of General munitions each.  
 
 

Going with the control tower route was a no go for me: I tried it, and found that A, there's no way in hell you can put dismounts that way without getting them shot up (kind of obvious considering that it's just the one control tower, and then just open ground, with everything exposed to some serious firepower) and B, the Strykers were either taking powerful handheld AT hits knocking them out, or the gunners were getting picked off when they opened their hatches to reload.
These guys are fedayeen and regime loyal special forces, total fanatics. They won't surrender, and they won't be retreating; they'll fight to the death, every last one of them. You'll basically have to approach this mission as though you're Marines fighting the Japanese. There's no fancy trick or hidden backdoor, just one stronghold after another, constested by fanatical enemies who will either win or die trying. I went in through the front, breaching the wall in a couple of places to avoid having to use the road in case of mines or booby traps. After that it was simply a methodical advance from one building to the next, coupled with extreme firepower against any building which still resisted. Bite, hold and blast the next set of buildings; bite, hold and blast; bite, hold and blast.
Load the dismounts up with all the explosives (Javelins, AT4s, 40mm, etc.) and ammunition they can practically carry (trust me, they won't be advancing at a rapid pace anyway) because there won't be any stage at which you can ease off on the firepower, and use all the direct and indirect fires you have to smash enemy occupied buildings. Don't move along the paved road because mines/booby traps, and keep your Strykers firing from behind the walls, keeping a sensible pace with the dismounts to provide mutual support (if you move them up ahead along the walls too quickly, they'll be at risk of being either hit by handheld AT (suppression doesn't affect accuracy as much as you're used to when the guy aiming doesn't care whether or not he dies) or the gunners will be swamped by small arms fire when reloading. If you have any artillery, Hellfires or aircraft bombs left when the mission is over, you did it wrong.

Check it!
https://tankhistoria.com/experimental/tiger-i-firing-trials/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR2-Q-ODTW60ywqlvk2mOb2AL6jynsN2wiX8YeW_hw82yu1hRZ7jEtdvU04_aem_yiLayToOtVcuztw6hDvFUw

It should also be noted M1A1 HA doesn't seem to have the same level of protection as M1A2. I can't quantify it, I've got no stats, but I remember in-game M1A1 getting more frequent penetrations.

Also this. But I didn't want to get drawn into too much of a tangent at the time. There's probably no harm in going on that tangent now though. The way I see it there are several different kinds of mistakes that can go down in history.
1. God's-eye-view mistakes: The commander may have made the right decision based on the information they had. But if they had been omniscient (or at least known what we know now) then they would have known not to make that decision. It is unreasonable to judge the quality of the commander based on these kinds of mistakes. But they're still worth identifying and examining since they can be very informative.
2. Actual mistakes: The commander really did make the wrong call based on what they knew at the time (even if from the god's-eye-view it actually turns out to have been the right call).
3. Trade-offs: The commander made a compromise rather than an outright mistake. They understood that their decision would have costs, but had a reasonable expectation that those costs would be balanced by commensurate benefits. Of course it is possible to make the wrong (or suboptimal) trade-offs. So on some occasions a trade-off could also be an actual mistake or a god's-eye-view mistake. But on other occasions a trade-off is just a trade-off.
4. Not-mistakes: It is the historian, not the commander, who has misjudged the situation. Perhaps the historian, or the historian's sources, needed a scapegoat. Perhaps the historian wasn't looking at a decision in the proper context in which it was made, or perhaps they didn't have an adequate understanding of tactics to understand the decision. Perhaps things went awry because the enemy commander did something right, and not because POV commander did something wrong. Or perhaps things went wrong just because of sheer random chance*.
All too often the "mistakes" that commanders are accused of are actually trade-offs, god's-eye-view mistakes, or not-mistakes, rather than actual mistakes. Of course commanders do make actual mistakes. They are only human, so a certain error rate is to be expected. And even the best commander can have a bad day. But decades (or centuries, depending on which wars we're looking at) of sloppy history** have left us in a position where we need to re-examine each mistake with a high degree of scrutiny before we can confidently decide whether it was an actual mistake or not.
*Outcomes in war are probabilistic, not deterministic. Decisions have to made based on probabilities, not certainties. And that means that it is entirely possible to do absolutely everything right, and still lose. In this case the culprit isn't any mistake, but the residual degree of randomness that cannot be eliminated no matter how hard you try.
**I say sloppy history. But historians, like commanders, are also only human. So again, a certain error rate is to be expected. Even the best historians make mistakes about which mistakes they accuse commanders of making.

