Armorgunner

damn.  That's no way to treat your goddaughter.
Putin brands his own goddaughter as a ‘foreign agent’ for ‘working with his enemies’ throughout the Ukraine war (msn.com)

Really hope you are right!! Or even better, that there is a big prisoner exchange. Where all in azovstal can go back behind Ukraine lines. Get food, and treatment! Russia wants to call out a victory, so its not impossible, right?

Exchanging heavily wounded soldiers for russian POWs most likely. But let's wait for an official statement.

I have a VERY fragmentary impression that their is an attempt to exchange some or all of the Azovstal wounded for Rusian POWs. Again based on Very fragmentary information, and it is in process, and who the bleep knows if it will work, ect. They are all heroes, just hope they live to have lots of grandkids.

They finally surrendered I think, question is on what terms.

A little skepticism about military spending is understandable after the last two wars. But it is worth remembering that Ukraine is fundamentally different from Afghanistan and Iraq. Those two wars had absolutely no influence on our security or our larger strategic interests. We lost Afghanistan just about as hard as it is possible to lose a war, and it ultimately meant nothing. Our position is not the slightest bit weaker for our defeat, which I think really drives home just how much wasted effort went into delaying it. Iraq we somehow managed to win, in the sense that the government we installed is still in place without our continued presence being needed to prop it up. But our position in the world is not the slightest bit stronger for that victory. The money, effort, and lives we poured into those wars really were completely wasted (and I really hope my words here are interpreted as more tragic than callous). So yeah, I get it. I understand feeling a bit jaded about any sort of military spending.
But, unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, Ukraine is absolutely central to our security and our interests. The outcome of this war really will make a big difference to our security and position in the world. Every dime we put into aiding the Ukrainians goes directly to improving the security of our European allies and weakening one of our greatest and oldest adversaries. And frankly Ukraine will be cheaper overall than Iraq and Afghanistan (probably). We spent north of 2 trillion dollars on Iraq and Afghanistan (~2.5 trillion based on my crude google efforts, assuming the top results were correct). I think we should be spending hundreds of billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine, but I doubt it will take anything on the order of trillions of dollars to decisively beat Russia in Ukraine (Russia would have to sustain the fight for years for it to breach the trillions for us, and I don't think that's on the table for them). Although, I would still be in favor of helping Ukraine even if it turned out to be more expensive overall than Iraq and Afghanistan.
Granting that it may take a few hundred billion more to rebuild Ukraine after the war, and that might top a trillion overall when added to the wartime aid. But it would be money well spent. Not only is there the ethical side, where that money would go towards improving the lives of 40+ million people. But it would also be a huge benefit for us strategically, as we would almost certainly gain a longtime ally in Ukraine in just the part of the world where another ally could really matter. And because I have heard a million and a half people say that we shouldn't be engaged in nation building let me preempt any complaints that you may have on that front. This would be completely different from Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of nation building. In Iraq and Afghanistan we were trying to build up countries with populations that viewed us as invaders (because, let's be honest, that's exactly what we were). In Ukraine we would be giving the Ukrainian government the money to rebuild their own country after helping them to repel their invaders. So the local resistance to nation building that we encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan simply wouldn't be present in Ukraine.

Ukrainian fields are interspersed by artificial lines of trees, as shown in the game.

Graphic images
Soldiers of the Ukrainian 93 motorized brigade, have defeated 3, T-72B3 Obr 2016 with Panzerfaust 3´s. And climb up on a flyedoff turret, saying "knock knock, is there any russian occupyers here" And looks down in one of the turret hatches. And one severly burned guy, had followed the turret when flying off, and sits in his place there. a bit more in the film, english subs.
 

@Battlefront.com
Seriously! After this is over. The next Game Engine uppdate, should include flying turrets for Russian tanks! They seem to divorce from the tank, at their first little disagreement 

But how much explosivepower a minute, can a 203mm 2S7 Pion deliver? If a modern 155mm can deliver 8-10 rounds/min, and the 2S7 can fire 1-2 rounds/min Before leaving position. Due to counterfire?
 
The Panzerhaubitze 2000 has the same range, and very high rate of fire. And fast time to leave. To be fare away from counterfire. The 2S7 has a time of 3-5 minutes to dismantle

Hmm, seems the Russians continue to bombard the perimeter of villages shielding the Sviatohirsk massif. But unclear how much ground game they're really putting into that or to Lyman.
Nothing further on that alleged crossing behind Lyman reported a few days back either.

I think, we all in the west. Are all the winners, of an out of gas Russian army! For a few years to come, at least!

