Centurian52

@The_Capt Is there anything you can share? I'd love to hear any details you feel comfortable imparting! 

I see you're relatively new here. Do a search on the forums for "spotting" and "spotting broken" and see how many hundreds of posts have been made about how spotting in game is broken.

It's an example of behaviour in CM happening in real life. Ergo, CM's spotting is realistic.

Unofficial twitter of Air Forces commented this "inside" with Russian prowerb "The fear has big eyes" (means someone, who fears exaggregates the danger)
Also interesting Rybar at least recognized three missiles "fell down" (hmm... new-language "hit") "former military unit". Crimean authorities claimed "fragments of UAV fell into vineyards and set fire the grass"
You can see "burning grass" with black smoke and locals could this watch many hours - there are many photos, despite Russian authorities warned about punishments for this. 
 

Also locals wrote about many ambulances driving toward smoke area - maybe some "winegrovers" got burns from "burning grass"? %) 
Reportedly territory of 744th Comm Center of Black Sea Fleet Command was hit in 2 km north from  Verhnyesadove village (northern suburb of Sevastopol). According to local chat rumors barrack and HQ building were hit. No final information about losses, but allegedly there are only wounded 109 alone. Among servicemen were many young conscripts (they formally don't participate in war until sign contract after 6 months of service).   
I note, when UKR strike ammo dump near Oktyabrskoye airfield about two months ago, local authorities also "shot down" all UAVs/missiles and "extinguished a burned grass". But since this time parents of more than dozen of conscripts try to find any info about their boys, who served on this base. They even openly established a group in local TG. Their children likely just evaporized, when ammo, which they unloaded, detonated after strike. But command of military unit doesn't say anything.   

"Storm Shadow" on route over Crimea, Simferopol district
 

right ... except ... he's not trying to describe this - or any - specific war (singular). Instead he's describing wars (plural), and how they compare to each other (along one metric).

Personally I like the definitions offered by Steven Pinker.
Small war: Deaths in the thousands
Medium war: Deaths in the tens of thousands
Large war: Deaths in the hundreds of thousands
Historically large war: Deaths in the millions
World war: Deaths in the tens of millions
No definition of a "world war" will ever be perfect (largely because any definition is obliged to include WW1, which was almost entirely a European war, not really a global war). But the advantage to defining it by the scale of the carnage, rather than by the number or size of the countries involved, is that it neatly prevents a skirmish between all the world's major powers over a desert island which results in two guys getting wounded from being called a world war.

It is completely broken. Just look at this they get within 50 meters of each other in broad daylight and be doesn't even see it. It's laughable that anybody would consider this to be realistic behaviour.
Completely unplayable, I want a refund.
 

I'll DM you with my email address so you have a place to send anything you have, but I'll put what I'm looking for out in the open. And if anything you have is the sort of thing that can just be posted as a link on this thread, that's probably better than sending it directly to me (provided that isn't a problem for whatever contact you get the info from). That way other people that may be interested in this period can read it.
I'm really not looking for anything specific. In fact the point is that I don't want to leave any part of the war untouched in my studies. That means covering events that occurred before the Russians escalated the war into a full scale invasion in Feb 2022 (I already have masses of sources for post Feb 2022, to the point that it would take me more than a day to go through everything I have for any given day (if no one beats me to it I could probably write a book with all this information (but who am I kidding, someone will probably beat me to it))). The kind of information I'm looking for is basically the same as what we're looking at for the Feb 2022-present period. Which is to say anything tactically, operationally, or strategically significant. What actions took place between which units, when, and with what result (ground gained, casualties), what equipment was present and in what quantities, which settlements were captured by which side and when, any relevant machinations between political figures or people in high command, any overall casualty or vehicle loss estimates for a given period, or anything else in this period you think might be of interest to a military history nerd. For the Russian invasion of Crimea details like where Russian troops were landed, how many were landed, what equipment they landed with, what routes they took to what objectives, any information about any clashes they had with Ukrainian forces in Crimea. How the initial fighting in the Donbass broke out, what battles were fought and what their outcomes were. Once things settled down into low intensity warfare I suppose relevant events would be things like raids or exchanges of artillery fire, and whether they resulted in any casualties or anything else significant.
The more granular the better, but a higher level picture would also be appreciated. Haiduk has already provided a bunch of information, mostly on the initial fighting in 2014, which I'm slowly working on translating, but I don't want to just rely on one source. Even if something you provide basically says the same thing as something in what Haiduk provided, that's still useful since it means the two sources are corroborating each other (no one source is ever 100% reliable, but when multiple sources are in agreement you may be on to something).