Also this. But I didn't want to get drawn into too much of a tangent at the time. There's probably no harm in going on that tangent now though. The way I see it there are several different kinds of mistakes that can go down in history.
1. God's-eye-view mistakes: The commander may have made the right decision based on the information they had. But if they had been omniscient (or at least known what we know now) then they would have known not to make that decision. It is unreasonable to judge the quality of the commander based on these kinds of mistakes. But they're still worth identifying and examining since they can be very informative.
2. Actual mistakes: The commander really did make the wrong call based on what they knew at the time (even if from the god's-eye-view it actually turns out to have been the right call).
3. Trade-offs: The commander made a compromise rather than an outright mistake. They understood that their decision would have costs, but had a reasonable expectation that those costs would be balanced by commensurate benefits. Of course it is possible to make the wrong (or suboptimal) trade-offs. So on some occasions a trade-off could also be an actual mistake or a god's-eye-view mistake. But on other occasions a trade-off is just a trade-off.
4. Not-mistakes: It is the historian, not the commander, who has misjudged the situation. Perhaps the historian, or the historian's sources, needed a scapegoat. Perhaps the historian wasn't looking at a decision in the proper context in which it was made, or perhaps they didn't have an adequate understanding of tactics to understand the decision. Perhaps things went awry because the enemy commander did something right, and not because POV commander did something wrong. Or perhaps things went wrong just because of sheer random chance*.
All too often the "mistakes" that commanders are accused of are actually trade-offs, god's-eye-view mistakes, or not-mistakes, rather than actual mistakes. Of course commanders do make actual mistakes. They are only human, so a certain error rate is to be expected. And even the best commander can have a bad day. But decades (or centuries, depending on which wars we're looking at) of sloppy history** have left us in a position where we need to re-examine each mistake with a high degree of scrutiny before we can confidently decide whether it was an actual mistake or not.
*Outcomes in war are probabilistic, not deterministic. Decisions have to made based on probabilities, not certainties. And that means that it is entirely possible to do absolutely everything right, and still lose. In this case the culprit isn't any mistake, but the residual degree of randomness that cannot be eliminated no matter how hard you try.
**I say sloppy history. But historians, like commanders, are also only human. So again, a certain error rate is to be expected. Even the best historians make mistakes about which mistakes they accuse commanders of making.

Great summary, I mean tangent
For sure. No only that it helps to highlight that getting the right information into the right hands at the right time is important. We can see that it can mean the difference between success and failure.
 
Oh yes, so important to understand this. "Why did my favourite tank not kick ***. It's clearly better and should win this duel" not how the works works my dude.

Also this. But I didn't want to get drawn into too much of a tangent at the time. There's probably no harm in going on that tangent now though. The way I see it there are several different kinds of mistakes that can go down in history.
1. God's-eye-view mistakes: The commander may have made the right decision based on the information they had. But if they had been omniscient (or at least known what we know now) then they would have known not to make that decision. It is unreasonable to judge the quality of the commander based on these kinds of mistakes. But they're still worth identifying and examining since they can be very informative.
2. Actual mistakes: The commander really did make the wrong call based on what they knew at the time (even if from the god's-eye-view it actually turns out to have been the right call).
3. Trade-offs: The commander made a compromise rather than an outright mistake. They understood that their decision would have costs, but had a reasonable expectation that those costs would be balanced by commensurate benefits. Of course it is possible to make the wrong (or suboptimal) trade-offs. So on some occasions a trade-off could also be an actual mistake or a god's-eye-view mistake. But on other occasions a trade-off is just a trade-off.
4. Not-mistakes: It is the historian, not the commander, who has misjudged the situation. Perhaps the historian, or the historian's sources, needed a scapegoat. Perhaps the historian wasn't looking at a decision in the proper context in which it was made, or perhaps they didn't have an adequate understanding of tactics to understand the decision. Perhaps things went awry because the enemy commander did something right, and not because POV commander did something wrong. Or perhaps things went wrong just because of sheer random chance*.
All too often the "mistakes" that commanders are accused of are actually trade-offs, god's-eye-view mistakes, or not-mistakes, rather than actual mistakes. Of course commanders do make actual mistakes. They are only human, so a certain error rate is to be expected. And even the best commander can have a bad day. But decades (or centuries, depending on which wars we're looking at) of sloppy history** have left us in a position where we need to re-examine each mistake with a high degree of scrutiny before we can confidently decide whether it was an actual mistake or not.
*Outcomes in war are probabilistic, not deterministic. Decisions have to made based on probabilities, not certainties. And that means that it is entirely possible to do absolutely everything right, and still lose. In this case the culprit isn't any mistake, but the residual degree of randomness that cannot be eliminated no matter how hard you try.
**I say sloppy history. But historians, like commanders, are also only human. So again, a certain error rate is to be expected. Even the best historians make mistakes about which mistakes they accuse commanders of making.