Thanks for this, and to several other people who responded as well. I'm trying to follow along with the ongoing discussion by @The_Capt, @Battlefront.com and others about the lessons to be learned from the first part of this war (and trying to keep in mind that the value of those lessons for us as spectators is not worth the price that Ukrainians are paying). "Mass" has been a key concept in this, and I think I'm correct in understanding that to be the concentration of force in time and space, but I wasn't sure if the "weight" of the units was meant to be part of that. Now I know it isn't, except that AFVs give heavy mechanized infantry the firepower and mobility to create their own local mass, and the ability to get their mass to the right place at the right time as part of larger unit maneuvers.
I'm trying to understand what you all think is new or different about the role of light infantry in this war. I think you've been saying it, but some of the terminology is new to me, so thanks for your patience as I rewind and try to re-state some basic things in this long post. I don't think anybody is surprised that light infantry can eat away at heavier forces on strategic timeframes. And I don't think we've seen light infantry become immune to combined arms attacks on the tactical level. It looks like the difference is that improvements in some key technologies have passed a tipping point that dramatically increases the importance of dismounted infantry in the balance of combined arms operations.
The improvements in technology mean that capabilities in reconnaissance, communications, and accurate long range fire power can be pushed down to much smaller light infantry units. On the defense this allows infantry to focus long range fire power against concerted attacks while remaining dispersed and concealed. Direct armor attack remains possible, but at a steep exchange rate. Artillery attack or suppression is possible, but it takes a lot of tubes and a lot of shells to cover all the possible hiding places, and it's expensive in supplies if not losses. Ditto air attack. But bypassing well equipped light infantry is also dangerous because even after being suppressed or pushed back a little they can retain the capability to find and attack the enemy lines of communication, either independently, or in coordination with neighboring units or higher command. As someone here said, the attacker would basically need to clear and protect a 10km wide corridor along their supply line, which looks more like an occupation than a breakthrough, takes resources away from the advance, and slows everything way down.
Mechanized infantry can't play the front line defensive role because more of their capabilities are built into vehicles that can only maneuver well in terrain where they are easy to spot by satellite or drone, and hit with artillery or aircraft. Plus they need gas every day and if they are cut off they quickly run out of options. Lower tech or more cheaply equipped light infantry couldn't do this because they wouldn't have the quality or quantity of portable AT weapons, or enough situational awareness to make good decisions on a rapidly developing battlefield. Units without permission, training, inclination, or morale to take their own initiative can't do it either. Insurgents can't do it to such good effect because the occupying force isn't trying to fight a conventional battle at the same time. But Ukrainian foot infantry with phones, drones, mortars, and loads of AT weapons have shown they can take a beating on day one of an enemy attack, and still have the ability to re-organize, re-orient, and mount their own counter attacks or ambushes for days. Trying to bypass or cut off forces like these turns into a "I'm not locked in here with you, you're locked in here with me" situation. That has been a capability of elite units in the past, but it looks like the new technologies bring it in the reach of far more units with less training.
Looking at the bigger defensive picture, the light infantry don't have to be decisive, they just have to do their part as part of a larger defensive operation to add "friction" to whatever part of the enemy's advance is still within marching distance. Mechanized units move to block the head of the attack, armored units go for its throat, the infantry keep throwing kidney punches, and artillery, air, and strategic assets strike as far back along the tail as they can reach. Even accounting for Russian incompetence, I looks like one of the big surprises or lessons so far has been how important of a contribution light infantry make to that bigger picture. 
There has been less discussion here of the role of light infantry on the offense, except for the idea that while the enemy's long range recon and fires prevent your heavier forces from assembling in the rear, infantry can still infiltrate forward despite drone surveillance with some pretty effective weapons. Maybe we will know more soon. There has been a lot more discussion about air power, autonomous systems, is this the end of the tank etc., but I think this is sort of where the consensus is at least for infantry in the defense. Am I getting it sort of right? What I am I missing? Am I using the words right?
 