Yes, all of this happened and made some waves in the media here. It is quite a bit of an embarrassment but it looks like they forgot to train technicians and supply spare parts. 
The 10 ‚new‘ tanks they wanted to deliver were used in the training of Ukrainian soldiers and are thus in need for maintenance. Same as the 10 already delivered which were obviously tested, too.
Now everyone is in a rush to fix this issue. 
 
 

Because you are talking about one factor one day does nothing to prevent you from talking about another factor the next day. For someone who spends their entire life studying warfare, spending a single day focused on just one factor absolutely does not risk missing out on all the other factors. Nor does it risk missing out on how those factors interact with each other or produce emergent effects (it's easy enough to talk about the trees one day and the forest the next day). There are a lot of days in a lifetime.
And of course bodycount is an imperfect measure of scale. It was very consciously a rough and imperfect measure, in part because there is no perfect measure, and in part because this one is good enough for the purpose it was being used for (Pinker's purpose being to illustrate a point about scale invariance, and my purpose being to forestall calling everything a world war).

It was supposed to be a very rough definition, which is why it was just going by orders of magnitude. Pinker is well aware that there are far more dimensions to war than just body count. But he needed a model to help explain what he was talking about to the reader, and this one was good enough (I seem to recall that he was talking about scale invariance in this chapter, and using this model he was able to point out that the ratio of small wars to medium wars was the same as the ratio of medium wars to large wars and so on (with the somewhat terrifying implication that no matter how large a war gets, there is a constant probability of it getting even larger)). He was not trying to denigrate the experiences of people who fought in smaller wars. In fact he did not even begin to imply that their experiences were less valid than the experiences of people who fought in large wars (is the experience of someone who survived a gang war which killed a few dozen people any less traumatic just because the incident was tiny compared to an interstate war?). He was not trying to reduce all of warfare to this one concept. This was a tiny footnote in a big book.
Deaths in the hundreds of millions would almost certainly be a nuclear war. And if you want to extend the scale into the billions, that would just be the last war (though it's generally a bad idea to try to extend models beyond their intended scope (all models break down eventually)). This scale obviously will not work in the far future when the size of the human population is very different from what it is today.
I like the definition because when we are talking about whether or not war X qualifies as a world war, we really don't need to account for every dimension of warfare. The scale of the war is the only dimension that matters for answering that question, because ultimately what we mean by a "world war" is a "really goddamn big war". It is only defining one dimension, scale. It is perfectly fine to refer to one dimension at a time. In fact it may even be necessary to be able to talk about one dimension at a time to allow us to go into greater detail. Dimensions I've found myself discussing lately include but are not limited to duration, intensity, relative capabilities (peer, near peer, asymmetric), and whether a war is a conventional war or a guerilla war (sometimes called an unconventional war or an insurgency/counterinsurgency). So I'm well aware those other aspects exist. But they don't need to be taken into account when you're just trying to define scale. Not every concept about war needs to capture every other concept about war. It would be impossible to discuss any one concept in detail if that were the case.