For sure this 100%
 
Are they really all mistakes though. Obviously some of them are but so, so, many are really "in hindsight with a bunch of information that was not available that was the not the optional choice". The reality is we all have to remember there is another force commander (or player) actively trying to thwart us. So, bad **** is going to happen even when you don't make a mistake.
 
Indeed. It takes some humility to say "perhaps I don't know as much as I think I do". That should be all of our starting points when we hit a problem or surprise.

I read a fair amount of tactical doctrine, to the point that I consider it one of my hobbies alongside wargaming (basically my hobbies are 1. learning tactics, and 2. putting tactics into practice). I usually go to the Nafziger collection for WW2 tactics.
https://nafzigercollection.com/product/american-tank-company-tactics-fm-17-32/
https://nafzigercollection.com/product/british-and-commonwealth-armored-tactics-in-wwii/
https://nafzigercollection.com/product/british-and-commonwealth-motorized-infantry-tactics-in-wwii/
https://nafzigercollection.com/product/employment-of-tanks-with-infantry-fm-17-36/
https://nafzigercollection.com/product/german-squad-tactics-in-wwii/
https://nafzigercollection.com/product/german-panzer-tactics-in-world-war-ii-combat-tactics-of-german-armored-units-from-section-to-regiment/
https://nafzigercollection.com/product/organization-equipment-tactical-doctrine-of-the-french-army-1939/
https://nafzigercollection.com/product/soviet-armored-tactics-in-world-war-ii-the-tactics-of-the-armored-units-of-the-red-army-from-individual-vehicles-to-battalions-according-to-the-combat-regulations-of-february-1944/
https://nafzigercollection.com/product/soviet-infantry-tactics-in-world-war-ii/
https://nafzigercollection.com/product/soviet-tactical-doctrine-in-wwii/
For the Cold War and modern era there's 'FM 100-2-1: Soviet Operations and Tactics' and 'FM 100-2-2: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support' for Soviet and Russian tactics. I'd say FM 100-2-1 is most relevant for CMCW and CMBS, since it covers the most common large scale Soviet mechanized operations. FM 100-2-2 is most relevant for CMA, since it has sections on Soviet airborne operations and mountain warfare. For US tactics I thought 'FM 71-1: Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team' and 'FM 71-2: Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force' were fairly helpful. FM 71-1 is probably more relevant to Combat Mission, since there are more company sized scenarios than battalion sized scenarios.
https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf
https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm100-2-2.pdf
https://ia802201.us.archive.org/23/items/fm-71-1-tank-and-mechanized-infantry-company-team/FM71_1TANK AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMPANY TEAM.pdf
https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/FM71-2(77).pdf
I've also read a small handful of manuals published between the Napoleonic Wars and WW1, which cannot be in any way applied to Combat Mission. I just have a general interest in the history of tactical development through the 19th and 20th centuries.
One thing I've come to realize though is that everything laid out in every single one of these manuals was learned by someone through direct experience in combat. Doctrine is basically a way of formalizing and remembering lessons learned through experience. It is not the immutable "right" way of doing things as passed down by the god of war. It does not overrule your own experience, and you should feel at complete liberty to develop your own "doctrine" as you go (though taking some inspiration from various formal doctrines here and there is rarely a bad idea). You could theoretically learn everything in any of these manuals the hard way, through your own experience, without ever reading a page from any of these manuals (though I think reading some of these manuals can significantly shorten the learning curve).
Having said all that
No.
I have started to gain some confidence that I'm a good Combat Mission player. But that's after years of playing the games. Skill in Combat Mission, as with everything in life, comes from experience. Even reading doctrine is just a way of letting those who came before you pass on their experience to you. So you get good at Combat Mission by playing lots of Combat Mission. Don't let the fear of mistakes or failure deter you. The fastest way to learn is to fail fast. Get lots of failures under your belt and you'll gain an excellent understanding of what works, what doesn't work, and why. "Fail fast to learn fast" may not necessarily be good life advice, but that's because failure in the real world has consequences. But this is a simulation. There are no consequences for failure here.
Of course even after playing Combat Mission for so long, and getting so many failures under my belt, I have never stopped making mistakes. You don't learn to stop making mistakes. You learn to stop beating yourself up over your mistakes, and you learn how to recover from your mistakes. And hopefully you learn to be a tad forgiving to all the commanders throughout history that historians like to routinely berate for making mistakes (because apparently most historians aren't wargamers, so don't know that it's basically impossible to go through an entire battle without making any mistakes).