probably fake? The turrets usaualy  is located, way of the tanks. Not on them 

You are. And I can comment on a couple things you bring up. 
First of all, the role of light infantry in the defense comparing Ukraine to {anything else}. During the Cold War, in the 82d Airborne we trained on something called the AAAD (Airborne Anti-Armor Defense). In practice, and from what I've seen of Ukraine, what wee did is a more concentrated version. We would have been in the line somewhere, with the mission to stop/seriously degrade the oncoming Soviet armor columns. To do this, we were loaded to the gills with TOWs and LAWs in strongpoints with interlocking fields creating crossfire kill zones. In Ukraine it seems to be much more decentralized, with hit and run tactics, rather than strongpoints. Just like mechanized company teams, we had alternate and fallback firing positions. This is a likely task of light infantry thrown into the line of battle.
HOWEVER, saying that, it isn't the best role for light infantry, and we didn't really expect to happen except in desperation, to plug a gaping hole. Which of course, gave us a fair estimate of our potential lifespan at the time (seriously, none of us expected to live to 30).
Your last point about offense - light infantry is most suited to "mobile" offensive operations, and we've seen some of those, mostly unsuccessful, by the Russians. An airmobile operation to seize an airfield, or over a river to assist in a bridging operation making an instant expanded bridgehead are classic light infantry ops. For non-airborne or non-airmobile ops, ("legs" in paratrooper terminology 🙂 ), offense from a light infantry unit is fairly limited. A typical mobile op could be to airlift a unit into an airfield, seize it, and then hold on for dear life for a day, or two, or three, until the armor/mech units can either be 1) airlifted in to reinforce/relieve, or 2) force their way to join up, or 3) some combination of the two. As you can imagine, these are high risk/high reward operations, with a large potential for hanging that light infantry unit out in the breeze.
There are some differences in Russian and US airborne/airmobile units in that Russia can airdrop light IFVs right along with the infantry. That would be quite a nice advantage if you can do it right. When you do something like that, OUR doctrine would be drop infantry first, secure and expand the drop zone and THEN you drop vehicles, including artillery (mortars come in first with the infantry). Don't I don't know how the Russians do it, (or considering how things have been going, how they are SUPPOSED to do it, which can be two different things.)
I don't know enough about Ukraine's airborne and airmobile units to compare, so perhaps @Haiduk could jump in and comment. This may have been well covered but in reading 700+ pages (and I have), it may have escaped my overworked brain cells.

I hope this helps. Feel free to ask more questions. We're all trying to figure out what's happening 🙂
Dave

It´s a very different game with taxes, in different countries! We have very high taxes, but pay 10 dollars a day on hospital. Even if you do brain cancer surgery! In a low tax country like the US, you make the choise by your self. 

I get the impression that river crossing had been preceded by someone with shoulder boards and a very red face pound the desk angrily and yelling that he doesn't want excuses, he wants it done NOW!

I think, we all in the west. Are all the winners, of an out of gas Russian army! For a few years to come, at least!

I think, we all in the west. Are all the winners, of an out of gas Russian army! For a few years to come, at least!

Looks like one of theese two Nona-K later became a victim of hungry tractor
 

You could probably have autonomous truck-hunting drones by tuesday of next week if you're willing to accept some constraints on their deployment, like they may not be all that picky so you have to constrain them to areas with no friendlies.  
And your point defense of the artillery and its train will have to not only be able to spot and eliminate drones from the sky, but probably also detonate incoming arty high enough that all the explosive energy behind the shrapnel is spent before it gets to the ground.

I don't think this has been posted here already but here's an arty hit on an "AFV"; not sure if it's edited or what but it looks very precise or lucky for arty.
 
 
And here some counter battery arty:
This is way more accurate than when I play CM, that's for sure.

Let's lay out a few assumptions about what I near future for us is going to look like. For this discussion I will assume that it will be possible for systems bigger than an infantry man in a very good ghillie suit, and a drone that's trying very hard to look like a goose are capable of surviving. This may be a bad assumption in which case you wind up in a completely different place. I did not mean to imply that I meant the 2S7 specifically. I am talking about the  Panzerhaubitze 2000, fully digitized, new from the ground up version of the 2S7. Assuming that the concept of large and expensive tracked vehicles are still viable, it is my assumption that various different kinds of such vehicles are going to have to operate together in order to create a viable onion layer defense. You're not going to be able to have your artillery running around without co-located electronic warfare and point defense assets. It is also my assumption that you were logistics train is going to have to have nearly as much, maybe as much, protection as your front line assets. Autonomous drones that hunt trucks are going to be a thing very, very soon. So the trade-off I am thinking about is that a 2S7 class self-propelled howitzer certainly has a large footprint, but the logistical footprint of each shell fired would be considerably smaller than a rocket with the same throw weight. Does this matter? Does this matter enough?

They can lay a pre pattern, to land exactly 20 meters apart. So a lot less rockets are needed to do the job! An 18 vehicle BM-27 battalion have to empty every vehicle, and still not reciving the same result. Exept more civilians killed!

And the russians think they are 14 years old, with pelletguns hunting birds! 😒