It was supposed to be a very rough definition, which is why it was just going by orders of magnitude. Pinker is well aware that there are far more dimensions to war than just body count. But he needed a model to help explain what he was talking about to the reader, and this one was good enough (I seem to recall that he was talking about scale invariance in this chapter, and using this model he was able to point out that the ratio of small wars to medium wars was the same as the ratio of medium wars to large wars and so on (with the somewhat terrifying implication that no matter how large a war gets, there is a constant probability of it getting even larger)). He was not trying to denigrate the experiences of people who fought in smaller wars. In fact he did not even begin to imply that their experiences were less valid than the experiences of people who fought in large wars (is the experience of someone who survived a gang war which killed a few dozen people any less traumatic just because the incident was tiny compared to an interstate war?). He was not trying to reduce all of warfare to this one concept. This was a tiny footnote in a big book.
Deaths in the hundreds of millions would almost certainly be a nuclear war. And if you want to extend the scale into the billions, that would just be the last war (though it's generally a bad idea to try to extend models beyond their intended scope (all models break down eventually)). This scale obviously will not work in the far future when the size of the human population is very different from what it is today.
I like the definition because when we are talking about whether or not war X qualifies as a world war, we really don't need to account for every dimension of warfare. The scale of the war is the only dimension that matters for answering that question, because ultimately what we mean by a "world war" is a "really goddamn big war". It is only defining one dimension, scale. It is perfectly fine to refer to one dimension at a time. In fact it may even be necessary to be able to talk about one dimension at a time to allow us to go into greater detail. Dimensions I've found myself discussing lately include but are not limited to duration, intensity, relative capabilities (peer, near peer, asymmetric), and whether a war is a conventional war or a guerilla war (sometimes called an unconventional war or an insurgency/counterinsurgency). So I'm well aware those other aspects exist. But they don't need to be taken into account when you're just trying to define scale. Not every concept about war needs to capture every other concept about war. It would be impossible to discuss any one concept in detail if that were the case.

It was supposed to be a very rough definition, which is why it was just going by orders of magnitude. Pinker is well aware that there are far more dimensions to war than just body count. But he needed a model to help explain what he was talking about to the reader, and this one was good enough (I seem to recall that he was talking about scale invariance in this chapter, and using this model he was able to point out that the ratio of small wars to medium wars was the same as the ratio of medium wars to large wars and so on (with the somewhat terrifying implication that no matter how large a war gets, there is a constant probability of it getting even larger)). He was not trying to denigrate the experiences of people who fought in smaller wars. In fact he did not even begin to imply that their experiences were less valid than the experiences of people who fought in large wars (is the experience of someone who survived a gang war which killed a few dozen people any less traumatic just because the incident was tiny compared to an interstate war?). He was not trying to reduce all of warfare to this one concept. This was a tiny footnote in a big book.
Deaths in the hundreds of millions would almost certainly be a nuclear war. And if you want to extend the scale into the billions, that would just be the last war (though it's generally a bad idea to try to extend models beyond their intended scope (all models break down eventually)). This scale obviously will not work in the far future when the size of the human population is very different from what it is today.
I like the definition because when we are talking about whether or not war X qualifies as a world war, we really don't need to account for every dimension of warfare. The scale of the war is the only dimension that matters for answering that question, because ultimately what we mean by a "world war" is a "really goddamn big war". It is only defining one dimension, scale. It is perfectly fine to refer to one dimension at a time. In fact it may even be necessary to be able to talk about one dimension at a time to allow us to go into greater detail. Dimensions I've found myself discussing lately include but are not limited to duration, intensity, relative capabilities (peer, near peer, asymmetric), and whether a war is a conventional war or a guerilla war (sometimes called an unconventional war or an insurgency/counterinsurgency). So I'm well aware those other aspects exist. But they don't need to be taken into account when you're just trying to define scale. Not every concept about war needs to capture every other concept about war. It would be impossible to discuss any one concept in detail if that were the case.

