CivE

Thanks for this, and to several other people who responded as well. I'm trying to follow along with the ongoing discussion by @The_Capt, @Battlefront.com and others about the lessons to be learned from the first part of this war (and trying to keep in mind that the value of those lessons for us as spectators is not worth the price that Ukrainians are paying). "Mass" has been a key concept in this, and I think I'm correct in understanding that to be the concentration of force in time and space, but I wasn't sure if the "weight" of the units was meant to be part of that. Now I know it isn't, except that AFVs give heavy mechanized infantry the firepower and mobility to create their own local mass, and the ability to get their mass to the right place at the right time as part of larger unit maneuvers. I'm trying to understand what you all think is new or different about the role of light infantry in this war. I think you've been saying it, but some of the terminology is new to me, so thanks for your patience as I rewind and try to re-state some basic things in this long post. I don't think anybody is surprised that light infantry can eat away at heavier forces on strategic timeframes. And I don't think we've seen light infantry become immune to combined arms attacks on the tactical level. It looks like the difference is that improvements in some key technologies have passed a tipping point that dramatically increases the importance of dismounted infantry in the balance of combined arms operations. The improvements in technology mean that capabilities in reconnaissance, communications, and accurate long range fire power can be pushed down to much smaller light infantry units. On the defense this allows infantry to focus long range fire power against concerted attacks while remaining dispersed and concealed. Direct armor attack remains possible, but at a steep exchange rate. Artillery attack or suppression is possible, but it takes a lot of tubes and a lot of shells to cover all the possible hiding places, and it's expensive in supplies if not losses. Ditto air attack. But bypassing well equipped light infantry is also dangerous because even after being suppressed or pushed back a little they can retain the capability to find and attack the enemy lines of communication, either independently, or in coordination with neighboring units or higher command. As someone here said, the attacker would basically need to clear and protect a 10km wide corridor along their supply line, which looks more like an occupation than a breakthrough, takes resources away from the advance, and slows everything way down. Mechanized infantry can't play the front line defensive role because more of their capabilities are built into vehicles that can only maneuver well in terrain where they are easy to spot by satellite or drone, and hit with artillery or aircraft. Plus they need gas every day and if they are cut off they quickly run out of options. Lower tech or more cheaply equipped light infantry couldn't do this because they wouldn't have the quality or quantity of portable AT weapons, or enough situational awareness to make good decisions on a rapidly developing battlefield. Units without permission, training, inclination, or morale to take their own initiative can't do it either. Insurgents can't do it to such good effect because the occupying force isn't trying to fight a conventional battle at the same time. But Ukrainian foot infantry with phones, drones, mortars, and loads of AT weapons have shown they can take a beating on day one of an enemy attack, and still have the ability to re-organize, re-orient, and mount their own counter attacks or ambushes for days. Trying to bypass or cut off forces like these turns into a "I'm not locked in here with you, you're locked in here with me" situation. That has been a capability of elite units in the past, but it looks like the new technologies bring it in the reach of far more units with less training. Looking at the bigger defensive picture, the light infantry don't have to be decisive, they just have to do their part as part of a larger defensive operation to add "friction" to whatever part of the enemy's advance is still within marching distance. Mechanized units move to block the head of the attack, armored units go for its throat, the infantry keep throwing kidney punches, and artillery, air, and strategic assets strike as far back along the tail as they can reach. Even accounting for Russian incompetence, I looks like one of the big surprises or lessons so far has been how important of a contribution light infantry make to that bigger picture. There has been less discussion here of the role of light infantry on the offense, except for the idea that while the enemy's long range recon and fires prevent your heavier forces from assembling in the rear, infantry can still infiltrate forward despite drone surveillance with some pretty effective weapons. Maybe we will know more soon. There has been a lot more discussion about air power, autonomous systems, is this the end of the tank etc., but I think this is sort of where the consensus is at least for infantry in the defense. Am I getting it sort of right? What I am I missing? Am I using the words right?

I'm about ten pages behind the thread by now, but one question about terminology. Does this really count as "light" infantry? ATGMs and MANPADS are solidly in the territory of heavy weapons. The ISR capabilities are only cheap and light because the civilian communication infrastructure is intact, but in more austere or contested environments similar capabilities would require truckloads of pricey gear. Sometimes light infantry denotes units with high mobility on foot, or easy to transport, but it looks like the Ukrainian infantry is succeeding more by being everywhere ahead of time rather than dashing to where they are needed. Sometimes "light" means a smaller number of soldiers per small unit, and that fits with the two-guys in a treeline idea. So what do you mean by light infantry, and do you think it is an important distinction?

Finally, a (minor) topic where my water resources engineering experience may be relevant to this thread. Checking out this dam on google maps, I would say that it would be a poor target for sabotage. It appears to function to maintain local river depth for navigation and for diversion to agriculture. It would have very little flood control function, and would be more likely to be damaged by a flood than to cause one by failing. A quick look around finds several similar structures in the region that would have a higher potential for economic or infrastructure damage if they failed. If this was a target, it was probably a target of opportunity, not choice. Given the background rate of accidental infrastructure failure, I would hesitate to read too much into it. The unrelated flooding pictured in the tweet, with the church on the hill, appears to be the Desna River in Bryansk, no where near the dam pictured on the Kuban river. But mostly I registered (after lurking since the CMBO demo) to say thank you to everyone participating in this discussion. For what it's worth, I think the updates, analysis, and debate here are as good or better than anything I'm reading or listening to from professional news outfits and think-tanks. Thank you for being here and doing what you do.