That all sounds very truthy. But at no point in time has that ever been how anything works. Anti-tank munitions have always been far cheaper than the tanks they are meant to destroy. If you ever have an anti-tank munition that is more epensive than a tank, you don't have an anti-tank munition. There is a fancy name for this actually. It's the shot exchange problem, and it has been plaguing air defenses throughout this war as they struggle with decisions over whether or not to expend an expensive missile to shoot down a cheap drone (in fact this is the driving factor behind the big comeback that anti-aircraft guns have made, since they can shoot down cheap drones without expending ammunition that is more valuable than the drone). So no, cheap ways of killing tanks do not render tanks obsolete. Cheap ways of killing anything has never rendered anything obsolete.
And I should remind everyone that the tank losses in this war are not remotely unprecidented (no one mentioned heavy losses recently, but I think the number of tanks destroyed is a large part of why so many people seem to think the tank is obsolete). Tanks have taken extremely heavy losses in every single conventional war they have ever participated in (I'll admit that they haven't taken heavy losses in many guerilla wars as far as I'm aware). The Isrealis lost around 400 tanks in just the two weeks of the Yom Kippur War. The Germans lost around 25,000 tanks in WW2, with the combined US and British tank losses being about the same, and Soviet tank losses being over 80,000. Yes, this war is an order of magnitude smaller than WW2, but tank losses have also been about an order of magnitude smaller. As far as I can tell tank losses in this war have been about on par with WW2 when you adjust for scale.
I think I am in agreement with Steve that what is likely to render tanks obsolete in the near future is gun armed UGVs. The services that a tank provides on the battlefield are still essential. But once something comes along that can do a better job of providing those services, such as a UGV, the tank will no longer be required. So I think once a country somewhere adopts a gun-variant of a UGV the tank will be obsolecent (and fully obsolete once that gun UGV has been produced in sufficient quantities). When that happens it will not be Javelins or Lancets that rendered the tank obsolete, but a better direct-fire asset. Even when UGVs do render manned tanks obsolete, I'm still not sure that it won't be entirely appropriate to think of them as unmanned tanks.

Personally I like the definitions offered by Steven Pinker.
Small war: Deaths in the thousands
Medium war: Deaths in the tens of thousands
Large war: Deaths in the hundreds of thousands
Historically large war: Deaths in the millions
World war: Deaths in the tens of millions
No definition of a "world war" will ever be perfect (largely because any definition is obliged to include WW1, which was almost entirely a European war, not really a global war). But the advantage to defining it by the scale of the carnage, rather than by the number or size of the countries involved, is that it neatly prevents a skirmish between all the world's major powers over a desert island which results in two guys getting wounded from being called a world war.

Personally I like the definitions offered by Steven Pinker.
Small war: Deaths in the thousands
Medium war: Deaths in the tens of thousands
Large war: Deaths in the hundreds of thousands
Historically large war: Deaths in the millions
World war: Deaths in the tens of millions
No definition of a "world war" will ever be perfect (largely because any definition is obliged to include WW1, which was almost entirely a European war, not really a global war). But the advantage to defining it by the scale of the carnage, rather than by the number or size of the countries involved, is that it neatly prevents a skirmish between all the world's major powers over a desert island which results in two guys getting wounded from being called a world war.

I guess when you're out of artillery ammunition the artillerymen become the ammunition

More progress around Bakhmut.
 

Evacuation of wounded soldier of 3rd assault brigade. M113/YPR with back ramp and roomy infantry compartment is a treasure. It would be impossible to evacuate this soldier on Soviet BTR and much harder to put him into narrow BMP back door.
 

Leopard 1A5 in UKR service. Alas, Florks will be dissapointed - it's turned out engine of Leo1 can't carry additional weight of ERA so far. 

Lebensraum, well that is a golden oldie.  Good old fashion greed and conquest.  Well at least they are telling the truth now and not trying to dress it up as anti-Nazi, anti-NATO, anti-whatever…it is a pure and simple land grab.  

Interesting qualitative first from Korea:
 
 

Very interesting coincidences...didn't 31st already lost its command early in the war?
Being top officer in VDV nowadays is like being Genghis-chan envoy. Maybe glorious, but definitelly one-way job.

I wholly disagree with this idea. Weve spend this ammount of money to be able to destroy as many tanks/IFVs as quickly as we can because that has been the primary threat since NATO exists.
The current MBT generation very well reflects that. They are for all intents and purposes tank destroyers and entirely optimized for that and in the 500m to 2500m range they are unparalelled in that task. For the longest time most didnt even have a proper HE round and the primary rounds were KE and HEAT. The IFVs were the ones doing the infantry support.
 
The core and unique selling point of a tank is if a tank moves somewhere and encounters an enemy no matter what it is a tank stands a good chance to take it out without being taken out in return.
That capability is so valuable that it will get continuously replicated and id argue its the essence of what makes a tank. What exact form this takes remains to be seen and it could very well eventually become unmanned and at some point most likely will have to be fully automated for short reaction times.